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
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**SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF
CARL SCHURZ**

IN SIX VOLUMES

SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS, OF

CARL SCHURZ

SELECTED AND EDITED BY

FREDERIC BANCROFT

ON BEHALF OF
THE CARL SCHURZ MEMORIAL COMMITTEE

2.

VOLUME II.

DECEMBER 13, 1870—FEBRUARY 27, 1874,
1870-74.

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THE WRITINGS OF CARL SCHURZ

The Writings of Carl Schurz

TO W. M. GROSVENOR

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13, 1870.

. . . After I had introduced my resolution yesterday, Drake's nomination [as Chief Justice of the Court of Claims] came in and was, as is the custom when a Senator is nominated for something, at once confirmed, to which of course I raised no objection. But we have an understanding that he is not to accept the office, until our debate is over.

You will find my speech [on Political Disabilities] calm in form and pretty strong in substance. I thought it advisable to take a wide range, in fact to go over the whole ground. I have considered everything very carefully. You may think, when you read it, that I have not assigned to the tariff question sufficient prominence, but I am convinced that the opinions I express about it are substantially correct, and I think at the present moment it is best to put things just so, and also to go in my criticism of the Administration just as far as I do. If there are things in my speech which do not come up to your expectations, do me the favor to think *coolly* about their bearing before expressing an opinion—I see you smile,—but you know what I mean.

Do me the favor to disbelieve all you read about me in the reports of interviewers. I authorize you to contradict

such statements flatly, for I never say anything to them. Tell Gratz [Brown] that I shall write to him as soon as I have delivered my speech. Here they quite generally put him down as having gone over to the Democrats—in consequence of his first serenade speech. I expect the thing to turn up in our debate.

**POLITICAL DISABILITIES: POLITICAL CONDITIONS,
ESPECIALLY IN MISSOURI¹**

MR. PRESIDENT:—The meaning of the resolution which you have heard must appear so clear, plain and just to every intelligent and patriotic mind that it would, at first sight, seem superfluous to say anything in its defense, or even in explanation of it; and yet events have taken place which render it doubtful whether the policy it indicates is justly appreciated in the high places of the Government; and considering this fact it is proper that a sentiment so emphatically indorsed by the people of the State which I have the honor to represent should find a vindicating voice here.

I have already given notice that I would avail myself of this opportunity to submit some observations upon the political movements in Missouri, which seem to have attracted unusual attention and have acquired more than local interest. If my remarks partake largely of the nature of a personal explanation it is not as if I felt any

¹Speech in the United States Senate, Dec. 15, 1870. On the 12th Schurz had submitted the following resolution: *Resolved*, That the disqualifications and disabilities imposed upon persons lately in rebellion against the Government of the United States were dictated by imperative public necessities, and not by a spirit of hatred or vindictiveness; and that, as soon as such public necessities cease, due regard for the fundamental principles of our system of government, as well as every consideration of sound statesmanship, demands the removal of those disqualifications and disabilities.

solicitude concerning my political position and fortunes, which are matters of little moment; but I feel that I owe a full statement of the facts to the brave and faithful Republicans with whom I acted; I owe it to the many friends on this floor with whom I have so long been associated in a common work, and who have given me so many marks of their generous confidence and partiality; I owe it to the people, who are entitled to a clear exposition of a political event which has been brought to their notice in so prominent a manner and with such a variety of interpretations.

The immediate result of the recent election in Missouri is the reënfranchisement of those who had been disfranchised on account of their connection with the rebellion. The principles upon which this result was brought about were in strict accord with those which have guided my course throughout my public life, and which more particularly determined my views of policy since the close of our civil war.

When the conflict of arms had ceased you found yourselves confronted by two great problems: first, to organize and secure the new order of things, which had resulted from the war, in the political and social institutions of the Republic, and then to create a moral support for that new order of things in the public opinion of the States where the great change had taken place. You had to contend with extraordinary difficulties. The sudden emancipation of the slaves, the precipitate transition from slave-labor to free-labor society, naturally called out the violent opposition of the popular habits and prejudices which had been identified with the abolished system, and the passions of the war, still burning after defeat, threatened to inflame this new contest.

But to effect the change was a necessity, and that necessity dictated the means to be employed. You

found yourselves obliged to disarm, to a great extent, the social forces arrayed in hostility to the establishment of the new order of things, and to accomplish this a large number, and in some States all of those who had been connected with the rebellion, were excluded from all participation in the exercise of political power by disfranchisement. Thus disfranchisement was resorted to as a measure of safety, as a temporary expedient whose duration would be determined by circumstances. As a measure of punishment it would have been utterly impolitic. It was not severe enough to terrify; it was just severe enough to exasperate. As a measure of safety it was well calculated to relieve the establishment of the new order of things from untimely and dangerous interference. Its justification rested on the plea of necessity.

In this sense I supported the measures of restriction as long as that necessity lasted, and I went with my party in my State even so far as to acquiesce in disfranchisement until the rights of political citizenship had been conferred upon the race lately in slavery, so that no hostile influences should prevent that consummation. But when all the principles which had issued victorious from the civil war, and which formed the basis of the new order of things, had become firmly fortified in our institutions by Constitutional amendments, and the public mind had accepted that settlement so generally that a reactionary attempt might at worst create but a temporary disturbance, and could no longer lead to a total subversion of accomplished results, that necessity appeared to me to cease, and the revolutionary phase of our National affairs to be closed. If carried beyond that point, disfranchisement was calculated—nay, it was bound—to prove hurtful to the very objects for which it had been adopted.

It has always been my opinion that, although the new order of things had to be established under a pressure of

force and restriction, other agencies than a continued protection by force and restriction—a system uncongenial to our principles of government—had to be relied upon for its development and perpetuation.

Public opinion had to be won by a generous and conciliatory policy. The people of the late slaveholding States had to be cut loose from their past, with its painful memories, as well as its peculiar desires and aspirations. The most efficient measures to this end were naturally those which were best calculated to make the Southern people measurably satisfied with their changed condition, and to identify their interests, aspirations and hopes with the new order of things. Their thoughts had to be diverted from the past in order to be directed to the future.

To divert their thoughts from the past two things were necessary: first, to fortify the results of the war in the political institutions of the country so firmly as to make all attempts at a reaction appear utterly hopeless; and then to do away as soon as possible with those restrictive measures which are felt by them as a common grievance, irritatingly reminding them of the past. And nothing can be better calculated to direct their thoughts to the future than to dispose as rapidly as possible of all political questions that have sprung from the war, and to clear the track for the new issues which are of equal interest to all of us, without any reference to our former dissensions and conflicts. The attention of the people once absorbed by new topics of general interest, controversies connected with the war will gradually drift into the background; people will meet upon new fields, irrespective of their former relations; the new order of things will insensibly and irresistibly grow into the daily habits and ways of thinking of the masses, and the desire of a reaction will gradually disappear in the absorbing activity for the furtherance of new objects. That this process may not work itself out as

rapidly and as smoothly as we might desire, I will admit; but I am profoundly convinced that it is, after all, the most rapid and the safest that can be devised.

It is evident that the political disqualifications and disabilities, especially the exclusion of large numbers of people from the ballot-box, have to disappear before this great end of moral pacification can be accomplished; for nothing will remind men more painfully of our past conflicts, nothing is more calculated to stir up from day to day the heartburnings of defeat and a deep dissatisfaction with the existing condition of things, than an abnormal and degrading position in society, which imposes all the duties and burdens of citizenship without coupling with them the corresponding rights.

But still another thing appeared to me most essential to the restoration of fraternal feeling. It was that the same party under whose auspices those political disqualifications had been imposed, and which was accused of a desire to continue them for the selfish purpose of perpetuating its ascendancy, should, while in the full possession of the powers of the Government, with free and frank generosity remove them; thus furnishing conclusive proof that such measures had not been dictated by a spirit of hatred and vindictiveness, but by the necessity to establish in the shortest possible time that which would be for the common good of all, and that the first opportunity to abolish invidious distinctions was embraced not only willingly, but with gladness.

In forming these conclusions I was not governed by a mere sentimental and hasty generosity, although I am willing to admit that it is against my nature to deprive others without the most irresistible necessity of rights which I myself enjoy; but I followed the plainest rule of statesmanship, which, under existing circumstances, could have no higher aim than to bring the late rebels

once more under the influence of the sentiment that this is their country just as well as ours; that their interests are wrapped up in its welfare just as well as our interests are; that their rights as citizens enjoy the same protection as ours under its institutions, and that the fortunes and the honor of this our common Republic should be as dear to them as they are to us.

It was for these reasons that I offered in the National Republican Convention of 1868 a resolution welcoming back to the communion of the loyal people all those of the late rebels who would coöperate with us in the establishment of the new order of things, and declaring the Republican party in favor of a prompt removal of political disabilities and disqualifications as soon as it would be compatible with public safety. This resolution was incorporated in the National Republican platform by a unanimous vote of the Convention, and upon that platform we carried on that memorable contest which elevated General Grant and you, sir, to the high offices which you now occupy. Thus was an important step taken in the direction I have just indicated, a step accompanied by the approval and applause not only of the Republican party, but of the whole American people; and it remained to carry out by practical measures that policy of which the Republican platform contained so emphatic a promise.

Permit me now, sir, to give an account of the manner in which that Republican promise was carried out in Missouri. In Missouri the civil war had raged with uncommon fierceness. The State had been devastated by repeated invasions. Great atrocities had been committed by rebel guerrillas, producing in some parts of the State that most terrible of wars, a neighborhood war in the truest sense of the term. This continued in a measure even some time after the surrender of the rebel armies. The bitterest resentments divided the people. It was thought

questionable whether rebels and Unionists would be able to live peaceably together on the same soil. Under such circumstances a State constitution was adopted which excluded from the right of suffrage all who had been connected with the rebellion either by act or by sympathy.

But while in no State the struggle between rebels and Unionists had been fiercer, in no State the animosities of the war died out more rapidly and more completely. Under the influence of restored peace the material development of the State at once took a new and vigorous start. For some time outrages were committed by the bushwhacking tribe; soon they disappeared. For some time, even until within the last two years to some extent, social and business ostracism was kept up by the two parties; gradually the genial habits of good neighborhood revived. The people of Missouri became again throughout an orderly and law-abiding people, until at the commencement of the present year the governor could proclaim in his message that there was not a county in the State where the sheriff could not at any time obtain a posse to aid him in the execution of the laws, and that life and the rights of property were as safe in Missouri as in any State of the Union. And never was there a word of praise more richly deserved. The governor might have said far more without going beyond the truth.

From other parts of the country reports have reached you of rebel riots, excesses and outrages; of attempts to nullify the freedom of the late slave; of those wild commotions which usually follow suppressed rebellions. I will not here investigate how much of exaggeration there may have been in some of these stories; but tell me whether within the last two years even the attempt at such a story has come from Missouri at all! You might travel over my State far and wide in all directions, and you would behold with your own eyes the irresistible evidences

of a most beneficent and wonderful transformation. You would find society everywhere moving again in the quiet channel of productive activity; you would find the minds of the people absorbed with railroad enterprises and mines and new fields of agricultural labor; you would find the school-house, against which the old pro-slavery prejudice had been so bitterly fighting, in successful operation; you would find the late slave securely enjoying his new rights as a freeman; you would find the late rebel obeying the laws, paying his taxes, and working peaceably by the side of the Union man as a good neighbor; you would find, even in those places which during the war had been specially noted for their rebellious spirit, society in a more peaceful and orderly condition than it had ever been there, not only during, but even before the rebellion. You would, in one word, find the new order of things rapidly working itself into the daily habits and the ordinary ways of thinking of the whole people. And if you heard here and there a hare-brained individual still indulge in an occasional swagger of the rebellious kind, you would find also that his voice is deadened by the very air surrounding him, like a voice on the sea which awakens no echo.

But a short time ago you would have found only one fountain of bitter feeling still flowing; and that fountain consisted in those very laws which cut off thousands and thousands of citizens from all the political rights of citizenship while they were fulfilling its duties and bearing its burdens. Of all living institutions this was the only one daily reminding the people of the great conflict, of the passions which had inflamed them, of the hatred which they had borne to one another; the only one calculated to rekindle the old bitter rancor of the vanquished against the conqueror, and to prevent the revival of that fraternal feeling among children of the same country

which all generous and patriotic men are longing for; the only one threatening to disturb the peace of society once more, if continued beyond measure.

And what could we answer when asked upon what ground disfranchisement could be continued in Missouri under such circumstances? Could we say that the life of the Republic and the results of the war were still threatened there by organized efforts? Everybody knew that they were not. Could we say that the rights and the lives and the property of the loyal people were not yet safe? Everybody knew that they were. Could we answer that the late rebels refused to obey the laws, to pay their taxes, and to fulfil the duties of citizenship? Such refusal was not heard of. What pretext, then, was left for sustaining disfranchisement? Absolutely none in the remotest degree resembling the justification of necessity. If continued, the system rested upon nothing but the arbitrary pleasure of the ruling party.

It was evident that disfranchisement had no longer any ground to stand upon. Republicans who were not willing to sacrifice every consideration of honor and decency to party advantage were rapidly growing ashamed of it, and finally the legislature, at its last session, resolved to submit to the people of Missouri amendments to the State constitution wiping out the system of disfranchisement and establishing complete equality of political rights without distinction of color, as well as of previous political attitude. This was done last spring, the amendments to be voted upon at the State election this fall. Thus the question was plainly placed before the people of Missouri, and when going to the polls they were called upon to answer simply "ay" or "no."

Would it be thought possible, sir, that under the circumstances I have described those amendments should have found any serious opposition? Should it not have

been expected that the whole Republican party, remembering the word of promise held out in the national platform, would, as one man, have greeted with gladness this tempting opportunity to wipe out the last remnant of the old animosities which had distracted us, to disarm the charge of vindictiveness and of a selfish policy which had been brought against them, and to unite the whole people of the State once more in the bonds of equal rights and fraternal feeling? Could patriotic men hesitate when the plain alternative was presented to them either to accomplish all this by responding "ay" to the simple proposition placed before them by the legislature, or, by saying "no," to take a step backward in the line of proscription?

Thus every generous impulse, every dictate of honor, of patriotism, of common-sense, of sound statesmanship, of fidelity to Republican pledges, pointed in one direction. Nay, sir, men of ordinary shrewdness, not even appreciating those higher motives, would have discovered that every consideration of prudent party polity did the same; for had we hesitated, the day would certainly have come when disfranchisement would have been abolished in spite of the Republican party, instead of by it, as a victory over the Republican party instead of a triumph of its good faith and just principles; and what hope had Republicans then to win over to their cause any of the re-enfranchised, if they had resisted re-enfranchisement when their very honor commanded them to grant it? And thus, I must confess, when under such circumstances the constitutional amendments were proposed by the legislature, I candidly thought all struggles on this subject in Missouri were over, and I congratulated, in my letters, my friends on the cheerful prospect.

And yet the opposition to this measure developed itself in a most formidable shape. We found a remarkable combination of forces in array against it. There were

those whose whole political horizon was bounded by the struggles of the rebellion; whose whole political stock in trade consisted in the battle-cries of the civil war; who would forever have rolled the word "rebel" as a sweet morsel under their tongues, and delighted in discoursing grimly over the beauties of eternal damnation. But the bulk of the opposition was moved by more practical views. I suppose there is a class of politicians everywhere whose great aim and end in political life it is to monopolize the local offices. That class in Missouri found disfranchisement a very handy contrivance to keep their presumptive opponents away from the polls. Enfranchisement struck at their monopoly; to prevent it was with them a question of personal advantage. They acted upon the simple principle that those who would probably vote against them had better not be permitted to vote at all. They did not expressly deny that the rebels should be admitted to the ballot as soon as public safety would permit it, but they simply reasoned that public safety would not be perfect without their own election as sheriffs or county clerks. I suppose Senators know the breed.

Thus we found inveterate prejudice and unscrupulous greed for office arrayed against fidelity to sacred pledges and sound statesmanship. I am aware that my colleague has distributed a speech among Senators in which he asserts that the opposition was not so much directed against enfranchisement itself as against the constitutional amendment as a form of effecting it, while the same thing might in 1871 also be accomplished by an act of the legislature. I boldly assert that this is not in accordance with the facts. From fifty to sixty country papers in Missouri, mostly published under the shadow of country courthouses, led by a central organ at St. Louis, began at once to assail the constitutional amendment, not merely as an objectionable manner of accomplishing

enfranchisement, but bitterly protesting against enfranchisement, or, as they termed it, rebel suffrage, itself. It was the *thing* they fought, not the mere shape in which it appeared, and my colleague ought to know it.

But there the opposition did not stop. It organized itself for the purpose of defeating any indorsement of the enfranchising amendment in the Republican State convention, and of carrying the nomination of a candidate for governor hostile to it. This candidate was Mr. McClurg. In order to accomplish this, things were done probably without precedent in the history of political parties.

I ask the pardon of the Senate for going into details; but they are interesting, and those who desire to study the art of wire-pulling as part of the civilization of our times will have an opportunity to learn something. The opponents of the constitutional amendment commanded a majority in the State central committee. The circumstance that the colored citizens of Missouri were to vote this year for the first time was taken advantage of to insure a majority in the convention against enfranchisement and for their candidate.

It was customary with the Republican party in Missouri that, on the basis of the general election last preceding, every one hundred and fifty Republican voters should have one delegate in the State convention. The colored citizens had never voted, but the majority of the State committee proceeded upon the presumption that every colored man would vote the Republican ticket and ought therefore to be represented in the convention. This appeared rather novel, yet the general proposition was acquiesced in. But then, instead of simply adding the colored citizens, according to the last census, to the aggregate number of Republican voters in each county, the State committee decreed to the colored men, as a distinct

class, a separate representation, and giving every fraction over one hundred and fifty, however small, a delegate, things were so manipulated that while one delegate appeared in the convention to every one hundred and forty white Republican voters, including fractions, the colored citizens were represented by one delegate to every ninety voters. The purpose for which this was done became soon apparent.

A great iniquity was perpetrated, far worse in its nature than a common trick of wire-pulling. Colored agitators were sent all over the State, from town to town, from settlement to settlement, to enlist the newly enfranchised colored people in the crusade against the enfranchising amendment and the support of the candidates representing that hostility, and all the artifices of demagogism, every possible appeal to passion, prejudice and fear, were freely employed. Look at this. The colored citizens were to exercise the right of suffrage for the first time, and those against whom so many prejudices were still alive, wrongful prejudices indeed, but stubborn; those who for their future welfare need the good-will of their neighbors more than any other class of society; those whose rights can be perfectly secure only in the security of the equal rights of all, were to be seduced to signal their very entrance in political life by using their virgin franchise for the purpose of continuing the disfranchisement of others. The thought is so abominable in itself that I do not hesitate to denounce the demagogues who gave the colored people of Missouri that most iniquitous advice as the worst enemies of the colored race.

And I regret to state the fact that this most unscrupulous trick succeeded. The colored voters, with some most honorable exceptions, permitted themselves to be used by the opponents of enfranchisement in organizing for the convention. And that was the object in giving them a

representation in proportion almost double that of the white voters. The students of the science will admit that this was an instructive piece of wire-pulling, and most neatly executed.

It was but natural that men who did not shrink from the employment of such means should have resorted to all the other appliances known to politicians who practice the art of fraudulently getting up delegations and of packing conventions. And all these things were done for the sole purpose of preventing the indorsement of the enfranchising amendment by the convention, and of securing the nomination for governor of Mr. McClurg, the candidate in sympathy with them. But I will not go into further detail.

Of this character was the opposition the friends of enfranchisement had to contend with in the convention. Twice we appealed to the convention to abandon that most absurd and scandalous system of representation, the nature of which I have just described. But twice, in spite of arguments and appeals incontrovertible and pressing, we were voted down. We should have been justified in leaving the convention then, and public opinion would have sustained us. But we preferred to submit even to these wrongs, willing to give our opponents a last chance to refrain from carrying their scandalous advantage to the utmost, but fully determined also that the fruit of it should not be reaped.

Finally we arrived at the main question. The committee on resolutions, of which I was a member, was unanimous on all other points, but on the question of indorsing the franchise amendment it was divided. The majority reported the following resolution:

That the Republican party stands pledged to remove all disqualifications and restrictions imposed upon the late rebels

in the same measure as the spirit of disloyalty may die out and as may be consistent with the safety of the loyal people; that we consider the time to have come, and we cordially indorse the action of the legislature of Missouri in submitting to the qualified voters of the State the amendments removing all disqualifications from the disfranchised people of Missouri and conferring equal political rights and privileges on all classes, and we earnestly recommend them to the people for their approval and adoption.

The resolution reported by the minority was as follows:

That we are in favor of reënfanchising those justly disfranchised for participating in the late rebellion, as soon as it can be done with safety to the State; and that we concur in the propriety of the legislature having submitted to the whole people of the State the question whether such time has now arrived, upon which question we recognize the right of any member of the party to vote his honest convictions.

The meaning of the majority resolution was unequivocal and plain; a solemn and straightforward declaration of the Republican party, through its convention, that as an organization it was in favor of enfranchisement, and of the measure proposed by the legislature to effect it, and that it called upon its members to redeem the solemn pledges of the party. But what was the meaning of the minority resolution? I have heard it argued by public speakers and in newspapers that there was no real difference between the two. Can any discerning mind fail to see the difference?

In the first place, it was an absurdity in itself. It repeated the promise of enfranchisement at some future period which it did not define. If under the circumstances surrounding us the time for enfranchisement had not come, when in the name of common-sense would it come? It approved of the act of the legislature submitting the

question to the people, but then, referring the matter to every individual voter, it declared that the Republican party as such had no opinion to express, no advice to give on the subject. Look at this; the question of reënfranchisement was the only one agitating the public mind, the only one prominently in issue before the people of Missouri. And that the great ruling party of the State should in its platform declare its neutrality, as a party, as to the only great question in controversy, a question so greatly affecting the future welfare of the State, was in the very nature of things so utterly absurd and ridiculous that you would search the history of parties in vain for a parallel. It amounted, in fact, to a confession either of imbecility or of cowardice: of imbecility, if the party had no opinion to express upon the subject; or of cowardice, if it had an opinion and did not dare to say so.

But that was not the worst feature of it. It was a fraud on its very face. In reiterating the promise that disfranchisement should be removed when compatible with the safety of the State, it virtually denied that it was already compatible with the safety of the State. If not then, under the circumstances prevailing, when would it be? The repetition of an indefinite promise was, therefore, the repudiation of a promise already due; the redemption of a pledge by another pledge, accompanied by the demonstration that the binding force of the pledge was not acknowledged. The honesty of the party stood in a worse light than Micawber's, when, after giving his due-bill for a debt long due, he exclaimed, "Thank God, that debt is paid, and I can once more raise my head as an honest man."

But even that was not the worst feature of it. It was a declaration of neutrality and an indefinite promise only in appearance. It was the device of the enemies of the constitutional amendment to defeat that measure. The

resolution was framed and introduced by the bitterest and most openly avowed enemy of the enfranchising amendment, who, while subsequently advocating the minority report, bluntly proclaimed his hostility to the measure and his intention to defeat it. In addressing the convention he boastingly pledged three-fourths of the people of his Congressional district to vote against it. His principal supporter, a colored man, spoke in the same vein, and so one after another, the advocates of the minority resolution, with few exceptions, while arguing in favor of it, professed their hostility to enfranchisement.

The operations which had preceded the convention, as well as the known character and proclivities and open and emphatic expressions of the movers and advocates of that resolution, left no possible doubt, therefore, of the fact that the apparent declaration of neutrality on the subject was nothing but a thin disguise, if a disguise at all, of determined hostility to enfranchisement, and that the adoption of that resolution would be an unmistakable victory for the enemies of enfranchisement. The question was therefore perfectly plain. All that had happened had made it plain before the debate on the resolutions began. What course was left to those who were determined to stand by the solemn pledges of the National Republican platform?

It fell to my lot to play a somewhat prominent part in those proceedings, and my convictions of duty were clear. In opening the debate I used, among others, the following expressions, and I select the strongest:

We are resolved, and I think I may declare it in the name of a considerable portion of this convention, we are resolved to maintain the plighted faith of the Republican party. We are resolved to have that which is declared in this platform and nothing less. We are resolved not to equivocate about it.

Upon this question as honest men and faithful Republicans we cannot yield. I therefore declare in my own name and in the name of my friends that this is our platform. Some such platform will go before the people of this State at the next election, and a candidate will go before the people for their suffrages who does not by his known opinions, by his associations and by his record give the lie to what is declared in the platform upon which he is nominated.

I may add, the charge which was made, that we insisted upon our own candidate and would accept no other, was false. We would have been satisfied with any candidate who was openly and honestly in favor of enfranchisement; but we would not put an anti-enfranchisement man upon an enfranchisement platform, for we were resolved not to deceive the people.

The remarks I made may appear strong, and I admit that they were. They were intended to be strong. I would not hesitate a moment to hold the same language again under similar circumstances. My personal position was a peculiar one. I have already alluded to the fact that in the National Republican Convention of 1868 I introduced a resolution in favor of the removal of political disabilities as soon as public safety would permit it. I, for my part, was honest in proposing that resolution and in making that promise. I sincerely meant what I said. I did not mean to deceive the people by opening the prospect of a conciliatory policy, with the secret intention to break the pledge and to obtain the votes of the people on false pretenses. I am sure the National Convention, which unanimously made that resolution a part of the Republican platform, understood the nature of the pledge also, and was honest in putting it forth. But of all men in the world I, who had moved the resolution and been the originator of the great promise, was the very last to trifle with it or to equivocate about it. I could not have

done so without disgracing myself forever in my own estimation. If I am proud of anything, it is not so much the position in the first law-giving body of the Republic to which I have been elevated by a generous people, but it is the fact that during my whole public career I have always been mindful of the great responsibility of those who undertake to exercise an influence upon public opinion; that I have never said anything to the people which I did not myself honestly believe in; that I never made a pledge which I did not mean honestly to keep; and that whenever I made a pledge in conjunction with others I meant to keep those others to it too.

I therefore looked upon that promise as one admitting of no uncertainty, no compromise, no trifling, no equivocation, which would have been faithlessness of the darkest nature. And this sentiment, which always has been and always will be the guide of my public life, governed me in this instance and dictated my language.

But more than that. It is well known that the conciliatory policy to which the Republican party pledged itself in its platform had much to do with the greatness of the success we achieved in the Presidential election of 1868. It was most emphatically indorsed by our candidate for the Presidency in those simple but powerful words which became the very inscription of the banner under which we fought, "Let us have peace." The words were accepted as meaning, and they could mean nothing else, that a firm but generous and conciliatory policy should be adopted, which, "with malice toward none and charity for all," would overcome the bitter animosities of the past and make the Americans once more a united people. And therefore it was that those words fell upon the popular heart like a clear sunrise after a long period of storm and anguish, warming it with new hope and noble aspirations. Therefore it was that they attracted to our cause thou-

sands and thousands of people who had never belonged to our organization and whose votes we could otherwise never have hoped for.

Am I not justified, then, in saying that the binding force of that promise was increased by value received in consideration thereof; value received, if I may use that expression, in cash down votes? And in this light that promise stood before my eyes in our State convention, when I saw it on the point of being dishonored by all the appliances of political trickery. Who will still pretend that the language I used was too strong? Whatever others may think, I considered it my duty to declare that if there were men unscrupulous enough to repudiate or evade a faithful recognition of their solemn obligations, there were also men there resolved to stand by their pledges to the last and at every hazard, to take their honor and that of their party into their hands and to carry that great measure of peace and reconciliation over the heads of the tricksters. I thought it due even to our opponents that I should let them know what the consequences would be if they persisted in the iniquity.

But, before going further, I desire to show the Senate what the character of that system of disfranchisement was upon the condemnation of which we insisted, and which our opponents by trickery and equivocation strove to preserve. I wish to call the special attention of Senators to it; for this, too, will be a somewhat valuable and interesting contribution to the history of our politics. I am sure but few if any members of this body know what disfranchisement in Missouri really was; and I must confess that I myself never fully understood it until many months after the election of 1868 I had occasion to investigate its working.

The constitution of Missouri, third section, second article, disfranchised not only those who had been in

armed hostility to the United States or the government of the State, but all those who had ever by act or word shown sympathy with the rebellion, or with any one engaged in exciting it or carrying it on, or had in other terms indicated their disaffection to the Government of the United States in its contest with rebellion, or had ever, except under overpowering compulsion, submitted to the authority of the Confederate States, etc.

This, it will be admitted, was rather sweeping. Sympathy with persons engaged in "exciting or carrying on rebellion" was somewhat calculated to cover a multitude of sins not visible to the unpracticed eye. No citizen could be registered as a voter unless he took a solemn oath that he had carefully abstained from all those things. But such oath was, according to section five, article two, of the constitution, not to be deemed conclusive evidence of the right of a person to vote or to be registered. Such right might be disproved, and all evidence for and against such right was to be "heard and passed upon by the registering officers, and not by the judges of election."

These registering officers, exercising a judicial power over the right of citizens to vote, thus became persons of extraordinary importance. A word about the machinery of which they formed part. Under the law, the governor appointed one supervisor of registration in each senatorial district, thirty-four in all. These supervisors of registration had the exclusive power to appoint and to remove at pleasure three registrars in each county, whose duty it was to make a list of the qualified voters. These registrars had power to examine under oath any person applying for registration as to his qualifications, and also to "ascertain and diligently to inquire that such person had not done any of the acts specified in the constitution as causes for disqualification," and if those registrars "were satisfied in their own minds" that such person was disqualified,

they had power to reject him, and they could do so even without any testimony. To be sure, an appeal from their decision was provided for by law. On certain days preceding each general election the supervisor and the three registrars of each county, or a majority of them, were to meet as a board of appeals and revision at each county seat, with power "to pass upon the claims of all persons who had been unable to appear before the registrar of their respective districts, and upon persons who considered that injustice had been done them by the officers of registration refusing to record them as voters; also on further objections made to persons who may have already been registered as voters. They shall add to the list in each election district the names of such persons as they may consider legally entitled to registration, and shall strike therefrom such as they shall consider improperly registered."

Such is the language of the law. Thus it will be seen that the appeal from the first decision of the registering officers lay again to the same registering officers. And then these same registering officers had the power, as a board of revision, to add to and strike from the list as they might see fit, this time without any further appeal. In fact the registrars evolved out of their own inner consciousness other people's right to vote. You will see, sir, that thus an immense and absolutely irresponsible power was conferred upon these men, for they were to construe, for their own guidance, the disqualifying provisions of the constitution to their own satisfaction. What were these disqualifying provisions? I have already mentioned some of them. Sympathy, shown by word or act, with the rebellion or with those engaged in exciting it or carrying it on. What was that? A man, a good Union man, had a son or a brother or a cousin in the rebel army, carrying on the rebellion, a not unfrequent case, where, as in Missouri,

families were divided against themselves. Did he desire to see that son or brother or cousin killed? Probably not. Did he therefore sympathize with him? The registering officers were to determine that to their own satisfaction. "Sympathy with those exciting rebellion." It was charged that the Democratic party was exciting rebellion. Did sympathy with Democrats constitute the disqualifying crime? The registrars might construe it so, and there was no appeal from their decision. And if they did, where was the limit to arbitrary disfranchisement?

You might say that this is running things to a fine point. But what was there to prevent it? If the registering officers had in all cases been high-minded, conscientious men, they would have put a liberal construction upon the law. But were they? Facts will tell. I know of faithful and consistent Union men, unfortunate enough to have had sons or relatives who insisted upon joining the rebels. They endeavored to keep them back; but, striving in vain to hold them, gave them a woolen shirt or a pair of socks, and not denying it, were disfranchised for giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Others expressed the wish that their relatives in the rebel army would return home safely, and were disfranchised for sympathizing with those engaged in rebellion. I know of scores of men who served three or four years in the Union Army, some having lost arms or legs in the service, disfranchised for having expressed sympathy with those exciting rebellion, and having used the incriminating expressions in some cases before they put on the blue jacket, in others long after the war was over. Nay, I know of the case of an old abolitionist in Linn county, Missouri, who had made emancipation speeches in 1861 and all through the war, and who was disfranchised in 1868 for having made certain remarks in 1865 and 1866 in favor of the so-called peace policy then agitated by some political leaders in Missouri.

And these were no isolated cases. Their number is legion. The fact is, that in a great many counties in Missouri the registering officers acted under the influence of the radical candidates for office, and the question governing their action in a multitude of cases was simply how many opposition votes had to be thrown out in order to insure the success of those candidates. And this cutting-off process was not confined to Democrats; Republicans of old standing were disqualified because they were suspected of an intention to vote against certain men running for office. The consequence was that now and then the Democrats attempted and succeeded in buying up a supervisor of registration, who, for value received, appointed registrars favorable to them. These registrars then usually registered with an excessive liberality, in violation of the law justly construed, and the successful candidates were then kept out of office on account of the fraudulent registration.

What I say here is not a mere surmise based upon vague rumor. It is a matter of general notoriety in Missouri, scarcely contradicted, and in many cases proven by official investigation. To show the atrocity of the abuses which had developed themselves under the system of disfranchisement, you will permit me to give the details of one case.

In 1868 there was appointed as supervisor of registration for the ninth senatorial district of Missouri, composed of the counties of Audrain, Boone and Calloway, an individual by the name of Conklin. This Conklin had at the same time secured for himself the radical nomination for the State senate. The district was strongly Democratic, but Conklin was determined to be elected, or rather to elect himself, and he went about it in a business-like way. As supervisor of registration he had the power to appoint the registering officers for the three counties.

He appointed a set of men upon whom he believed he could rely to do his bidding, and having the power to keep or remove them, as he pleased, he cracked his whip over them to his heart's content. His plan of operations was very simple. He followed his registrars as they were making the list of voters from place to place, attended nearly all their meetings, and controlled them in all their actions. In this way he had, in the first place, all the Democrats rejected against whom, by any possibility, the disfranchising provisions of the constitution could be construed. Heavy work was done, but his mind was not relieved of doubt. He was so thoroughly despised by a great many Republicans that he thought it best to have a good many of them cut off by the board of review. Thus a number of Union officers and soldiers and other citizens of high respectability, who would have voted for Grant and Colfax but not for Conklin, were disfranchised for disloyalty.

But even this did not relieve him of doubt. He hit upon a most ingenious expedient, and that was simply to disqualify his competitors. Shortly before the day of election he had the candidate who was nominated against him struck off, late enough, as he thought, to render another nomination impossible. The name of this decapitated opponent was David H. Hickman, a gentleman of great moral worth, an unflinching Union man during the war, and formerly a member of the legislature. But Conklin did not feel quite safe yet; and so he had also the only man cut off who, as he suspected, was likely, if there was still time, to be nominated in Hickman's place—a Dr. Hunter, also a Union man.

But, wonderful as it may seem, fortune did not smile upon the intrepid Conklin. The Democratic committee nominated at the eleventh hour Hon. James S. Rollins. My colleague knows him well; he is the same who in 1857

was a candidate for governor in Missouri, when my colleague refused to vote for him on the ground that his election would be dangerous to the institution of slavery in Missouri; he is the same who as a member of Congress voted for the Constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. Well, Mr. Rollins was put in nomination, while he was absent from home, without his knowledge and consent. And Mr. Rollins assures me that to his certain knowledge Conklin would have disqualified him, too, had he not relied upon his previous declaration that he would not be a candidate. But Mr. Rollins, returning home on the day before election, reconsidered that declaration, and Conklin, who in the meantime had thoroughly disgusted every decent man, was defeated by a respectable majority. Still he had the impudence to contest Mr. Rollins's seat, but was sent home by a unanimous vote of the senate. The record of that contest, containing the sworn testimony, which proves the facts I have stated, I have in my possession.

But there the story does not end yet. You will admit that in this transaction Conklin had proved himself a thorough villain. His first appointment as supervisor of registration by Governor Fletcher may be excused on the ground that the governor did not know him. But now Conklin had made a public record of irrepressible rascality, and yet in spite of the remonstrances of several Republican members of the legislature, Governor McClurg, the same gentleman whom we defeated at the late State election, reappointed him to the same place, possibly to do the same sort of work. But this time Conklin acted under the impulse of different motives. When he was a candidate himself and determined to elect himself, in a senatorial district containing about nine thousand males over the age of twenty-one years, he registered them down to sixteen hundred and twenty-

one. But this year the same Conklin registered in the same district fifty-nine hundred and ninety-three legally qualified voters. Whence the discrepancy? There were about twelve hundred colored voters in the district, swelling the number of legal voters to that extent. But, then, there is still a difference of thirty-one hundred and seventy-two to be accounted for; thirty-one hundred and seventy-two over and above the number registered two years ago. The increase did not result from immigration, for in those counties immigration was notoriously inconsiderable. No, aside from other influences that may have been brought to bear upon him, Conklin was this time not a candidate himself, and, as I heard him declare in a speech, he made it a special object to defeat the Liberal Republican candidate for Congress, Colonel Dyer. And so he registered "liberally" against him.

And now, sir, what does this prove? Simply this: that under such a system the right of citizens to vote was completely at the mercy of any villain who might happen to be appointed a registration officer, and there was no remedy against the grossest of outrages. But the case was, if possible, even worse than that.

Permit me to give you another instance. In 1868 there were in Buchanan county, Missouri, 4,621 persons registered as qualified voters. Before the board of review met, over one thousand affidavits were filed with the members of that board against persons who had taken the prescribed oath and had therefore been registered, and who were afterwards to be disfranchised. When the board of appeals and review met, hundreds of them besieged the door of their meeting place. But the proceedings of that board, limited by law to a very few days, were remarkably slow. About three hundred cases were considered—about forty favorably, the others unfavorably; the board closed their doors in the faces of the

rejected citizens, and the rest of the one thousand who had not been heard were simply disfranchised. On what ground was this done? On the ground that the registration of those individuals had been objected to by somebody. By whom they were objected to, they were never informed. They simply learned that affidavits had been filed against them. Neither was their demand to have the affidavits produced complied with. They obtained only a general intimation of the charges against them, and were required to prove their loyalty; and the board of review not sitting long enough to hear even one-third of them, they were simply disfranchised, for the registering officers were sufficiently satisfied that they ought not to vote.

Time has shed a little more light upon those proceedings also. It turns out that over five hundred of those secret affidavits, on the ground of which so many citizens were deprived of their right to vote, had been manufactured by and under the direction of one man, one James Beach, living at St. Joseph, Missouri, an employé of insurance companies, who was at different times prosecuted for embezzlement. The hundreds of affidavits of this individual were for a long time kept a profound secret among the official records of the registering officers. But some of them have found their way to other people's eyes, and it will edify you to know, sir, that hundreds of men were deprived of their suffrage for no other reason but that such a disreputable individual, of whom the most respectable Republicans of St. Joseph assured me that they would not believe him under oath, objected to them simply on the ground, as the affidavits read, "that the person mentioned in the affidavit has the reputation of being disloyal or of being a rebel sympathizer." It is also instructive to know that the same man importuned the Representative in Congress of that district to

obtain for him the post-office at St. Joseph, urging as his peculiar claim to reward that he had disfranchised so many hundreds of individuals; an application which was properly rejected.

I might go on for some time yet, giving you further detail of an equally interesting character. But it is enough. Last summer I listened to the burning eloquence of the Senator from New York, denouncing the election frauds committed in the metropolis of his State. His denunciations were not too severe. But he will agree with me when I say that it matters little whether the frauds be committed by stuffing illegal votes into the ballot-box, or stealing legal votes out of it under color of law. I feel much freer to-day to hurl denunciations against the Democratic repeaters of New York and Philadelphia, after having struck an honest and decisive blow against a similar abomination in Missouri where it disgraced my own party.

I call it an abomination, sir, as it had developed itself. I will not impeach the motives of those who first introduced disfranchisement. They certainly did not foresee the disgusting abuses that would grow out of it. But as it had developed itself the system amounted to this: the governor selected and appointed the supervisors of registration; the supervisors appointed the registering officers, subject to removal at their pleasure, and therefore under their control; and the registering officers, under a constitutional provision open to the most arbitrary construction, and being judges on all appeals against themselves, virtually appointed the voters. With such a machinery carefully made up, an unscrupulous man in the executive office, choosing instruments equally unscrupulous, might not only maintain himself in power against any opponent, but he might have a legislature elected to carry out his will. And even with an honest

governor at the head of the system, the highest right of the citizen was completely at the mercy of any set of registration officers who might combine their interests with those of candidates for office. Call such a system whatever you will, but call it not republican government. Let such a system be defended by whosoever may do it, but let it not be the Republican party that mourns over its downfall.

Well, sir, it was this system, demonstrating itself in its workings as the very incarnation of arbitrary party despotism, as the very nursery of fraud, and the most scandalous political demoralization; this system which, however good the intentions of its originators may have been, was bound in time to stifle all sense of honor, shame and decency in any party supporting it, and to hand that party over as a mere engine of corruption and tyranny to the most unscrupulous of political schemers; it was this system which the wire-pullers and spoilsmen in our State convention attempted to shield by a dishonest equivocation.

I ask you, sir, in the face of these glaring facts, what good American, bearing the faintest love to the purity of democratic institutions, what honest Republican caring in the least for the honor and good faith of his party, could have hesitated to condemn it in the strongest language, and not only to advise but to implore the people to relieve themselves of the disgrace? Who could have stooped to a declaration of neutrality on such a question, a dodge which was avowedly devised as a hint in favor of the continuation of the system?

The vote was taken. Our resolution, pronouncing for the adoption of the constitutional amendment abolishing disfranchisement, was voted down; the substitute was adopted, and the proscriptionists and spoilsmen had carried their point in the convention. Then we went

out; then we adopted a platform which did justice to the feelings of honest men and faithful Republicans, and upon that platform we nominated Hon. B. Gratz Brown, one of the oldest and most consistent anti-slavery men of Missouri, as our candidate for the governorship. And I affirm that in leaving that body we carried the honor, the good faith, the true principles and the true banner of the Republican party with us.

This, sir, is the history of the party division in Missouri; and it is for this that those who acted as I did have been denounced as traitors to the Republican cause.

Here I desire to notice an impression, which was spread abroad by public speakers and newspapers advocating a high protective tariff, that the so-called "bolt" in Missouri was nothing but the upshot of a conspiracy formed at Washington last winter by advocates of revenue reform. I had as much to do with the division in Missouri and the movements which preceded it as any man. I know every detail of its history. Whatever meetings of revenue reformers may have taken place at Washington, I not only did not participate in them, but no plan that could possibly have been formed there had the least influence upon my action in the Missouri convention. My colleague, in the speech he has distributed among Senators, arraigns me as the leader of the "bolt." I take my full share of the responsibility for it—the whole, if you please—and I pronounce the statement, that the "bolt" had anything to do with any such conspiracy of revenue reformers formed at Washington or anywhere else, unqualifiedly and absolutely false. While my convictions, conscientiously formed, lead me to oppose the protective system, I know that the tariff question was not the one which produced the division of the Republican party in my State. While it is unquestionably true that the Republicans with whom I

acted readily indorsed the anti-protective tariff resolution in our platform, it is also true that no discussion of the tariff question occurred in the convention at all before we left it. In fact, a resolution on that subject, drawn by myself, and identical in spirit with the revenue-reform plank of our platform, was unanimously reported by the committee on resolutions and adopted by the rump convention after we had left it. Another resolution, intended to favor protection, was adopted also, and we enjoyed the rare spectacle of seeing in the McClurg platform the two hostile sisters, revenue reform and protective tariff, peaceably standing side by side, the most accommodating assortment of principles heard of in the history of political parties. I make this statement in order to place the real cause of our party division in its true light.

At the same time I give it as my opinion that, had protection or anti-protection been the only question before the people of Missouri, unincumbered by any other issue, the majority against protection would in all probability have been nearer one hundred thousand than forty thousand. A close examination of the vote on candidates for Congress would bear me out. The question was indeed discussed, but it was not overshadowing the main issue. No, sir; the party division in Missouri was not the result of a plot formed at Washington or anywhere else. Its cause appeared on the very face of our action. It was nothing more and nothing less than the spontaneous outburst of the honest feelings of men who wanted to relieve the people of a great wrong and themselves and their party of the disgrace of a flagrant public scandal. The motive-power was the impulse of duty.

But it has been said that we might have performed that duty in another way. My colleague, in the speech I have referred to, states that the question might have been

referred to the legislature, which, in 1871, would have had power to abolish disfranchisement. But how refer it? Was not the constitutional amendment before the people demanding an answer, "ay" or "no," and should we say "no," and first defeat the constitutional amendment in order to refer the matter from the people to the pleasure of a majority in the legislature? Would not that have been absurd? But my colleague himself in his speeches avowed the reason why he desired that reference to the legislature. It was that he wanted to preserve at least part of the system which our consciences condemned, and we were not foolish enough to fall into his trap. And, besides, would that have preserved the unity of the party? It would simply have transferred the struggle to the legislative districts, ranging the Republicans for disfranchisement on one side and the Republicans hostile to disfranchisement on the other.

But might we not have submitted to the action of the convention and fought for enfranchisement just as well? Had we done that, what then? We might indeed have been at liberty to pronounce individually against disfranchisement. But their victory in the convention would have inspired the friends of the obnoxious system with new courage and determination. Every nook and corner of the State would have rung with a bitter fight against the constitutional amendment; its enemies would have strained every nerve and organized a registration more arbitrary than ever to defeat it; all the scandals of former elections would have repeated themselves. But, as it was, the mere act of our leaving the convention, showing our determined earnestness, already decided the contest. A popular uprising took place, before which even the bitterest enemies of enfranchisement finally yielded their opposition. When the matter was already virtually decided, then one by one they dropped; and at

last, not many days before the election, even Governor McClurg himself, the very standard-bearer and candidate of the proscriptionists, withdrew his hostility to the constitutional amendment, and announced that he would consent to anything if the people would let him only be governor once more. Without the division this could never have been accomplished. Just the reverse would have taken place. They struggled against enfranchisement as long as they thought they had a chance; they struck their flag when the fight was virtually decided. That is the whole story.

But the significance of our action went further. When a party once falls under the control of that class of spoilsmen and wire-pullers who in Missouri had arrayed themselves in defense of the disfranchising system, and were ready to sacrifice all higher considerations for their personal advantage, that party stands in eminent need of purification. Then it becomes necessary to demonstrate by tangible facts that the control of the organization by such elements can and will not be tolerated; and if the administering of such a lesson was ever indispensable it was so in Missouri. Had we submitted, in spite of all that had happened, it would have been a surrender to the most unscrupulous elements in the party, and there would have been no check to its demoralizing influences save another insurrection. Thus, from whatever point of view you may look at the circumstances surrounding us, the step we took was the only honorable, the only dignified, the only efficient one left to us. It was a moral necessity.

A bold and unusual movement like ours could not be expected to escape acrimonious criticism and misrepresentation. But it was a somewhat curious spectacle to me to see my colleague take the lead in personal attack, and to direct his most pointed shafts against myself and

against the Germans generally. He treated the case as a sort of criminal prosecution, putting the most singular pieces of evidence together to prove a deep-laid plot against the Republican party and all the good things that party had ever achieved. If I refer to this at all, sir, it is not for the purpose of defending myself, but for the purpose of showing the Senate what kind of capital our traducers were working on. It was the comical *intermezzo* of a serious drama. In a speech which my colleague made at Hannibal early in the campaign, and which he subsequently repeated on every possible occasion except one, which one he will certainly remember, he tried to convict me of having meditated treason to the Republican party long ago by the following piece of history. He said:

I have here, too, a thing which I have carried in my pocket-book now for some twenty months, knowing perfectly well when I put it there that the time would come when the explanation of it would appear. I cut it from the New York *Tribune* of the 27th of February, 1869. It gives an account of the presentation to General SCHURZ in New York of an address in German beautifully engrossed on parchment. A copy of the address is published, but that is not a matter of any interest here. But there is given a statement of General SCHURZ's response to the presentation of this address, and I read it in the language of the report in the *Tribune*, which I have reason to believe is correct:

“Mr. SCHURZ responded in a few words, stating that if he was considered the representative of German-Americans it was no merit of his own, but all had contributed toward this result, the citizen by his voice and the soldier on the field of battle. He was, perhaps, the least enthusiastic of all about his election to the United States Senate, because of the high idea he entertained of the importance of the position to which he had been called. If in the future new ties would have to be formed, and he should arrive at different conclusions from

those held by the ones who had now addressed him, they might nevertheless rest assured that a conscientious conviction alone had guided him."

There, gentlemen, in February, 1869, just before he took his seat in the Senate of the United States, to which the great-heartedness of Missouri had confidingly elected him, you see the foreshadowing of the purpose in the future to form new ties different from those that connected him with those who presented him that address that night.

Well, sir, this is a grave thing. It must have been difficult for my colleague to overcome the kind collegiality of his feelings toward me when he carefully cut out that damning piece of evidence, with a certainty to use it some day as proof of my treachery to my party. But I ask you, sir, to imagine my situation. Oh, if I had known when in the meantime I held sweet and pleasant converse with my colleague, and he was making me glad with his winning smiles, that in his bosom he was carrying something far more dangerous than a loaded pistol—a loaded pocket-book; something like a paper torpedo, ready at any moment to vomit forth destruction upon me—had I known that, what would my feelings have been! Imagine it, sir, as I can well imagine how carefully my colleague kept that trusty weapon in his pocket-book for twenty long months, and how, when the great moment had finally come, he went to the President, and, with sorrow and anguish in his eye, performed the most painful duty of unfolding to the Executive this most conclusive proof of my long-plotted and deliberate crime! Ay, sir, what would my feelings have been had I known that!

But what would my colleague's feelings have been had he known that the precious paper torpedo in his pocket-book, so carefully picked up and so lovingly preserved, was nothing but a weapon loaded with sawdust after all;

that it was a speech addressed in German to a German audience, and reported in English; that I had never spoken of new ties to be formed; but at most of new questions, new issues to arise, and that a mere mistake of a reporter, or of a type-setter, making "ties" out of "issues," was at the bottom of that dark and infamous plot to overthrow the Republican party?

Of course my colleague did not think of looking into other newspapers for a confirmation of the harrowing intelligence. Had he done so he would have found that same speech in the New York *Herald* reported as follows:

General SCHURZ responded briefly, thanking the committee for the honor they had conferred upon him, and assuring them that, no matter what might be the change in the political firmament, his countrymen would ever find him enlisted in the cause of humanity and ready at all times to sacrifice every personal consideration for the welfare of the country of his adoption.

And in the New York *Times* of the same date my colleague would have found my intention to betray the Republican party expressed in the following words:

Senator SCHURZ replied that he felt it an honor to be identified with the Republican party. With that party his sympathies had ever been, and it would be his proudest boast that he had always endeavored to popularize the principles of that party.

How sad that my colleague had no access to those journals! But had he suspected that he was carrying a mere reportorial fancy in his pocket, and that for twenty long, agonizing months, what would his feelings have been? I know it. He would have come to me with tears of joy in his eyes; he would have pressed my hand with fraternal fervor. He would have said: "My friend,

my brother, I always felt that this must be a mistake. It struck me at once that you could not have been so foolish as to confide to a party of serenaders your secret intention to commit treason against the Republican cause and to join the Democrats. I am altogether too smart to be caught by such nonsense, as you are too honest to have any such designs. Come, let us embrace."

In fact, sir, when I read my colleague's speech in the papers I enjoyed it so much that I refrained from correcting the misrepresentation in the same public manner; for it would have been a pity to disturb the intense and grave satisfaction with which my colleague was peddling that preposterous story from town to town, to have it laughed at by his hearers just as heartily as by myself.

And from evidence of this character, rivaling the immortal Buzfuz with his "chops and tomato-sauce," my colleague drew a most ingenious conclusion, which, with the same intensity of satisfaction, he conveyed to the people of Missouri, as follows:

I believe that General SCHURZ has nurtured the more daring thought of marching the entire German mass of the Republican Germans of the United States over to the Democracy, to secure the election of a Democratic President in 1872, over whose Administration he may exert an influence as supreme as his aid in its election was efficient. It is the old idea of "a power behind the throne greater than the throne itself."

Is my belief on this point unreasonable? If General SCHURZ does not mean this, what meant his dark hint in February, 1869, just before taking his seat in the Senate, when, in answer to New York Germans, who had presented him an address, he spoke of new ties to be formed by him in the future, and of his "arriving at different conclusions from those held by the persons who had then addressed him"?

Sir, this case is becoming more and more grave all the time. The future of the Republic seems to be trembling

in the balance. But as my colleague has evidently given his whole mind to this subject, and has formed his conclusions, no doubt with great reluctance, it will not do to treat the matter lightly.

Seriously speaking, sir, if I should discuss the moral aspect of my colleague's performance, I do not know whether it would be easy to remain within the bounds of parliamentary language. But being charitably disposed, I look at it as a thing of pathological interest, as a somewhat morbid hallucination, such as is frequently produced by the tortures of disappointed affection, and which, in its wild flights, loses all perception of reality and all appreciation of probabilities. I forgive him, sir; I forgive him, especially as I must do him the justice to say that his distemper did not altogether overcome the natural kindness of his heart, for I will not ascribe it to prudent discretion that he carefully avoided making any of those assertions in my presence. At the commencement of the campaign I invited my colleague to a public discussion; he declined for reasons undoubtedly satisfactory to himself, and then went straightway to a place where he knew I would not be to set afloat these stories. And when afterward I met him at some place in the interior of the State he carefully left out of his speech all that related to my contemplated treason; and then at the next place where I was not, he repeated the same stories again. His extreme reticence may be most satisfactorily explained on the theory that he thought such charges pronounced in my face might be too harrowing to my feelings.

But it was not against me alone; it was against the Germans generally that my colleague directed his batteries. After having represented them as a class of voting cattle who can be used by unscrupulous politicians for any

purpose, and transferred from one party to another at pleasure, he gives us his idea of the motives which govern the German-born citizens of this country on political matters. In his speech at Hannibal he appealed to the native prejudice, referring to the tariff question in the following language:

For my part all my sympathies are with the industries of my own land, and not with any other country of Europe or on the face of the globe. But General SCHURZ is a German; perhaps he might not be expected to have quite as warm sympathies for the industries of America as for the industries of his Fatherland.

As a piece of demagogism my colleague would consider it in anybody else of rather a low order, as low, I think, as a small politician may be capable of; and I use this strong term because not I alone am assailed, but because the patriotism of a very numerous, and I may say a very valuable class of our population is categorically called in question. In explaining it I shall have to return to my pathological hypothesis. To accuse me, because I was born a German, of a propensity to sacrifice the interests of this to the interests of a foreign country, and thus to stigmatize German nativity as the source of unpatriotic feeling, and this in the face of that spirit of self-sacrificing devotion which but yesterday led far more than a hundred thousand German-born citizens upon all the battlefields of the Republic, where their blood was as freely shed as that of any class of American citizens, and to do this in the position of a United States Senator and a professed spokesman of the Administration, is a thing so utterly repugnant to the commonest common-sense, so frantically preposterous, so ridiculously unjust, that the explanation on the pathological theory is the last refuge of the psychologist.

In the name of the Germans, sir, I forgive him again.

But while the charges and insinuations thrown out by my colleague had no effect upon the people of Missouri, except the contrary of that which they were intended for, I am sorry to say they seem to have had a strong effect upon the mind of the President. For, as the circumstances of the case have convinced me, it was at my colleague's instance that the President wrote a letter to the collector of internal revenue at St. Louis, in which the following language occurred:

I regard the movement headed by CARL SCHURZ, Gratz Brown, etc., as similar to the Tennessee and Virginia movement, intended to carry a portion of the Republican party over to the Democracy, and thus give them control. I hope you will all see your way clear to give the regular ticket your support.

And it was also at the instance of my colleague that the President subsequently suspended a number of Federal officeholders in Missouri for the reason that they preferred one Republican candidate for governor to another.

While the interference of the Administration in State elections by means of the patronage has long been considered a matter of most questionable propriety and bad policy under any circumstances, I am inclined to think that in this case he who persuaded the President to interfere proved a most dangerous adviser. I have already exposed some of those absurd stories which my colleague, before retailing them in Missouri, poured into the President's ear for the purpose of eliciting from him that denunciatory letter and a sort of commission to punish refractory officeholders in Missouri. To these he added the further assertion that the Gratz Brown movement was distinctly designed to be a war upon the Administration. That the President should have lent his ear to

such insinuations I sincerely deplore; I should not deplore it were I really an enemy of the Administration.

My position with regard to the Administration is easily stated, and that statement will be a complete refutation of the charge of factious opposition. When General Grant was elected to the Presidency his mission appeared to me so exalted and enviable as to excite and satisfy the noblest ambition. I described that mission, as it stood before my mind, in the first speech I delivered in the campaign in 1868, and I desire to quote a few passages of it, not as though the ideas put forth might not be clothed in more fitting language, but in order to show that I have only adhered to the line of thought expressed before General Grant's election. In July, 1868, I said:

The nomination of General Grant for the Presidency was not the work of the politicians; it was the work of the people. The popular instinct pointed to him as the available man in the best sense of the term; that is to say, not only because his renown as a soldier would command for him the largest number of votes, but because General Grant was looked upon as the fittest man to do just the things which at present are to be done. To execute the laws and to secure the results of the Congressional policy of reconstruction is a task which might have been performed with judgment and vigor by any Republican President. But another thing is to be done. The great objects of the Republican policy are to be reached in a manner calculated to overcome the difficulties produced by passion and animosity, to bring forth willing submission on the part of our opponents and to restore the long lost cordiality of feeling.

The waves of passion are still running high, and nothing is more necessary than that the country should be brought back to an even balance of mind. The questions before us require calm thought and a considerate exchange of ideas. It is in vain to hope for this as long as Andrew Johnson is President. It would certainly be vain to hope for it if the Democratic party with all its impatient greed and pent-up vindictiveness

should come into power. But the elevation of just such a man as Grant will be calculated to calm the waves of excitement, and to give to our deliberations the necessary degree of equanimity.

Immediately after the close of the war the late rebels of the South were disposed to submit quietly to whatever conditions of restoration the National Government might have imposed upon them. Had that opportunity been judiciously improved the country would have been at rest long ago. By Andrew Johnson's vicious intrigues it was lost. With General Grant's elevation to power it will return. He knows the Southern people and they know him. They have been in close and lively contact, and understand one another. He has given them evidence of his unbending determination in a conflict and of his generosity after a victory. They know that when he demanded an unconditional surrender he meant it to be unconditional; they know also that he treated the vanquished with magnanimous forbearance. He has proved to them that he is well capable of achieving and following up a success, but not capable of abusing it. The people of the South will therefore have no reason to fear that he will act with the vindictive spirit of an exasperated partisan, and no reason to hope that iniquity and factious opposition will meet from him with weak indulgence. They will be convinced that they will have to submit, and they will readily submit, to a policy which has been conceived with moderation and will be adhered to with firmness. As Andrew Johnson has stirred up the most vicious elements of Southern society to new activity, so Grant's election will give new encouragement and moral power to those men who in a spirit of peace and justice strive to confirm the new order of things.

Thus the new Republican Administration will move quietly and steadily forward on a line clearly traced in a fixed direction; the most unruly elements of Southern society will see the uselessness of kicking against irreversible results; the fires of party passion will burn out for want of fuel; the different branches of the National Government will coöperate in harmonious action, and with a President whose mind is untouched by the acrimony and bitterness of long party feuds we may

once more hope for what the Republic stands so greatly in need of, an era of good feeling.

Then, at last, when the country is no longer distracted by a fierce conflict between Congress and the President; when the great results of the war are placed beyond the reach of a reaction; when peace is assured by the fact that every class of society has its rights secured, and when we have a President whose ambition it is to follow the enlightened judgment of the people, then at last the people may safely devote their undivided attention to the important and pressing questions of social improvement and material prosperity. Then we shall be able to discuss the best means for discharging our National debt and the currency problem without being interrupted by wrangles about reconstruction; we can remodel our system of taxation without being troubled by violations of the tenure-of-office law; we can boldly attempt the reforms demanded by the dangerous practices which have crept into the civil service without fear of disturbing the machinery of government at a critical moment.

And just for the accomplishment of this most desirable, nay, most necessary reform, General Grant's peculiar position will afford invaluable facilities. He is indebted for his nomination and will be indebted for his election to nobody in particular. The Republican party in mass, not this or that combination of individual politicians, will have elevated him to the Presidency. No personal obligations to such will bind him to do their bidding, to adopt their preferences or to be governed by their dislikes. When selecting his advisers and instruments he will have the whole mass of talent, knowledge and character to be found among the true men of the country to choose from, without being narrowed down to a given circle by established claims on his gratitude. He will therefore have every inducement to lend a helping hand in the introduction of a thorough and permanent reform of the civil service, which, proceeding upon the idea that established character, knowledge and capability ought to be the only test of fitness for office, will at last give the country an able, honest and economical administration of the public business.

Indeed, from whatever point of view you may look at it, his peculiar position is so singularly fortunate that he needs only to appreciate its advantages in order to make his Administration one of the most peaceful and one of the most productive of good this Republic ever had.

Nobody will pretend, sir, that the hopes I then expressed, and which were undoubtedly shared by the best portion of the American people, were inspired by any but a spirit of the sincerest friendship for the then coming Administration. Indeed, sir, what could be better calculated to crown those in power with imperishable glory than a firm maintenance of the great principles which were victorious in our civil war, coupled with that wise generosity and benevolent justice shrinking from the restriction of any man's liberty and rights beyond the point marked by the evident necessities of the public peace; a steady determination to reform abuses even at the expense of immediate personal or party advantage; even-handed justice in rebuking and redressing that which is wrong, even when perpetrated by friends, and in recognizing that which is good, even when found in opponents; a management of affairs so clearly intended for the public good as to render ridiculous the mere suggestion of other motives; and a noble unselfishness in the use of power calculated to disarm any opposition; for nothing appeals so irresistibly to the popular heart as unselfishness brought into strong relief by great temptations firmly resisted? I ask, what policy could have been suggested by the President's most devoted personal friend that would have been more certain to lead to glorious results?

I have never hesitated, and I shall always be sincerely happy, to give the Administration my most cordial and arduous support in the direction thus indicated, and I

solemnly affirm it was in the line of this policy that the movement was designed which we undertook in Missouri. Nay, sir, far from entertaining intentions hostile to the true interests of the Administration, we sincerely believed ourselves entitled to the President's sympathy. And I must confess, when the President's letter appeared it was to me a painful surprise. Was not this surprise natural? Did not General Grant, when he wrote upon his banner those great words, "Let us have peace," stand before the country as the very exponent of a moderate and conciliatory policy; not as the creature and representative of professional politicians, but as the candidate of the people longing for the restoration of the long-lost cordiality of feeling? And did not this very circumstance give him that peculiar strength which carried him so triumphantly into the Presidential chair? "Let us have peace" was our watchword, just as it had been his. How could we be regarded as the enemies of his Administration in faithfully carrying out that idea with which his own success was so intimately identified?

If finally the election in Missouri became a defeat of the Administration, the President must look to himself or his advisers for the responsibility. We did not attack him; he attacked us. It is thus that our success became his discomfiture. The President's own principles achieved a victory over his patronage. Those who are denounced as his enemies protected his natural policy against the mistakes which those who call themselves his friends made him commit. Had he only maintained a friendly neutrality, our success would have passed for a triumph of the President's principles. Look at it. What would the result have been had he followed that most natural policy? He would have gained thousands of friends, even among those who had formerly opposed him, where now he has lost thousands. He would have

rendered an inestimable service to the cause of peace and good feeling, where now that cause has to be protected against his pretended friends. If instead of celebrating a triumph he has to deplore a rebuke, whose fault is it? Not ours, sir; certainly not ours.

We know well that the President has had no great opportunities for acquiring extensive political experience. That is certainly not his fault. It might have been an advantage. But the advisers who pretended to be his friends ought to have told him what the result of his interference would be. My colleague has been long enough in political life to know that almost all Administrations which attempted to control the people of a State in the regulation of their State affairs broke down in the operation. He might have told him that nothing was more calculated than such interference to rouse that spirit of independence, that feeling of a citizen's pride which indignantly repels all attempts at dragooning, and that the moral power of an Administration never issues unimpaired from the contest. My colleague at least ought to have remembered the history of Pierce, of Buchanan and of Andrew Johnson, and had he been the President's true friend no temptation of patronage would have seduced him to advise the President to fall into the mistakes of such predecessors.

Now, sir, I will show you how the authority of the Administration was prostituted by its pretended supporters. Here is a circular issued by the chairman of the McClurg State committee, addressed to the Federal officeholders in Missouri:

[Confidential and Important]

ST. LOUIS, October 24, 1870.

DEAR SIR: The State Republican committee have great and imperative need of funds at once, to carry the campaign

to successful issue. An assessment of one per cent. on the annual gross receipts of your office is therefore called for, and you will please inclose that amount, without delay, to the treasurer, E. S. Rowse, in the envelope inclosed.

This assessment is made after conference with our friends at Washington, where it is confidently expected that those who receive the benefits of Federal appointments will support the machinery that sustains the party which gives them pecuniary benefit and honor. The exigencies are great, and delay or neglect will rightly be construed into unfriendliness to the Administration. We do not look for such a record from you, and you will at once see the propriety and wisdom of the earliest possible attention to the matter.

ISAAC SHEPPARD,

Chairman of Committee.

E. S. ROWSE, *Treasurer.*

That this did not come from the Administration itself may be looked upon as certain. It was probably a mere attempt to levy blackmail by threats and intimidation. But does not the Administration see what the practical political managers are capable of doing in its name?

But there are still other things which render it difficult to find in our history an instance in which the attempt to turn the civil service into a mere machinery of political coercion and moral degradation showed itself in a more repulsive form. Imagine a professed spokesman of those in power travelling from town to town, like Judge Jeffreys with his bloody assize, boisterously proclaiming to the trembling tribe of officeholders that he was the man to have their official heads cut off if they dared to transgress the rules laid down by him. Why, sir, I heard with my own ears how that gentleman, in that assumed representative capacity, with a jubilant taunt referred in a public speech to the postmaster of a small town upon whom the execution had already been performed, and who sat there listening to him. Is it a wonder, sir, that decent

men turned away with disgust when the dignity of the National Government was asserted by such exhibitions?

Of course, sir, some of the understrappers caught the lusty spirit of the chief executioner. It was a burst of civil service reform, and the principle which governed it appears with striking clearness in the following correspondence:

U. S. INTERNAL REVENUE COLLECTOR'S OFFICE,
FIFTH DISTRICT MISSOURI, CARTHAGE,
MISSOURI, October 3, 1870.

MY DEAR SIR: It becomes my painful duty to inform you that the course you are pursuing in regard to politics in this State is of such a character, in my judgment, as will in the end prove detrimental to the true interests of the Radical party of Missouri. Such being my view of the matter, I am compelled to inform you that your resignation will be received. In doing this, Colonel, it grieves me to the heart. As an officer you have been honest, worthy and true; as a business man you have exceeded my most sanguine expectations; as a friend I believe I have no more devoted in the State. All of our transactions have been of the most pleasant nature, and in parting at this time let me assure you of my friendship, let me assure you of my well-wishes in all your undertakings (save politics of the Brown kind) in the future. As we have always been friends, let us so remain.

This is as we expected, when I was with you last. Let it be understood as having been your own motion, that you voluntarily resigned. I am anxious that it should be so. None will be the wiser for me, for my feeling toward you is the same personally.

Please retain the records and do the business of the office until I can send your successor to you to transfer.

Very truly, your friend,

GEO. D. ORNER, *Collector.*

Colonel DANIEL E. SAUNDERS,
Deputy Collector Fifth Missouri District,
Sedalia, Missouri.

Look at this. There is an officer whose character and ability are certified to in the highest terms of praise. His efficiency exceeded the most sanguine expectations of his superior; and yet that superior coolly informs him that he must go because he refuses to degrade himself by giving up his honest convictions on a question of difference inside of the party, and a more pliant tool is put in his place! Can you imagine the impression such things make upon the people?

But enough of this detail. We learn from the President's message that the Administration is in favor of civil service reform. I hail the announcement with sincere satisfaction. All patriotic men greet it with applause. It is only to be regretted that in this instance the coming event did not cast its shadow before. Had it been intended to demonstrate in Missouri, even to the dullest mind, how necessary a reform is to prevent such scandals the lesson would not be lost upon the people, and I hope Congress will not hesitate to act upon it. But if the action of the Administration in Missouri was meant to be a specimen of the intended reform, then I am sorry I cannot place much value upon the promise, for in Missouri the civil service was reformed in the true Andrew Johnson style, by an undisguised attempt to organize a genuine bread-and-butter brigade, driving out of the service those who had honest manhood enough to sacrifice their salaries for their convictions, and putting a premium on venality. As to the moral effect, I will not describe the indignation of the more excitable, and the profound sadness at this spectacle which prompted the criticism of our best and most patriotic citizens. There is the result of the Administration following the advice of the "practical political managers." The Lord save the Administration and the party if such influences should further succeed in governing their course!

And now, sir, why was all this done? "Because you designed to disrupt the Republican party in Missouri," as our accusers say. Well, sir, my allegiance is to the Republican cause. In the principles embodied in that cause I believe. To the advocacy of those principles I have faithfully devoted the best years and efforts of my manhood. And I do not hesitate to declare that to me that cause stands above the party. When the party or any subdivision of it becomes faithless to that cause, and I have to choose between fidelity to it and fidelity to the organization, then my allegiance belongs to the cause still. And it was that allegiance which directed every one of my steps. Show me in our platform a single resolution that is not a faithful reassertion of the best principles we as Republicans have been fighting for; show me a single point in which any of the great results of the war is given up, in which a single iota of the true Republican creed is compromised. You will search in vain. Point out to me a single one of the candidates we nominated who was not thoroughly identified with the Republican cause. You can find none.

"But you did break the Republican organization of Missouri in two," our accusers say. So we did. When a portion of the Republican organization became faithless to a vital point of the Republican platform, and when the Republican cause was endangered by the wire-pullers and spoilsmen of the party, it was better to break the organization in two than to permit the whole to be covered with common disgrace and to be reduced to common impotency. In this way we saved the moral power of the Republican cause for the future.

"But you asked for Democratic votes," we are told. So we did. I always did. During fifteen years of work for the Republican cause I scarcely ever made a speech but for the distinct purpose of obtaining Democratic

votes. In my opinion it is the main object of political agitation to convince your opponents that you are right and that they had better go with you. It has always been my ambition to obtain Democratic votes for Republican ideas, and the more I could obtain the better was I satisfied, and, for aught I know, my party too.

"But your policy pleased the Democrats," our opponents say. I am glad it did. It is no objection to our policy that it commended itself to the sensible men of all parties. And in this connection, sir, I may say that something was accomplished by our movement in Missouri which, I think, was never accomplished before in any State. Not only was there not the least attempt at a disturbance anywhere in our State when the colored people for the first time exercised the right of suffrage, and while they were generally supposed to vote against the State ticket, supported by the Democrats, but an overwhelming majority of the Democrats themselves voted for an amendment to the State constitution giving colored men the right to hold office. This alone, sir, is so great a triumph of Republican principles, and in its peculiar greatness it stands so conspicuously alone in the history of our days, that in the face of it all the charges brought against our movement as hostile to Republicanism vanish into utter nothingness. Let our detractors show us anywhere a success like this, and then let them throw a stone at us. Yes, sir, a movement which accomplished the practical recognition of the principle of equal rights even to this extent, and by our opponents themselves, has so gloriously vindicated its Republican tendency by tangible results that no Republican who has his cause more at heart than mere party drill can fail to hail it as a most triumphant consummation.

But, I am asked: "How are those whom you have now enfranchised going to vote? Will they not vote the

Democratic ticket?" And here, I suppose, is the rub. Candidly speaking, sir, I expect that a great many of those who were disfranchised on account of their connection with the rebellion will abhor a reopening of the questions that sprang from the war, sincerely accept accomplished results, honestly identify themselves with the new order of things and vote accordingly. I know that some of the most intelligent and prominent men among them would have voted with us in 1868 had they been permitted to vote, and I hope—and I have reasons for that hope—that now the number of their followers will not be small. I know also, that, had we not acted as we did, there would never have been any possibility to produce a moral impression on our part upon that class of citizens. To-day the moral strength of true Republicanism in Missouri is infinitely greater than it was six months ago, for true Republicanism dares to be itself again.

But, sir, the number of votes our opponents would have was not a question which I could permit to control my action. I supported those measures of safety, disfranchisement included, which the necessities of a revolutionary period demanded, as long as those necessities existed. They having ceased, disfranchisement has no longer any justification to rest upon. If to the last man the reënf franchised in Missouri were to vote against me, that, I solemnly declare, is at this day to me no reason why they should not vote at all. I have struggled for the equal rights of men, whether they be black or white. I am ready to stand up for the equal rights of men, whether they be Democrats or Republicans. I do not know how many of the reënf franchised will vote for us, but I do know—and here I express my profoundest conviction, sir—I do know that if there is a party which, after the danger to the Republic is past; after the principles which triumphed in the war are firmly fortified in our

fundamental laws; after the rights of even the lowliest citizens are constitutionally secured—still attempts to proscribe and disfranchise its opponents merely for the purpose of maintaining itself in power and of monopolizing the offices, such a party will lose all moral influence over public opinion, and will be bound to go to the bottom. And, moreover, I do know, that as the system of slavery rendered the master-class unfit for true liberty, so the system of disfranchisement, kept up for reasons of party advantage, must in a short time render the ruling party unfit for good government.

In fact, sir, I recognize objects in political life superior to the immediate advantage of my party. I am well aware that political parties are necessary, and that to make them live a certain drill and discipline are needed. I also appreciate the necessity of compromising on minor points inside of a party, for the purpose of securing strong and hearty coöperation in the furtherance of greater ends. A party may not satisfy me in every respect, but I may belong to it because it approaches my ideal more closely than any other. But I have never been able to look up to a party as a deity that has supernatural claims upon my veneration. To me my party has never been anything else than an organization of men gotten up for the purpose of carrying certain principles into living reality, or of promoting the execution of certain measures of public good. This object of the organization has always been to my mind the first, nay, the only thing of real importance, and I look upon all other so-called party interests as absolutely secondary to it. "My party, right or wrong," is therefore a cry which I never was and never shall be able to appreciate. I might submit to its being wrong on a minor point; but should it go wrong on an essential principle, I should defend that principle even against the party.

Among the fundamental ideas which have governed me in my public life, there is this in the first line: to guarantee the largest possible liberty and, at the same time, the greatest security of individual rights to all in our political and social organization. I joined the Republican party for the only reason that it appeared to me to work in the direction of that great end. And it did. If, under exceptional circumstances, it restricted the rights of some, it was to establish an order of things in which the rights of all would be secured. That accomplished, the vital principles of the party compel a prompt removal of the restrictions, for only thus can the great end of the Republican policy be reached. If it is said that thereby the ascendancy of the Republican organization is imperiled, the answer is, that the true object for which the party has been struggling will be better subserved by securing all in their right to vote, even if ever so many vote against us, than by arbitrarily depriving of their vote those hostile to the party as a means to keep the organization in power.

This is what I mean by saying that I recognize in political life objects far superior to the pretended advantage of my party. Such a doctrine may appear strangely heretic to those who know nothing higher than obtaining at the polls a majority for their candidates, whoever their candidates may be. But these are the principles which have always guided me in my political course; I have always professed them, and shall always be ready to act upon them.

And I go even further than this. The greater this Republic grows, and the more extensive the interests become with which we have to deal in political life, the more imperative becomes the necessity of raising the standard of our political morals, and the more difficult will be this task. In order to effect it, it is not only desirable but indispensable that a healthy spirit of indi-

vidual independence and self-criticism inside of political parties be encouraged and developed, even at the expense of party discipline.

I do not underestimate the value of party discipline so far as it facilitates the subordination of minor questions to objects of paramount importance. But when the mere possession of power and office for its own sake becomes the paramount object of a party, then party discipline becomes a demoralizing element, and the sooner it gives way the better; the better for the general morality of political life, and sometimes the better for the party itself. Such a case we had in Missouri, and I repeat what I said before, had the object of our independent movement been only to defeat the selfish maneuvers of the spoilsmen and wire-pullers it would deserve the commendation of every patriotic citizen. The spirit of individual independence may seem to be a troublesome element in any organization; but if it is largely represented in a political party it will have the most wholesome effect of keeping the professional managers mindful of the fact that they may succeed in setting on foot a selfish and corrupt scheme, but are by no means certain of being permitted to enjoy the fruit of it, and that an improper nomination even in a majority party is not equivalent to an election.

But the problems this generation has to solve render the development of honest self-criticism and individual independence inside of parties peculiarly indispensable. We have just issued from a social and political revolution which has essentially changed the relations of the elementary forces of society and the distribution of political powers. The political rights of the individual, formerly at the mercy of the States, have been in a great measure placed under the safeguard of the National authority. The working out of this great result has led to certain

habits in the assumption and exercise of political power which have to some extent disturbed those balances in which self-government finds its security. We shall have to readjust those balances so as to make the new prerogatives of the National authority answer their legitimate objects, and at the same time render them conformable to that independence which local self-government must possess in order to develop its blessings. In that delicate task we shall not unfrequently find the apparent interests of party in conflict with the important object to be accomplished. And just there a rigid party discipline may sometimes be found standing in the way of the necessary solution, and the intervention of conscientious independent action may become necessary for the public good.

And, more than this. Great pecuniary interests have sprung up in an organized form and commenced to exercise an influence in politics which threatens to become controlling. Do not understand me as indulging here in a one-sided fling at the so-called industrial monopolies fostered by a high protective tariff; I allude to all those powerful corporations whose hands have been so visible here and there in the proceedings of legislative bodies and even in the decisions of judges. Influences like these are more likely to grow than to decrease; and when once the machinery of political parties falls into their hands, with the resources of patronage and all the appliances of professional management, what will the consequences be unless the spirit of individual independence breaks through the routine of party drill and discipline? How much we are involved in those struggles already, or how soon they will be upon us, I will not here undertake to discuss; but certainly we cannot too soon nor too much encourage that spirit which sees in political parties not mere mutual insurance companies, but means for the

promotion of great public ends which stand above them; that spirit which recognizes the interests of the public welfare as infinitely superior to the temporary advantage of mere political organizations. It is for such reasons mainly that I am so strongly in favor of destroying what is called patronage, and of a civil service reform which is not only to give the country a more efficient class of public servants, but, above all things, to remove from our political life a most dangerous element of demoralization. Some of our "active and practical political managers" may object that if such doctrines prevail they will no longer be able to run any party. I answer, so much the better. The running of parties which we observe here and there leads me to the conclusion that they would run better were they not run at all.

And now, sir, I desire to devote a few remarks to a subject which of late has been discussed with a certain degree of nervousness, and with which, among others, the recent election in Missouri and my name have been brought in connection. I mean the organization of a new party. I shall express my opinions with entire frankness, for I have never hesitated to avow the motives governing my political course. My colleague, as you are aware, asserts that I intend to go over to the Democrats. Let me assure him, if that were my intention I should have the courage to say so.

Every hint at the possibility of organizing a new party on the part of a Republican or a Democrat has been treated on both sides as a sort of high treason. I will at once confess that, whatever my views concerning its practicability may be, I do not look upon the idea as anything particularly criminal. I am even convinced that things have a tendency in that direction. But I know also that parties cannot be manufactured to order; they spring and grow into being as new issues arise or old

ones press into the foreground and give a powerful impulse to the popular mind. Neither can new issues be manufactured to order; they also spring and grow out of the existing condition of things. In one respect, however, the circumstances surrounding us seem to favor a change of party relations.

That the Republican party has virtually accomplished those things which lay in the line of its original policy, and that the Democratic party has had to change its policy with regard to the most essential points in controversy several times within the last ten years, and now exists merely as an opposition party, are things which are every day asserted and every day denied. There is, however, an impression growing on the popular mind that it actually is so; and there is some reason for that impression.

The Republican party fought against slavery and that sort of State sovereignty which formed the protection of slavery, and they have disappeared. The Democratic party fought for these things, and they cannot be restored. The fight for and against them is therefore ended and become obsolete. Thus the great issues which originally formed the line of division exist no longer. Attempts to artificially revive them will not avail much longer. On one side efforts may be made to unsettle the positive results which have grown out of this struggle. These efforts may produce grievous disturbance and confusion for a time, but in the end they will prove powerless against the fixed determination of the popular mind to uphold the new order of things. Such efforts may for a moment strengthen, and justly strengthen, the idea on the other side that much is still to be done to protect accomplished results, and that to this end the continuance of the old organization is necessary; but it will also turn out to be true that the task of protecting those results will in many

respects be best performed by a natural development which depends on other agencies than direct political action.

The popular impression, if not entirely right, is therefore not entirely wrong. A new phase of development is upon us. It will naturally bring forth new problems, new duties, new questions of general interest, and this circumstance will not long remain without influence upon the composition and the relations of parties.

But while in this respect the situation of things seems to favor a new formation, in another it does not. While the old issues are well-nigh exhausted, the fresh problems which the new order of things brings with it have not sufficiently developed themselves. Not one of them has so far seized upon the popular mind with that power which is required for a new creation. The question of the removal of disabilities is but an ephemeral one; it may be disposed of to-morrow, and I hope it will. The question of the future relations of the States to the National Government is still covered by the reminiscences of the war, and does not appear yet in the light of the new interests which our new condition will develop. The tariff question, great as its importance is, has not yet proved absorbing enough to overshadow all other political differences. Moreover, it has not yet been reduced to that simplicity which would render it less liable to compromise, and a vague impression of the inexhaustible abundance of our economic resources on the one side, as well as the revenue necessities of the Treasury caused by the National debt on the other, prevents it as yet from gaining sufficient prominence to become the principal line of division between parties. As for civil service reform as a great party issue, we see already that if one party adopts it the other will also raise the cry, although it may be nothing but a cry.

Thus it appears that at this moment the necessary inspiration is wanting for the formation of a new party. And yet the preliminary fermentation is evidently working in both the existing organizations. I confidently assert that a considerable element in the Democratic organization are dissatisfied with their party, but stay in it because they like the Republican party still less. And a considerable element in the Republican organization are dissatisfied with their party, but stay in it because they like the Democratic party less. I know this assertion will be vociferously denied by zealous partisans on both sides; but such is the result of my observations, and I believe it to be correct. Both parties have lost much of that positive moral power which is necessary to sway the popular mind.

That under such circumstances the discipline of either party should prove insufficient to prevent irregular movements, splits and breaks and schisms, is by no means surprising. You witness such things not in Missouri only; you observe them wherever you turn your eyes. They do not spring from the wiles and intrigues of "political Catilines," as an indignant party organ expressed itself. They are not the cause but the result, the natural outgrowth of the situation. They are elementary upheavings; and if you try to repress them by a violent enforcement of party discipline you will only provoke more violent and formidable explosions. And now, while the prospect of a new line of division may to-day appear rather dim, yet I repeat something of the kind will come with the necessity of a natural process. It may not come for some time, and yet it may come all at once, over night, as a political question strikes and sets on fire the popular mind; a question, perhaps, existing to-day, but thrust into prominence by a sudden event which we do not think of at present.

And thus I hear myself asked, Thus you think, that if such a new line of division must come, the Republican party is in a moribund condition? No, sir, not necessarily so. I do not think so; for I believe the Republican party may and ought to become the new party itself.

I do, however, believe that the Republican party is doomed if it fails to appreciate the vital conditions of its existence. The rank and file of the Republican party have always been very different in character from the elements composing the Democratic organization. The latter finds its main strength in habit, drill and discipline. But the former consists of volunteers who are united and strong only when fighting for a cause powerfully engaging their intellectual and moral natures. They are always inclined to look with a critical eye at the ends they are to serve and at the conduct of their leaders. Drill and discipline are not sufficient to control them. When they ask, "What are we fighting for?" and the only answer is "The party," they are slow to march. You remember they did fight with the power of genuine enthusiasm against slavery and for the integrity of the Republic and the great principles from which true republican government draws its life. But if the Republican party should ever adopt as the main aim and end of its political operations its own perservation and the possession of power and office, or other selfish interests, and rely to that end upon something like the patronage and those tricks of the trade which form the traditional apparatus of the "practical political manager," then the party will most certainly lose the support of its best elements, for it will lose the great inspirations which enlist the volunteers and set them in motion. Trimming and wire-pulling can certainly not preserve the vitality of an organization like ours.

Neither will the high-sounding recital of our glorious

memories answer much longer. The Republican masses are indeed proud of their past achievements, as they have a right to be. But they do not desire their party to quarter itself, like an idle and hungry pensioner, upon the public crib on account of great services rendered some time ago. They know that the war is over, and they are glad of it. They do not want to beat the war-drum longer than it is called for.

Still less do I think that a stroke of sensation, such as a foreign difficulty, gotten up for the purpose of preserving the party in a blaze of artificial excitement, can answer the object. Far from going into a trap of that kind, the intelligent and patriotic masses would indignantly repel such a trick as an atrocity worthy of a Louis Napoleon, but not of a republican people governing themselves.

Neither do I believe that the Republican party can live if it makes itself the representative, advocate and agent of any special economic interest. Such a policy would certainly bring on its decomposition.

Nay, sir, the only way to preserve the vitality of the Republican party is to make it the party of progressive reforms; in other words, the new party, which is bound to come in one form or another. I do not mean that as a party of reforms it should lightly catch up every new "ism" hatched by heated brains; but it should resolutely address itself to the reformation of the abuses and the solution of the problems which daily become more evident to every observing mind.

Let it first and foremost promptly sweep away those political restrictions which were born of the necessities of a revolutionary period, and ought not to survive them; things which now, instead of protecting anybody, are only calculated to impede a gradual settlement of difficulties by natural process. Let it speedily abandon the preposterous idea that in days like these such restrictions

can be an element of strength to any party. Let it endeavor by all means to divert the minds of those we have conquered away from the past, and to turn them toward the future, by boldly advancing the questions of the present and future to the foreground, instead of harping upon reminiscences. Let it so exercise the powers of the central authority as not to hamper the beneficial action of local self-government, while protecting every citizen in his right to participate in it. Let it be just to itself and to the people by fearlessly acknowledging, exposing and correcting what errors of policy may have been committed and what abuses may have crept in under its rule, and by discountenancing unworthy men in its ranks. Let it resolutely put the ax to the root of the great scandals of our political life which spring from our absurd and demoralizing system of civil service. Let it practice true and conscientious economy, not only in the expenditure and application of public moneys, but also in the method of levying them, so as to be equally just to all classes and all economical interests. And finally, let it set itself, not only in legislation, but also in its influence upon popular elections, with the most indefatigable watchfulness and unflinching energy, against the growing political power of moneyed corporations, which steals upon us with a cat-like step and threatens to make our democratic institutions a mere tool in the hands of despotic monopolies.

Let the Republican party follow a policy like this with an unselfish spirit, and it will find in it a surer means of maintaining itself than in the most refined tricks of political management. It will then scorn the idea of sustaining its ascendancy by disfranchising its opponents, and wonder how that idea could have lived so long; for it will, as in the most glorious days of its past career, again with the full pride and force of great inspirations

appeal to the popular conscience, and its rejuvenated moral strength will never falter before a number of opponents ever so large. As it was the great party of the past, thus it may and ought to become the great party of the future.

But can this be accomplished? I know the difficulties and hostile influences to be overcome, and I do not underestimate them. But I have sincere and great faith in the Republican masses. Whatever changes may have taken place in the composition of the party, I believe it still represents a vast preponderance of popular intelligence and also of popular integrity. I am certainly not blind to its failings, and I cannot be blind to its virtues. I firmly believe the Republican party does contain the elements of a healthy regeneration. I further believe, if a new party should arise, it would have to draw its most valuable material from the Republican ranks in order to become equal to the exigencies of the times. I think, therefore, the Republican party has the stuff in it to become that new party itself. The question is only whether its *best* can also become its *controlling* impulses. It is the question determining its vitality. I firmly hope and trust it can be successfully solved.

I am aware that the Democrats to-day set up a loud pretense to the monopoly of the true reformatory spirit. But it appears to me that pretense stands somewhat loosely in the air. My Democratic friends on this floor will not accuse me of having been governed in my discussions with them by the stupid prejudices of partisanship. I have not unfrequently put a high value upon their criticisms, and I have endeavored to look at their party with the eyes of a calm and conscientious observer. And having done this, I repeat, I have so far seen no reasons strong enough to make me believe in the reformatory mission of the Democratic organization. It is true,

the prevailing sentiment in it may be in favor of what is called revenue reform. But I have not only noticed in their last national platform a resolution strongly squinting the opposite way, but on this very floor I have observed a strange tendency to compromise on that question according to local interests. Besides, the tariff question is not the only, it may perhaps not even be the most important, question of the future.

I read in Democratic papers that their party has always been in favor of civil service reform. This is news to me. I cannot forget that the principle "To the victors belong the spoils" is of Democratic origin; that they have inaugurated the system and developed the abuses under which we now suffer, and if these abuses have multiplied it is only because, in consequence of great necessities, the machinery of the civil service was made more complicated and extensive. I have neither heard from a Democratic leader, nor have I read in a Democratic newspaper, of any practical proposition of civil service reform which would lead me to believe that any other change was intended than to transfer the offices from Republican to Democratic hands, and to let the vicious method of appointment and removal continue. If I am mistaken I shall be glad to be corrected.

But the most prominent feature of the course of the Democracy in our days has been that it did not keep pace with, but continually lagged behind, the progress of the times. I will not rehearse the catalogue of Democratic sins committed during the war. I am not given to that. But here is a point touching the living present. While on the Republican side mistakes were made in relying for the development of the new order of things too long on a policy of restriction, instead of giving wider range to the natural process, the Democratic party impeded a healthy development, and kept up the ani-

mosities of the past by mischievous appeals to old prejudices and the promise of a reaction. I know well that a reaction against the new order of things cannot now lead to a lasting success; but I know also that a policy tending in that direction would result in temporary confusion. Instead of burying the issues of the past, the Democracy has rather shown an inclination to gain local advantages by uselessly renewing them. Of late they have here and there promised to give it up, and every patriotic man would hail the fulfilment of that promise with delight.

A more important point still is this: while there is not as much self-criticism in the Republican party as might be desired, party drill and discipline are infinitely more potent in the Democratic party in stifling the moral impulses. This arises in a great measure from the character of the elements which compose the rank and file of the organization. They show little individual independence in political action, and therefore easily yield to management and leadership. The Democrat who still votes for Andrew Jackson may be fabulous, but as a satire on an existing class the story is not without point. I have already spoken of the sinister influence of powerful moneyed corporations. No party will resist them easily. But when such influences take an organization in which habit, drill and discipline are so potent as in the Democracy, in hand, they are for these very reasons apt to become irresistible. New York may to-day be looked upon as the model Democratic State, and if the Democratic organization, Tammany, with its rings, is to take possession of the Democratic national organization, to dictate its policy and designate its candidates, as has been openly suggested, and as is quite probable, the prospect of stern resistance to the dangerous intrusion of the money power, and the chances of a wise and unselfish reform policy,

are, to say the least, not flattering enough to prove seductive. The Democratic party in opposition performs the pleasant office of a critic. But its fair promises are accompanied by a rather damaging commentary furnished by the party in those places where it enjoys decided facilities to carry those promises into practice. Many of those who make promises of reform are undoubtedly sincere. But I fear, with the Democratic party in power, those sincere men would be unable to carry them out. They would find in the component elements of the party an insuperable difficulty.

Taking it all in all, therefore, I may return to what I said before: the best materials for progressive reforms, the true unselfish reformatory spirit, as well as the healthiest impulses of individual independence, are still to be found among the elements out of which the Republican party is formed. And I fervently hope that this spirit and those impulses may succeed in determining the character of its policy, without permitting it first to go through the crucible of defeat, and preventing it from falling into that decomposition which otherwise, not individual politicians, but the natural progress of events, would inevitably bring on.

Mr. President, I am about to close. My remarks have taken a wide range, and I have said things which may displease some of my political friends. I regret that. But, sir, I cannot look at all that surrounds us with the eye of the partisan. I cannot bid my moral impulses and my conscientious convictions be silent in the face of wrongs and abuses, whoever may be responsible for them, and whoever may derive advantage from them. The convictions upon which I have acted in Missouri and spoken here were not formed lightly, on the spur of the moment. They are the political faith of my life. I have cherished them from the beginning of my career,

and I think they will guide me to the end. In their advocacy I am profoundly in earnest.

Let no man suspect me, sir, of any willingness to jeopardize for future reforms any of the great results we have won by the struggles of the past. No; not that. By them I shall stand to the last; I will help to maintain them at any cost and hazard. But it is my sincere belief, and I cannot express it too strongly, that there is no policy better calculated to secure those results against all danger, than that which will furnish the conditions for a general revival of national feeling; that which will divert the popular mind from its broodings over past dissensions and occupy it with the great things now to be done for the common good; that which will raise our political life to a higher level of morality; that which will restore once more all over the soil of this Republic the working of true popular government. Whatever temporary disappointments we may have to meet, such a policy is sure to triumph in the end. And I am confident that those who contribute to such a result will, when at a future day the controversies of this period can be surveyed in all their bearings, be considered to have worked for the best interests of their country.

TO CHARLES SUMNER

2020 F St., New Year's Day, '71.

My dear Friend: Your servant has brought joy and strength to this house, so far as such things can be carried in bottles. I thank you most sincerely for what you have sent, but I almost suspect you of sinister motives for having sent *so much*. Do you intend to bribe me? Do you think you can thus induce me to stand by you when you are to be driven from the Committee on Foreign

Relations, or to vote with you on San Domingo? If such are your designs, you have chosen your means wisely. Well, I will do it. In the meantime accept, with my thanks for the bribe, the sincerest wishes of my whole family, for a happy new year.

ANNEXATION OF SAN DOMINGO¹

MR. PRESIDENT:—The Congress of the United States is at the present moment presenting a curious spectacle to the American people. We are discussing the question whether a commission of inquiry shall be sent to San Domingo for the purpose of investigating the condition of that country; and we are deliberating under the whip and spur of extraordinary urgency, being told that it must be done now, and must be done quickly. That commission is to furnish us certain information. Who needs that information? Not the President of the United States, for he has told us in his message that it was an act of folly to reject the annexation of San Domingo, and that it would be a great calamity to this country if that act should be repeated. It must therefore necessarily be presumed that he had in his possession already all that information which led him to such peremptory conclusions.

Who else may want it? Probably not the Senators around me who are in favor of annexation, for they have made up their minds. It may be presumed that they know all they desire to know to lead them to the formation of the convictions upon which they are ready to act.

Who then does need it? If anybody, the Senators and

¹ Speech in the United States Senate, Jan. 11, 1871. The Senate had under consideration the amendment of the House of Representatives to the joint resolution (S. R. No. 262) authorizing the appointment of commissioners in relation to the republic of Dominica.

the members of the House of Representatives do, who are so far opposed to annexation.

Is it then unreasonable, when making up a bill of the subjects which are to be inquired into, that the desires of those who stand in need of that information should be consulted? Should not they before all others be asked (for they may be open to conviction) "What do you desire to know; what information is it that may possibly shake the conclusions at which you have arrived?"

And yet, what was the spectacle we observed upon the floor of the Senate the other day? A bill of subjects to be inquired into was laid before us. It was argued on our part that that bill of subjects contained a great many things which were indifferent, and that, on the other hand, it did not contain many which were of the utmost importance for the Congress of the United States to know; and yet, wonderful to tell, whenever any suggestion was made in the form of an amendment by a Senator who was known to be opposed to annexation, as to a point upon which he desired to be informed, it was incontinently voted down.

For instance, it was asserted on this floor, and I think with some show of reason, and the assertion came from a quarter entitled to respect, that the Government of President Baez was upheld by the naval power of the United States. This may be true or not. It was asserted that if the naval forces of the United States were withdrawn from the waters of San Domingo, the Government of President Baez would at once fall; that the people themselves were dissatisfied with their ruler; that they would avail themselves of the first opportunity of free action to tumble him from his seat. That may be true, or it may not be; and yet nobody will deny that it is for us a most interesting subject to have reliable information upon.

For that reason I introduced an amendment that the ships of war kept by the United States in the waters of

San Domingo should be withdrawn, and that if any protectorate was exercised over the present Government of San Domingo by which that Government was kept in power, such protectorate should be immediately discontinued; and that for the purpose of giving the people of San Domingo an opportunity and time to speak their true sentiments freely and without any restraint, and for the purpose of giving that inquiry commission an opportunity to learn the true sentiments of the people freely developed, the commission should not commence its inquiry until about three months after all outside pressure had been removed from the people of that island; and yet, sir, that amendment was at once voted down.

I would ask gentlemen, are they afraid of what might come to light if the protection of the United States Navy were withdrawn from that island? And furthermore, why in the name of common sense are we in such a tremendous hurry? Is it necessary that we should annex San Domingo to-morrow? Can we not wait two, three, or four months? Is it indispensably necessary that the commission should start without the least delay, with instructions ill-digested and hurriedly made up?

One reason was given why it should start at once: that if it did not it could not complete its labors during the cool season. Why, sir, the joint resolution requires that the commission shall give us some information concerning the climate of San Domingo; and here they are to be sent off at once, and to return before the hot season commences, so that they may have no unpleasant experiences of the climate of that island to report upon. Senators, are we serious men, or is this a mere mockery with which we are attempting to delude ourselves, and to deceive the people of the United States? Is this to be an honest inquiry, or is it to be merely a piece of

political jugglery? In the face of the facts, is not this a legitimate question?

I expressed the opinion when the resolution was under consideration before, that if that commission were to inquire conscientiously into all the subjects enumerated in the joint resolution it would require at least from three to five years to arrive at a result of real value; and that is my opinion still. And yet we were coolly told here that the whole inquiry is to be finished in three or four weeks. I might vote for a scientific commission to be sent to San Domingo, or anywhere else, for the purpose of, in good faith, augmenting the stock of human knowledge; but can any such end be attained by a commission like this, sent there in hot haste, without preparation, to do what it is to do in an unseemly hurry and then to report here before the expiration of this Congress so that we may quickly annex San Domingo? It looks rather like a mockery than like a solemn act of legislation.

The gentlemen who favor this project themselves feel the weakness of their proposition, for they endeavor to devise all manner of pretexts to divert our minds from the true purpose. It was said that the commission was to be sent there for the purpose of justifying, exonerating, exculpating the President of the United States in certain things; that suspicion had been thrown upon his character; that accusations had been raised against him personally. If this be so I do not know it. As far as I am aware, no such charge has been made by any responsible party willing to sustain it. Neither do I believe that the people of the United States think the President of the United States to be acting in this matter from corrupt motives. We certainly did not say that he needed any justification. That suggestion came from the other side, and at the same time from the other side came the proposition that the President should, without the advice and consent of the

Senate, himself appoint the jury to try him. Is it not evident on the very face of things that the declamation about the President having to be justified and exculpated was nothing but a mere subterfuge?

We are asked, "Why not give the President this commission which he would like so much to have?" Do gentlemen on the other side desire to represent the President of the United States to us as a child, to be humored with a bauble? I, for my part, have more respect for the office and more respect for the man. No, sir; for such things a grave act like this ought not to be performed. Such things are hardly compatible with the dignity of the President, and just as little with the dignity of the Congress of the United States.

Mr. President, what is the subject which we are thus to inquire into and which is being treated with such levity? It is not whether we shall purchase a building site for a new public office, to expend a million or two; not whether we shall grant aid to a railroad; not whether we should acquire a strip of territory on our frontier to rectify a boundary. Sir, the subject we are discussing is one in comparison with which such things appear insignificant and trivial; the question before us is one of the most momentous problems that has ever occupied the attention of the Congress of the United States or any legislative assembly in the world. It is not even merely whether we are to annex the Dominican half of the island of Hayti. It is the question whether we shall incorporate the American tropics in our political system.

Suppose we annex the Dominican republic; will there be the end of our acquisitions? Remember the outcry which was raised against the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SUMNER] the other day when he asserted that the message of the President contained a menace against Hayti. I will not enter into a controversy here about the

phraseology of that state paper; but does not the mere idea of annexing the Dominican republic contain in itself *ipso facto* the most flagrant threat against Hayti that can possibly be uttered? Is there a man on the floor of the Senate who thinks that when we have the one-half of that island we shall stop before we have the other? Does the Senator from Indiana [Mr. MORTON] think so? Has not the Senator from Nevada [Mr. STEWART] just asserted that of course we must have the other half? And so we must. It is an absolutely preposterous idea that we should content ourselves while part of that island is in the hands of another Power. Our possessions being divided from the Haytian republic by a mere imaginary line of boundary, continually crossed by marauding parties, the very exigencies of our customs service would oblige us to take the territory of the Haytian republic too. Is it not, therefore, a trifling equivocation if you deny that there is really a threat against the Haytian republic continued in this project? And are not the Haytians fully justified in being alarmed about their independence? Yes, the annexation of the Dominican republic renders the annexation of the Haytian territory a foregone conclusion.

But there we cannot stop. Look at the map and you will find that the island of Cuba lies between San Domingo and the coast of Florida; thus there will be foreign territory inclosed between one possession of ours and another. Must we not have Cuba? Of course we must, for the purpose of securing the continuity of our possessions. This is no idle conjecture; it is not even denied, for the Senator from Indiana openly avowed on this floor that of course we must and shall have Cuba; that, too, is a foregone conclusion. With Cuba, Porto Rico will come, and the Senator from Indiana has already included it in the program, which he openly laid before us.

But there you will not stop. The Anglo-Saxon race is somewhat notorious for its land hunger, and such appetites are always morbidly stimulated by eating. Having San Domingo, Cuba and Porto Rico, you will not rest until you possess, also, the other West India islands; and what then? Then your possessions will fill the Caribbean sea and closely encircle the Gulf of Mexico; and, possessing the islands and the sea, how long will it be before you are driven by the spirit of adventure or by the apparent necessities of your situation to move for the annexation of the continent bordering that sea on the other side? Once started in that course you will not be able to control yourselves; you will want more and more and more; and it is my sincere conviction that you will not stop until we have everything down to the Isthmus of Darien. Does it not occur to Senators that here is a question presenting itself far greater than the mere acquisition of the Dominican republic only?

We may be asked, why should we not have all this? Are not those countries rich, fertile and beautiful? Do they not offer all the magnificence of tropical production? Are not their mountains full of precious ore? Yes, they are rich; I do not deny it; they are fertile; they may be considered as possessing magnificent resources; and yet I would ask every Senator before me, before he lays his hand upon that seductive portion of the globe for the purpose of incorporating it in this Republic, and fusing it with our political system, is there not a voice speaking within him telling him to consider it well, to pause, to ponder and to beware? Consider: if you incorporate those tropical countries with the Republic of the United States, you will have to incorporate their people too. If you do that, you will have to accept them as a component and coöperative element in that system of Government, the blessing of which we now enjoy. This is an imperative

necessity which you cannot escape; the logical consequence of your beginning; and before this one consideration all others, that of money, of the Dominican debt, of Baez and Cabral, of sugar, coffee, cotton, salt, gold and precious stones, dwindle down into utter nothingness.

The grave question arises: Is the incorporation of that part of the globe and the people inhabiting it quite compatible with the integrity, safety, perpetuity and progressive development of our institutions which we value so highly? If it is not, is the price which we are to pay worth the bargain? Let us look at the history of these islands; and that history, I would respectfully suggest, we know without the report of this commission, and I do not think the gentlemen to be sent to San Domingo will be able to give us much new light upon it. Read that history, read that of all other tropical countries and then show me a single instance of the successful establishment and peaceable maintenance, for a respectable period, of republican institutions, based upon popular self-government, under a tropical sun. To show me one, do not confine your search to the West Indies; look for it anywhere else on the face of the globe in tropical latitudes. I challenge Senators to point their fingers to a single one. There is none, sir. But, more than that, show me a single instance in any tropical country where labor when it was left free did not exhibit a strong tendency to run into shiftlessness, and where practical attempts to organize labor did not run in the direction of slavery. Show me a single one, not only in the West India islands, but anywhere in any tropical country under the sun. You find none.

Sir, have we read history in vain? Shall I give you an example of this tendency? There was Toussaint L'Ouverture, the great emancipator on that very island of San Domingo which you propose to annex. Slavery was

abolished, and in his hand rested the destinies of that young Republic; upon his shoulders was imposed the interesting and difficult task to organize labor and to keep up the prosperity of his country. What did he do? He simply issued ordinances and laws and instruction which commanded every possessor of a landed estate to see to it that the laborers who had been working on that estate were kept to work, if need be, by force, the employer being held responsible for his delinquency if he did not, in case of necessity, apply force for the purpose of accomplishing that object.

MR. CARPENTER. Will the Senator yield to me to ask a question?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. CARPENTER. Do I understand the Senator to approve of that treatment?

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir; by no means.

MR. CARPENTER. Do I understand the Senator to fear that it would cease if that island should be annexed to the United States?

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir; it ceased long ago. But the proposition I was laying down was this: that you cannot show me a single tropical country on the face of the globe where labor, if left free, did not run into shiftlessness, and where attempts were not made to establish or revive something akin to slavery for the purpose of organizing labor. I stated that as a historical fact.

MR. CARPENTER. If my friend will allow me one remark, I would remind him that it is only very recently that the Senator could point to a tropical negro that was not in the condition of slavery. If the existence of a condition of things and the length of time it has existed prove its necessity or its justice, slavery ought never to have been abolished in the United States.

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir; the conclusion is wrong.

There is another view to be taken of that subject. I solemnly declare here that if by the abolition of slavery the development of the resources of the tropical countries was impaired, and if the organization of labor has a tendency to run in the direction of slavery there, I would much rather do without the products of the tropical countries than reintroduce slavery or anything akin to it. Is the Senator answered?

But does he deny the fact which I have just stated? He says that but recently every negro there was a slave. Is that true? Does he know when slavery was abolished in San Domingo? The abolition of slavery in San Domingo is nearly as old as the Constitution of the United States.

MR. CARPENTER. That is recent in the history of man.

MR. SCHURZ. Several generations have arisen and disappeared since, and there has been abundant time during which all the faculties of freemen under the tropical sun might have developed themselves and produced results which the Senator might wish to be more potent in opposition to my argument. No; certainly, sir, in me there lives not the faintest thought in favor of anything like slavery. I would continue to fight against it, as I have fought against it, to my last breath. But I am dealing with facts; stubborn facts, abominable facts, facts I detest, but FACTS; and if the Senator is able to deny them let him speak!

I do not know whether it might be improper to suggest to him to study the history of those countries, to investigate the working of causes and effects. Such studies might perhaps clip the wings of that youthful enthusiasm which here and there throws such a brilliant gloss upon the periods of public speakers. But it would at the same time bring them to a sober appreciation of the problems they

have to deal with when disposing of the destinies of a great people.

What I was asserting was simply this: that there seem to be certain laws of nature in operation, as we perceive by certain visible effects, which you cannot repeal by a treaty and cannot modify by a joint resolution; that those laws of nature have asserted themselves time and again and may reassert themselves again much against our liking. Such effects may be modified here and there temporarily; we may, perhaps, in the course of time, discover means to modify them in a high degree; but such means have not been discovered yet, and I am going to show the Senator presently that even the Anglo-Saxon race has not been able to escape the government of those laws, in spite of its native vigor.

MR. CARPENTER. I hope the Senator in that connection will define the precise limits within which liberty can exist; in fact, where free institutions are possible.

MR. SCHURZ. I think I shall gratify the Senator in the course of my remarks. For the present, I will simply say to him that I am not dealing in theories, but that I am quoting historical facts, which I like just as little as he does; that I have challenged any Senator to deny those facts; that, so far, I have heard no denial yet, and I am curious whether any will come. I have a strong liking for the truth, however unpleasant the shape of which it may appear.

Our historical experience, not to use the term "natural law," points to this: in the temperate zone man finds himself confronted by a nature not bountiful enough to yield him sustenance without a struggle, but bountiful enough to amply reward any strong and well-directed effort. The obstacles man has to combat call into play the strength of his body, and develop the inventive faculties of his mind; he finds a stimulus in success,

and his very labor is encouraged and facilitated by the atmosphere surrounding him. That is the experience which we gather all around us. The exigencies of life render it necessary that the different elements and forms of society should coöperate together for common interests. They strengthen the desire for social order, they quicken the spirit of organization. The necessity of fixed and permanent rules to govern the movements of society becomes apparent; the popular mind accustoms itself easily to the idea that, while the individual must maintain his independence in his immediate sphere, the opinion of the few must, in the management of common affairs and for the good of society, yield to the opinion of the many, and constitutional government, based upon the general acquiescence in laws which are brought forth and modified from time to time by the peaceable and patient conflict of opinions, is the natural result. And this result has in its highest development been brought forth and put in successful operation by our race on this continent under natural influences most favorable to its essential conditions.

Let us now examine our historical experience in tropical latitudes. Wherever man has to struggle with nature, with an encouraging promise of reward, there he grows great. Wherever that reward is denied him, or wherever nature is so bountiful as to render constant labor superfluous, there man has, as far as our observations go, always degenerated. While the temperate climate stimulates the exercise of reason and the sense of order, the tropical sun inflames the imagination to inordinate activity and develops the government of the passions. The consequences are natural: there is a tendency to government by force instead of by argument; revolutions are of chronic occurrence, like volcanic outbreaks, and you will find political life continually oscillating between two

extremes—liberty which there means anarchy, and order which there means despotism.

True, sir, people living under a southern sun sometimes develop high qualities, but they are more of a brilliant than of a solid kind. They show themselves more in spasmodic exertions, in meteoric display, than in that consecutive, steady, methodical work and application to which we owe our great successes here. Sometimes great statesmen and warriors will rise up there, who astonish the world with the brilliancy of their genius; but let us not forget that something more is required than individual genius as a basis for the development and security of free institutions. There are nations struggling for liberty, generation after generation, and shedding streams of blood, and yet never attaining it. Looking over the history of nations you will find that those are in the steady enjoyment of free institutions who need them for their daily work, for their pursuits of daily life. They cannot practically do without them, and they have them. Where do you find such under the tropical sun? You cannot point to a single instance. Again a historical fact, hard and deplorable, but a fact for all that.

Say not, sir, that I lack faith in the efficiency of republican institutions. No, I do not; for here I witness that efficiency with high appreciation. But, on the other hand, I trust we have lived too long and seen too much to believe that the mere absence of a king is sufficient to make a true republic, and that you have only to place the ballot in the hands of a multitude to make them citizens fit to sustain the fabric of self-government. Yes, sir, we have seen too much in our lives to indulge in such delusions, and the experiences which prove the contrary are crowding too densely around us.

What, then, is it that prevents people in the tropics from establishing good and free governments? We

have heard the Senator from Nevada [Mr. STEWART] declaiming about our duty to confer the blessings of our institutions upon them. What do they want? Are they not independent? Can we make them more so? Are they not their own masters? Do they not freely dispose of their own destinies, just as freely as we? Look at Mexico, at the Central and South American republics. Is there any foreign Power that holds them under coercion? Is not every man there a freeman? Are not those States nominally republics? What is there that interferes with the free disposition which they might make of themselves? Do they not possess all the rights and forms of popular sovereignty? What is it that prevents them from building up a stable political system, resting upon the basis of self-government, like ours? Certainly no foreign Power or influence prevents them. If they are prevented at all they are prevented by themselves, for they are their own masters. And how is it that they are prevented by themselves? Simply because they are laboring under natural difficulties which cannot be overcome by adopting certain political forms. You cannot mention any other reason for it. Say not that it is that failing of the races living there alone, for I will prove to you that the Anglo-Saxons have been tried under the tropical sun, and have, in the main points, failed in every instance.

MR. STEWART. I should like to inquire of the Senator from Missouri if there was any better condition of government in California than in any other part of Mexico while it was a portion of Mexico; and if the change of allegiance has not entirely changed the condition of the people, and greatly for the better?

MR. SCHURZ. What does the Senator desire to prove: that there were some disorderly countries also under a temperate climate? I have never denied that. There are other things than climate exercising an influence upon

the character of nations and in destinies of countries. I acknowledge that; but I desire to discuss one point at a time.

MR. STEWART. I want to prove to the Senator that it was not the question of climate that affected their condition, because there was an illustration where they had the finest climate in the world. They were our neighbors. When it came under the United States it turned out that we could establish our institutions and make them prosper there very well. So it does not appear to have been the case in California, which, previous to annexation, I maintain was in no better condition than any other part of Mexico. It does not appear to have been a question of climate. It must have been owing to other causes.

MR. SCHURZ. I understand the Senator now. Does he desire me to make the difference clearer? In the first place, California is not a tropical country. He will not assert that it is. In the second place, there was a sparse Mexican population in California. Americans went in there, and by numbers and energy completely overwhelmed them, so that at the present moment the Mexican race in public life is hardly noticed—is that not so?—and if they wanted to make trouble they could not.

MR. STEWART. Might not that occur in San Domingo, or in Sonora; or in Sinaloa, if we were to annex it? Is there any particular line where that may not occur?

MR. SCHURZ. If the Senator will be kind enough to give me time to explain that to him also I shall be most happy to do so. He will admit, then, that the example of California, which he has just adduced, does not fit the case at all. I was just going to prove that whenever similar attempts were made by the Anglo-Saxon race under the tropical sun they had equally failed in the main point.

MR. STEWART. If the Senator will find a similar case where we have tried it, very well.

MR. SCHURZ. The Anglo-Saxon race established itself on the West India islands, did it not? the same race which peopled this country. They had the government of affairs there. Will the Senator tell me what became of the English colonies in the West India islands? Will he tell me what has become of the descendants of the original Anglo-Saxon immigrants there?

MR. STEWART. Yes.

MR. SCHURZ. Well?

MR. STEWART. They had a miserable system of slavery that degraded and destroyed them. They never tried the experiment of free institutions there until the people got entirely degenerate. The original stock started in on the basis of slavery, and they never have had a fair chance under free institutions.

MR. SCHURZ. I will give the necessary explanation to the Senator from Nevada of the facts he adduced. In the first place, the Anglo-Saxons on the West India islands started with a no more miserable system of slavery than they did here. Does the Senator from Nevada see the difference in the results? I presume he is acquainted with the fact that slavery was long ago abolished on the island of Jamaica, and that the condition of things in Jamaica is very far from satisfactory, and at any rate has not led to anything that might in the remotest degree be compared with the beneficial results of self-government as we observe them here.

MR. STEWART. If I do not interrupt the Senator, I will say that at the time of the abolition of slavery there the people were so demoralized that there was not a nucleus to form an organization of society sufficiently strong to maintain free government. There were not enough free people there for the purpose; there were just a few slaveholders and a mass of slaves, and not enough free people of the right kind to form a nucleus for the

establishment of free institutions. They had not a fair chance to inaugurate free government. They were in the same situation as the people of California previous to its annexation to the United States. There were not enough of the right kind of people there who knew how to establish free government, and they remained in the same condition as before, without any sufficient organization.

MR. SCHURZ. Then it would seem that the experiment there failed because they had not the right kind of Anglo-Saxons there. Will they have the right kind of Anglo-Saxons in San Domingo? In the meantime let us see whether we can find the right kind of Anglo-Saxons somewhere else. We are frequently pointed to the success of the great Australian colonies, some of which are under a tropical latitude. The first colony in Australia was planted in New South Wales in the year 1788. In the colony of New South Wales two distinct elements developed themselves, one of democratic instincts, which gradually drifted toward the southern coast of the Australian continent, as far toward the pole as possible, and established there under democratic inspirations those flourishing colonies which Great Britain is so justly proud of. There they work for the division of land as a basis for democratic society, and develop a vigorous and free political life in every sense. Another element went north from New South Wales into Queensland; Queensland, a large part of which lies under tropical latitudes, where the tropical staples can be raised. What has become of them? Why, sir, but a short time ago a correspondence from there appeared in the *London Times*, of which I have an extract here, describing the efforts that were made by the colonists of Queensland to kidnap the natives of the surrounding South Sea islands for the purpose of using them as slaves in working their plantations.

Is that perhaps the right kind of Anglo-Saxon? If so,

he exhibits just that dangerous tendency, under the influences of the tropical sun, which I have been describing, and instead of establishing and developing free government, justly respecting the rights of man, he attempts to organize labor in the direction of slavery. And the colonies in Queensland being still young, he does that in spite of the light of our days, in spite of the generous influences which the opinions and sympathies of the rest of mankind might be presumed to exercise upon his action; even under such circumstances he falls a victim to the demoralization which tropical nature seems to inflict upon man.

Do you want any further addition to the historical experiences I have stated? Look, Senators, at our own country. There is not one of us who is not perfectly acquainted with the difference which existed between the North and the South before slavery was abolished, and which exists yet. We were living under the same political Constitution, the two sections of the country were peopled by the same race, and yet while in the North the dignity of labor asserted itself, with its instincts and impulses of enterprise, of enlightenment, of education, of social and political equality, of a progressive civilization, of free government, the South developed the rule by force of the strong over the weak, and a social and political system in which the elevation of labor, the peaceable friction of opinion on all matters of public interest, and the tendency to raise, by general education, all classes to the highest attainable level, had no place. And to this was added a revolutionary tendency lurking like a chronic disease. Is not that so?

You will say it was slavery. Yes, it was slavery; but it was not slavery alone. The North, too, had slavery once; but the North abolished it at an early day. Why? Because it was not profitable there, is the current reply.

Why was it not profitable there? Simply for the reason that the conditions and circumstances of labor and production in the North were not congenial to slavery, and naturally developed a public sentiment and a social system hostile to the degradation of labor.

MR. MORTON. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. MORTON. I ask the Senator if he is not conscious now that he is restating the arguments which were made in behalf of slavery in the Southern States for fifty years before its abolition?

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir; I am not conscious of that.

MR. MORTON. Yes, the precise arguments.

MR. SCHURZ. I am not repeating arguments at all, but I am stating historical facts which the Senator from Indiana is conscious of not being able to deny. I state them for the purpose of showing what dangerous elements and tendencies we shall have to deal with in San Domingo and other tropical possessions. While slavery could not maintain itself at the North why did it maintain itself at the South? Simply because in a hotter climate natural causes developed those passions and propensities of human nature which, in the gratification of its appetites, lead to the arbitrary employment of force in preference to a just recognition of the rights of others. That was the reason of it. Thus slavery was after all not the primary, it was only an intermediate cause of the difference that existed between Northern and Southern society. That primary cause lies deeper, and you will see in future developments that that primary cause is working still.

I will not go into a disquisition on the political events which brought on our great civil war. But I may say without fear of refutation that our civil war was not a mere historical accident, but a conflict between two different

currents of civilization developed under different natural influences. And these different currents have not ceased to run yet. We heard it said not very long ago that Virginia and North Carolina were in a very much worse social and political condition than Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. It may have appeared so at some time; and yet it was so only in appearance. The time is not far distant when you will see that the appliances and influences of northern civilization will pervade Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee almost as thoroughly as Maryland and Pennsylvania. The northernmost of the late slave States, however obstreperous the spirit of their people may appear to-day, will, only gradually to be sure, but inevitably, change for the better under the not congenial pressure of Northern influences. But those influences will grow weaker and weaker as you descend farther South into the semi-tropical portion of this Republic. There it will be far more difficult to eradicate or even seriously to modify the old spirit of violence, the old impatience of adverse opinions, the old propensity to use force in preference to patient reason, and all those disorderly tendencies which are still so evident in alarming transgressions. When we complain of the turbulent state of society there we mistake the nature of the case if we ascribe the whole evil exclusively to the traditions of slavery or the usual irregularities of life in thinly settled countries. These things certainly have aggravated the evil, but they have not produced it. They are rather symptoms than causes. Look over the globe and study the history and present condition of nations and you will find similar things more or less developed in all hot countries; the people passionate and of a turbulent disposition and more inclined to appeal to force than to patient argument, and averse to orderly acquiescence in deciding conflicts of opinion and interest. And thus it will at last

become painfully evident to us here that as it was not the existence of slavery alone which produced our differences before, so it will not be the traditions of slavery alone that will foment our difference hereafter. The natural influences I have been describing will inevitably assert themselves.

Let us look at our future. The natural influences breed chronic distempers, which I fear will still keep the body-politic of this Republic in uneasy agitation for a long time to come. They will require judicious and prudent treatment. A wise policy may, indeed, prevent violent paroxysms; but—and here I express my sincerest conviction, startling as the proposition may seem—I doubt whether we shall ever be able to become completely masters of the disease. We shall have reason to congratulate ourselves if we succeed by prudent management in repressing its most violent symptoms and in securing to the South a tolerable state of order without giving to this Government too dangerous a measure of arbitrary power. At this very moment there is a rumor abroad that the President is going to send a message to the Senate advising further measures of re-reconstruction with regard to some of the Southern States; and just while such problems are staring us in the face, while they are straining republican government to the very utmost, and pressing upon us so that we cannot escape them, we are asked to add to the disturbing elements others far worse still.

Now, sir, I am, for argument's sake, willing to grant all the good things that are said about the people of San Domingo. They are described to us as the most peaceful, pastoral race in the world; a people who, like Paul and Virginia, lead an innocent, childlike existence; peaceful, harmless, hospitable, honest, confiding and just ready to drop into our arms as children would drop into the arms of their mother. I say I am willing to grant that for

argument's sake, although the history of those people which lies open before our eyes—a history of interminable and bloody civil feuds, of murder and devastation—stands in rather striking contrast to this poetic description. Still I will let the Senator from Indiana have the full benefit of all the magnificent things which he has been telling us about the people of that island. I will not even dilate upon the experience of Spain; Spain, who was invited as we are to take possession of San Domingo, who attempted to do so, and then was compelled to give up the attempt after having suffered a loss of \$40,000,000 and ten thousand soldiers.

There are the Dominican people, such as they are; what will you do with them? It is said they are few; that you can absorb them; that you can turn a powerful stream of immigration into that country. Absorb them! How? What kind of immigration is it that will go into that country? We know the men who first drift into those places where at great risk rapid gains are to be made. It is the adventurous, the reckless element of our population. They will be the first to go to San Domingo, to take fraternal care of the colored people who, with such a confiding spirit, are inviting our embrace! They are going to confer upon them the blessings of free government and of that enlightened, humane and philanthropic spirit which has been so eloquently described by the Senator from Nevada! Why, gentlemen, do you know what fate you prepare for those poor people? Do you know that there is no race on the face of the globe more grasping than the Anglo-Saxon, and of that race no part more unrelenting than the adventurous characters, who most readily rush into newly opened, especially tropical countries? Do you not know that no sooner will immigration of that character numerously flow in there than it will try to crowd out the inhabitants, or to press them forcibly into the service

of their eager appetites? May not a state of things arise under which the rapid extermination of the natives, although cruel in itself, might be the most lenient fate that could overtake them?

But let us go further, and examine the task which, after the "absorption" of the Dominican population, will await us. San Domingo is said to have a population of about one hundred thousand. We annex Hayti, and there comes a population of from eight hundred thousand to a million under our control. They do not want annexation; they do not invite us; they rather bid fair to resist us, defending their independence with the whole power they possess. And yet, in spite of such resistance, we must have that country. There is the "bloody dance." Nobody will fail to see it at that stage of the proceedings. But you do not fear them. Of course you will have to carry on a war against them; and we take it for granted that you will succeed in subjugating them, at what cost I will not now inquire. France and Spain might offer some suggestions on that head. But you succeed. What then? You have a subjugated race there under your feet. That will be the first blessing of your philanthropic intentions with which you are going to approach upon them! What a peaceable possession you, and what a life of peaceable progress and sweet contentment they will have!

But you go still further. You annex the rest of the West Indies; more and more; not hundreds of thousands, but now millions of people. You cannot exterminate them all; you must try to incorporate them with our political system. And who are they? People who have nothing in common with us; neither language, nor habits, nor institutions, nor traditions, nor opinions nor ways of thinking; nay, not even a code of morals—people who cannot even be reached by our teachings, for they will not understand or appreciate them; all the good lessons we

may try to impart to them will evaporate into nothing under the hot rays of the tropical sun. How will you fit them into our political system? Have you thought of it?

It is said that our free institutions exhibit a wonderful power in blending and assimilating the most heterogeneous elements of population living under their beneficent influence. So they do. Under the influences of our northern clime we certainly find such effects produced. The most stubborn prejudices are melted, the most inveterate habits are gradually changed; the best faculties resting in the various races of men congregating here are drawn to light and developed, and finally those heterogeneous elements are fitted for the great duties and responsibilities of republican citizenship. You see, indeed, here a blending of races going on which, as its result, leaves one united American people; and I may say that here, upon our soil, I am not afraid of any foreign element that may come to share our fortunes with us, not even of the Chinese. What cannot rise to and with the general level will sink, but it cannot prevent the rising of the rest. Assimilation here, therefore, is assimilation upward.

But it must not be forgotten that Anglo-Saxon vigor stands here upon its own congenial ground; from the very atmosphere its energies receive their inspiration, and by the very necessity of things Anglo-Saxon vigor is here the absorbing element, the assimilating force.

But how is it in the American tropics? The Anglo-Saxon invading them meets there the mixed Latin, Indian and African races upon *their* own congenial ground. There *they* receive their characteristic inspirations from the atmosphere; there they develop their characteristic qualities under the influences of tropical nature; there *they* are the natural growth of the soil, and the Anglo-Saxon appearing as a mere exotic plant, *they* will not be

the assimilating force. And what will be the consequence? Inevitably this: that in the course of time and by the process of assimilation the Anglo-Saxon will lose more than the Africo-Indo-Latin mixture will gain. This will be assimilation indeed, but it will be assimilation downward. Do you want any proof of that? I have already been adverting to the descendants of those Englishmen who had settled the West Indian colonies. Now go there and examine the point of degeneracy they have reached. To be sure, some of the wealthy, who in early childhood were sent to England to be educated there, and who spent there perhaps the greater part of their lives, may have preserved the native vigor of their race; but I refer to the multitude born on West Indian soil, and their children who had continually inhabited it. Have they not become a race, if possible, as miserable as that mixed element which is acknowledged as the indigenous one of the American tropics? You will find that fact confirmed by every intelligent traveller.

But will you be able to obtain a large and valuable quantity of Germanic immigration for those tropical possessions?

Look at the history of migration from one part of the globe to another and you will see how certain laws operate. It is a well-ascertained fact that the masses migrating from any given country show a tendency to keep always—not strictly, but nearly—between the same isothermal lines. You will notice that the Germanic element never goes *en masse* into tropical regions. To be sure, individual speculators go there to amass rapid and large fortunes in a very short time, then to go home again and to enjoy them. You see also, here and there, colonies established by speculators, which have hardly ever been known to prosper. But they do not go there in great masses to found commonwealths upon the basis of the political

ideas represented by the Germanic race. They are, and they always will be, strangers—conquerors, perhaps, but, for all that, strangers—upon that soil. On the other hand, to the so-called Latin races the tropics seem to be far more congenial. They originally sprung from a warmer soil; and with them—if I may use that word—miscegenation with the native children of the tropics is nothing extraordinary. They seem to blend without difficulty. Hence the Indo-Africo-Latin cross-breeds, that hybrid population, which propagates itself and flourishes there. They will, therefore, if we may judge from the past, remain the prevailing element.

Now, whatever means and remedies you may devise—emigration, education, or whatever else—you will in all probability not be able seriously to change the characteristics of the people inhabiting the American tropics, and they will remain the assimilating force. And here I desire to claim the attention of my friend from Indiana for a moment, for I am going to allude to a remark he made the other day in this debate. He said to us that the people of San Domingo would easily fuse with our political system for the simple reason that they were our friends and wanted to be annexed, and that that process would be infinitely more easy than the absorption of the Canadian people, if the English possessions on this continent were annexed, for the reason that the Canadians during the war had been our enemies, had been sympathizing with the South and at the present moment entertained any but kind feelings toward Americans.

MR. MORTON. Will the Senator allow me to correct him?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. MORTON. I did not say anything about their sympathizing with our enemies during the war. The Senator is in error in regard to that.

MR. SCHURZ. Well, I take the Senator's word for it. But that point is immaterial.

MR. MORTON. What I spoke about was the inclination of the Canadians to be annexed. I mean to intimate that we were deluding ourselves on that subject, that they were further from annexation now, that there was less annexation feeling in Canada now, than there was thirty years ago.

MR. SCHURZ. Do I understand the Senator to deny that he said in the debate the other day that the people of San Domingo would much easier become Americans and be fused, or something to that effect, with our political system, than the Canadians, because the latter cherished sentiments unkind to us?

MR. MORTON. I referred to the fact that the tendency toward annexation in Canada had diminished instead of increased; that the people of Dominica, and of all the West India islands, referring particularly to Cuba and Porto Rico, were now our friends; that the great body of them desired annexation, and that they would readily adopt our institutions. So far as the institutions of Canada are concerned, the body of the law is very similar to ours; but in speaking of consolidation and absorption I referred to the people of the islands. But speaking of the desire for annexation, I said Canada was further from it than it was thirty years ago; and so I say now.

MR. SCHURZ. Very well; I understood the Senator to say that the assimilation of the Canadian population would be more difficult than the assimilation of the Dominican population. I am very glad he did not make that remark, for I was going to observe that, considering that the people of Canada speak the same language, have the same habits, social and political, have the same common law, the same traditions, the same ways of thinking, almost the same experience of self-government, if we annex

them to-day they would be good Americans and republicans to-morrow. On the other hand, if the people of the West India islands even desired at this moment annexation, it does not have the least effect upon their capability of being assimilated with us, of being absorbed by our population, of being fitted for our institutions, any more than if they were ever so hostile to us. The main question would remain absolutely the same.

Well then, sir, assuming that we are to annex those islands, San Domingo, Cuba and Porto Rico, the West Indies and possibly the continent also down to the isthmus of Darien, I ask you what will you do with them? Will you govern those countries as provinces, as colonies, dependencies? Will you make satrapies of them? Do you not consider that that would be a thing entirely foreign to our political system? And what would be the consequence? You might leave those possessions for a time in a territorial condition; but reduce this to a permanent system, or merely continue it ten years, and the satrapies you erect will be so many nurseries of rapacity, extortion, plunder, oppression and tyranny, which will, with the certainty of fate, demoralize and corrupt our political life beyond any degree yet conceived of, and impart to our Government a military character most destructive of its republican attributes. That plan, then, cannot be thought of.

What, then, are you going to do with those countries and people? You must at last admit them as States, such as they are, upon an equal footing with the States you represent; you must admit them as States, not only to govern themselves, but to take part in the government of the common concerns of the Republic. Have you thought of it, what this means? Let us carry the business to its final consummation. Imagine "manifest destiny" to have swallowed up Mexico also; and you will not be

able to stop when you are once on the inclined plane. And then fancy ten or twelve tropical States added to the Southern States we already possess; fancy the Senators and Representatives of ten or twelve millions of tropical people, people of the Latin race mixed with Indian and African blood; people who, as I already have stated, have neither language nor traditions nor habits nor political institutions nor morals in common with us; fancy them sitting in the Halls of Congress, throwing the weight of their intelligence, their morality, their political notions and habits, their prejudices and passions, into the scale of the destinies of this Republic; and, what is more, fancy the Government of this Republic making itself responsible for order and security and republican institutions in such States, inhabited by such people; fancy this, and then tell me, does not your imagination recoil from the picture?

I ask you, sir, did I overstate anything? Are not the consequences of the step that is contemplated just as I pointed them out? Did I state a single fact—and as I see the Senator from Indiana before me I may address that question personally to him—did I state a single historical fact which he is able to deny?

MR. MORTON. I think so.

MR. SCHURZ. Which?

MR. MORTON. If I have an opportunity I will tell the Senator several which I can deny very successfully.

MR. SCHURZ. Well, sir, the Senator has that opportunity now; he had that opportunity all the time; I have not heard the denial yet, and I doubt whether it will ever come, and upon what authority it will rest. But until it comes, I have a right to ask you, sir, is it not well for us to ponder well before we take a step of such tremendous importance? Our semi-tropical States we have. Thank heaven and the great spirit of the American people—and

I claim the attention of the Senator from Indiana again—thank heaven we have abolished slavery there in spite of the natural influences which seemed to be working in its favor; and I trust the attempt will never be made to re-establish it. And if the Senator from Indiana ever misunderstood my feelings in that respect, I will console him with the solemn assurance that he would no more zealously struggle against it than I.

MR. MORTON. I desire to say to my friend that I do not distrust his purpose or distrust his hostility to slavery; but I do desire to say to him that every argument he has made goes to show that it was wrong to abolish slavery in the South and especially in the West Indies.

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir; that is a misconstruction of what I said. I did not argue that the abolition of slavery was wrong there, for the abolition of a great wrong cannot be a wrong anywhere. But I did say that the organization of labor by which it was sought to develop the resources of those tropical countries ran in the direction of slavery, and that this tendency is characteristic of tropical latitudes. I challenged the Senator from Indiana to deny it and he failed. I stated facts as such; ugly facts, which I deplore, but facts; I did not argue a theory; and I said further, and I repeat it again, that rather than reintroduce any organization of labor in the remotest degree akin to slavery anywhere I would much rather and with gladness abandon the enjoyment of any and all of the tropical luxuries which we are now so fond of enjoying. The question of freedom or slavery stands far above the question of coffee or no coffee. But whatever our feelings may be, they do not alter the facts of history which I have stated, nor do they neutralize the natural influences under which those facts have arisen.

Sir, our semi-tropical States we have, and we must keep them; it is a continental necessity; and I indulge in the

fond hope that a wise policy will mitigate the evils existing and troubles still brewing there. But do these evils not impose problems upon us sorely taxing our ingenuity and violently straining the elasticity of our institutions? Can we multiply these disturbing elements with impunity? I asked you once, Senators, and I repeat the question, have we not enough with one South? Can we afford to buy another one? Are there not disturbing elements enough in this country that we should artificially increase them? Is there not a mass of ignorance great enough here that we should by such means try still further to augment and accumulate it?

Again, I ask, have we not enough with one nursery of trouble and embarrassment, and should we squander the money of the people to purchase ten more?

Sir, what are the inducements that are offered to us in this insane bargain? Do we really need the West India islands? I read in the President's message of a great calamity, which consists in not possessing San Domingo. How fortunate it is that the people of the United States were so happily insensible of their distress, so entirely unconscious of their calamitous privation! They do not seem to feel the want of San Domingo at all. Did you ever hear a voice in the country clamoring for the annexation of those islands before the treaty was presented to the Senate? Not one. What the people of this country desire under existing circumstances is to develop the resources of their own country; to get rid of the burdens of taxation that are imposed upon them; to increase their prosperity at home; and I have still to hear of the first voice in favor of the annexation of San Domingo that was raised before the treaty of purchase was negotiated.

What other inducement, then? Wealth. True, those countries are rich. And here let me claim the attention

of the Senator from Indiana again, for I desire to tell him now why I made that argument and stated those facts which seem to have alarmed him so much concerning my anti-slavery sentiments. With the principles we cherish, and which I trust we shall never abandon, if we should go to San Domingo and attempt to develop her resources, those gorgeous visions of wealth, of untold millions to be gained every year, will soon turn out to be somewhat airy. That is what I desired to suggest to him. The greater the opportunities of gain may appear to the greedy speculator invading that country the greater will be the temptation to encroach upon the rights of the laborer to develop those resources. That is what I as a man and a citizen of the American Republic am opposed to. Whether means can be discovered to develop them fully without encroaching upon the rights of the laboring man I know not; but they are not found yet; and until they are we shall have to choose between a tyrannical policy, hostile to the great principles upon which this Republic now stands, on one side, and great disappointments on the other. Is this an alternative we should be eager to buy with money?

Moreover, Senators, did you consider what the dangers connected with tropical wealth are, and how precarious is its possession? Can you point out to me a single nation that grew and remained rich by tropical wealth? Look at France. France possessed the island of San Domingo, and we are told wonders of the many millions French proprietors drew annually from the soil of the island. What has become of that wealth? All the millions ever gained there, and more too—perhaps twice, three times as many—were swallowed up by a few years of war on that very island.

MR. MORTON. What do you say to England and India?

MR. SCHURZ. I am going to speak of India. India

is not, properly speaking, a colony; it is an empire. Do you want to rule the West India islands as England rules India?

MR. MORTON. That is not the question.

MR. SCHURZ. I know. But let me tell the Senator from Indiana that we have had in India but one symptom of the storms which are brewing, one puff of smoke from the volcano which may break out at any moment there. Does he forget the Sepoy insurrection? Does he not know that worse things than happened then may happen any day again? I was going to speak of India without being reminded of it. England has not seen the last days yet of her Indian dominion, and the Senator is certainly not prepared to assert that the wealth which was gained from India will not be consumed again by the conflagrations for which the fuel lies already mountain high.

MR. MORTON. Will my friend allow me to interrupt him?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir.

MR. MORTON. The question of the Senator was: What country had drawn wealth or grown rich from tropical possessions? I might refer him to the possessions that England has in India, and from which she has drawn countless millions, I might say billions of wealth, for the last one hundred and twenty-five years. I might further say that the Anglo-Saxon race have not failed in India. While about one-half or two-thirds of India, perhaps, is within the tropics, yet nearly all of India has a tropical climate and tropical productions; but the vigor of the Anglo-Saxon race in that country is such that a few thousand or a few hundred thousand govern two hundred and fifty millions of native Hindoos.

MR. SCHURZ. I am very glad to hear the Senator make that statement, for I was going to come to that point myself. He has merely anticipated me. I was pointing

out to him that England has not yet seen the last days of her India dominion, and when finally the balance shall be cast he cannot foretell where will be the profit and where the loss.

But the Senator says that England has not failed in India. In what has she not failed? She has not failed in starting and carrying on a rapacious tyranny. Does the Senator call that success? It is the kind of success characteristic of tropical latitudes. Is it the kind of success the Senator desires to achieve in the American tropics? Is it the kind of rule he desires us to succeed in establishing over the West India islands? Yes; England has not failed in India in extorting with an iron hand from the laboring masses by force, illy if at all disguised, the fruits of their labor. But has England succeeded in developing there the blessings of free government? She has not even attempted it.

MR. MORTON. Will my friend allow me to say that he evades the point? His proposition was that Anglo-Saxons had failed from deterioration in tropical climates and that they had never drawn wealth from tropical possessions. Now he refers to the form of government. That was not the proposition which he made and to which I replied.

MR. SCHURZ. I do not think that the Senator from Indiana desires to misrepresent me.

MR. MORTON. Certainly not at all.

MR. SCHURZ. But most certainly he does so at the present moment. What I was proving was this: that whenever the Anglo-Saxon race went into a tropical climate it did fail to establish those institutions which we are here enjoying upon our soil; and if there is a glaring proof of it he will find that proof in the very country of which he now is speaking—India; for I repeat there never was a more rapacious despotism than the one carried on in that country. There never was a more heartless and

more unscrupulous practice to wring from the hands of a subjugated people the fruits of their labor. Is it not so?

MR. MORTON. That was not the fault of the climate.

MR. WARNER. If the Senator from Missouri will allow me, before he gets away from this point, I should like to ask him a question in perfect good faith and for information.

MR. SCHURZ. Very well.

MR. WARNER. I understand the Senator to say that the material prosperity of the West Indies has been in a large degree destroyed by the abolition of slavery. I understand him to maintain, and we all know that he does maintain very firmly, that slavery was a wrong. Now, I should like to ask him this—and I wish his explanation—how it occurs in the economy of a wise Providence that the abolition of a wrong works to the injury of the people?

MR. SCHURZ. I suppose the Senator from Alabama, who is a pious man, does certainly not expect me to go behind those mysterious reasons upon which the decrees of Providence rest. I do not take upon myself that office. I was merely stating facts, and I desire the Senator from Alabama to tell me whether he denies those facts. I attempted their explanation. I said that, as a matter of experience, whenever the attempt was made at organizing labor under a tropical climate for the purpose of realizing large gains the tendency was to do it in a manner inconsistent with the freedom of labor, while, on the other hand, there was a tendency to shiftlessness, when labor was left entirely to itself. Does the Senator deny it?

MR. WARNER. The Senator does not answer my question, but asks me one. Still I will answer it. I think what he calls the destruction of the material prosperity of the West India islands has been but a temporary suspension. We had a fair illustration of it in the South,

where the abolition of slavery did for a time suspend material development, but we have seen in the past year made by free labor, despite of all the difficulties in our way, and the fact of the withdrawal of perhaps one-third of the actual laboring population, a cotton product equal to the average product before the war; and that I think will eventually be the result in the West Indies.

MR. SCHURZ. I am sure the Senator from Alabama does not impute to me the opinion that in our Southern States successful labor is inseparably united with slavery in the first place.

MR. WARNER. Certainly not.

MR. SCHURZ. In the second place, I am sure the Senator will not assert that the Southern States of this Union are in the tropical latitude, and that people there labor under the same circumstances and natural influences under which they labor in San Domingo, Cuba and Jamaica. Does he?

MR. WARNER. No.

MR. SCHURZ. Very well, then; that case is disposed of. But I come back to the assertion made by the Senator from Indiana. He asks, has the Anglo-Saxon race degenerated in India? I say it has; and it is a notorious fact that it is continually doing so. We learn that the soldiers who are sent to India are relieved now every six or eight years because the former theory that they could be kept in the best state of health by acclimatization has been abandoned, and it is now found that it is best to withdraw them from time to time and send fresh men there, because in their full vigor the latter can endure the influences of the climate much better than if they live there longer. It is also a notorious fact that the descendants of English people born in India and remaining there are degenerating about as much as they are on the West India islands.

MR. MORTON. The British do not enlist their soldiers for more than six years generally to serve anywhere.

MR. SCHURZ. They serve a long time, I think.

MR. MORTON. They may reënlist.

MR. SCHURZ. At any rate, the practice with regard to service in India is as I have stated. I have seen these things discussed in English newspapers and periodicals. But however that may be, it is not denied that the descendants of Englishmen, born in India, and remaining under the influences of that climate, do degenerate. The fact is established beyond controversy. No well-informed man will deny it.

I was, I believe, interrupted when I was arguing that tropical wealth is a very deceptive possession. I was stating that France had, indeed, drawn a great many millions from the fields of San Domingo, and that all she had gained was swallowed up by a short period of war—armies, vessels, money, men and all.

We know also that Spain derived great gains from her West Indian possessions; yes, her colonies made her once the richest nation on the globe. Where is her gold now? Sunk where it was found. Why, but a few years ago the attempt to repossess San Domingo cost her \$40,000,000 and ten thousand soldiers. And is not the wealth which Spain has derived from Cuba about being consumed now in revolutionary convulsions?

And, sir, must I refer you to our own country? Here we had our semi-tropical staple, cotton. What a mine of wealth! We boastingly counted it by hundreds and thousands of millions. Do you know what it has cost us in four years of war? Half a million of our sons; eight thousand millions of money. Is our memory so short that we should forget it? But you may say that all that arose from slavery and despotism. Possibly it did, but the tropical sun will breed slavery and despotism in a

thousand disguises. And look at the tropical countries in which there is not slavery now. Look at Mexico, look at San Domingo, at Hayti, at the Central American republics, and compare the development of their resources and the wealth that is produced with the cost of the continual civil convulsions going on there. Draw the balance. Do those countries grow rich?

What other inducement is there? It is said that San Domingo is offered cheap. Cheap, sir! If we could have the island for nothing, and twenty millions to boot, I would consider it a ruinous bargain.

What else? They say we must have what they designate by the mysterious word "outpost"; we must have a harbor for our fleet in the West Indies. Do we not know that outposts are the weakest points a country can have? Do we not know also that in point of economy if we buy among the West India island harbors for our fleets we shall have to build fleets for those harbors to protect them? If we were really in need of a naval station there, then I would ten thousand times rather have St. Thomas, or a barren rock with no back country behind it, at a cost of twenty millions, than San Domingo for nothing, with all its resources of wealth and danger.

And finally, the great bugbear of foreign interference is again raised up before our eyes. We are told that if we do not take San Domingo, some foreign Power will do so and in annoying proximity enjoy all the sweets we reject. Why, sir, is there a sensible man willing to believe it? I am ready to assert here, on my responsibility as a Senator, my confident belief that there is no European Power that will ever dare again to set its foot upon a square inch of American soil in the northern hemisphere against our pleasure.

MR. SUMNER. Will my friend allow me to interrupt him there?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. SUMNER. It is reported that North Germany may——

MR. SCHURZ. I was about to come to that.

MR. SUMNER. I would ask my friend's attention to that, and I hope he will be good enough to state whether in his judgment North Germany would do such a thing.

MR. SCHURZ. I intend to refer to that. What Power is to do it? England? England is growing wise with age, and English statesmen have before this day come to the conclusion that their old colonial system has ceased to be profitable, and whenever they can get rid of the colonies with honor, in most cases they will be very glad to do so. At any rate, I think if Jamaica did not belong to the British Crown now, England would not [for] a moment think of acquiring it. No, sir, from that quarter we have to fear nothing.

Is it France, then? Why, sir, France has had her experience in America. In the first place, France once possessed San Domingo; and after having lost on Haytian soil the flower of her revolutionary armies, the Army of the Rhine, and untold millions of dollars, and a fleet in the bay of Samana, France will never be tempted to burn her fingers again on that spot. France made an attempt on Mexico, recently, under very favorable circumstances, it was thought, and what has been the consequence? Just while France was frittering away her strength there, disorganizing her armies for the purpose of keeping up the Mexican expedition, just at that time it was that Germany executed her tremendous stride into the front rank of the European Powers, and France found herself unable to stop her. I need only point out the present condition of France and every man will acknowledge that from that quarter there is nothing to fear.

Do you think that Spain will attempt anything of the

kind? Spain has had her experience too on the very island of San Domingo, and after having lost \$40,000,000 and ten thousand soldiers, having been invited by the Dominicans to take possession of the country, I think you cannot bribe Spain to set her foot upon that island again.

Finally, I come to Germany. Will Germany, in her new ambition of power, attempt any such thing? I think not; and I will tell the Senate why. In the first place, under the guidance of the enlightened statesmen who now guide the destinies of that empire, there is not a single Power in Europe, perhaps not on the globe, that is so careful to keep on terms of friendly understanding, and to cultivate the kindest relations with the United States, as Germany; and I am sure the knowledge that any such step would be looked upon with disfavor by the United States would alone have the effect of making the German Government desist from the attempt.

MR. MORTON. I ask the Senator if his argument does not fail completely? After San Domingo offers herself to us, and we reject her, have we a right to say one word against any other nation taking her? Put it on the hypothesis now that the people of San Domingo want to be annexed, a thing we propose to investigate; if we reject San Domingo, reject her advances, can we then assert the Monroe doctrine against any other nation?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir; I think we can.

MR. MORTON. I do not think we can in justice.

MR. SCHURZ. I think we can with absolute consistency assert the Monroe doctrine with regard to the colonization of foreign Powers upon American soil, upon soil which we neither possess nor covet.

MR. MORTON. Not after that.

MR. SCHURZ. I think that the Monroe doctrine has nothing at all to do with the acquisition of territory by us. I maintain, and every Senator knows, that the Mon-

roe doctrine refers to nothing else but to the establishment of new colonies by European Powers upon American soil. The Monroe doctrine is a veto against that and nothing else; it has no connection whatever with the acquisition of territory by the United States. If the Senator pretends that my argument fails, he shows only how weak his is and to what desperate straits those are reduced who want to frighten us with the European bugbear into an improper enterprise.

There is another reason why I think Germany will not covet that possession, and I will state it. Germany has already the very best system of colonization that ever existed in the history of the world. While Germany does not own a single square foot of ground outside of her continental possessions, with the exception of the little islands on her coast—not one—yet, I repeat, she has the most perfect and most beneficial colonial system that ever existed. It will have been noticed that of late years the German commercial marine has developed in a greater proportion, perhaps, than the commercial marine of any of the maritime nations. Germany had no numerous fleet of war vessels to protect her commerce. Germany had no colonies, in the ordinary sense of the term, to nourish that commerce. But Germany had something far better. Instead of keeping up colonial establishments, for which the home Government is politically responsible, and which it is bound to protect and defend with arms, Germany has clusters of mercantile establishments in every commercial town on the globe—in Europe, America, Asia, Africa and Australia—colonies not political, but colonies commercial, which protect themselves, regulate themselves and feed German commerce of their own motion, without imposing upon the mother country the remotest political responsibility.

This colonial system has proved of infinitely less trouble

to the German Government and has yielded greater benefit to the commercial interests of that country than any colonial establishment in the ordinary sense of the term, however splendid in appearance, could ever confer; and I trust the statesmen of that nation will never fail to see that it would be most unwise for them to adopt the old colonial policy, which has already exploded and failed under the auspices of other Powers, and that the policy inaugurated for them by the enterprising citizens of the Fatherland, a policy which confers such immense benefits without implying the least shadow of political responsibility, without exposing a single vulnerable point, is the safest and the most advantageous system they can devise. I therefore am quite confident that the statesmen of Germany do not feel tempted to commit a mistake as to San Domingo which other nations will be equally careful to avoid.

MR. MORTON rose.

MR. SCHURZ. Does the Senator desire to interrupt me?

MR. MORTON. One moment. I shall not have an opportunity of replying to the Senator. He denies that Germany, that Prussia, has any disposition to acquire this island, or any other possession in the West Indies. He has a greater knowledge of the people of Germany, of course, than I can have; he understands her language and institutions much better than I do. But I beg leave to say to the Senator, notwithstanding, that there is good reason to believe, as I think, that Germany does desire to acquire this island, or some other rich possession in the West Indies.

MR. SUMNER. Can the Senator state the reason? The Senator says he has good reasons for that belief. Will he do us the favor to state them? Then we might judge of them.

MR. MORTON. I do not know that I am at liberty to

state the particular reasons which lead me to think so; but I am of that conviction. In fact, I entertain no doubt about it; and I think all that has made Germany hesitate heretofore in attempting this acquisition is because it would be regarded as unfriendly to the United States and a violation of our traditional policy. But, sir, if it should turn out that Dominica desires to be annexed to this country, and we refuse her, then that traditional policy fails, and we have no right to say one word against Germany, or any other European country acquiring Dominica, or any other West India possession.

MR. SCHURZ. I have already replied to that argument once.

MR. MORTON. Not successfully.

MR. SCHURZ. I think I have most successfully and incontrovertibly shown that whatever the construction may be which we or other people put upon the act of rejecting the acquisition of San Domingo, the Monroe doctrine stands absolutely untouched; and besides, other nations will not be foolish enough to do what the Senator wants to make us believe they will do; for it may justly be assumed that they understand their own interests better than the Senator does.

MR. CASSERLY. Will the Senator from Missouri allow me to say one word?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir.

MR. CASSERLY. The argument of the Senator from Indiana is, that if San Domingo is offered to us and we decline to take her, our mouths are closed against enforcing the Monroe doctrine in respect to that island against a European Power.

MR. MORTON. On all principles of justice, certainly.

MR. CASSERLY. Certainly the result of that position of the Senator is that we are debarred from enforcing the Monroe doctrine against any country on this or the South

American continent that we are not willing to take in as a part of our territory. That is his argument. It only requires to be stated to show how untenable it is.

MR. SCHURZ. And now, when the Senator comes to me and says that he is convinced that Germany intends to do any such thing, I may say that against such a faith there is no weapon, no argument.

MR. MORTON. I have simply put my opinion against yours; that is all.

MR. SCHURZ. I will reiterate my own, then; that I am profoundly convinced that there is nothing in it; and I believe if the Senator would approach any German statesman and express that opinion to him, he would be received with a very benevolent smile.

MR. SUMNER. Will my friend allow me to make a remark there?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. SUMNER. As I took the liberty of addressing the inquiry to the Senator from Indiana as to his reasons for supposing that Germany or some European Power would take possession of a portion of this island if we declined it, and he declined to give his reasons, but fell back upon his convictions, I ask the same privilege to express my conviction that there is nothing in it. Germany is too wise, too civilized, too glorious, to think of doing what the Senator from Indiana imagines. There is nothing in it.

MR. MORTON. I will say that as a general thing the convictions of the Senator are better than his reasoning, especially on the subject of San Domingo.

MR. SUMNER. The Senator says that my convictions are better than my reasoning. I am glad that he approves my convictions.

MR. SCHURZ. Mr. President, I will now take leave of the bugbear that cannot stand on its own feet. I think I may repeat what I said before, that there can hardly be

a sensible man in this country who will in any way feel frightened by that spectre of foreign interference which is so artfully held up before us.

What else, then, is urged? "Manifest destiny." "Manifest destiny" is a great cry; and that cry has played a sinister part in the history of the world before this. "Manifest destiny" is written upon some of the saddest pages of the history of nations. And I might here recall some of the memories which will crowd upon the minds of those who have sprung from the nation of which I am a son. It is one of the most remarkable pathological phenomena in the history of the world that northern nations are so frequently haunted by a romantic longing for the south. And how often has that vague dream brought forth deplorable disaster! You have read the history of Germany in the Middle Ages. There was the great power of what might then be called the civilized world; and that power abandoning itself to the fatal dream of southern dominion. It was on the beautiful plains of Italy that the German empire spent its strength. It was in hunting after southern shadows that it frittered away its great opportunities of home consolidation. It was, so to say, in the embraces of that beautiful southern siren that the German empire lost its manhood.

That was "manifest destiny," if you will call it so. And here now stands the American Republic; so vigorous, so beautiful, so great, so hopeful on the ground of her strength; and she, too, is to be seduced with the treacherous charm! And the cry of "manifest destiny" is raised by the thoughtless spirit of adventure hurrying her on to take the fatal leap into a region far more dangerous than Italy, where her very vitality, perhaps, would meet with deadly contamination.

Sir, if that were manifest destiny, then I should be seriously tempted to call it manifest doom. But is it,

indeed, manifest destiny? What is destiny for a country and a people like this? Sir, the reason, the good sense, the conscience, the enlightened will of the American people is their destiny. Let them acknowledge no other. And I fondly trust that reason, that sound sense, that conscience, that enlightened will, can never be seduced by the deceptive allurements of tropical splendor! Away, then, with the wild cry for tropical possession, which was once raised by the slave-power, and was, indeed, within the line of its cruel and dangerous logic, but which is devoid of sense now, since it is liberty and civilization in the best form of their development to which we aspire.

The Senator from Nevada tells us that all public men who oppose the annexation of any country to this must go down. If that is true, then I am ready to go down, holding fast to my convictions, for those convictions are strong within me. But is it so?

MR. STEWART. The Senator did not understand me to say that all public men opposed to annexation must go down. They are going to be beaten on that issue beyond any doubt. I suppose the Senator from Missouri can stand one or two defeats, and still survive. He is going to be defeated on that issue, if he tries to stop annexation.

MR. SCHURZ. I am ready to admit now that the Senator from Nevada is not as dangerous as I thought he was.

MR. STEWART. I am sorry I alarmed the Senator so much.

MR. SCHURZ. Not me; I can endure it.

What then, sir, is the true destiny of this country? Can we fail to see it? Here, on our Northern ground, we stand in our strength. Here are congenial circumstances surrounding us. Here the genius of our race is fed by the very air we breathe. Here our free institutions are the natural growth of our soil. Here is the true seat of our empire.

Our country extends at present to a region which is already in some degree infected by the moral miasma of the tropics. The influence of Northern civilization in close contiguity may, by its preponderance, be strong enough to control the disturbing elements, and thus to impart to our South, in its present limits, a reasonable measure of the peculiar blessings we enjoy. But to secure that beneficent result it is absolutely necessary to preserve the preponderance of Northern civilization to such an extent, that the Southern weight cannot seriously disturb the balance. That balance was disturbed once, and the Republic was in danger of perishing. That balance is sufficiently disturbed now to put our republican institutions sometimes to a dangerous strain. Disturb it still more by adding to the Southern weight the burden of the tropics, and in the same measure in which the anarchical element will grow in one part of this Union, in the same measure the development of our political life will tend to the arbitrary assumption of power by the National Government, and perhaps to military usurpation. In fact, the very acquisition of that territory would put us on the high road to military rule. And here I do not hesitate to express my profoundest conviction: incorporate the tropics, with their population, with their natural influences, in our political system, and you introduce a poison into it which may become fatal to the very life of this Republic.

What, then, is the true American policy? It seems to me clear. Let the American people devote their great energies to the vast domain we possess, to that magnificent field of labor and of enterprise where the genius of our race, as I said before, is fed by the very atmosphere. Do we feel cramped in our domain? Let us expand, then, where we are healthy and strong. Is not there a magnificent field left for our ambition of aggrandizement? Yes, and it

fills my soul with delight when I see events preparing themselves which will lead the whole continent north of us into our arms. That will indeed be a natural, congenial and happy association. And the day when that great consummation takes place this Republic will be stronger than ever before; stronger, for the very seat of her empire, the center of gravity, will then be more firmly fixed than ever under the healthful influences of the northern sky. But beware of every addition in that quarter where the very sun hatches out the serpent's eggs of danger to our republican institutions; beware until by further development and accretion the preponderance of northern civilization becomes so firmly fixed that nothing in the world can shake it.

When that moment will come, whether it will ever come, I know not; but of one thing I am sure, that moment has not come yet. And I must confess it is incomprehensible to me how, in days like ours, when these legislative halls so frequently resound with propositions for the enlargement of the military power,—propositions sprung indeed from honorable sympathies and motives, but at the mere sound of which the Fathers of the Republic would have stood aghast—and those propositions prompted by the very southern distemper I have described; and when the most exciting struggles we witness here have just this meaning, how we may maintain the integrity of our republican institutions against the pressure of the necessities growing out of that distemper—I say it is incomprehensible to me how, under such circumstances and with that voice of warning ringing in our ears, a plan to augment all these dangers a hundredfold can find a single advocate upon the floor of the American Senate.

I am asked, are we to turn our backs upon the people of that region entirely? Are we to waive them off with cold indifference? Are we to have no heart for our brothers

in the American tropics? No, sir, I do not say that. The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SUMNER] has expressed the idea that the tropics should belong to the colored race. Yes, let that region belong to them; let them cultivate that soil in freedom; let them be happy there——

MR. MORTON. Allow me to ask the Senator whether he, in common with the Senator from Massachusetts, is in favor of this Government establishing a protectorate over the island?

MR. SCHURZ. I was just going to say what I am in favor of: and if in the course of time it should come to pass that those West India islands should form a confederation of their own under a common flag, and the Government of the United States can do anything to promote that object in a kind way by offering its friendly offices, certainly I should hail the opportunity with sincere satisfaction; I should be the last man on this floor to stand in the way of such a consummation.

MR. MORTON. Do you mean a protectorate?

MR. SCHURZ. I said, if the Government of the United States can do anything in the way I have described; and I add, if those States should be attacked by a foreign Power, and the Government of the United States should find it convenient to secure them against foreign aggression, I should not stand in the way even of that.

MR. MORTON. The Senator has substantially avowed himself in favor of a protectorate. I understand that to be his sentiment. Now, I ask him if a protectorate would not be the worst possible form of connection that we could have with any West India island?

MR. SCHURZ. The Senator says I have substantially announced myself in favor of a protectorate. The Senator will permit me to inform him that I have said no such thing; and he will please not put words into my mouth which I did not use.

MR. MORTON. I understand him to mean that.

MR. SCHURZ. The Senator should not find it difficult to understand my meaning as I express it.

Mr. President, I have been interrupted so often that I have spoken much longer than I intended. I beg the pardon of the Senate for having taxed their kind patience. I am coming to a close. There was a time, sir, when the American people were permitted to indulge in the exuberant dreams of youth, laughing away all suggestions of danger and delighting in those eagle flights of fancy, which showed to them nothing but continents and seas to be conquered, a world to be ruled, an infinite, incomprehensible destiny to be fulfilled. The American people have by this time outgrown their boyhood. The American people have come of age; and it is time for them, after having met with great disappointments and passed through tremendous dangers and trials, to consider calmly what their true and peculiar forces are, to what tasks those forces are best suited, upon what ground they can be made most valuable, in what direction we can employ them most advantageously to ourselves and to mankind and in what way the American Republic can achieve the most useful, and therefore the most glorious position in the history of the human race. Our power has grown great, and with it our responsibilities. We should consider them well, and settle down upon a rational plan of life. It rests with our decision to achieve the greatest success or the most lamentable failure in history; for never were opportunities more magnificent. The Republic stands at the present moment like Hercules at the parting of the ways; one running southward, pointing to a repetition of the Roman empire, with all its magnitude, its power, its splendor, its riches, its demoralization, its civil commotions, its military government and its inevitable decay; the other pointing northward, toward the

great republican power of the future, growing upon its own congenial soil, destined to become a lasting and beneficent example to all mankind. And, sir, the awful responsibility is laid upon the Congress of the United States to decide between the two!

And in the face of these tremendous problems we are asked to send an excursion party down to San Domingo, in order, after a little jaunt of three or four weeks, to give us the light of their experience, and to do it quickly, right quickly, so that before the expiration of this Congress we can in a hurry dispose of this portentous subject. That is what we are urged to do. I address myself to your sober judgment, and ask you, is not that trifling with the great interests of the American people?

There have been some words spoken of "factious opposition." Sir, I certainly am not conscious of any such intention. I have given the reasons why I oppose this scheme, and every candid man within the hearing of my voice will admit that those reasons are far from being "factious."

Ah, sir, I think it would be much better for the President and for us; it would perhaps better comport with the dignity of this great Government, if we dealt fairly and honestly with the President. If we are resolved to reject the fatal policy which is proposed to us—and I trust we are—let us not equivocate about it. Let us not, by ambiguous action, lead the President to indulge in false hopes. Let us put an end to this agony, and drop here the scheme which already has worked so much mischief.

We are told that we oppose the annexation of San Domingo because we are opponents of the Administration. No, sir; not for any such reason as that. Those who say so must be accustomed to measure by a small standard the motives of serious and patriotic men. What I am opposing is a measure which I consider dangerous to the

best interests of the Republic to which I have sworn allegiance, of the country of which I am proud to be a citizen, of the American people, to whom I owe my first duty.

And now, sir, if the President were my own brother, and if all my private and political interests were wrapped up in the success of this single scheme, and if the words I have spoken to-day were to send me forever back into obscurity, yet to the last moment of my public life I would never cease to entreat the Senate and to conjure the American people, by the love which they bear to their country, by the inheritance of peace and good government which they desire to leave to their children, by the hopes of liberty-loving mankind which are centered upon this Republic: do not touch a scheme like this; do not trifle with that which may poison the future of this great nation; beware of the tropics.

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM¹

MR. PRESIDENT:—I sympathize most heartily with the Senator from Illinois [Mr. TRUMBULL] as to the object he means to accomplish by this bill. At the same time I must confess that there was one objection brought forward against it which struck me as forcible. It was this: that if we absolutely prohibit members of Congress from giving advice to the President with regard to appointments to office, then the President will be deprived of that source of information which, as long as the present loose system of filling offices continues, can be better depended on than any other; while, on the other hand,

¹ Speech in the U. S. Senate, Jan. 27, 1871. The Senate had under consideration the bill (S. No. 298) to relieve members of Congress from importunity and to preserve the independence of the different departments of the Government.

if an amendment be adopted like that offered by the Senator from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL], which makes it possible for the President to put himself, at his option, in communication with Congressmen, asking for their advice, then it would be considered a rule of courtesy that he should do so in all cases where a member of Congress agrees politically with the Administration; an omission would be considered an unfriendly act, and the present practice would not be materially changed.

It is evident, therefore, that if we desire to effect a change in the direction pointed out by the Senator from Illinois, we must put another source of information from which the appointing power can obtain the necessary advice, in the place of that which we take away; and this circumstance, it seems to me, opens the whole question of civil service reform.

We have been listening to some very interesting speeches on that subject, some expatiating upon the excellence of the method in which at present the Departments at Washington are conducted, some arguing that a great many of the evils existing cannot be cured by reform. Sir, in my opinion, the question whether the Departments at Washington are managed well or badly, is, in proportion to the whole problem, an insignificant question after all. Neither does the question whether our civil service is as efficient as it ought to be, cover the whole ground. The most important point to my mind is, how we can remove that element of demoralization which the now prevailing mode of distributing office has introduced into the body-politic. A long familiarity with existing abuses is apt to blunt the keenness of our perception and the nicety of our moral appreciation. We are looking with exceeding leniency at abuses which, from our early days, we have been accustomed to see every day and in which the force of circumstances made us participate;

and in order to judge of their true bearing it is sometimes necessary that, so to say, we should transport ourselves out of ourselves, so as to obtain a perfectly independent, impartial and objective view of things.

Let me suppose that you, Mr. President, although being born in this country, had left it when still young. You had studied the theory of our government; you had become imbued with its principles, your mind had become saturated with the teachings of the Fathers of this Republic, but you had not become familiar with the workings of our political machinery in detail. Then you had gone to study the theories and observed the practice of other governments in different parts of the world. Imagine then you had come back to this country about the 4th of March of the year after a Presidential election which had resulted in a change of party control. You would at once hasten to the capital of your country. You would bring with you an exalted idea of the greatness of this Republic, of its tremendous extent, of its gigantic resources, of the multifarious interests which are involved in its political life, of the great history and noble qualities of its people, of its great mission in the history of the world. You come here to Washington to witness the spectacle of the inauguration. You see the President standing in front of the Capitol, and before him an immense multitude, and you behold that grand and simple scene in which the President lays before the people of the United States those principles and views of policy which are to guide him in the administration of public affairs—a scene grand, simple and in imposing harmony with the nature of our institutions.

So far your mind receives impressions corresponding to the convictions you had previously formed. But you spend some time at Washington, after having viewed this interesting and grand spectacle. Presently it strikes

you that upon the avenues, and in the hotels, and at all public places you meet a motley throng with anxious eyes, nervous movements, a curious expression of countenance. Gradually you learn to understand what it means. After a few days you desire to pay your respects to the President. With something akin to awe you enter the White House to visit the Chief Magistrate of this grand Republic. Of course you expect to find him surrounded by his council of State, and, being new to the duties of his great office, diligently and earnestly studying those great problems which it will be his mission to solve. But how do you find him? In the midst of the same anxious faces, the same eager eyes, the same nervous countenances which have already attracted your attention before, and man after man pressing upon him, pouring hurried tales into his ear, or thrusting papers at him with the vehemence of extreme urgency. What do they ask for? They all want office, and want it quickly. You see the President bewildered, confused; and after a little while you come to the unwelcome conclusion that the great chief of the American Republic, in his present situation at least, is an object of pity. From him you go to visit the ministers of State, the heads of the Departments, and what do you find there? You expect, of course, to see them at least, if the President is otherwise occupied, engaged in an arduous study of their great duties, for to them also these duties are new. But you find the same spectacle there; a pressing multitude asking for office. You visit Senators and Representatives, and how do you find them? Engaged in the consideration of the great political questions whose solution the situation of things demands of them? No; you find them surrounded by the same crowd, dogged from place to place, marching along the avenues at a hurried step, followed by a long train of anxious pursuers, running to the President, running to the Depart-

ments—nay, you may follow them even to another place in some of these splendid public buildings of ours—a side office, where they pay their respects to a young gentleman who at first must appear to you one of the high dignitaries; and you are somewhat astonished when you hear that he is the appointment clerk, who very graciously receives the representatives of the people, with their hats in their hands, and condescendingly dispenses his favors upon them, or with polite regret assures them that he cannot accommodate them all. Sir, it is by no means with a feeling of pride that I make the confession, but I must say that, carried away by the system which prevails, I have been there myself and I have witnessed the scene.

And now, sir, what are all these men engaged in? What does this spectacle of frantic hurry and pressure mean? It means nothing more nor less than that the President, the members of the Cabinet, Senators and Representatives and the whole multitude which fills the capital are busy in taking to pieces the whole machinery of the government immediately after the accession to power of the new Administration, then to recompose it again out of new materials. From the collector of customs in New York down to the meanest postmaster in the country, from the Minister Plenipotentiary down to the tide-waiter, all must be removed to make room for new men. Nobody is to be spared but some old experts here and there in Government offices, without whose experienced aid the machinery would come to an absolute standstill. Such, you are told, has become the established custom in this great Republic of ours; and the same spectacle repeats itself every four years.

You ask yourself, is this necessary, is it desirable? And if it were necessary or desirable would this be an opportune moment for doing it? Why, sir, the President and heads of the Departments, just having been put in

their places, are new to the duties they have to perform, new to the requirements of the service which they have to carry on, unacquainted with the *personnel* they have to deal with. It would seem extremely difficult for them even to form an intelligent judgment at first of the propriety of any change to be made, however limited. Nothing, therefore, would be more urgently required than calm reflection, a quiet survey of the whole field, so as to ascertain what there is calling for transformation, and what the means are, and where and how proper material can be found, to execute it. And yet, just at that moment, when, to use a popular phrase, hardly anybody is knowing what he is about—just at that very moment the tremendous operation is to be performed of taking to pieces the whole machinery of the government and recomposing it again out of new material.

Now, sir, what is to guide the appointing power in this fearful and perplexing task? Is it personal knowledge? Impossible. They do not know the men who are applying for office; in nine hundred and ninety-nine of a thousand cases they never saw them, never heard of them. What is it then? They are required to act on recommendations, and those recommendations are put on paper. You are curious to see such a paper, and one of the aspirants, perhaps considering you an important man, will be very glad to hand it to you, maybe to obtain your signature, too, in his favor. And what do you read? The applicant for office is represented to be the model man of the age in point of character, of intelligence, of capacity and of political merit; he is just the man for such a place, and it would inflict serious damage on the country not to appoint him. You ask his neighbor, who, perhaps, is his competitor, and he will inform you that the same man who in that paper is described as the model man of the Republic is a very shabby character, and that no more

improper person could be selected; but that he himself (the competitor) is just the man whose services the Republic needs.

Now, sir, how are these recommendations made and how are they obtained? Look at the Congressman who is to distribute the offices in his district. Laboring under the pressure coming from those who exercise political influence among his constituents, he is not permitted to follow his own judgment. He is bound to a great many of his "political friends" by what he considers honorable political obligations, and he is forced to take their judgment in a great many cases for his own. Sometimes, indeed, he has a personal knowledge of the individuals he is to recommend; but in a great many cases not. So you see that by no means in all cases the recommendations of the Congressman for office in his district are his own, but forced upon him by other people, to be taken upon trust.

But as to offices not local, you witness the interesting spectacle of Senators and Representatives coöperating. It is the organization of a mutual insurance society; "You sign this recommendation of my friend, I sign that recommendation of yours." It is a matter of mutual accommodation. And here the element of personal knowledge enters but rarely. What must the consequences be? Consider our senatorial duty to act in a judicial capacity on the confirmation or rejection of nominations which we ourselves, without personal knowledge of the individual, have aided in procuring, and then look at a case which happened to myself. At the solicitation of a friend on this floor I put my name to a recommendation, in good faith; and on the strength of that paper, bearing many signatures, the President nominated the applicant; and when his name came before the Senate, and we had to pass sentence upon him, I learned things which, had I

known then, would never have permitted me to join in the recommendation. But there he was; and possibly my own signature, together with those of other Senators, had induced the President to nominate him. What should we do when called upon to confirm or reject the nomination? Reject a nomination we ourselves had induced the President to make? Or confirm it against the dictates of our own consciences? Do you perceive the conflict between duty and fairness which the present way of doing things is so apt to bring upon us? And I venture to say that no session passes by without the occurrence of many similar cases.

There, then, are recommendations with and without personal knowledge, extorted and freely given, honest and dishonest; and these are the things which are to guide the appointing power in that most important and difficult operation, the sudden and hurried disorganization and reorganization of the whole administrative machinery.

And, sir, this is not the worst feature of the business. I have known instances where a regular office brokerage was established, and where a member of this Senate, not now here, a gentleman of the most honorable character, was induced by a so-called friend to sign a recommendation for a third individual, by which that third individual was to obtain an appointment in one of the Departments, the "friend" having exacted and obtained a fee of one hundred dollars to procure the signature of the Senator. The Senator would have kicked that friend from his presence had he had any suspicion of the dishonorable traffic. But I ask you, can you tell, or can I tell, if we are facile enough to sign papers at the request of outside friends, that we have not fallen into the same snare, and that your and my signature have not been sold by an office-broker for money?

Now, sir, a glance at the absurdities that are occurring

under this system. There is that most formidable of men, "the man to be provided for"; a man who must necessarily have an office; a man who has "claims" that cannot be disregarded and who cannot be neglected with impunity; a man to be put in position at all hazards. I will ask the Secretary to read from the testimony taken by the Retrenchment Committee, published last year, the passage I have marked.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

There was a gentleman named Livingston, who belonged to one of the old families of New York. He lost his property in the crisis of 1837. There was a vacancy in the appraisers' department at New York, by removal or death. He was a Catholic. Mrs. Alexander Hamilton, taking a letter from Bishop Hughes, went to Mr. Tyler, and had Mr. Livingston appointed appraiser. Nobody in the customhouse had any respect for his report; nobody had any respect for his signature. The custom was to inclose his return to another appraiser in an envelope, and it would be investigated before the goods were passed. When Mr. Polk came in everybody thought Mr. Livingston would be removed; but Mr. Livingston remained. Mrs. Hamilton was living, and Bishop Hughes was there and in addition to that there was a petition got up in his favor, headed by Martin Van Buren, and signed by all the leading influential Democrats in the State of New York. That document would be worth \$500 for the autographs alone. I knew he could not be removed; but when the tariff of 1846 was made I was one of Walker's Congress, as it was called. Mr. Walker sent for me to go to Washington to help him frame a circular, to arrange the bill. I went there, and worked for some time with him. One night, when we had got through, he ordered up some toddy, and was gossiping. I said to Mr. Walker, "Why don't you send Mr. Livingston as Minister to England?" "Why so?" said he. "Why," said I, "there are very few questions pending between the two countries now—nothing but what the Secretary of State can attend to.

The salary is \$9000 and the outfit is \$9000, making \$18,000. Mr. Livingston is losing you more than two million dollars every month. You cannot remove Livingston. I know you cannot remove him; but I will tell you what you can do. There is a vacancy soon to take place at Chili; let him be sent as *chargé d'affaires* to Chili." I went further, and said to him, "You had better send for Bishop Hughes, and send for Mrs. Hamilton, and tell her that the post of appraiser is not the post for Mr. Livingston; that he wants a better place; that you want a Catholic to represent us at the Court of Chili; that the pay is \$4500, and the outfit \$4500." Mr. Walker said nothing; but I saw that it made an impression on him; and in about three months I saw in the papers that Mr. Livingston had gone to Chili.

MR. SCHURZ. Now, Mr. President, you may think that this is an old story and that such things do not happen to-day. I will tell you of the case of a man to be provided for that came under my own personal observation, and with which I was myself somewhat connected, a circumstance which I by no means mention with pride—it was one of those early errors which, under the present system, a Senator at the commencement of his career is apt to fall into. After the incoming of this Administration, a gentleman of my acquaintance who had strong "claims" desired to be appointed postmaster in a Western city, but the President happened to put one of his own friends into that office; and so the man to be provided for could not be postmaster. Then the delegation of his State agreed to make him pension agent at the same place; but then an influential member of that delegation opposed him, and so he could not be pension agent. Then he took his case into his own hands, for he knew that he was a man to be provided for, and the President nominated him as Minister Resident to a South American republic. Having obtained that, he thought

he could obtain more. He saw a chance to be appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to another government, and, sure enough, he received the nomination for that also. Then his nomination came into the Senate and was rejected. There was a terrible disappointment! And yet the man to be provided for was provided for. He was finally sent as governor to a territory. Thus, sir, under the present intelligent system of making appointments, the same man aspired to a post-office, a pension agency, a Minister residentship, a full mission, and finally landed in the governorship of a territory; and the appointing power, yielding to the peculiar pressure characteristic of the existing system, declared him fit for all these places consecutively. And all this in seven days, save the territorial governorship, which was discovered for him afterward.

And with him there were a multitude of men to be provided for at the same time; there always are a good many more than places to put them in. Do you complain of the unnecessary multiplication of offices? That evil is unavoidable as long as we suffer under the system which recognizes men to be provided for. Must it not be clear to every observing mind that our present mode of making appointments is a blindfold game, a mere haphazard proceeding? Was Mr. Lincoln very wrong when once, in a moment of despair, he said with grim humor, "I have discovered a good way of providing officers for this Government: put all the names of the applicants into one pepper-box and all the offices into another, and then shake the two, and make appointments just as the names and the offices happen to drop out together"?

Now, sir, you, as enlightened citizen of the world, observing these things, find this rather a wild way in which the affairs of this great Republic are carried on at Washington. You are somewhat bewildered, and you

extend your inquiries further, to ascertain whether the same wild way prevails everywhere else. You go to New York. You visit the customhouse; you know of the magnitude of the interests administered there; you know that the revenues of that customhouse are now far larger than were the revenues of the whole Government not a great many years ago; you notice how complicated that tremendous machinery is, teeming with weighers and gaugers and inspectors and appraisers and examiners, and clerks of all descriptions. A new collector has just been appointed to direct and control that mighty engine. He is a sort of a president on a small scale. Being a new man you find him perplexed with the greatness, variety, delicacy and responsibility of his duties; duties new to him, duties which, in their complexity, he will not be able clearly to understand, much less successfully to perform, without careful study and close application. And yet, what is he doing? The same thing which you found the President to be doing, and the members of the Cabinet; he is distributing offices. He is overwhelmed with applications. He has received in a few days about fifteen thousand of them, and the pressure of applicants and their friends bids fair to drive him crazy. He, too, is obliged to take to pieces the whole machinery of the customhouse and to reconstruct it again in a hurry. You ask him, why all this? He will tell you it is a political necessity. A political necessity, sir! Is not the first political necessity the conscientious and efficient collection of the revenue? No, sir. He will tell you that there is a political necessity far above that, of a much higher order; and you discover that the great customhouse at New York is essentially a political machine. It is to control, as much as possible, the politics of the city and State of New York in the interest of the ruling party.

Now, sir, what are the influences pressing upon that

unfortunate potentate, the collector? We heard the Senator from New York [Mr. CONKLING] say the other day that he had carefully abstained from making any recommendations for office in the customhouse. I certainly believe his assertion; and all honor to him for it. But I am sure that here we behold not the rule, but an exception. To show you what Congressional influences are sometimes active, I will again refer to the report of the Retrenchment Committee, from which I desire the Secretary to read what I have marked.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

Question. Can you state how or through what influence Deputy Collector Grigsby obtained his appointment?

Answer. In the first place Senator EDMUNDS, of Vermont, and Mr. GRISWOLD, of New York, made strong efforts to get me the appointment of Collector of Customs at Brownsville or Corpus Christi, Texas. They did not succeed. I was too black a Republican. Judge Olin also went to the Secretary and told him how long he had known me and what my character was. One day I met Mr. Creecy on the street, and he told me I had the best influence in the country for any position in the Treasury Department, and he asked me if I did not know any Democratic Members or Senators. I told him no. He named over different ones, and I said, "I do not know them." At last I said, laughingly, "I know JOHN MORRISSEY. I was born and bred in Troy, near him." I said, "I know John, but of course he is no good." Creecy said, "He is just the man you want; he has never asked anything yet. Get MORRISSEY to ask for a place for you and you will be taken care of." Going down the street I met Mr. Stevens, a lawyer on Seventh Street, a friend of mine, and I told him of my conversation with Creecy. Said he, "The idea of you being recommended by JOHN MORRISSEY! I would starve first." Said I, "I will not starve, and if JOHN MORRISSEY can get me a place he will do it. He has always known me, and if I can get a place I am going to have it." I went and saw MORRISSEY, and MORRIS-

SEY wrote a letter to Colonel Cooper, stating that he had known me from boyhood and requesting that I be provided for. I took that up and gave it to Colonel Cooper, who had always received me very pleasantly, and he told me to come next day and he would see. Then he said, "Go up-stairs and tell Mr. Creecy that I sent you up to look over the books and select the place you want."

MR. SCHURZ. Let me interrupt the Secretary there. I will state, in order to shorten the story, that the gentleman was appointed, and that this case happened under the Administration of Andrew Johnson, when Mr. Smythe was collector of New York. There is a sample of Congressional appointment in the customhouse at New York, and what has happened is not unlikely to happen again. It is the natural outgrowth of the system.

But Congressional influences are by no means the worst in filling places in the customhouse. They may, and undoubtedly do, sometimes lead to the appointment of good men. But now the ward politician of the great Babel steps upon the scene with his followers, the mighty man who packs caucuses and controls nominations, who does the heavy work at the ballot-box, and attends to the political work done in the grog-shops. His voice is heard in the distribution of office, and the voice of such men of influence cannot be disregarded with impunity.

The other day the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. PATTERSON] showed you that, as the investigations of the Retrenchment Committee prove, the New York customhouse, too, suffers from men to be provided for, for whom offices must be created, even if the service does not need them. He cited the case of an old apple-woman having a stand near the customhouse who had been on the payroll of that institution at New York for months. I presume she represents the case of a woman to be provided for. She had, perhaps, some son or cousin keeping a

grocery in one of the lower wards, who exercises political influence, and, in order to propitiate that man of power, the "claims" of the old apple-woman had to be recognized by putting her name on the pay-rolls of the customhouse.

You notice officers there called inspectors; officers whose duties are of the very highest consequence. They, in fact, to a very great extent, hold the revenue of the customhouse in their hands; for they have to watch the unloading of ships and see to it that no goods are smuggled into the city from the vessels arriving in that port. What class of people are those inspectors taken from? We heard it said the other day by the Senator from New Hampshire that they, as they themselves confess, are in the habit of accepting bribes of fifteen to fifty dollars for each vessel that is unloaded under their supervision; that they accept those bribes as a rule, not as an exception. And those officers are selected from that class of people of whom the Senator from New York told us, that, yielding to the frailties of human nature, they would naturally drift into the habit of taking presents or bribes, and you would not expect anything else. If you cannot expect anything else, what becomes of the revenue? But, I will admit, under the present system of distributing offices, you have, indeed, no right to expect anything better.

I will not go into any further particulars. You may think that in New York things were in a bad condition, but that at other places they would present themselves differently. Go across the continent to San Francisco, and you will find exactly the same system working there, leading to similar results. You will be told there that under the prevailing system five collectors went out of office as defaulters to the Government. You will be told that, under the law, officers are to be examined before they are appointed, and yet the very heads of those establishments will, at the same time, inform you that

the examination is a mere farce; that as soon as the examining board knows whom the collector wants appointed the favored candidates will pass the examination without the least difficulty. And so you go from place to place, you examine office after office, and you will find the same system at work, and you will find that it tends to produce similar results, only different in degree.

MR. COLE. If the Senator will allow me, he is evidently alluding to a condition of affairs in California at a former period, under another Administration.

MR. SCHURZ. As to the default, I do.

MR. COLE. But as the Senator was using the present tense, saying "you will find the same condition of things there," I was apprehensive that a mistake might arise. I will say to the Senator that the offices in California were never better filled, nor could they be, than they are now.

MR. SCHURZ. I shall certainly not charge upon the customhouse in San Francisco anything that is not in accordance with the truth. What I referred to was simply the results of investigations which the Committee on Retrenchment made in California when we were there. And I refer to the report of the committee all who want to inform themselves. I will not say that we discovered great frauds being now perpetrated; but we did discover the same looseness in making appointments which prevails elsewhere; and in some statements which were made to us by the higher officials, who themselves complained of bad results, we found evidence that the looseness in the manner of making appointments was at the bottom of the abuses.

MR. COLE. That examination took place two years ago and referred to what had preceded that time.

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir. The committee visited San Francisco in August, 1869.

Now, Mr. President, let us go on in our inquiries. You might think that after all that frantic bustle and hurry

immediate upon the accession of an Administration to power, the tearing down and the reconstruction of the machinery of the government must finally be accomplished; that the engine must at last be in working order and enjoy something like stability. But you find yourself mistaken. The same system continues through all the four years of an Administration to produce the same disorder. We have the authority of ex-Secretary Cox for this. He says in his essay in the *North American Review*:

If a month or two were all that is wasted in this employment it would be bad enough, but the truth is, that by far the larger part of the time of the President and all the members of his Cabinet is occupied by this worse than useless drudgery during the whole term of his office, and it forms literally and absolutely the staple of their work. It is therefore no figure of speech to say that administering the Government means the distribution and redistribution of its offices, and that its diplomacy, finance, military, naval and internal administration are the minor affairs which the settled policy of the country has relegated to such odds and ends of time as may be snatched from the greater cares of office.

MR. CASSERLY. Will the Senator from Missouri allow me to interrupt him?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. CASSERLY. I understood him to say, after the correction which he made upon the interruption of my colleague—and my understanding of what he said becomes important—that there was some period in the past when three or four consecutive collectors at the port of San Francisco were defaulters. The port of San Francisco is but a little over twenty years old, and I should be glad to have the authority of the Senator for that statement if he can turn to it.

MR. SCHURZ. I will give it to the Senator.

MR. CASSERLY. I am quite certain there were many collectors of whom that could not be true.

MR. SCHURZ. Here is the testimony taken by the Committee on Retrenchment, of Mr. Samuel J. Bridge.

MR. CASSERLY. What is the date?

MR. SCHURZ. September 1, 1869.

MR. CASSERLY. What page in the book?

MR. SCHURZ. Page 133. He says:

In San Francisco we have had seven collectors, and five of them have gone out in default. The office now is well conducted. I do not know of any abuses that exist in it. It was shocking at the close of Buchanan's Administration. It became very corrupt and continued so at the beginning of Lincoln's; the new appointees fell into the old track.

MR. CASSERLY. I think there must be some mistake about that. I think I know of at least three collectors of whom that could not be true. And if Mr. Bridge's testimony is correct, it embraces a period of eight or ten years, during which the party of which the Senator is so honored a member had the control there.

MR. SCHURZ. I will certainly accept the explanation of the Senator from California, and let it be recorded that three collectors in San Francisco have gone out of office who were not defaulters.

MR. CASSERLY. I said, of my personal knowledge, previous to the incoming of the Republican party.

MR. SCHURZ. Mr. President, I was saying that, far from having that great work accomplished, after all this frantic bustle immediately consequent upon the accession of a new Administration, it continues through four years. For instance, the political machinery in New York does not work well, and a new collector has to be appointed. Then the whole structure of the civil service in the custom-

house is recast again; and similar things occur all over the country. But even without the appointment of a new collector, there is nothing like stability. As an illustration, I will state the significant fact, that under one collector there were, in the two hundred and forty inspectorships, four hundred changes in the course of three years, and we have reason to believe that the last set was as bad as—if not worse than—the first. At any rate, we have now arrived at the point where all the changes that have taken place have furnished us a set of inspectors who, as they themselves confess, have made it a rule to accept bribes.

Mr. President, you pause after having examined all this and take a general survey. I ask you in all candor and soberness, is not this something like Bedlam? Look over all the civilized countries of the world: do you discover anything equal to it? Look at the characteristic features of the prevailing system. You observe that in making appointments the interests of the public service are—I will not say in all cases, but certainly in a very great proportion of cases—a consideration of only secondary importance. Men are appointed for what they have done or are to do for the party, and not for what they have done or are to do for the public service. They are not infrequently appointed to the salary and not to the office. It is political favoritism raised to the dignity of a ruling system.

Now, sir, in the face of these facts you cease to be astonished at the abuses which abound all around us. Under such a system it cannot be otherwise but that inexperience should follow inexperience and rascality should follow rascality in rapid succession. There is nothing unnatural to your mind now in the needless and expensive multiplication of offices. There is nothing surprising to you now in the frequency and magnitude of embezzlements

and defalcations. You understand now perfectly well that when the whisky tax was fixed at two dollars, it was absolutely impossible to enforce the law with the machinery of the public service we had. You are no longer surprised at the frequency of mail robberies which are perpetrated in post-offices. You see the smugglers in our ports lying in wait to watch their opportunity when, taking advantage of the inexperience of new officers, or with the aid of dishonest ones, they can rush whole cargoes into the ports of the United States. It is no longer surprising to you henceforth when you read in the reports of the Committee on Retrenchment that from this source losses have occurred for many years amounting to from twelve to twenty-five million dollars annually at the port of New York alone. Nor is it surprising to you to learn, as is calculated by gentlemen of experience in that institution, that each change of a collector in the customhouse at New York costs the country an average of ten million dollars, in consequence of the confusion and disorder which necessarily follow.

Neither will it be surprising to you to learn, as an illustration of the effect of the system on the administration of justice, what I learned from a United States Judge this very morning, that in his district there had been three changes in the district attorneyship within two years, and that three late district attorneys appeared in the courts as attorneys for the same defendants whom they had commenced to prosecute when in office, now defending them with all the secrets of the Government in their possession, and that in all probability from this source there will be a loss arising to the Government of more than four hundred thousand dollars. No, sir; there is nothing astonishing in all this, for you have learned that the offices of the Government are mere "spoils," "public plunder;" that instead of being regarded as the places of

duty, they are regarded as conquests, the conquest of a party; as "berths" into which men are put, not to use the best of their energies, not to look with anxiety after the interests of the Government, but to make it comfortable for themselves and to serve their friends. And you have learned more: how current these words "spoils" and "plunder" have become in the mouths of the people, so that we have lost almost all sense of their fearful meaning.

I repeat, sir, there is nothing astonishing in all these abuses, if you consider the natural effect of such a system upon the frailties of human nature, which we have heard discussed so feelingly in the course of this debate.

Sir, when a man receives an office as a reward for political services rendered, or as an incentive for further political work; when he feels himself sustained, less by his own energy and efficiency than by political influence, is he not naturally led to rely upon that political influence instead of his own fidelity and efficiency to sustain him in office? Is it not a matter of experience, that even well-intentioned men, who go into office honest and industrious, frequently become dishonest and lazy there, feeling that political influence is more potent than the appreciation of dutiful conduct?

Let us look further. Is not the short and uncertain tenure of office a very severe temptation to a man burdened with the ordinary frailties of human nature to make the most of short opportunities, or at least to have the greatest possible benefit from the least possible work? Hence the formation of "rings" in the public service, of which I will give you an instance in my own experience. I was informed by a very reliable and honorable gentleman, a clerk in one of our Departments here, that immediately after his appointment he endeavored to fulfil his duty to the very best of his ability, doing as much work as he

could possibly perform; but after a very few days he noticed that his colleagues in his room were looking sourly at him; and finally he learned the reason of it. They told him, "My good man, it will not do for you to work as much as you do now; it is against the rules of this room. You must conform yourself to these rules. We are accustomed to work just so much and no more, and if you will do more you will repent of it." The poor fellow, anxious to keep his place, conformed himself to the rules of his room, and then worked just so much and no more, like the rest.

Let me call your attention to a statement made by a gentleman who probably has studied the system of our civil service more thoroughly than any other man in this country; I mean Mr. JENCKES of the House of Representatives. The Secretary will oblige me by reading the passage from his speech which I have marked. It embodies part of the report of an investigating committee.

The Clerk read as follows:

We do not seek to disguise the cause of the inefficiency (to use the mildest term) of these officers. They are all appointed upon political or personal grounds, and as their tenure of office is insecure, and they may be removed at any time without previous notice and without cause, they do the least they can to earn their salaries. To use a favorite phrase with them, they "make the most of their time." Indeed, if any one should prove faithful and vigilant, and not only see that persons dealing with the Government act fairly, but also report any delinquencies of their fellows, their tenure of office would be more insecure, and any repetition of such fidelity to the Government would be the occasion of their removal.

One of the worst, if not the very worst, feature in the present condition of the service is that good and faithful officers are unwilling to testify as to what they know of the "irregularities" (to use the fashionably mild term) of their

associates. For there are many good and faithful servants, who do the work of these unfaithful politicians, men of character, of families, of long service, who have been unwilling to have their names go upon the record as witnesses to the faults of their associates, lest they should be immediately dismissed by their superiors, or lest their places should be made so uncomfortable by their "irregular" associates that they would be compelled to resign. Nothing has impressed me more with the rottenness and corruption of our present want of system than the tears of these old and faithful servants, who begged that they might not be placed upon the record as witnesses to the faithlessness of their associates, and that it might not even be known that they had been called to be witnesses. Nothing but the assurance of secrecy and the protection given by law to persons giving such testimony could procure us evidence of how the people were being plundered instead of being served.

MR. BOREMAN. I ask the Senator what is the date of that speech?

MR. SCHURZ. May 14, 1868. I desire to say to my friend from West Virginia and to the Senate that the review I give here of the public service does not by any means apply exclusively to the present condition of things. I am endeavoring to present a general view of the workings of the existing system, extending over a series of years. Those workings may appear a little more favorably now, and a little worse then; but the general results, while the system prevails, are essentially the same.

Now, sir, observe the effect which this system is calculated to produce upon the character of those who are under its influence. Officers being party servants, have they not to sacrifice to a very great extent the independence of their own opinions? Is it not true that their very position breeds hypocrisy, sycophancy and venality, and that this is apt to result in a deterioration of manhood?

Is it not also natural that, in consequence of this, the public service should not stand as high in public opinion as it ought to do; that men who aspire to office, do so not infrequently at a sacrifice of self-respect? I have seen men of ability and a fine sense of honor walk the streets of Washington hanging their heads and full of shame for doing what ought to be considered honorable: aspiring to public office; now smarting under the necessity of self-humiliation which the desire to succeed seemed to impose upon them, and giving up the attempt because they could not endure it. The consequence of this is obvious; it is a class of aspirants of lower character. The impaired respectability of the service can hardly fail to have such effects. It weakens the inspirations of an honorable pride, which public servants ought to possess. There is the destruction of that *esprit de corps* which preserves the morality of the civil service in other countries, and which here distinguishes the Army and Navy in point of personal honor and integrity. Render our public servants proud of the dignity of their position, and most of the immoral practices will disappear from which the public service is now suffering.

I am certainly very far from representing all our public servants as a degraded class of men. There are, I am happy to say, many, very many, who manfully bear up against the influences working upon them. Honor to them! But those influences are as I have described them; they are the natural product of the "spoils" system as it exists; and their effects will grow worse the longer they are suffered to be at work.

But, sir, their effect upon the efficiency of the civil service itself is not the worst evil we have to deplore. Follow a Congressman into his State or district. Look at him as a candidate. Some of them rely for success upon their ability, their character, their merits; others

do not. These others speculate upon the frailties of human nature among their constituents. Observe one of the latter; how he attempts to build up the machinery of his influence at home; and for this the patronage offers him the ready means. He makes promises of office for the purpose of obtaining support, sometimes promiscuously, recklessly, in duplicate and in triplicate—promises impossible to be kept. Look at the situation of such a man. He is covered all over with fraudulent mortgages, and he stands before himself as a dishonorable deceiver before he is elected. By his promises he may have endeavored to buy others; he has certainly succeeded in demoralizing himself.

But now he is elected, and he commences to distribute offices. The Senator from Indiana [Mr. MORTON], whom I am sorry not to see in his seat, says that the system by which a Congressman is to distribute local offices is a guaranty for conscientious recommendations, for a Congressman would make himself unpopular by recommending unworthy men to public places. In some cases that may be so; but is it not frequently otherwise? Does not a Congressman frequently make recommendations for office merely for the purpose of paying old debts, discharging political obligations, or preparing for a new campaign with a view to his own reëlection?

But, sir, when he commences to distribute the offices, those duplicate and triplicate promises come down upon him; and what then? Then you will find those cases which are referred to in the essay of ex-Secretary Cox where he describes honorable Senators and members of the House of Representatives standing before a member of the Cabinet with recommendations in their hands and with the candidates for office on their arms, abounding in expressions of good will and friendship for their *protégés*, presenting them as the worthiest of mortals, whose

appointment they most ardently, anxiously advocate, while the Cabinet minister has in the drawer of his table confidential notes from the same honorable Congressmen requesting him not to pay any regard to the recommendation which they are just so eloquently and affectionately urging. Why, sir, I know that assertion of Secretary Cox to be true, for I myself have been informed by two heads of Departments that such cases are by no means infrequent.

Well, sir, look at the member of Congress who does this. You may pity the poor constituent who is thus deceived. But is not the honorable gentleman who resorts to such tricks of duplicity, and who stands as a liar before himself, to be more despised than pitied? And yet you may pity him also. For he is a victim of the spoils system as it works upon the frailties of Congressional human nature. But what will the man who does this be capable of doing afterward? And what will you say of a system which brings forth such results among the representatives of the people, who make the laws of the country?

Let us proceed. The machinery of the home influence is now constructed, and the Congressman thinks he has accomplished what he needs for his future prospects. But something new intervenes. It happens that the Executive has a pet scheme of which the Congressman conscientiously disapproves. Here is a complication. Does he insist upon his opposition? Then the Executive may threaten to withdraw his favor from him and to remove his appointees. If, on the other hand, he yields, the Executive may promise not only to keep those in office who were appointed upon his recommendation but to grant new favors to him. There, sir, is that great struggle between conscience and interest which has brought so many a man to his fall. Will such things happen? They may happen; nay, sir, they have happened; and the Spoils system invites them with such

power of seduction that they certainly will happen again. Here the system develops its full effects upon the frailties of human nature.

The temptation to the Executive is certainly great. It is that temptation which is always connected with power; a temptation which but few men, if any, have been able to withstand. But the temptation to the Congressman is still greater. His interest is potently working upon his mind. The Congressman, losing favor with the appointing power, loses his power also to keep that machinery of home influence, upon which in a great measure he depends for success, in working operation. His chances at the next election are constantly before his eyes. His own appointees, if he persists in his opposition to the Executive, may turn against him, for the Executive has means to work upon the frail human nature of officeholders. Thus the Congressman may suddenly find himself deserted by the very friends upon whose gratitude he counted. The clamor of new aspirants for office will be still stronger.

Sir, we have all experienced that kind of pressure upon us. Do you remember at the commencement of this Administration, when we were asked to repeal the tenure of office act, how the clamor of officeseekers arose around us to influence our decision; how they denounced those who resisted the repeal of that law as the enemies of the President at the very beginning of the Administration; and how they vociferously demanded that we should fling the laws at the feet of him who sits at the fountain-head of favor?

Thus the spoils system, with the vast ramification of its influences, works upon the independence of the legislator.

But the same temptation presents itself in another shape. A Congressman discovers abuses in a Department. If he attacks them he is in danger of having his clerks removed; he may be informed that he is no longer entitled

to the favors of that Department. Shall he give up his appointees, or violate his duty in ignoring the abuses?

The thing has sometimes been turned the other way. I am reliably informed that Congressmen have gone to a head of Department and threatened him that unless he appointed their particular *protégés*, they would vote against the appropriations for the Department. To appoint supernumeraries would have been a grave violation of duty on the part of the head of the Department. And yet, under the pressure of the spoils system, a Congressman demands it, with the threat that unless it be done he will violate his duty in a manner equally gross, by voting against a necessary appropriation.

But it appears in still another shape. A Congressman has procured an appointment for one of his friends, an appointment of great responsibility. He has, so to say, pledged his honor for the honor of the officer. That man commits gross misconduct; under his management serious abuses develop themselves. Is not the Congressman sorely tempted to cover up or whitewash that delinquency instead of fearlessly exposing it and bringing the guilty man to punishment? Is not there again the interest of the Congressman, under the influence of the Spoils system, working directly against the interest of the public good?

And now, sir, we arrive at a very interesting and somewhat startling question: can a Congressman, under the present system, be entirely honest? That question has been addressed to me by an intelligent observer, and my first impulse was at once to say, certainly he can. Yes, I believe he can; but I declare, sir, when you survey the whole field, when you study the influences of the present system upon the frailties of human nature, you will admit that it is exceedingly difficult for him to be so. The system is a hotbed of that peculiar kind of corruption which is the more dangerous as it does not appear in the

palpable, gross and unequivocal form of money, but appears in the seductive shape sometimes of an apparently honorable political or personal obligation. It insinuates itself like a subtle poison into those crevices of the human conscience which are opened by the expansion of generous feelings. And when that poison finds in an individual already the least corrupt tendency to work upon, it will develop it with wonderful rapidity. All the practices which I have been describing here I call corrupt, as I would call corrupt every act of a public servant intended to promote personal interest at the expense of the public good. If we have ceased to regard those practices in that light, it only shows that under the influence of the "spoils" system our moral sensibility has been dulled, and that a certain indifference as to the corrupt character of our own motives, unless they appear in the most palpable and the grossest form, has gradually and insensibly crept over us all. And this I regard as one of the most dangerous influences of the present way of doing things.

Now look at the effect upon the workings of the government. It is said that, by the patronage as it is now dispensed, a part of the Executive functions is transferred to the Legislature. This is true. But at the same time the independence of the Legislature is seriously endangered by the corrupting power of the Executive. The true statement of the case seems to be this: by the so-called right of recommendation, as it is at present practiced, members of the Legislature encroach beyond the point foreseen in the Constitution upon what the Executive ought to be most independent in and responsible for, namely, the administrative functions; and, on the other hand, by the power of giving and withholding patronage, the Executive exercises power over what the Legislature ought to be most independent in, namely, the legislative

functions. Thus the system weakens and demoralizes both ways. It is a disturbance of the Constitutional balances; it is a perversion of the powers of the government.

But, sir, on the whole, it strengthens the Executive in the worst sense, by giving him power over the meaner instincts of human nature. See how it works. The representative of the people stands before the Executive in the attitude apparently of an adviser, but in fact of a petitioner—an attitude always improper, and not seldom degrading. The appointments to office he asks for, even if they are calculated to promote the public good, are granted to him as favors, favors that can be withheld just as well as they can be granted. If such favors are necessary to him to keep up the machinery of his influence at home, then he feels himself, as he really is, in the power of the Executive.

The temptation is terribly strong, therefore, to buy those favors, even at the expense of his convictions and of his manhood. Thus it is that this system weakens the backbone and makes supple the knees of public men before the great dispenser of gifts. Thus it creates and nourishes that fawning servility which stifles the voice of honest criticism; and it requires very great emergencies indeed, like Andrew Johnson's glaring tergiversation, to break that dangerous spell.

But, on the other hand, the system is a source of peculiar dangers to the Executive also. Those who ascend the Presidential chair do not leave all the frailties of human nature behind them. The voice of interested sycophancy is apt to fill their ears and to befog their judgment. Even their errors find some who will applaud them. Even their follies will meet with obsequiousness. The servility which cringes before them is apt to lower their general estimate of manhood. They will form the dangerous conclusion that they can wield the people as readily as

they can wield those individuals who live and thrive on the Presidential smile. They are not seldom easily persuaded that, whatever a few factious critics may say, the country is fairly aglow with delight over its ruler. Why, sir, even Andrew Johnson, when he arrived at that point where those of his friends who respected themselves turned their backs upon him, was firmly convinced that his popularity with the people was omnipotent; and Presidents of better sense are not exempt from the danger of falling into errors of similar significance. They are not infrequently led to despise an unpleasant truth because it appears so lonesome and forlorn in the crowd of agreeable fictions gotten up for the purpose of pleasing and propitiating the Presidential fancy. And thus Presidents, seduced by the picture of popular admiration which is constantly held up before them, are apt to drop from mistake to mistake, to dare one blunder after another, until finally the verdict of the people, unmistakably expressed, wakes them up from the dangerous and deceptive dream of invincible popularity.

And why all this? The reason is very simple: because the Spoils system has made the atmosphere of the Executive Mansion so thick with favor-seeking flattery that the sound-waves of an independent public opinion can no longer penetrate it. Thus even Presidents are apt to become the victims of the spoils!

And yet this is not the worst feature of the system. You extend your observations further. A new Presidential election is coming on; a great contest of principles and policies, but at the same time a great contest for "public plunder." There are the spoils ahead, with the prospect of "a new deal." Men of patriotic and pure motives enter the arena; but also the speculators rush to the front, with whom all patriotic motives are overshadowed by mercenary impulses. They are ready for what

is called "dirty work," and their presence will create it where they do not find it.

The periodic recurrence of a "new deal" of the spoils has created a greed for office which is raging like an epidemic disease and is continually growing worse. There is a desire, unfortunately spreading among the young men of the country, to live either without work or with as little work as possible, and that desire is stimulated to a morbid degree by the seductive opportunities of political life. Many good men, young and old, are drawn off from honest and remunerative labor, because they are told that it is so easy to get an office and so pleasant to enjoy a living at the public expense. A political proletariat is forming itself in consequence, which is recruited from men who, following that morbid infatuation, are drawn away from productive pursuits. That proletariat is pressing upon candidates, not infrequently forming their body-guard. The most reckless politicians become very important in the fight, voluntarily undertaking the work which sometimes candidates would shrink from advising. And these men will be the most clamorous for reward; and being the most persistent and the most dangerous, they will not infrequently be also the most likely to receive it. Thus a class of camp-followers, caring for nothing but the spoils, fastens itself upon political parties.

You ask, why cannot political parties preserve their purity? Mainly because the spoils system attracts to them, and makes prominent and important in them, impure elements. On the other hand, men of a higher tone, disgusted with this spectacle, will sometimes fall to the rear; and thus we deplore the loss of some of the most valuable elements of the population from active political life.

Now, sir, the Presidential election being over, the same spectacle, as I have described it, is repeated, whatever party may have carried the day. Another question pre-

sents itself: the Spoils system being carried on under the auspices and responsibility of political parties—can a political party be honest? Sir, I look upon it as almost, I might say entirely, impossible. The reason is simple: the party in power being held responsible for the conduct of partisan officers, will always be irresistibly tempted, in order to save itself, to conceal and whitewash the dishonest practices and abuses carried on by such officers, instead of fearlessly exposing, punishing and correcting them. Party interest, as now understood, exercises a terrorism over the members of political organizations which but few are able to resist. He who honestly and fearlessly denounces abuses is considered not only a dangerous character, but he is considered a bad party man; and it may interest the Senate to know that a member of this body, who but a few days ago spoke about the abuses carried on in one of the offices of the country, was approached by anxious political friends and blamed for having made a speech against his party!

Sir, it is in vain while the Spoils system prevails to look to any party for a thorough reform of abuses. It is in vain, because those very abuses have become an integral part of the machinery through which parties obtain and wield power.

But by far the worst and most dangerous effect of the Spoils system is the demoralization of the public sentiment. We know that on certain frontiers smuggling, robbing the revenue, is not considered an entirely dishonorable business. Now, I ask you, sir, is it not true that here it does not render a man generally infamous if he robs the United States provided he does it cleverly? Is it not true that things are considered fair in politics which would be looked upon as positively dishonorable in private life? Has not the taking dishonest advantage of political power and influence for the acquisition of wealth become a

thing which is judged by a great many with alarming leniency? When the offices of the Government are looked upon as spoils to be enjoyed, instead of duties to be performed, is it a wonder if in certain quarters the atrocious notion has gained currency, that he is a fool who in a political position is not knave enough to steal? Is it a wonder that under the spoils system the pursuit of politics should be looked upon as a trade of somewhat tainted character; that in explaining the actions even of the most honorable men the suspicion of impure motives should, in preference of all others, be resorted to by the multitude, not with proper indignation indeed, but with stolid levity and with resigned indifference, an indifference still more demoralizing?

Is it a wonder if professional politicians, sensible of the tainted character of their business, sometimes ask themselves, "Why should we be better than the reputation of our trade? Why should we not enjoy the benefits of dishonest dealings if they are imputed to us all the same?" Is it a wonder that even well-meaning men drift into corrupt practices without knowing it, since long habit and the general example have dulled their moral apprehension of the true character of such practices, and since public opinion has become so indifferent to them?

Thus, sir, the demoralization nourished by the system of spoils has filtered through the whole body-politic from top to bottom, even to the lowest strata of the population; and you cannot fail to feel the deep significance of the words once uttered by Mr. Lincoln, to which the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WILSON] has already alluded. One day shortly before his death, after the commencement of his second Administration, he pointed out to a friend the crowd of officeseekers besieging his door, and said to him, "Now we have mastered the rebellion; but there you see something that in the course of time may become

far more dangerous to this Republic than the rebellion itself." And indeed, sir, he had a prophetic mind.

I have endeavored to describe the evil; what now is the remedy? Is there any probability that the evil will correct itself? I doubt it. A revolution in public sentiment ever so decided would hardly have lasting effect unless clothed in the form of law. We have to deal with a system of temptations which will work the same results as long as it exists at all. Let us see, then, whether legislative means are available and bid fair to be effective.

The present practice of distributing office in the way of patronage being the root of the evil, the problem consists in reaching that, without running against the spirit of the Constitution. I desire to move the bill to reform the civil service, which I introduced at the commencement of the last session, as a substitute for the bill introduced by the Senator from Illinois. I have changed it in only one essential point.

I do not indulge in the delusion by any means that the substitute I offer has any claim to perfection; on the contrary, I am painfully sensible of its shortcomings; but at any rate it may serve well as a basis for discussion. As I have already stated, the weak point in the bill of the honorable Senator from Illinois is this: that if he renders it impossible for the appointing power to derive information about the appointments to be made from Members of Congress another source of information must be substituted, which his bill fails to do. This source of information is supplied in my bill by the second section, which I ask the Secretary to read.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 2. *And be it further enacted*, That, there shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a board of nine commissioners, to be called

the civil service board among whose duties shall be the following: First. To prescribe the qualifications requisite for an appointment into each branch and grade of the civil service of the United States, having regard to the fitness of each candidate in respect to age, health, character, knowledge and ability for the branch of service and the particular office for which he presents himself or is presented for appointment. Second. To provide for the examinations and investigations to be instituted concerning the character and qualifications of all persons eligible under this act who may present themselves or be presented for admission into the civil service. Third. To establish rules governing the applications of such persons, the times and places of their examinations, the subjects upon which such examinations shall be had and the investigations to be made concerning the character and qualifications of such applicants, the mode of conducting the same and the manner of keeping and preserving the records thereof, and of perpetuating the evidence of such applications, qualifications, examinations and investigations, and their result as they may think expedient. Such rules shall be so framed as to keep the branches of the civil service and the different grades of each branch distinct and separate. The said board shall divide the country into territorial districts for the purpose of holding examinations of, and conducting investigations concerning, candidates resident or sojourning therein, and shall designate one or more convenient and accessible places in each district where examinations shall be held and investigations conducted. Fourth. To hold and conduct such examinations and investigations personally, or by persons by them specially designated for the purpose. Fifth. To make report of all rules and regulations established by them, and of a summary of their proceedings, including an abstract of their examinations of, and investigations concerning, candidates for positions in the civil service, annually, to Congress at the opening of each session.

MR. SCHURZ. Before this board all the applications for office are to go. This board is not to be in any sense

a partisan engine. The mode of appointment and the tenure which it is to have will give it a certain independence of party government. It is to be renewed one-third by every successive Administration, and will soon have a mixed political character, as one Administration succeeds upon another, probably under the auspices of different parties. The members of the board shall not be removed except for cause, according to the provisions of the tenure of office act before it was amended by this Congress at its first session. But they may be removed for cause deemed sufficient by the Senate. The salary of the commissioners is to be ample enough to command a respectable degree of ability and acquirements, and the value of the salary as enhanced by a long tenure. I will add that the number of commissioners composing the board, as the bill fixes it, is not essential. It ought not to be too small at first, for there will be a great pressure of work. It might be reduced afterward, when the machinery is in successful operation. I ask the Secretary now to read the fifteenth section of the substitute, to show in which way it is designed to secure to the board a mixed political character.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 15. *And be it further enacted*, That the several members of the civil service board first appointed in pursuance of this act shall by lot be divided into three classes of three persons each, the first class to be appointed for the term of four years, the second class to be appointed for the term of eight years, and the third class to be appointed for the term of twelve years, unless sooner removed in accordance with the provisions of this act; and that after the expiration of their respective terms their successors shall be appointed for the term of twelve years each: *Provided, however*, That whenever, by reason of the death or resignation or removal of any member, any vacancy occurs in the civil service board before the expiration of the term for which the member so vacating his office was ap-

pointed, then the person appointed to fill such vacancy shall be appointed to hold such office only during the balance of the term for which his predecessor was appointed.

MR. SCHURZ. The officers of the Government are divided into two classes: first, the subordinate officers, whose appointment is now by law vested in the heads of the different Departments, the routine men, the clerks; and secondly, the executive officers, who are now appointed by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The subordinate officers are to be appointed after competitive examination; and I desire the Secretary to read the third section of the substitute.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted*, That all appointments of inferior officers whose appointment is or may hereafter be vested by law in the heads of Departments, except postmasters, shall be made from those who shall have passed the required examinations in the following manner: the applicants who stand highest in order of merit on the list of those who have passed the examination for any particular branch and grade of the civil service shall have the preference in appointment to that branch and grade, and no person now in office who shall hereafter be appointed under the provisions of this act shall be promoted or transferred from a lower to a higher grade unless he shall have passed in like manner the examination prescribed by the civil service board for such higher grade. All such examinations shall be open to all persons who shall make application therefor.

MR. SCHURZ. The fitness of candidates for Presidential appointments shall also be examined by the board. There are certain offices the discharge of the duties of which requires special knowledge, experience and skill; and candidates for such offices are fit subjects for regular

examination. There are other offices, for instance country post-offices, in connection with which the examination of a candidate would hardly be deemed necessary and proper. The distinction is to be fixed by the regulations of the board. Where no examination is considered necessary the board shall institute such inquiries as may be called for to ascertain the character, antecedents, standing in society and general fitness of candidates. The results of such examinations shall be reported by the board to the President and to the Senate, to guide the Executive in making nominations and the Senate in confirming or rejecting them. The interference of Congressmen will then no longer be required. Will the Secretary now read the fourth section?

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That whenever any vacancy occurs in any office required by law to be filled by appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, except those specially designated as exceptions in section twenty-one of this act, the qualifications of all candidates who present themselves or are presented for appointment to fill such vacancy shall be ascertained either by examinations to be held or investigations to be instituted, or both combined, according to general rules to be established by the civil service board, and that said board shall make a full report of such examinations and investigations, stating what candidates have and what candidates have not, in the opinion of the board, demonstrated their fitness for the performance of the duties of such office, and the reasons for such opinion; and also, as nearly as possible, the order of merit of the different candidates; and that the board shall forward one copy of such report to the President, and one to the Senate.

MR. SCHURZ. You will notice, sir, that in the case of Presidential appointments the President is to choose freely from the whole number found fit, and that those

only are to be excluded from his choice who are found unfit for the office for which they present themselves. Thus the choice is by no means to be made by the board, but by the President.

One of the most important features of the substitute is the change in the tenure of officers. The section of my bill touching subordinate officers, as it originally stood, provided that those subordinate officers who are appointed by the heads of Departments, except postmasters, should be appointed on good behavior. The current objection to this was that it would create a distinct and aristocratic class among our population. I, for my part, must confess that I never feared any such result. In fact, the idea of a class of aristocrats, consisting of departmental clerks at Washington and of customhouse and post-office clerks at New York and other cities, seems to me somewhat ludicrous.

MR. HOWARD. If the Senator from Missouri will allow me, I wish to make an inquiry respecting the substitute which he has offered. It has not yet been fully read; and I wish to ascertain from him whether his substitute does not require that all appointments should be made from the lists of those who have passed an examination in pursuance of the regulations of the board of which he speaks?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir.

MR. HOWARD. And that all other persons are excluded from that charmed circle; is that it?

MR. SCHURZ. The design is that all who apply for office shall be sent before the board for examination.

MR. HOWARD. And no person shall be appointed at all unless they belong to that class?

MR. SCHURZ. I was just going to state that all applicants for office shall be sent before the board for examination, provided they be applicants for offices for

which an examination is found necessary by regulation, and that those who are not found fit shall be excluded from appointment.

MR. HOWARD. That is to say, that no person having failed in an examination before the board shall be appointed to office?

MR. SCHURZ. Not until he proves able to pass the examination or is found fit upon inquiry.

MR. HOWARD. And no person can be appointed to office unless he has been examined. Is that it?

MR. SCHURZ. I think if the Senator had listened to me he would have heard me say that in regard to some offices an examination would be necessary, and that in regard to others mere inquiries, to be instituted by the board, would be sufficient, the result to be laid before the President in the shape of reports; but that where examination is considered necessary no man shall be appointed who fails to pass that examination.

MR. HOWARD. That is to say, the President of the United States shall not select, in making nominations to the Senate, any person who has not passed an examination, and he shall not especially appoint to office any person who has not passed a certain examination. Is not this an infringement of the power of the President to make nominations and appointments?

MR. SCHURZ. That is one of those questions which I have been considering in drawing that section. I do not believe that it is. I believe that it is competent for Congress to exclude certain classes of people, unfit for the performance of public duties, from those public duties. For instance, it would decidedly be competent for Congress to exclude from nomination, say for Lieutenant-General, men who had never served in the Army. I have no doubt Congress has power to attach such conditions of appointment to offices created by law.

MR. WARNER. I should like to ask the Senator from Missouri a question, if he will yield.

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. WARNER. Would not his system prevent the President from appointing to office any man who did not apply?

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir; it would not. The President may select a man whom he wishes to appoint to office, and then send him before the civil service board, to ascertain whether he is fit. If that man does not want to go before the civil service board, the presumption is that he does not want to go into office.

I was just remarking that in my opinion the tenure on good behavior of those subordinate officers would, in my opinion, by no means be productive of the dangers which have been pictured in such glaring colors. I do not believe that these dangers exist in a country which is ruled by public opinion, and where the administration of affairs changes so frequently. And yet it is so obvious that a proposition like this could not carry in either House of Congress, or perhaps even before public opinion, that it has been abandoned. This, however, is not the only reason why it was given up. I believe that free competition and a rigid competitive examination before a board composed of conscientious examiners, as a condition of appointment, will prevent the frequent occurrence of removal without sufficient cause. At any rate, when vacancies in the Departments are to be filled only with men having issued best from a competitive examination, the service will not suffer by the change, removals and appointments on mere partisan grounds will cease and greater stability will be secured without sacrificing the elasticity of the system.

As to the Presidential appointments, I desire the Secretary to read sections eight and nine, defining the tenure of those offices.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 8. *And be it further enacted*, That all officers in the civil service of the United States at the time when this civil service board shall commence their examinations, except those whose appointment and promotion is regulated in section three of this act, and those specially designated as exceptions in section twenty-one of this act, shall hold their offices for the term of five years from the date of their commissions, respectively, unless sooner removed in accordance with the provisions of this act: *Provided, however*, That the discontinuance of an office shall in every case discharge the person holding it from the service.

SEC. 9. *And be it further enacted*, That all appointments in the civil service of the United States made after this act shall have taken effect and in pursuance of its provisions, except those whose appointment and promotion is regulated in section three of this act, and those who are specially designated as exceptions in section twenty-one of this act, shall be made for the term of eight years, unless sooner terminated by the death, disability or resignation of the occupant, or by his removal as hereinafter provided; and that, when before the expiration of such term a vacancy occurs in any such office, the officer selected in pursuance of the provisions of this act to fill such vacancy shall be appointed, not merely for the balance of the unexpired term of his predecessor, but for a new term of eight years from the date of his commission.

MR. SCHURZ. The object of these two sections is twofold: in the first place, to relieve the Administration at its commencement of the pressure which we now witness; and secondly, to take the partisan character from the civil service. Section eight throws the expiration of the term of those now in office at least one year beyond the commencement of the next Administration, when the new President, as well as the new members of the Cabinet, will be well versed in the exigencies of the service.

It is provided that the regular term of office shall be eight years, and whenever a vacancy occurs it shall not be filled merely for the balance of the unexpired term, but the officer filling the vacancy shall be appointed for another full term of eight years. The object is this: in the first place, regular rotation with every successive Administration shall cease. Officers being removable only for cause to be tried, and officers appointed by one Administration holding through the term of another, we shall accustom ourselves to the practice of having men in office belonging to another party than that which controls the Administration. And as vacancies gradually occur, by death, resignation or removal for cause, to be filled for full terms of eight years, the expiration of the terms of the different officers will no longer occur at one time, but be scattered over the period of eight years, thus giving the civil service board sufficient time to conduct their examinations and inquiries as they successively become necessary to fill vacancies, and enabling the Executive, as well as the Senate, to act leisurely and intelligently upon all the cases coming before them.

That the regular term should be just eight years I do not deem absolutely essential. It would indeed give the public service the benefit of more experienced officers. But to attain the other objects described it would be sufficient to fix a term of five, six or seven years as well. I admit that the practical capacity of a candidate for office, his executive ability, cannot be with sufficient certainty ascertained by examination. This might lead to embarrassments, as the officer is not to be removed during his term except for cause to be tried. It is therefore provided that the first year of service of an officer belonging to this class shall be his year of probation, during which his practical ability may be well ascertained. And during that year of probation the Executive shall

have power to remove the officer at pleasure, without assigning or proving a cause. It will thus be seen that no distinct and privileged class of Government officers, no bureaucracy is to be created, but the elasticity of the present system is to be preserved—improved, however, by a method of selection, which will secure a better class of officers, and by a longer and more secure tenure, which will remove the partisan character and raise the moral standard of the service.

The fifth section of the bill is intended to encourage honesty and efficiency in the service and to give the public servant an honorable record in the form of a testimonial. The Secretary will please read it.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 5. *And be it further enacted*, That whenever any officer in the civil service of the United States shall vacate his office, either at the expiration of his term, or by resignation, or otherwise, the head of the Department under which such officer served shall issue to him a testimonial stating the manner in which such officer performed the duties of his office; and that copies of such testimonials shall be kept on record in the Departments from which they issued respectively; and that whenever any such person, after having vacated such office, shall make application or be presented as a candidate for the same, or any other office in the civil service, such testimonial shall be produced before the civil service board and shall form part of the report of said board on the case of such person. And whenever any officer in the civil service shall, before the expiration of his term of office, make application for continuance in the same office for another term, or for any other office in the civil service, then the head of the Department under which such officer serves shall likewise issue such testimonial, which shall then be produced before the civil service board and form part of the report of said board as aforesaid: *Provided, however*, That whenever the President shall see fit to reappoint an officer at the expiration of his term

to the same office for another term, then this shall be considered as an equivalent to a certificate of good behavior and efficiency, and no further proceedings by the civil service board shall be required in the case of such officer.

MR. SCHURZ. Finally, sir, certain officers are excluded from the operation of this bill. I desire the Secretary to read section twenty-one.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 21. *And be it further enacted*, That the following officers shall be excepted from the operation of this act: the Judges and clerks of the courts of the United States, the members of the Cabinet, the Ministers Plenipotentiary, and the Ministers Resident of the United States, and the officers of the two houses of Congress.

MR. SCHURZ. As far as the Judges of the United States are concerned, it may be presumed that no other than men universally recognized as being eminent in the law would be selected for such places by any Administration; and as to members of the Cabinet and diplomatic officers, representing, as they do, not only a public duty, but in a certain sense also the political views of the Administration, it is proper that the Administration should have the free disposal of those places.

MR. HOWARD. I would ask the honorable Senator why he excepts the Judges of the Supreme Court from the category of persons to be examined before their appointment? Is there not greater necessity for the examination of applicants for judicial station than for any other position in the civil service?

MR. SCHURZ. As I have already stated, it may fairly be presumed that no Administration would select any other but men very eminent in their profession to fill such positions.

MR. HOWARD. Is not the eminence of the station the strongest reason that can be conceived for subjecting the applicant to an examination as to his fitness?

MR. SCHURZ. It might there with propriety be asked, who is to examine the candidates for such places as judge-ships on the Supreme Bench?

MR. HOWARD. I suppose they would be examined by the board of examiners, the nine, would they not?

MR. SCHURZ. I supposed in such a case it would be entirely inappropriate.

MR. HOWARD. Why not, is the question?

MR. SCHURZ. For the simple reason that for the highest judicial offices of the Government, if only obeying the voice of decency, every Administration would select only those standing highest in their profession. There are examinations in the Army for a number of grades. We might just as well ask who is to examine a candidate for the position of General-in-Chief.

MR. COLE. Would not that reason apply to all offices?

MR. SCHURZ. It would not. In the nature of things, it may fairly be presumed that the applicants will exclusively belong to the small class of those who are eminent enough to be mentioned in connection with such places.

MR. CRAGIN. The Senator, I presume, has not forgotten that these appointments are for life, and therefore there would be greater necessity of having exactly the right men.

MR. SCHURZ. I have certainly not forgotten that. But, on the whole, I think the experience of the people of the United States has been that but very few mistakes in the history of this country have been made in the selection of members of the Supreme Court of the United States. As to the diplomatic officers of the Government, there, I admit, this question might be asked with much greater propriety. But as diplomatic officers of the Government

are to represent not only a public duty, but also the political views of the Government, it is proper that the Administration should be left free in their choice; and I believe also that when no longer any danger exists that a man will be appointed Minister Resident or Minister Plenipotentiary because he fails in obtaining a post-office, we shall have a better set of diplomatic officers than now.

Now, sir, I repeat, I do not pretend that this plan is in any way perfect. On the contrary, I feel its shortcomings. Let us regard it as a suggestion that may call out others. I invite the Senate to consider the benefits arising from some such system. It would, of course, not at once remove all the evils complained of; but it would certainly secure greater efficiency in the civil service. It would certainly procure for it men of higher capacity, even by deterring ignorance and men of low reputation. It would certainly raise the respectability of the service; and a certificate of fitness issued by the civil service board would be a mark of distinction and serve as a passport in all the walks of private life everywhere. It would certainly inspire a sentiment of honorable pride among officers. It would secure more efficient control, by putting by the side of an officer one belonging to another party, instead of making the whole one great partisan ring. It would abolish the absurd practice by which an Administration is pressed to take to pieces and rebuild at the start the whole machinery of the government. It would relieve the President, Cabinet and Congressmen from importunity, and give them time to attend to their legitimate duties. It would restore the independence of the different departments of the Government. Offices ceasing to be party machinery, political parties would be relieved of responsibilities and would be encouraged in the freedom of criticism. Then a thorough retrenchment and reform of abuses would finally be attainable.

But more than that, the Spoils system, once destroyed, a healthier moral feeling in political life will be rendered possible; the corrupt temptations working in all spheres of the body-politic will be greatly lessened; the standard of morality in political life will be raised; political contests will once more be contests of principles and policies, instead of being scrambles for spoils; the political proletariat, with its demoralizing practices and influences, will gradually be broken up, and all the best elements of the population will again be attracted to political life. Politics will then become once more what they always ought to have been, a most honorable occupation engaging the noblest aspirations.

I am aware of the objections that are currently brought to a system like this. It is said that the reform proposed would be obnoxious to the theory of our government. I maintain that in its effects it would be in strict accordance with the original intentions as exemplified by the early practices of the Government. The Senator from New Hampshire, a few days ago, quoted a passage from *The Federalist* in which Alexander Hamilton states most strongly the intention of the makers of the Constitution to prevent the interference of members of Congress in the appointment of officers and to secure stability in the civil service.

MR. WILLIAMS. I should like to ask the Senator one question. Does it not appear from the early history of this Government that it was held that officers were subject to removal at the will of the Executive?

MR. SCHURZ. It does; but it appears also that the power of the Executive in that direction was but very rarely exercised. It appears from the teachings of the Fathers, as well as the early practice of the Government, that nothing was further from the minds of the statesmen of those times than that there should be a general breaking

up of the administrative machinery every four years, to be accompanied and followed by the scandals which we now witness. Who of them ever thought of it, that a competent and worthy officer should be removed as long as he was competent and worthy? Nay, let me say to the Senator: if the great Fathers of the Republic, if Washington and Jefferson and Madison and Hamilton could rise up from the dead and look at the spectacle which now so frequently presents itself to our eyes, they would stand aghast at the perversion which the beautiful fabric of the government, as they designed it, has suffered at the hands of subsequent generations.

MR. WILLIAMS. I wish to ask the Senator if the system which he is now assailing was not established by the Fathers of this Republic, and if all the evils of which he complains may not be remedied by electing a man President of the United States who will return to the early practices of the Republic?

MR. SCHURZ. Have we not elected more than once men to the Presidency of the United States upon whose integrity and sagacity and wisdom we built the highest hopes? Can the Senator point out within the reach of his memory a single President of the United States who ever dared to attempt the sweeping reform of which he speaks? Does he expect, as long as the present system prevails, if a change of party control should occur, that then a President would have the strength to rise up and say, "I will have no longer a partisan organization in the public service?" Does he think that such a President could thus control the greed of his partisan followers? Does he expect any party that may follow ours in the control of affairs, to abstain from grasping the spoils if there is no impediment in the way? To produce such a result would require a tremendous revolution in popular sentiment. I certainly would hail with delight such an

event; but have we a right to expect a moral revolution so powerful unless we prepare the way for it by removing the temptations which are now operating on the minds of the politicians and the multitude?

We are told that there is a popular notion prevailing in this country that every American citizen is entitled to public office. Yes, so he is; but would it not be well to create the additional popular notion that then every American citizen shall fit himself for public office in point of intelligence, acquirements and character? Thus office may even become an educational element in society.

"Are we to do nothing for our friends who helped sending us here?" we are sometimes asked. "Shall we say to them when they come to us asking for an office, 'No, you shall not have it?'" Sir, I am willing to do much for my friends; they shall command my best endeavors. And I think we can do something vastly better for them and their children and their children's children than giving them post-offices and places in customhouses; and that is, to pass laws which will secure to them good government.

Again, the objection is made that a reform of this kind would be incompatible with republican institutions. Sir, it seems to have become fashionable with some, whenever a great abuse is attacked that has worked itself into our political habits, to say that this is one of the evils inseparably connected with republican government, and that we must not touch it lest we touch republican government itself.

I, sir, have a far higher idea of republican government. I do not believe that true republican government is in any sense necessarily wedded to organic disorder and demoralization. I certainly do not indulge in the delusion that all the frailties and weaknesses of human nature can be abolished by an act of Congress; but I do not think that republican government will suffer if we repress

ignorance and mercenary motives, and thus open a wider practical field for the intellectual and moral elevation of man. I am sure that republican government can endure the examination of candidates for public office before they are intrusted with public responsibilities; and that it can endure also the exclusion of those who are intellectually and morally unfit for public station.

Republican government, it seems to me, does not depend upon an official tenure of four years. I think it will not suffer by an extension of that tenure to six or eight. I maintain that republican government will rather gain than lose, and gain immensely, by a reform which takes from the machinery of the public service its partisan character, and which will remove from our political life that most dangerous agency of corruption and demoralization which consists in partisan patronage; which will restore to political activity again all the best elements of our population, and to predominance the loftiest and most patriotic feelings of the human heart. I therefore repel that cry, as a slander upon the beneficent institutions under which we live and as an insult to the good sense of the American people.

It is said also that the country cannot be governed, that parties cannot be sustained under any but the existing system. Why, sir, such assertions are almost as old as history. There never was an absolutist, there never was a devotee of despotism, who did not strenuously affirm that if you limited the power of kings the whole world of morals and civilization would fall into chaos. If you had asked Walpole, he would have told you that it was impossible to govern England without a corruption fund. If you had asked the Duke of Wellington, he would have insisted upon it that the constitution of Great Britain would be ruined beyond redemption if you abolished the rotten boroughs. Why, have we become so imbecile as

to declare ourselves incapable to conceive and act upon a new idea, which is to do away with existing abuses? Has republicanism really arrived at its wit's end? Nay, sir, we are not permitted to stand still in this matter; we must go either forward or we shall be driven backward. We must control these evils or these evils will control us.

It has been said that a practice like the one proposed might have been proper when the Republic was young and small, when the interests it had to deal with were limited and when the number of offices was insignificant; but that now since the Republic has grown great, since the functions of the government have become complicated and the number of officers immense, it is entirely out of the question. Is that so? I affirm that just the reverse is the case. When the machinery of the government was simple and when the eyes of the Executive and his chief agents could be everywhere, then rotation in office might have been endurable; it might not have left those dangerous consequences behind it. But now, since the interests we have to deal with have grown so tremendous, since the number of officers has risen to the dimensions of an army and since the machinery of government stretches its arms into every relation of life, now, sir, is it not evident that the evils springing from the demoralizing tendency of the existing system increase a thousandfold as we go on, and that a reform is imperatively commanded by this very circumstance?

On previous occasions I have alluded to the dangers threatening from the growing power of great moneyed corporations; how that power is already felt in State and National politics, and bids fair to exercise a controlling influence, dangerous even to our free institutions. Can we afford to disregard that danger? Is it not time to consider what will become of our political life when such a power takes possession of political parties, whose very

discipline is enforced by continual appeals to mercenary motives, and by practices in their very nature corrupting? Is it not time to consider what, under the influence of such a power, a Government will become, which is surrounded by demoralizing temptations on all sides, and which holds in its hands means of corruption penetrating all spheres of society? And considering this, in the face of such dangers, is it not high time that those temptations should be removed, that those means of corruption should be curtailed and that a moral spirit should be infused into our body-politic capable of resisting such sinister influences?

Sir, this is no mere fancy. The demand for civil service reform is not a mere cry of croakers, who are constitutionally dissatisfied, or of restless innovators, who want to achieve a little cheap notoriety. It springs from the patriotic anxieties of serious, thinking men who, with profound solicitude, watch the growth of evils threatening the future of the Republic which they love. That demand cannot be laughed out of the way; it will not be put down by jests and sneers. That demand will become stronger every day; and I predict the time is not far [off] when political party can disregard it with impunity.

It was to me a hopeful sign when the President had a favorable word for civil service reform in his message. Why should we hesitate to act upon that suggestion? Do we not know that the older the evil grows the more difficult will be its eradication? Do we not feel that every session, every day, lost, is an opportunity lost? It is in this spirit that I have submitted to the Senate the plan I have explained. I repeat that I have no pride of opinion about it. On the contrary, no man will be happier than I if the wisdom of the Senate should discover and furnish one which is better. But let us at last approach this important problem with that fearlessness of thought which

will enable us to be candid with ourselves, and with that determination of purpose which is necessary to arm us for the struggle with inveterate habit, prejudice and the corrupt influences developed to such alarming power in our political life.

TO JACOB D. COX¹

UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3, 1871.

I regret very much not to have seen you when you were here. I should have been very glad to have a conversation with you on matters in which we have a common interest. I have to thank you for the very kind letter you wrote me some time ago. You understand my position perfectly, and your approval of my course is a great encouragement to me. I appreciate it highly. The Republican party is drifting into great dangers. You know as well as I do that under this Administration a great many things are as they ought not to be. To cover up and conceal all that is bad would be a course at the same time immoral and impracticable. To attack existing evils in order to cure them is a task which requires more moral courage than you find among the common run of partisans. And he who is bold enough to attempt it will soon find his motives suspected and his party-standing imperiled. And yet it must be done, or the cause we have so zealously been fighting for will drift upon the rocks.

I have made up my mind to go on, without regard to my own political fortunes, preaching the doctrine that a party like ours cannot be successful without being honest. And I am confident, we shall have a good many converts to that faith before the next Presidential election.

¹ Secretary of the Interior, 1869-70.

There is an attempt being made to create the impression that the Republican party can be successful only if General Grant is renominated. Tell me, do the people of Ohio think that the fortunes of the party depend on one single individual? I think it is time that all, who think not so, should speak out frankly and loudly. Nothing can be more demoralizing than to identify a cause with a person; and nothing can be more dangerous at the same time, when that person is in a fair way of becoming a heavy load to that cause.

I send you by this mail a speech on Civil Service Reform which I delivered about a week ago. Of course, there is no hope of carrying a plan like that which I propose in the present Congress, but we can in any event work on public opinion. When you have read the speech, will you be kind enough to give me what suggestions occur to you on the subject? They will be very valuable to me.

I send you also my speech on the San Domingo question.

GRANT'S USURPATION OF THE WAR POWERS ¹

MR. PRESIDENT:—Three speeches have now been made in reply to the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SUMNER], and although they were strong in imputations, with all due respect be it said, I did not find in them a vast accumulation of argument. The Senator from Indiana [Mr. MORTON] first intimated that the Senator from Massachusetts had delivered his remarks for the purpose of forestalling the effect of the report of the commission that had been sent to San Domingo, and thus, perhaps, to prevent the ratification of the treaty. Being somewhat

¹ Speech in the U. S. Senate, Mar. 28 and 29, 1871. The Senate had under consideration Mr. Sumner's resolutions relative to the employment of the naval forces of the United States in the waters of San Domingo.

acquainted with the Senator from Massachusetts, I think I can give my friend from Indiana the consoling assurance that nothing of the kind was in the mind of the Senator from Massachusetts. Whatever the report of the commission sent on a mission of investigation to San Domingo may be, I do not think it is likely to shed such a flood of light on the subject as to materially alter the judgment of the Senate. I should therefore deem it unnecessary to forestall anything with regard to the San Domingo treaty, for I am living in the hope that the fate of that treaty is already sealed.

The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. HOWE] opened with a most beautiful exordium, revealing to us a very remarkable acquaintance with the events of ancient and modern history. He slaughtered, one after another, Solomon, Cicero, Brutus, Cassius, Casca, William Pitt and Daniel Webster, with merciless rigor, and finally closed the column with my friend from Massachusetts. Really, sir, it was a brave sight to see him standing, with his fatal hatchet, scalping one after another, and proving that all these great men, toward the close of their lives, had entirely lost their mental faculties. Very sad, indeed. But as to the conclusion he desired to draw, that the course of the Senator from Massachusetts is also owing to a failure of his mental faculties, I cannot refrain from replying that the difficulty seems to be far less with the failure of the mental strength of the Senator from Massachusetts than with the failure of the moral strength of others.

I do not enter into this debate for the purpose of affecting in any way the result of the San Domingo negotiation; for my arguments against that treaty stand on a different ground. I enter into it solely for the purpose of raising my voice in vindication of sound Constitutional government; for no man can have listened to the discussion on the

floor of the Senate on these very resolutions without having been struck by the sinister looseness of Constitutional notions which has been exhibited to us; by the continual confounding of the President's person with the Government of the United States, just as if the whole Government of the United States consisted of only one man. It is for the purpose of vindicating the Constitutional division of powers that I enter upon this debate; and to bring the discussion back to a legitimate basis it is well that we should once more have a rapid survey of the facts.

The President, of his own motion and accord, as he had a Constitutional right to do, made a treaty with Buenaventura Baez for the annexation of the Dominican republic to the United States. The Dominican republic was disturbed by revolutionary parties hostile to Baez. The Dominican republic was also said to be threatened by the neighboring republic of Hayti, whose people were unfavorably disposed with regard to the project of the annexation of a part of that island to this Union, in which they saw danger to their own independence. The President then ordered certain naval officers of the United States, in command of a heavy naval armament, to protect the Government of the Dominican republic against any interference on the part of Hayti by force of arms, and to capture and destroy the ships of the republic of Hayti, according to circumstances. In pursuance of such orders, a rear-admiral of the United States, in command of heavily armed vessels, sails into the port of Port-au-Prince and informs the Haytian Government that whatever their relations with the Dominican republic may be, he will use his guns to capture and destroy their ships as soon as they attempt to interfere in any way with the Dominican republic. More than that, the commanders of the naval armament of the United States in Dominican waters

proclaim themselves also instructed, not only to protect the territory of the Dominican republic against foreign invasion, but also to protect the existing Government, that is, the personal power of Baez, against the citizens of that republic; and they actually aid Baez in his military operations.

Is there any Senator on this floor who will deny these facts? They all appear from the documentary evidence which I have on my desk. And such orders, instructing the naval officers of the United States to commit acts of war with arms of the United States, are issued by the President without the least authority from the Congress of the United States. Will any Senator deny this fact? And such orders are continued in force not only during the pendency of the projected treaty before the Senate, but after that treaty had expired on the 29th of March, 1870, and even after it had been formally rejected by a vote of the Senate on the 30th of June, 1870, while not even a shadow of a treaty is existing between the Government of the United States and that of the Dominican republic.

I submit that these are the facts; and every one of these facts is proven by the documentary evidence before us, furnished by the Executive department of the Government of the United States. What do these facts signify? It is affirmed by the Senator from Massachusetts that the orders thus issued by the President constituted a violation of the fundamental law of this Republic. Let us see. If it can be proven that these orders were unconstitutionally issued, then I suggest that all the glowing rhetoric about General Grant's past services, and all the vituperation heaped upon the Senator from Massachusetts and others, will be utterly without avail.

Let us strip the whole argument, then, of its flowers and go to its core. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Congress shall have power to declare

war; but my eloquent friend from Wisconsin steps in and says, as I understood him, although Congress may have the sole power, with the approval of the President, to declare war, yet war can be made, acts of war can be committed, without the authority of Congress. Did I understand the Senator correctly?

MR. HOWE. Yes, sir.

MR. SCHURZ. What is that great safeguard of our peace and security, as it is written in the Constitution, that Congress, and not the President alone, shall have the power to declare war—what is it worth if an Executive officer of the Government can initiate or make war without Congressional authority? I have high respect for my friend from Wisconsin, but I cannot refrain from thinking such an argument would be ruled out of any justice of the peace court in the West. That the Executive department of the Government shall not commit any act of war except in case of the invasion of the territory of the United States, unless expressly authorized by Congress, that must be the meaning, and the only meaning, of that Constitutional provision; and if it be anything else it is not worth the paper on which it is written.

MR. HOWE. If my friend will allow me, he did not misunderstand what I said, but he evidently misunderstands what I intended by it. I simply said that the President could, in the discharge of his authority over the Army and Navy, commit an act of war. I did not say he could rightfully do it, but I said he would be amenable to our Government for any such conduct.

MR. SCHURZ. That is another thing.

MR. HOWE. I was only trying to make a distinction between an act of war and a declaration of war.

MR. SCHURZ. Very well; then let us lay down the meaning of the Constitutional provision in these terms: that the Executive department of the Government shall

not commit an act of war except in case of an invasion of the United States by a foreign enemy, unless expressly authorized by Congress. Is that it?

MR. HOWE. Will you repeat that?

MR. SCHURZ. I will repeat it once more.

MR. SUMNER. It will bear repeating.

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly, it will bear repeating, and I think in our times it can hardly be repeated too often. The meaning of the provision of the Constitution that Congress shall have power to declare war is simply this and nothing else: that the Executive department of the Government shall not commit an act of war except in case of an invasion of the territory of the United States, unless expressly authorized by Congress. Is that it?

MR. HOWE. No, sir.

MR. SCHURZ. Let me hear what it is, then.

MR. HOWE. I admit that the President should not and ought not to commit an act of war unless under such circumstances as will justify him in that act in the judgment of the tribunals of the country, whether they are legislative or judicial.

MR. SCHURZ. Very well. The definition of the Senator from Wisconsin, then, if I understand him correctly, is this: the President shall not commit an act of war unless under circumstances which are approved by Congress as being such that he may rightfully commit an act of war. Is that it?

MR. HOWE. I will accept that.

MR. SCHURZ. Very well. Now, sir, that in this case Congress has not declared war or authorized the commission of acts of war is absolutely certain. Then the question occurs, were acts of war actually committed? The President ordered officers of the Navy of the United States to employ the force of arms to capture or destroy the ships of a foreign nation with whom the United States

were at peace. Is not that so? Is not this order in itself, standing alone, unsupported by anything else, an act of war as far as the Executive department can commit an act of war?

MR. HOWE rose.

MR. SCHURZ. I would ask the Senator from Wisconsin to be patient a moment; I have to add something. The President does not himself in his own person load and fire the gun; he can only order the gun to be loaded and fired; and he did so order. It is true the President made the actual use of arms, that is to say, the flagrant, bloody act of war, dependent upon a certain contingency. But, I ask the Senator from Wisconsin, has the President the power under the Constitution at his own arbitrary pleasure and discretion to define a contingency in which the arms of the United States shall be used against a nation with whom the United States are at peace? Has he the unlimited discretion to order the use of arms in a contingency so defined by himself? Let us consider. If he has that discretionary power to define a contingency in which the arms of the United States shall be used in the actual commission of a belligerent act, then he has power to use the arms of the United States to commit acts of war in contingencies of his own choosing; that is to say, whenever he pleases. And what becomes of that provision of the Constitution lodging the war-making power in Congress? It signifies nothing at all; it is written in water. Sir, that simple provision of the Constitution that Congress shall have power to declare war cannot by any rule of construction be interpreted to mean anything else but that Congress, and not the President alone, shall define the contingencies in which the belligerent power of the United States is to be used. I therefore affirm that the President in ordering the naval commanders of the United States to capture and destroy by force of arms the vessels

of a nation with whom the United States were at peace, in a contingency arbitrarily defined by himself other than self-defense, did usurp the war-making power of Congress.

MR. HOWE. Will the Senator answer me this question? Does he mean to say that the President can only employ force in a case where its employment has been preceded by an actual declaration of war by the Congress of the United States?

MR. SCHURZ. We know very well that when the territory of the United States is invaded he has the right to employ force.

MR. SHERMAN. On the high seas?

MR. SCHURZ. There also in case of an attack.

MR. HOWE. The Senator then admits that force may be employed in cases where Congress has not declared war; that cases may exist in which the President may employ force where war has not been declared by Congress. He admits that.

MR. SCHURZ. I said so.

MR. HOWE. Then will the Senator answer me this other question: who shall determine in what cases the President may or may not employ that force where war has not been formally declared by Congress, if President Grant shall not?

MR. SCHURZ. I think the Senator had better formulate his question in this way: who shall determine whether an invasion of the United States is an invasion or not? Is not that it? Who shall determine whether an attack upon a vessel of the United States——

MR. STEWART. Allow me to ask the Senator——

MR. SCHURZ. In one moment. Who shall determine whether an attack upon a vessel of the United States on the high seas is an attack or not? Why, sir, is not that trifling with the common-sense of the people?

MR. STEWART. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir.

MR. STEWART. Suppose an American citizen in a foreign country is maltreated in any way, deprived of his rights, and our Navy is cruising in the waters of that country, has the President of the United States any right to use force for the protection of that citizen?

MR. SCHURZ. If the Senator from Nevada will take the *Congressional Globe* for the year 1859, and look at a discussion which took place on this floor on the 18th of February of that year, he will find that President Buchanan asked of Congress power to protect by warlike means the safety of citizens of the United States on the transit route of Panama, and that the Senate indignantly refused such discretionary authority.

MR. STEWART. Let me ask the Senator, if the Navy of the United States has no power to protect our citizens abroad without an act of Congress declaring war, when it is perfectly obvious in most cases that all the virtue and all the benefits of that protection will pass by before the convening of Congress, before an act can be had, why have an expensive navy cruising in foreign waters?

MR. SCHURZ. Is that all the Senator has to ask?

MR. STEWART. Yes, sir.

MR. SCHURZ. I do not think that question deserves an answer.

As I have said, I repeat that the President in ordering the naval commanders of the United States to capture and destroy by force, without being attacked, without our territory being invaded by force, the vessels of a nation with whom the United States were at peace, in a contingency arbitrarily defined by himself, did usurp the war-making power of Congress; and I repeat it.

That a warlike collision between the forces of the

United States and those of a foreign nation resulting in the actual use of arms and the shedding of blood did not occur, is true; but I affirm, also, that the President after having given those orders cannot claim the benefit of that circumstance. The order to use force, to destroy or capture Haytian vessels, and to protect the Baez Government against all comers in certain contingencies was given in the expectation, or, if it better please you, in the apprehension at least, that such contingencies would happen; for had that apprehension not existed the orders, in all probability, would not have been given. It was believed that the Haytians were actually invading the Dominican republic, and that revolutionary parties in the Dominican republic were actually threatening the Baez Government. It was with reference to this very contingency that the order to use force was given, and it was most emphatically enjoined upon our naval commanders, as the record shows, that there should be no failure in this matter; and when our war-vessels, with such orders, had sailed on their mission, the effect of those orders was just as much out of the President's control as the cannon ball when it has left the muzzle of the gun is out of the control of him who fired the piece.

You are not permitted to say, gentlemen, that it would have been an unfortunate accident if a collision had actually occurred, for it was a most fortunate accident, but a mere accident for all that, an accident absolutely uncontrollable by the President, that a collision and bloodshed did not happen. When the order had left our shores, the President had done all that he could do to bring on that collision. It was out of his power then to prevent it, for not even the telegraph could reach our naval vessels stationed on the coast of San Domingo. As far as the peace and honor of the country could be jeopardized and compromised by him, he had actually jeopardized and

compromised it. As far as war could be made by the President alone, the President actually had made war. Who will deny it? It was an accident out of his control that a bloody collision did not take place. I therefore repeat that these orders, in themselves, constitute a usurpation of the war powers of Congress, under the fundamental law of this Republic.

Now let us see what Senators have to say to controvert this argument or to weaken its force. It is claimed that when the President had agreed upon a treaty of annexation with the Government of a foreign country, an inchoate right of the United States in that foreign country had been created, and that then the President had under the Constitution the power to protect by force of arms that inchoate right against all interference, just as he would have the power to protect the territory of the United States against invasion. Let us see what logical results will follow from such a doctrine as that.

From whom does the President claim to obtain the power to protect by acts of war the inchoate right in a foreign country assumed to have been created by a treaty not perfected by the consent of the Senate? He certainly does not claim to have obtained that power from Congress, from the only branch of the Government in which by the Constitution the war-making power is lodged, for Congress had not been consulted on the subject and Congress had not spoken. By virtue of what, then, does the President claim such power to enforce an inchoate right? By virtue of the mere project of a treaty, which, although concluded between himself and a foreign power, had not become the law of the land by the sanction of the Senate; and who made that project of a treaty? The President made it himself, of his own motion and pleasure, in conjunction with a foreign Government.

Thus, then, gentlemen claim that the President, of

whom nobody pretends that he possesses the power to initiate a war of his own motion under the Constitution, still does possess the power, by making a treaty, to create an inchoate right of the United States in some foreign country, and having by his own arbitrary act created that inchoate right, he has the power at his own arbitrary pleasure, without authority from Congress, to commit acts of war for the enforcement of that inchoate right. In other words, it is claimed that the President, by an act performed of himself at his own arbitrary pleasure, in conjunction with a foreign Government, may obtain for himself alone the war-making power, which the Constitution expressly vests in Congress. I look upon this as perhaps the hugest absurdity, the most audacious preposterousness, the most mischievous, dangerous and anti-republican doctrine that ever was broached on the floor of the Senate. When we hear advocated in the American Senate so wild a heresy, as that the President, by a mere sleight-of-hand, may steal from Congress the war-making power, does it not occur to you, Senators, that it is at last time that such theories and such acts should be sifted to the bottom by independent men?

But I am asked, may not the United States during the pendency of a treaty of annexation assume a protectorate over the country to be annexed, so as to prevent foreign intervention? Most assuredly the United States may do that. The United States may do that by force of arms, may do it by acts of war, may in every possible way enforce that protection. The United States may do that by a simple exercise of their sovereignty, may do it even without a treaty, may do it just as the United States, by a simple exercise of their sovereignty, may declare war, with or without reason, against any country in the world. But where does that sovereignty reside? Does that sovereignty reside in the President alone? This is, perhaps,

the first time in the history of this country that such a doctrine has been imported upon the floor of the American Senate.

The Constitution tells you that, as to the power to initiate war, that sovereignty is vested in Congress, and not in the President alone. If, then, an inchoate right assumed to have been created by the President's own act is to be enforced by acts of war, the United States can certainly do it, but Congress, and not the President alone, is, according to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, the branch of this Government to decide the question whether such protection involving a question of war shall be enforced or not. If the President desired to protect an inchoate right in the republic of San Domingo after he had initiated the treaty with the Baez Government, he had a very plain way to do that. Congress was at that very moment in session. When the orders were given to the naval commanders to enforce that inchoate right by sinking or capturing the ships of a Government with whom the United States were at peace Congress was assembled in these halls. You, Senators, occupied these seats when the President, unmindful of the Constitutional prerogatives of the National Legislature, over your very heads issued that order to the naval commanders.

It cannot, therefore, be claimed that the President had not an opportunity to consult Congress and to do so without loss of time. But he did not. If the President alone, as he did in this instance, presumes to decide for the Government the question whether the inchoate right shall be enforced by force of arms, and to act upon his decision in that case without being authorized by Congress, then, I repeat, he commits a palpable act of usurpation; he violates the Constitution of this Republic.

Thus it turns out that the President in this case simply made the mistake of taking himself to be the United

States of America, the mistake of acting upon the mighty presumption that he had absorbed in himself all the sovereignty of this great Republic. And this is what I call an indefensible usurpation of those powers which the Constitution withholds from the Presidential office. If the Senator from Wisconsin, or the Senator from Indiana, or the Senator from New Jersey still deny this, I shall look for their arguments with a high degree of curiosity.

I venture to express the hope that this most absurd, most audacious and most un-republican doctrine that the President can, under the Constitution, steal the war-making power from Congress under the shallow pretense of having created by his own arbitrary act an inchoate right of the United States in a foreign country, thus creating for himself the power to use belligerent measures to enforce that inchoate right, will not be heard on the floor of the Senate again. It is indeed time that such a heresy and such practices, so strongly smelling of personal government, should be held up to the contemplation of a republican people, and that a republican Senate, who have sworn to maintain the fundamental laws of this Republic, should openly and emphatically pronounce their disapproval of them.

Senators have been unsparing in their denunciation of the Senator from Massachusetts because he made his speech. I think the Senator from Massachusetts is entitled to the gratitude of every American citizen for having brought this momentous subject to the notice of the country, a subject which has been treated with so much levity, and it is to be hoped that the Senate will not hesitate to do its duty.

Now, sir, I have to follow the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from New Jersey a little further in their discoveries. All Constitutional argument, it seems, having

failed, the defense of the President's act of usurpation resorts to the last, and, as I look upon it, the most dangerous and desperate expedient, a justification by precedent. I call it a most dangerous and desperate expedient, for the justification of evil deeds by precedent once recognized as generally admissible would be utterly subversive of all our public and private morals. If a crime could once be committed with impunity, is that a reason why it should be regarded as less criminal when perpetrated a second time? If an act of usurpation was once submitted to without resistance, is that a reason why its repetition should not be condemned, rebuked and resisted? If so, then the integrity, nay, the very existence of republican government in this country hangs on a very slender thread indeed. I venture to say that the levity with which bad precedents are sometimes employed and admitted as arguments in the discussion of public questions bids fair to produce a confusion of moral, legal and political notions which will have a most sinister influence upon the popular conscience.

But now, let us look at what the Senator from Indiana [Mr. MORTON] calls the precedent relied upon to cover the President's usurpation of the war-making power of Congress. It appears that at the time when the treaty for the annexation of the republic of Texas was pending before the Senate the then President of the United States dispatched certain war vessels to the Gulf of Mexico and certain military forces to the Texan frontier. Who was the President of the United States who did that? His name was John Tyler. And who was the Secretary of State, his principal adviser? His name was John C. Calhoun. This is a significant spectacle indeed. What desperate straits the defenders of President Grant's acts must have been driven into to crawl under the shadow of John Tyler and John C. Calhoun for protection! To appeal to John

Tyler's and John C. Calhoun's example for the justification of President Grant's acts! To set up John Tyler and John C. Calhoun as the great models after which President Grant shaped his policy! The distress must indeed be extreme when such a refuge is resorted to. If you looked over the whole history of the United States for the names of men whom you would like to quote in justification of your own acts, I suppose John Tyler and John C. Calhoun would be the very last. It is very strange company into which gentlemen have introduced General Grant; and, I am sorry to say, even that company begs to be excused.

If you look carefully at the records of history you will find that even the conduct of Tyler and Calhoun cannot in any important particular serve as a precedent for the usurping act of General Grant. In the first place, President Tyler did not order the military and naval forces of the United States to sustain by acts of war the then existing Government of the republic of Texas, either against foreign aggression or against revolutionary movements set on foot by its own citizens. President Tyler sent certain naval and military forces to the Gulf of Mexico and to the Texan frontier merely for purposes of observation.

Now, let us compare the documents in the two cases. First, I will read a dispatch addressed by John C. Calhoun to Mr. Shannon, referred to yesterday by the Senator from Indiana. He said it was too long to read it. Had it been read in its full length, things would have appeared which might not have agreed very well with the Senator's argument. John C. Calhoun says in his dispatch to Mr. Shannon:

The President has fully and deliberately examined the subject, and has come to the conclusion that honor and humanity,

as well as the welfare and safety of both countries, forbid it; and that it is his duty, during the recess of Congress, to use all his Constitutional means in opposition to it—

You will notice this dispatch treats of the question of Mexican aggression upon Texas. I read again—

and that it is his duty, during the recess of Congress, to use all his Constitutional means in opposition to it; leaving that body when it assembles to decide on the course which, in its opinion, it would be proper for the Government to adopt.

In accordance with this conclusion, the President would be compelled to regard the invasion of Texas by Mexico, while the question of annexation is pending, as highly offensive to the United States.

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If Mexico has thought proper to take offense, it is us who invited the renewal of the proposition, and not she who accepted it, who ought to be held responsible; and we, as the responsible party, cannot, without implicating our honor, permit another to suffer in our place. Entertaining these views, Mexico would make a great mistake if she should suppose that the President would regard with indifference the renewal of the war which she has proclaimed against Texas.

That is all, sir. Do you find there the sending of a military and naval armament to sink or capture the ships of Mexico? No; it is simply a diplomatic representation informing the republic of Mexico that certain acts which might be committed by her would be looked upon with great disfavor by the United States, a thing which happens within the history of a nation like this in almost every decade without resulting in the least in the commission of any act of war or in the issuing of any order to commit an act of war.

Now I come to the orders given by John Tyler to his military commanders.

MR. MORTON. Does the Senator mean to say that he has read all of that dispatch?

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir; I have not. Is there anything else in that dispatch than simply this: that the Secretary of State of the United States declares to the Government of Mexico that if they should attempt to invade Texas during the pendency of the treaty it would be looked upon by the United States with great disfavor and as an unfriendly act? Is not that all; or is there anything beyond that?

MR. MORTON. The whole dispatch amounts to this in substance: that the invasion of Texas at that time would be regarded as highly offensive to the United States, and that Mexico would be held responsible for the act. The language was the diplomatic language; but it was the language of war, and was so understood at the time. I think if the Senator will turn back to the files of the *Globe* of the ensuing session he will see that that dispatch was so regarded at the time. Of course the Navy was not ordered into Texas; it could not sail there very well; but the language was the language of war; and I think nobody can read the dispatch through without so understanding it.

MR. SCHURZ. Does the Senator pretend that this dispatch contains anything to indicate President Tyler's determination of his own will, without calling upon Congress for authority, to make war on Mexico?

MR. MORTON. I do. I maintain that the dispatch in itself gave Mexico to understand that her invasion of Texas at the time would be resisted; and a Senator suggests to me that it was followed by the march of troops to the disputed territory, and there never was a declaration of war by Congress.

MR. SCHURZ. I will show the Senator directly what that march of troops signified. In this very dispatch Mr. Calhoun tells Mr. Shannon—

That it is his [the President's] duty, during the recess of Congress, to use all his *Constitutional* means in opposition to it, leaving that body, when it assembles, to decide on the course which, in its opinion, it would be proper for the Government to adopt.

MR. MORTON. Precisely; that he shall use all the Constitutional means. He does not say what they were. Perhaps he might take the same view that President Grant did in reference to what were Constitutional means. Of course the question would be referred to Congress when Congress met, if actual hostilities took place. What I maintain is, that that dispatch must convey the impression to the Senator, as it did to my mind and as it will to the mind of any man who will read it, that an invasion of Texas would be resisted if it was then made. I do not want to quibble about it.

MR. SCHURZ. It conveys the impression to my mind that the President of the United States, through the Secretary of State, made a declaration to Mexico which our Executive, under the Constitution of this country, can always make to a foreign Government, a declaration which, in the course of our diplomatic relations with England, we were frequently on the point of making, and which we would have found no fault with the President for making if——

MR. STEWART. Will the Senator allow me a word?

MR. MORTON. Allow me to make one suggestion.

MR. SCHURZ. One at a time, gentlemen.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. To which Senator does the Senator from Missouri yield?

MR. SCHURZ. The Senator from Indiana.

MR. MORTON. The Senator from Massachusetts yesterday read an extract from Benton's *Thirty Years' View*, I believe, showing that Mr. Benton put that construction upon the dispatch that I say the dispatch bears, and it is

trifling with the meaning of that dispatch to say that it does not mean that.

MR. SCHURZ. I am always glad to hear the Senator from Indiana, but I desire to say a few words now. If the Senator from Indiana had not been so hasty, or perhaps if he had gone through all the papers in this case with some care, he would in other dispatches have found an interpretation of the meaning of the very language I have just quoted. He would then have found that it meant something very different from the acts which are now under discussion as having been performed by President Grant. If he will now permit me to proceed with the dispatches, I think I shall be able to satisfy him. Here is the message from President John Tyler, of May 15, 1844. In that message he says:

It will also be perceived by the Senate, by referring to the orders of the Navy Department, which are herewith transmitted, that the naval officer in command of the fleet is directed to cause his ships to perform all the duties of a fleet of observation, and to apprise the Executive of any indication of a hostile design upon Texas, on the part of any nation, pending the deliberations of the Senate upon the treaty, with a view that the same should promptly be submitted to Congress for its mature deliberation. At the same time——

And here President Tyler expresses his personal opinion——

it is due to myself that I should declare it as my opinion that the United States having by the treaty of annexation acquired a title to Texas, which requires only the action of the Senate to perfect it, no other Power could be permitted to invade and by force of arms to possess itself of any portion of the territory of Texas, pending your deliberations upon the treaty, without placing itself in a hostile attitude to the United States, and justifying the employment of any military means at our disposal to drive back the invasion.

MR. MORTON. Precisely; that is it.

MR. SCHURZ. Precisely; and yet John Tyler, who is the only great authority of the Senator from Indiana, does not arrogate to himself the right as President of the United States, without consulting Congress, without having any authority from the National Legislature, to issue an order to commit belligerent acts.

MR. MORTON. The last clause contradicts your argument.

MR. SCHURZ. I beg the Senator's pardon. The facts in the case contradict his.

MR. STEWART. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly; I will at last yield to the Senator from Nevada.

MR. STEWART. I should like to ask the Senator how that war actually begun; whether, after this warning, Mexico did not enter over the line, and war commenced, and Congress never did declare war, according to my recollection?

MR. CONKLING. Congress declared that war existed by the act of Mexico.

MR. STEWART. The President sent a message to Congress after the disobedience of this warning that war was actually existing, and Congress passed a resolution, "Whereas war exists by the act of Mexico," etc.

MR. SCHURZ. If the Senator from Nevada is through I will give him my attention. This happened two years afterward, and the war was accepted as having been originated by the republic of Mexico.

MR. STEWART. How was it originated? Was it not by disobeying that warning and by resistance on the part of the United States to that disobedience?

MR. THURMAN. Will the Senator from Missouri give me the date of that document?

MR. SCHURZ. Which document, Calhoun's dispatch or the message of the President?

MR. THURMAN. Either.

MR. SCHURZ. The President's message is dated May 15, 1844.

MR. THURMAN. Texas was annexed fully, completely, and represented in Congress before there was a particle of war with Mexico.

MR. SCHURZ. That point is settled then. There is one thing I forgot to read in another message of President Tyler. If the Senator from Nevada had not interrupted me, I should have kept the order of my remarks. It was this:

Since that time Mexico has, until recently, occupied an attitude of hostility toward the United States; has been marshaling and organizing armies, issuing proclamations and avowing the intention to make war on the United States, either by an open declaration or by invading Texas. Both the Congress and convention of the people of Texas invited this Government to send an army into that territory, to protect and defend them against the menaced attack. The moment the terms of annexation offered by the United States were accepted by Texas, the latter became so far a part of our own country as to make it our duty to afford such protection and defense.—*Senate Documents*, first session Twenty-ninth Congress, vol. I, 1845-46.

MR. SUMNER. That was after the passage of the joint resolution.

MR. SCHURZ. Does the Senator from Indiana see the difference? The joint resolution had passed both Houses; the republic of Texas had accepted and ratified the conditions of annexation; and then the President regarded it as the duty of the President of the United States to defend

that territory as part and parcel of the territory of the United States according to the Constitution.

Now I come to the orders which President Tyler issued, in pursuance of which a naval and military armament was sent down to the Mexican waters and the Texan frontier.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 15, 1844.

To Commodore DAVID CONNER,
Commanding Home Squadron, Pensacola:

I will not read the whole order, but the main part of it:

If, while the question of ratification is pending, an armed force shall threaten an invasion of Texas, you will remonstrate with the commanding officer, and you will accompany your remonstrance with the assurance that the President of the United States will regard the execution of such a hostile purpose toward Texas, under such circumstances, as evincing a most unfriendly spirit toward the United States, and which, in the event of the treaty's ratification, must lead to actual hostilities with this country.

So far the Navy. Now as to the Army.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, April 27, 1844.

Brevet Brigadier-General Z. TAYLOR,
*Commanding First Military Department,
Fort Jesup, Louisiana.*

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You will take prompt measures, in the first instance by a confidential officer, and subsequently by the ordinary mail or special expresses, as you may deem necessary, to put yourself in communication with the President of Texas, in order to inform him of your present position and force and to learn and to transmit to this office (all confidentially) whether any, and

what, external dangers may threaten that Government or its people. Should such danger be found to exist and appear to be imminent, you will collect and march the forces above indicated to the Sabine river, but not proceed beyond the frontier without further instructions, keeping in readiness, in the case supposed, all necessary means of transportation, as well as ample stores of subsistence and ammunition.

Now, a few documents in explanation of all these acts. Mr. Murphy was the accredited agent of the United States near the then Government of the republic of Texas, and Mr. Murphy addressed a note to Mr. Jones, who was then the Secretary of State of the republic of Texas, in which he says:

You therefore ask of me some pledge for the security of Texas pending such negotiations, previous to the appointment of a special Minister to act with Mr. Van Zandt, your chargé d'affaires near the Government of the United States, in opening and conducting that negotiation at Washington city, for the annexation of Texas to the United States.

Sir, I have no hesitation in declaring, on the part of my Government, that neither Mexico nor any other Power will be permitted to invade Texas on account of any negotiation which may take place in relation to any subject upon which Texas is or may be invited by the United States to negotiate; that the United States having invited that negotiation will be a guarantee of their honor that no evil shall result to Texas from accepting the invitation; and that active measures will be immediately taken by the United States to prevent the evils you seem to anticipate from this source.

That was the promise given by Mr. Murphy, the representative of the United States, to Mr. Jones, the Secretary of State of the Texan republic, and with regard to this promise having been applied for by the representative of the Texan republic, John Nelson, Secretary of State *ad*

interim of the United States, administers the following polite rebuke to Mr. Murphy:

Entertaining these views, the President is gratified to perceive, in the course you have pursued in your intercourse with the authorities of Texas, the evidences of a cordial coöperation in this cherished object of his policy, but instructs me to say that while approving the general tone and tenor of that intercourse, he regrets to perceive, in the pledges given by you in your communication to Hon. Anson Jones of the 14th of February, that you have suffered your zeal to carry you beyond the line of your instructions, and to commit the President to measures for which he has no Constitutional authority to stipulate.

Does the Senator from Indiana understand that language? The dispatch goes on:

The employment of the Army or Navy against a foreign Power, with which the United States are at peace, is not within the competency of the President.

Does the Senator from Indiana understand that language?

And while he is not indisposed, as a measure of prudent precaution and as preliminary to the proposed negotiation, to concentrate in the Gulf of Mexico and on the southern borders of the United States, a naval and military force to be directed to the defense of the inhabitants and territory of Texas at a proper time, he cannot permit the authorities of that Government or yourself to labor under the misapprehension that he has power to employ them at the period indicated by your stipulations.

I think the Senator from Indiana will no longer question the position of the Government of the United States at that time.

Now, sir, let us compare with the attitude of John Tyler the record of the present Administration:

Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral Poor, at Key West

NAVY DEPARTMENT, January 29, 1870.

Proceed at once with the *Severn* and *Dictator* to Port au Prince, communicate with our consul there, and inform the present Haytian authorities that this Government is determined to protect the present Dominican Government with all its power. You will then proceed to Dominica, and use your force to give the most ample protection to the Dominican Government against any Power attempting to interfere with it. Visit Samana bay and the capital and see the United States power and authority secure there. There must be no failure in this matter. If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their ships, destroy or capture them. See that there is a proper force at both San Domingo city and Samana.

If Admiral Poor is not at Key West, this dispatch must be forwarded to him without delay.

And now I would again ask the Senator from Indiana whether John C. Calhoun and John Tyler really do not have reason to beg to be excused from being quoted in the company of President Grant's San Domingo policy?

MR. MORTON. Does the Senator want an answer?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir.

MR. MORTON. The Senator has read a dispatch from Mr. Nelson, as I understand it; but he does not contradict the position I took yesterday in regard to the dispatch of Mr. Calhoun. I gave the correct construction of that dispatch, and he cannot gainsay it. That dispatch meant just what I said it meant, and Mr. Benton gave it the same construction. As to their complaining of being found in General Grant's company, that is perhaps a question of taste. I should suppose the Senator himself

would not now take very much exception to being found in Mr. Calhoun's company.

MR. SCHURZ. Does the Senator from Indiana really believe that he can pass off upon this Senate, composed of intelligent men, and upon a people composed of intelligent citizens, the preposterous notion that a simple declaration in a diplomatic dispatch informing a foreign Government that certain acts of that Government, which are apprehended, would be received with disfavor by our Government, is equivalent to a declaration of war? Is there a school boy in the United States who does not know the difference between a diplomatic dispatch specifying a certain act as unfriendly to the country and a declaration of war? I am astonished to see the Senator from Indiana with such perseverance reasoning himself into that absurdity.¹

¹ The correctness of the view here expressed is still further and most conclusively proven by a dispatch addressed by Mr. Calhoun to Mr. Howard, September 10, 1844, with direct reference to the quoted dispatch of Mr. Nelson to Mr. Murphy. Mr. Calhoun says: "The President approves of the construction which you placed on the letter of Mr. Nelson, Acting Secretary of State *ad interim*, to Mr. Murphy, and on mine to Mr. Van Zandt, in relation to the assurances to which the Texan Secretary of State refers; but he instructs you to assure the Government of Texas that he feels the full force of the obligation of this Government to protect Texas, pending the question of annexation, against the attacks which Mexico may make on her in consequence of her acceptance of the proposition of this Government to open negotiations on the subject of annexing Texas to the United States. As far as relates to the Executive department, he is prepared to use all his powers for that purpose. But the Government of Texas is fully aware that they are circumscribed by the Constitution within narrow limits, which it would not be possible for the President to transcend. All that he can do is to make suitable representations to the Mexican Government against the renewal of the war pending the question of annexation and the savage manner in which it is proposed to conduct it, accompanied by appropriate protests and indications of the feelings with which he regards both, and to recommend to Congress to adopt measures to repel any attack which may be made."—SCHURZ's note in pamphlet edition.

Now, sir, having read these dispatches, these orders, these proclamations, these messages issued by John Tyler and other members of the Executive department, and compared them with the order issued by the Secretary of the Navy, I should like to ask, is not in this point the difference between the two cases as clear as sunlight? There, an instruction to observe events, and before committing any belligerent act to wait for further orders; here, the order to commit the belligerent act distinctly and emphatically given, with the imperative addition, "there must be no failure in this matter"; and this not only before the treaty of annexation is ratified; nay, sir, these orders even continued in force long after the treaty of annexation had been formally rejected by the Senate and wiped out of existence. If Tyler did indeed entertain any such intention as the Senator from Indiana ascribes to him, he was very successful in concealing it; at any rate, he was very careful not to give effect to it. There were the naval and military forces in his case, quietly and patiently lying on the lookout; but here we see a rear-admiral of the United States, with a heavy armament, steaming into the port of a Power with which the United States are at peace, and saying to them, with his hand at their throats, "If you attempt to do a thing"—which, the Senator may say what he pleases, was still within the province of their independent sovereignty to do——

MR. MORTON. Will the Senator allow me to make a statement?

MR. SCHURZ. I should be glad to be permitted to finish my sentence.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. Does the Senator yield?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir.

MR. MORTON. The Senator reads certain instructions given to the commander of the naval forces, and a dispatch to Mr. Murphy from Mr. Nelson. Now, if he intends to

state it fairly, and of course I must assume that he does, the case stands thus: Mr. Calhoun instructed Mr. Shannon at Mexico to make a statement that meant war, was so understood at the time, was afterward commented upon by the historian of Congress as meaning war. The Army of the United States was to be marched to the border, and was to threaten war. Mexico was to understand that we meant war. The fleet was to be placed so that it would threaten war and Mexico must so understand it. The world understood at the time that we meant war. The Mexican Government understood at the time that we meant war. The private dispatch sent to the commodore and given to Mr. Murphy does not at all change the situation so far as the world is concerned. The dispatch that I referred to yesterday, taken altogether, is a clear and distinct menace of war if Mexico invaded Texas while those negotiations were going on, and that dispatch was laid before the Government of Mexico by the instructions of Mr. Calhoun.

In pursuance of that dispatch the Army was ordered to the frontier, the fleet was ordered on the coast of Mexico and Mexico was given to understand, not only by the dispatch, but by the position of the Army and Navy, that if she did invade Texas we would make war upon her. The private instructions afterward given do not change the face of the affair. No doubt Mr. Calhoun meant what he said at that time. What Mr. Nelson may have meant afterward is another thing. The Senator vindicates the truth of my statement, notwithstanding all attempts to cast confusion upon it. It was understood at the time that we menaced Mexico with war if she did invade Texas, and the result was she did not do it; she maintained the peace, and in this case Hayti has maintained the peace, and Hayti has made no complaint.

MR. SCHURZ. If I did not know that the Senator from

Indiana has had some experience in foreign affairs, being a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I should think that the subject was entirely new and foreign to his mind. His attempt to compare the case he just cites, of a dispatch informing a foreign Government that a certain act will be looked upon as an unfriendly one, with the orders given in this case to sink or capture ships, with due respect to him I cannot refrain from calling positively ludicrous. There is no resemblance between the two cases. No complaint is made in this case of any dispatch that may have been sent to the Haytian Government through the accredited Minister there. But complaint is made of this: that the Executive gave orders to a rear-admiral of the United States to commit belligerent acts against a foreign Power, in a foreign country, and is taking an active part in its internal conflicts, without the authority of Congress.

I have shown the Senator from Indiana clearly from the dispatches issuing from the State Department at the same time, with relation to the same subject, that the use of armed force at the discretion of the President was not the intent and purpose of those proceedings in the Texas case. The Senator from Massachusetts calls my attention to another letter from Mr. Calhoun, in which he says:

Should the exigency arise to which you refer in your note to Mr. Upshur, I am further directed by the President to say that during the pendency of the treaty of annexation he would deem it his duty to use the means placed within his power by the Constitution to protect Texas from all foreign invasion.—*Senate Documents*, Twenty-eighth Congress, first session, vol. 5, page 349.

And what those means confided to him by the Constitution are is explicitly and clearly enough stated in the dispatches to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Murphy.

MR. HOWE. Is it not also stated in the Constitution which confides to him the Army and Navy?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir; but it does not confide to him power to use that Army and Navy against a foreign nation with which we are at peace, at his own discretion.

MR. HOWE. It confides to him those means, and he says he will use the means the Constitution confides to him.

MR. SCHURZ. Well, now, I must declare this is felt to be a desperate case by the Senator, and if it were transacted—I have to use the simile again—in the court of a justice of the peace in Nebraska or Kansas, then I could understand such arguments; but I cannot appreciate them upon the floor of the Senate.

MR. POMEROY. I protest against the justices of the peace of my State being brought up.

MR. SCHURZ. The Senator from Kansas protests that even in the offices of the justices of the peace of his State such arguments would not be tolerated.

MR. POMEROY. No, I protest against any reflection upon the justices of the peace in my State.

MR. SCHURZ. Well, it would be a reflection to be sure.

MR. TIPTON. The Senator from Missouri will allow Nebraska to put in a disclaimer also.

MR. SCHURZ. With the greatest pleasure. Now as to the second point in which the case of John Tyler and John C. Calhoun differs from that here under consideration. President Tyler attempted to justify what he did while the Texas annexation treaty was pending before the Senate. But here we see the naval forces, the warships of the United States kept at their unholy business long after the treaty for the annexation of San Domingo has been formally rejected by the Senate of the United States, and while not even the pretense of a treaty engagement exists between the United States and the Dominican

republic. And now, sir, here are the reports of the naval officers, showing under what instructions they acted and how they even went so far as to carry the troops of Baez in their warfare against the revolutionary attempts of his own fellow-citizens, from one place to another, long after the treaty of annexation had been rejected by the Senate.

Why, sir, it is a fact, probably unknown to most Senators on this floor, that even while the commission we sent there, recently, were at their work, a scientific party was carried to a certain place in the steamer *Nantasket*, Commander McCook, and that the same war vessel of the United States which carried that scientific expedition, carried arms, munitions and stores of war for Baez from one division of his troops to another.

MR. SUMNER. To be used against Cabral.

MR. SCHURZ. To be used against Cabral, Baez's own fellow-citizens in insurrection.

Now, sir, is there even the merest pretense of a treaty between the Government of the United States and San Domingo in existence at the present moment? Here is the President's message, laid before Congress in December last, proving that no new treaty was in existence then, and asking Congress to authorize him to send a commission to San Domingo, so that then a new treaty might thereafter be framed. Does the Senator from Indiana still fail to see the difference?

But even this is not all. President Tyler sent a military and naval force to the Texan frontier and coast for the purpose of observation as to the apprehended invasion of Texas by a foreign Power; but here we see our naval officers ordered not only to observe events, but to interfere by force of arms, and not only to interfere in case of invasion by a foreign Power, but in case of a rising of the citizens of the Dominican republic against their present

ruler, Baez; thus to use force, not only against foreign invaders, but against the people of the very country that is to be annexed; thus to protect, not only the territory of the country to be annexed, but to protect the person of Baez, in the control of that Government; ay, sir, Baez, who himself had become the ruler of that country by a revolutionary act, overturning the constitutionally-elected Government of that country, Baez is to be protected in the possession of his usurped power by the arms of the United States against the people of his own country if they should attempt to restore their constitutional Government.

MR. MORTON. There is nothing of that kind in the whole evidence, not a word.

MR. SCHURZ. Ah! I am glad the Senator from Indiana calls my attention to that. Let us see. Here is the report of the Secretary of the Navy, which the Senator from Indiana will undoubtedly acknowledge to be good evidence of a documentary character:

Instructions to Commodore Green

NAVY DEPARTMENT, February 9, 1870.

While that treaty is pending, the Government of the United States has agreed to afford countenance and assistance to the Dominican people against their enemies now in the island and in revolution against the lawfully constituted Government, and you will use the force at your command to resist any attempts by the enemies of the Dominican republic to invade the Dominican territory by land or sea, so far as your power can reach them. Of course, a great deal must be left to your discretion, but by communicating freely with President Baez he will show you the stipulations of the agreement drawn up between the United States and the Dominican Government, which will explain to you how far you are authorized to act.

While strictly complying with the agreement between the United States and the Dominican Government, you will avoid difficulties with foreign Powers when it is possible to do so, and will warn any naval force fitting out from Hayti, or any part of the Dominican republic now in revolution, that the United States will not permit any hostile acts to be committed against the Dominicans.

Does the Senator from Indiana understand and appreciate that language?

MR. MORTON. I do, sir.

MR. SCHURZ. I will go further. The Secretary of the Navy says to Lieutenant-Commander Allen, of the *Swatara*:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, January 31, 1870.

SIR: You will proceed with all dispatch, without waiting for inspection, to the city of San Domingo, in the east end of the island of Hayti, and report to the commanding naval officer at that place.

If you find when you get there that the Dominican Government require any assistance against the enemies of that republic you will not hesitate to give it to them.

There is no exception made of revolutionary movements in the interior of the country.

Next I read from Rear-Admiral Poor to the Secretary of the Navy:

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP SEVERN,
SAN DOMINGO, March 12, 1870.

In a recent interview with President Baez he informed me that the British consul at Puerto Plata——

Which, as far as I am, and as the Senator from Indiana is informed, is a place in the republic of San Domingo——

(Mr. Farrington) recently arrived here, stated to him that there was a party at that place inimical to the policy of the

United States in reference to the annexation of San Domingo, principally composed of foreign merchants and consuls; that they had collected a sum of money equal to \$8,000, to supply Generals Cabral and Luperon, who appear to be predatory in character and ready to espouse the cause of any party that will pay them and afford them the opportunity of pillaging.

The *Nantasket* will be dispatched to Puerto Plata immediately, to inquire into the truth of the report and to inform the people of that place who entertain hostile feelings toward the United States of the determination of our Government to protect San Domingo and its present administration.

Does the Senator from Indiana understand that language?

MR. MORTON. Certainly.

MR. SCHURZ. I read next from copy of a dispatch to Rear-Admiral C. H. Poor from Lieutenant Commander F. M. Bunce, commanding the *Nantasket*, dated Puerto Plata, March 24, 1870:

The morning after this conversation——

With somebody in Puerto Plata——

I called with the consul upon General Caseras, commanding the province and that of Santiago. I asked him if he had any knowledge of an opposition party existing among the foreign merchants here. He said he had heard rumors to that effect, but nothing positive; but he was keeping a lookout upon them. I told him it would be against their interests to aid Luperon, for even if he obtained possession of the city you had a heavy squadron about the island and would drive him out; probably, in doing so, destroying the town and all the property in it.

That was a Dominican town, as the Senator is aware.

MR. MORTON. That does not change the case.

MR. SCHURZ. It does not?

MR. MORTON. No, sir.

MR. SCHURZ. I think by this time, however, the Senator from Indiana will be ready to admit that our United States vessels did interfere against the people of San Domingo.

MR. MORTON. Not as between Baez and his own people. There is no instruction of that kind that can be found.

MR. SCHURZ. Well, now, before heaven and earth I declare if even this documentary evidence that I have read does not penetrate the brain of the Senator from Indiana, I despair of all human means of persuasion. If anything is clear here, it is not only that they were ordered to do so, but that they did actually do so, and I shall have a few more facts for the Senator:

*Commander Green to the Secretary of the Navy, October 8, 1870,
Inclosing the Following Report from Commander Irwin*

UNITED STATES STEAMER *YANTIC*,
SANTA BARBARA DE SAMANA, September 3, 1870.

Mark you, long after the treaty of annexation was rejected——

We left Kingston, August 26, and arrived at San Domingo, August 29.

August 30, President Baez . . . informed me that he had dismissed General Hungria, his minister of war, and had just received a note from the British consul informing him that General Hungria had sought an asylum at the British consulate. The note . . . was informal and non-committal . . . did not state whether he would afford General Hungria the protection of his flag. . . .

The President was anxious to add to the force at his disposal in the city of San Domingo, as he feared an outbreak, and asked me if I could not bring him some of his men that were at Azua; I acceded to his request . . . and on the 2d instant landed sixty-five officers and men that we had brought from Azua.

Now, in the name of common sense, will the Senator from Indiana still deny that our naval vessels coöperated in the war upon citizens of San Domingo as carried on by President Baez, that the Navy of the United States took part in the military operations of Baez against his own subjects?

But I am not through yet.

Rear-Admiral Lee to the Secretary of the Navy

UNITED STATES STEAMER SEVERN,
SAN DOMINGO, January 9, 1871.

SIR: The *Severn* arrived at Samana, December 24, 1870, and found the English man-of-war *Raccoon* there, of eighteen guns, Captain Howard, with Mr. Farrington, the English vice-consul, on board, bound for San Domingo city.

Captain Howard then called on board and asked me as to the extent of our protectorate over Dominica, and if it extended to our making good the Dominican bonds. I answered in substance that pending the treaty between Dominica and the United States the latter protected the former against its enemies in the island; and that I did not suppose the United States insured speculations in Dominican paper, etc.

Is the Senator from Indiana not yet satisfied?

Here is more:

RESIDENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE——

If the Senator from Indiana will be kind enough to favor me with his attention, here the great Baez himself steps upon the scene——

RESIDENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE,
SAN DOMINGO, September 2, 1870.

Commander JOHN IRWIN, U. S. N.,
Commanding United States Steamer "Yantic,"
San Domingo City.

My dear Sir: I beg to thank you for the service you have just rendered the republic in transporting the troops from

Azua to this city, in accordance with the desire I expressed to you in my communication of the 31st of last August.

So it seems our men-of-war were, to a certain extent, governed by instructions received from President Baez!

I take advantage, therefore, of the occasion for expressing the necessity at present of a man-of-war in this port, and that none would be more convenient than the *Yantic* for the facility of entering the river Ozama owing to her size. I hope that on your arrival at Samana you will determine what you may deem most convenient in this matter, assuring you that I confide greatly in your good disposition.

There, then, is President Baez thanking a naval officer of the United States for what? Not for the protection afforded him against invaders from a foreign soil, but for having transported troops to be used against his own fellow-citizens within the walls of the very capital of that republic; and yet the Senator from Indiana asserts that the naval forces of the United States have not been used against the citizens of the very country that we were to annex!

Here is still more:

Lieutenant Commander McCook to Commander Irwin, Forwarded in Rear-Admiral Lee's Letter of January 10th [9th?]

Yesterday the captain of the *Raccoon* called officially to ask me how far our Government protected the Dominican Government. He said that in making his report to his admiral he would like to be able to give some statement about it. As the Englishman has been exercising his boats and small-arm men a good deal, I thought it possible he might intend to take some summary action here, so I concluded to give him a pretty strong hint that I would disapprove of his taking any action whatever, and informed him that we would protect the Dominican Government against any internal enemies, or

revolutionary party, and that in case he should consider it necessary to take any steps here, the very least I could do, under my instructions, would be to make a decided protest.

I should be glad to know whether the thing is not clear to the Senator from Indiana yet. Well, sir, after all this, will it be pretended that there is not a fundamental difference between the case under the Presidency of John Tyler and the case which is now under discussion?

At this point the Senate went into executive session. March 29, Mr. Schurz continued:—

Mr. President, when I was interrupted in my remarks yesterday by the vote to go into executive session, I had been endeavoring to prove, and I think I did prove to the satisfaction of every fair-minded listener, that the conduct of the Government of the United States in the case of the annexation of Texas did not furnish a precedent in any manner which can serve as a justification of the acts of the present Administration now under discussion. The difference between the Texas case and the San Domingo case I designated as threefold. In the first place, in the Texas case, the naval and military forces of the United States were sent to Mexican waters and to the Texan frontier for purposes of observation only, with instructions to abstain from hostilities, and in case of any hostile demonstration on the part of Mexico to wait for further orders. There was no extension of belligerent aid to the Texan Government as long as annexation was not consummated, on the distinct ground that the President of the United States alone had no Constitutional power to order acts of war; while in the San Domingo case there was not only a diplomatic threat, but there was a positive order to use the naval forces of the United States, in the capture and destruction of the ships of a

nation with whom the United States are at peace, in certain contingencies; and all this without the least authority from Congress.

I think I have also shown the futility of the objection brought forward by the Senator from Indiana, which was based upon a dispatch addressed to our Minister in Mexico by Mr. Calhoun; a dispatch which contained virtually nothing else but a declaration that in case the republic of Mexico should interfere with the independent republic of Texas during the pendency before the Senate of a treaty of annexation to this Republic, it would be looked upon as an act highly unfriendly to the Government of the United States. I say I think I proved the futility of that objection, and I added that many instances can be found in our history where similar language was employed in our correspondence with foreign Powers, without the remotest idea that such representations were equivalent to orders given to the Navy at once to sink or to capture the vessels of a foreign Power without the authority of Congress.

For instance, I might call the attention of the Senator from Indiana to the fact that during the occupation of Mexico by French forces, Secretary of State Seward protested against that again and again, and informed the French Government in most pointed language, more than once, that the presence of French troops on Mexican soil was looked upon as an act highly offensive and unfriendly to the Government of the United States, a declaration which the Executive department of the Government had a right to make; and yet the then President of the United States never went so far, never thought of going so far, as to give orders to the Navy to use their guns in sinking and destroying and capturing French vessels in case an attempt was made to land French reënforcements upon Mexican soil.

It must be known also to the Senator from Indiana that it was not until two years after the negotiations and transactions I have referred to took place, that the Mexican war commenced, long after Texas had been annexed to the United States by joint resolution, and the conditions of that annexation had been complied with by the republic of Texas; and I remind the Senator from Indiana that when the supplies were voted in Congress for our troops engaged in the Mexican war the preamble of the act read thus: "Whereas war has commenced by the act of Mexico." I am sure the venerable Senator from Kentucky [Mr. DAVIS], who took an active part in the debate at that period, will certainly bear me out as to the correctness of my statement.

The second difference which I noted between the Texas case and the San Domingo case was this: that in the San Domingo case the protection by armed force of the Baez Government was continued, and is being continued now, long after the treaty has expired by its own limitation; not only that, but long after the treaty has been formally rejected by the Senate, thus being doubly dead.

The third difference was this: that the United States Government at that time never thought of protecting the Government of Texas then existing, against any revolutionary movements that might have sprung up among the citizens of Texas against their Government, while the protection of Baez, not only against hostile interference on the part of the Haytians, but against the revolutionary attempts of his own subjects, as I may truly call them, seems to be one of the chief objects of the naval expedition to San Domingo.

And here I cannot refrain from taking notice, by way of episode, of a fine flight of oratory indulged in yesterday by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. HOWE] with regard

to Baez. Do you remember, sir, how touching his description was of the patriotic unselfishness of that man, who was going to sacrifice all his power and all his honors in transferring the republic of San Domingo to the United States? He, the powerful ruler of that republic, to step voluntarily back into private life; and all that not for reward, not for his own personal advantage, but merely for the good of his fellow-citizens; an example of sublime disinterestedness hardly paralleled in the history of mankind. This morning I happened to see an abstract of the forthcoming report of the commission that was sent down to San Domingo—by the way, as I understand, the whole report will be in the newspapers very soon—and in that abstract I find a very interesting piece of information about the sublime unselfishness of the pure and disinterested patriot. It is this:

The public debt statement is to be compared with the letter to-day received by the commission to see if they have been furnished with the correct figures. As now made up, the debt is, in round numbers, \$1,400,000; additional pending claim, \$204,000; inclusive of \$70,000 by President Baez for personal property destroyed in the Spanish war, and under the first head \$600,000 for back salaries.

Ah! what a disinterested and pure patriot Baez is! How his heart aches to get rid of all his worldly honors and possessions, merely for the purpose of turning over his country to the tender care of the United States! How impatient he is to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his fellow-citizens with the snug sum of \$70,000 damages in his pocket, and \$600,000 to be divided among, mark you, brothers and relatives who constitute the chief officeholding force of the republic of Dominica, and Baez himself!

Considering that Baez is sure to be driven from his

office as soon as the war vessels of the United States cease to sustain him, it will be admitted that for him and his relatives and friends disinterested patriotism, with a bonus of \$670,000, is not an unprofitable business.

Having now stated the main points of difference existing between the Texas precedent, so called, and the San Domingo case, I would ask the Senator from Indiana, when he looks at that picture and at this: there, forces sent down merely for the purpose of observation, under strict instructions not to commit any belligerent act; there, mere diplomatic remonstrance with regard to the possibility of an invasion by Mexico; there a positive recognition of the incompetency of the President under the Constitution to order belligerent interference; and here a positive order to sink and capture ships by the use of American guns, in case certain emergencies happen, and active interference in the internal broils of the Dominican republic; I ask the Senator from Indiana, does not the difference sear his very eyeballs? In defending President Grant's course he appears to me like the drowning man who catches at a straw, and that straw John Tyler! And even that straw begs to be excused, and President Grant's case has to sink or swim on its own merits!

But the Senator from Indiana may learn some sound Constitutional doctrine with reference to the same case from another authority. I hold in my hand the message of President Polk of December 2, 1845; mark you, long after Calhoun had written the Senator's favorite dispatch. Mr. Polk speaks as follows:

Since that time Mexico has, until recently, occupied an attitude of hostility toward the United States, has been marshaling and organizing armies, issuing proclamations, and avowing the intention to make war on the United States,

either by an open declaration, or by invading Texas. Both the Congress and convention of the people of Texas invited this Government to send an army into that territory to protect them against the menaced attack.

I would request the Senator's attention.

The moment the terms of annexation offered by the United States were accepted by Texas the latter became so far a part of our own country as to make it our duty to afford such protection and defense.

So far President Polk. But here is a dispatch addressed by Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Donelson, dated Washington, May 23, 1845:

I am instructed by the President to inform you that as soon as the existing Government and the convention of Texas shall have accepted the terms proposed in the first two sections of the joint resolution for annexing Texas to the United States, he will then conceive it to be both his right and his duty to employ the Army in defending that State against the attacks of any foreign Power.

No belligerent aid, therefore, until annexation is Constitutionally and legally completed! A significant spectacle again—the defense of President Grant's acts put to shame by James Buchanan!

So much for the Texas precedent. Were there any precedent for the usurping act now under discussion in all this, I think it would be high time to upset and disavow and condemn that precedent as a rule for future action. But it was no such precedent; and thus it may be affirmed that the President's usurpation of the war-making power in this case stands absolutely and utterly without a parallel in the history of the United States. And here I desire to address a solemn word of warning to the Senate. If even an attempt could be made, as it has been made

on this floor, to use President Tyler's conduct as a precedent in justification of a palpable act of usurpation, such as is now before us, I ask you, sir, what precedent will this act make, and what sinister things may it serve to justify in future times if we let it pass without the mark of our disapprobation?

And now permit me, sir, to devote a few remarks to a letter concerning this subject, signed by the Secretary of the Navy, which I found in yesterday's newspapers.

It appears that our commission, while on their travels in San Domingo, desired to have a conference with the so-called rebel chief Cabral; that they wanted to travel across the country, and that the commander of the *Tennessee*, Captain Temple, gave them to understand that it would be rather unsafe for them to do so under existing circumstances. His letter is so remarkable that, although it has already been quoted by the Senator from Massachusetts, I cannot refrain from calling attention to it once more. It is addressed to Mr. Wade and dated "On board the *Tennessee*, Azua bay, February 24, 1871":

I understand that several of the gentlemen belonging to the expedition are to start to-morrow overland for Port au Prince. It may not have occurred to these gentlemen that, by so doing, they will virtually place themselves in the position of spies; and, if they are taken by Cabral's people, they can be hung to the nearest tree by sentence of a drumhead court-martial according to all the rules of civilized warfare. For they belong to a nation that, through the orders of its Executive to the naval vessels here, has chosen to take part in the internal conflicts of this country; they come directly from the headquarters of Cabral's enemies; they are without arms, uniform, or authority of any kind for being in a hostile region. They are, in fact, spies. They go expressly to learn everything connected with the enemy's country, and their observations are intended for publication, and thus indirectly to be reported

back to President Baez. Surely Cabral would have a right to prevent this if he can.

It can well be understood how the publication of that letter in the newspapers startled the Navy Department, for here was a captain of the Navy who undoubtedly had some knowledge of the instructions issued to naval commanders in Dominican waters, telling the whole story and construing those instructions as meaning that the United States, as allies of the Baez Government, were actually at war with the so-called revolutionists of San Domingo; and the captain, so understanding those instructions, drew the most natural and logical conclusion that persons in the service of the ally of Baez, if they fell into the hands of Cabral, were liable to be treated as enemies, according to the rules of civilized warfare.

Our Secretary of the Navy found it necessary to reply to that startling letter in an indirect way. I suppose most Senators have read the reply, and yesterday it was handed up to the Secretary of the Senate by the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN] with an air that seemed to indicate that he rather considered it a most triumphant document.

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. I trust my manner was not offensive.

MR. SCHURZ. Not at all, sir. On the contrary, I think the manner of the Senator was only intended as a compliment to the Secretary. In his letter the Secretary of the Navy sets forth that Captain Temple is entirely wrong in his construction of international law, and in order to controvert his position he makes some statements of fact. He says, for instance:

But neither the United States nor its Executive has chosen to take part, or has taken part, in the internal conflicts of the Dominican republic.

That the United States have not chosen to take part in the internal conflicts of the Dominican republic is absolutely certain, for I am sure the United States, as represented by Congress, never thought of doing so. But when the Secretary of the Navy goes so far as to say that the Executive has never chosen to take part in the internal conflicts of the Dominican republic, I beg leave respectfully to differ with him.

What has so often amazed me in this business is the exceeding shortness of men's memories. It would seem that when a Secretary had issued orders and sent an official document to the Senate of the United States to be published here and laid before the world, he should remember at least something of its contents. Yesterday I gave the Senate a long string of orders and reports in which naval commanders represented themselves as having actually taken part in the internal conflicts of the Dominican republic. But, if the Secretary of the Navy could be presumed not to know what reports were sent to his own Department by the naval commanders as to their doings in foreign waters, he ought at least to remember the language and purport of his own orders. Here is one of them, the instructions issued by the Navy Department to Commodore Green:

While that treaty is pending, the Government of the United States has agreed to afford countenance and assistance to the Dominican people against their *enemies now in the island, and in revolution against the lawfully constituted Government*——

Do you understand that, sir?——

and you will use the force at your command to resist any attempts by the enemies of the Dominican republic to invade the Dominican territory by land or sea, so far as your power can reach them. Of course, a great deal must be left to your

discretion, but by communicating freely with President Baez, he will show you the stipulations of the agreement drawn up between the United States and the Dominican Government, which will explain to you how far you are authorized to act. While strictly complying with the agreement between the United States and the Dominican Government, you will avoid difficulties with foreign Powers when it is possible to do so, and will warn any naval force fitting out from Hayti, or *any part of the Dominican republic now in revolution*, that the United States will not permit any hostile acts to be committed against the Dominicans.

And now the same Secretary of the Navy is found to put over his own signature the statement that the Executive department has not chosen to take part in the internal conflicts of the Dominican republic! Truly, sir, the memory of Secretaries has grown wonderfully short. Let me attempt to revive the recollection of certain events in the Secretary's mind. Yesterday I called attention to the fact—and undoubtedly the Secretary of the Navy must have heard of it, for it is reported in his own document—that a United States man-of-war actually transported Dominican troops from Azua to San Domingo city at the request of President Baez, to be used against an apprehended insurrection there. Now, in the name of common-sense, I ask you, is the transportation of troops a belligerent act or not, when a conflict is pending? What would you have said, gentlemen, if an English man-of-war during our late rebellion had taken on board a division of rebel troops at Mobile bay and transported them to Charleston for the accommodation of the Southern Confederacy? Would that not have been considered an act of war by every sane man? Would that not have been considered active interference in the internal troubles of this country? Would we not have resented it as such? And what else was the transportation of Baez's troops

by a United States warship during a revolutionary struggle in the Dominican republic?

But that is not all. I referred yesterday to the case of the *Nantasket*, which, with even a part of the scientific force of the United States commission on board, went from one place to another, at the same time transporting arms and ammunition for the military forces of President Baez. Why, sir, the very ship *Tennessee*, with the United States commission on board, went from San Domingo city to Azua, carrying Baez and his whole military staff to a place where he was to take personal command of his army. And not only that, but while the *Tennessee*, with the commission, was lying off San Domingo city, bodies of Dominican troops were shipped there in lighters from the wharf to Dominican schooners in the harbor, to go to Azua, where an expedition against Cabral was being organized, and those lighters carried the flag of the United States over them, under the very eyes of our commissioners; and not only that, but when Baez started that expedition against Cabral that expedition carried a United States flag at the head of the column, so as to make Cabral's people believe that they had to fight the United States!

Now, sir, I ask every intelligent man in this country whether all the things I have recited, most of which are taken from the Secretary's official report, do constitute interference in the internal conflicts of that republic or not. I should like to know what flight of fancy can have seduced the Secretary of the Navy into the unfathomable absurdity of his statement. Perhaps he may receive one of these days a report from one of his naval commanders informing him of the following circumstance: that the United States man-of-war *Congress* one night lay off Monte Christi, and that an attack from the revolutionary chief Luperon being expected, the com-

mander of that vessel sent some rockets and lights on shore to Baez's troops with instructions that in case an attack by Luperon should actually happen those signals should be lighted, whereupon the commander of the United States war vessel would send reënforcements from his ship ashore to aid Baez's troops in repelling the attack of Luperon. The Dominican troops, Baez's men, not being very experienced in the use of fireworks, felt somewhat uncertain whether the lights or rockets which had been handed to them would go off, and so they resolved to try one or two of them. They did go off, and the commander of the United States vessel, believing that Luperon's attack was being signaled, manned his boats with armed men from his ship and put for the shore. Whether they actually landed or learned of the false alarm before the land was reached I do not know. But they were actually put on boats and went to assist Baez's troops in repelling the attack of a force of Dominican revolutionists, which attack, however, fortunately did not take place. So the story was told to me by a gentleman who accompanied the commission; and I shall not be surprised if the Secretary of the Navy should very soon receive official information of it.

In the face of all this the Secretary of the Navy blandly tells us that the Executive department of the Government has not chosen to take any part in the internal conflicts of the Dominican republic! Now, let me proceed with the letter. The Secretary writes:

The situation is this: the President of the United States has, by the Constitution, the right to make treaties, subject to the ratification of the Senate.

Of this we are aware.

The Congress of the United States in 1866 appropriated a considerable sum of money for the understood purpose of

acquiring by lease or purchase a part of the island of San Domingo.

Where does the Secretary obtain that information? The official journals of Congress say nothing of this story.

The bay and peninsula of Samana were considered most appropriate for our purpose as a naval station; and the republic of San Domingo itself, with its favorable position and natural resources, its friendly Government and people, seemed for the purposes of commerce and civilization far the most desirable for us of those fragments of our continent which lie across the gateways of our domestic commerce and shut up the entrance to our great inland sea. To initiate all treaties is the Constitutional right of the President and thus he had the Constitutional power to negotiate treaties for the cession of Samana and the annexation of the Dominican republic. If, upon proper consideration, he thought it right and for the interest of the country whose interests are to this extent intrusted to his judgment, it was his Constitutional duty to do so.

Nobody questions that.

In pursuance of this Constitutional right he did negotiate such treaties with the existing Government of the republic, confessedly the Government, both *de facto* and *de jure*.

That is to say, it confesses itself that it is *de jure*!

These treaties were of course inchoate, and subject to be confirmed or defeated by the action of the Senate of the United States and of the people of the Dominican republic; but by such treaties and pending such final action the United States acquired an interest in the thing negotiated for which could not be rightfully disturbed by any other Power; and it was the plain duty of the Executive to protect, if need be, the integrity of this Constitutionally acquired interest, so that the subject of the negotiation might remain intact until the final action of the ratifying Powers could be properly had.

Here let me stop a moment. In asserting that it was not only the right but the duty of the Executive to enforce by means of war an inchoate right which had been acquired by the act of the Executive himself, the Secretary was only falling into that confusion of ideas which seems to have spread from the Executive department of the Government even to the floor of the Senate; that confusion of ideas which I designated yesterday as confounding "the Government," "the United States," and "the President," as entirely convertible terms. But then, for argument's sake, I will for a moment accept that theory. He says that during the pendency of such a treaty and negotiations the Government had the power to protect the inchoate interests of the United States there. Sir, what power had the Government then, according to the Secretary's own reasoning, after the pendency of such treaties and negotiations had ceased? It is a fact as well known to the Secretary as it is to me and every well-informed man in this Republic, that there has been no treaty between San Domingo and the United States since the 30th of June, 1870; and yet all these things are still going on under the Secretary's immediate supervision. Nay, sir, there have not been even ostensible negotiations for a treaty, for you will not consider as negotiators the commission who were sent to San Domingo to explore the land. They went there, like the Pickwick Club, for the investigation of all human, earthly and heavenly things, and in pursuit of useful knowledge, but not to initiate or carry on diplomatic negotiations. So that not only there was not a treaty pending or in existence, but there were not even formal negotiations for a treaty going on; and yet this barefaced, most undeniable interference in the internal conflicts of the Dominican republic by the war vessels of the United States protecting Baez was continued from day to day.

Thus, sir, even upon the Secretary's own assumptions, the bottom drops out of his statement.

And, after all this, it seems to me that Captain Temple was not quite wrong when he cautioned Mr. Wade against coming into contact with revolutionists with whom the United States, by an act of their Executive, were at war, expressing the apprehension that the peaceable commissioner, turned into a spy of a belligerent Power, might all of a sudden be strung up to the limb of a tree. The captain had evidently a clearer perception of our international position than the Secretary.

But now I arrive at the richest part of the Secretary's letter. He says:

The duty——

To enforce such an inchoate right——

is plain, and in every case of valuable acquisition the execution of it will be expected and approved by the people.

Mark you, sir.

It was in the discharge of such duty that, in the early part of the present century, President Madison marched the armies of the United States into and actually took and held possession of the territory then known as West Florida (including what is now the State of Alabama), for which territory negotiations were then pending, afterward concluded and settled with Spain. This action was approved by Congress and the people, not as an exercise of war power, but as the protecting of an interest Constitutionally acquired, and which the Executive was bound to maintain intact while it remained in us.

Why, sir, the Secretary seems to be just as conversant with the history of this case as the Senator from Indiana yesterday showed himself to be with the Texas precedent. What did the Secretary mean to intimate to us by a

statement like this? If he meant it to have any bearing upon this case at all, he desired to make us believe that the United States had made a treaty with Spain for the cession of what was called West Florida, that such treaty was pending before the Senate, and that during the pendency of that treaty, before it had been acted upon, in order to protect an inchoate right accrued to us there, President Madison ordered the Army into that territory to take and hold military possession. Sir, this is perhaps one of the most glaring misrepresentations of our history I ever heard of from any official, nay, I had almost said from any respectable source.

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. Does the Senator question that President Madison did send the Army?

MR. SCHURZ. Ah! I am about to tell the Senator what I do question.

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. I suppose the point the Senator makes against the Secretary is on the question whether the troops were sent there in reference to the question of boundary, or whether they were sent there pending the treaty.

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir. If the Senator will permit me I will make my own points.

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, sir, I will not interrupt you again.

MR. SCHURZ. With due respect, I am always glad to be interrupted by the courteous Senator from New Jersey, but then I cannot permit him to make for me other points than those which I intended to make for myself.

Now, sir, the origin of that case the Secretary of the Navy might have discovered if he had simply referred to a very popular book on the history of the United States—I mean Hildreth's work, second series, volume three. He would have found there, on page 223, the following statement:

The success of the French in Spain, and the probability of that kingdom being obliged to succumb, had given occasion to revolutionary movements in several of the Spanish American provinces. This example set by the Caracas, where Miranda had again reappeared, and imitated in Buenos Ayres, had been followed also in that portion of the Spanish province of West Florida bordering on the Mississippi. The inhabitants, most of whom were of British or American birth, had seized the fort at Baton Rouge, had met in convention, and had proclaimed themselves independent, adopting a single star for their flag, the same symbol afterward assumed by the republic of Texas. Some struggles took place between the adherents of the Spanish connection and these revolutionists, who were also threatened with attack from Mobile, still held by a Spanish garrison. In this emergency they applied through Holmes, Governor of the Mississippi Territory, for aid and recognition by the United States, modestly claiming all the unlocated lands, pardon for all deserters from the United States Army, of whom there were many among them, and an immediate loan of \$100,000.

The President, however, preferred to issue a proclamation, taking possession of the east bank of the Mississippi, occupation of which, under the Louisiana treaty, had been so long delayed, not from any defect of title, but out of conciliatory views toward Spain. Indeed, its present occupation by the United States, so the proclamation stated, was for the equal benefit of Spain, whose rights and interests were put in jeopardy as much as those of the United States by the present movement, while in the occupancy of the United States the territory would still remain a subject for friendly negotiation and arrangement. Simultaneously with the issue of this proclamation Claiborne, Governor of the Orleans Territory, then at Washington, was dispatched to take possession. In case he should meet with resistance, which was not anticipated, he was authorized to call upon the regular troops stationed on the Mississippi, and upon the militia of the two adjoining Territories; but no force was to be used against such places as might be held by Spanish garrisons, however small.

Thus it turns out that there was not a treaty pending between Spain and this Republic for the annexation of that territory by virtue of which the President considered an inchoate right to have accrued to the United States which would give him the power to march troops into that territory, but that by virtue of the Louisiana purchase, a treaty duly consented to by the Senate, duly ratified by the United States as well as France, the United States claimed that territory to belong to them as part of their own domain.

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. The Senator certainly is not ignorant of the fact that from 1803 to 1819 just that territory was claimed by Spain. She claimed that the Louisiana purchase was bounded on the east by the Mississippi river, while we claimed, as the Senator knows, that it was bounded by the Perdido.

MR. SCHURZ. I know that very well; but will the Senator pretend that President Madison took military possession, in the way indicated, of that territory by virtue of an inchoate right created by a treaty from which he assumed to have derived the power to march troops in there to protect the interests of the United States? No, sir; I will convince the Senator, out of President Madison's own mouth, that he claimed that territory as having come to the United States under the Louisiana purchase.

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is a question of fact, not what the President claimed. The fact is that pending that treaty he did send troops. For political reasons, one cause may have been given or another; but the fact was that the troops were sent there.

MR. SCHURZ. Does the Senator say there was a treaty pending at that time?

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. Not pending. The treaty was made in 1819.

MR. SCHURZ. Ah, exactly.

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. And from 1803 to 1819 the controversy was going on. The true position, as I understand it, is that a treaty need not be pending; that the President of the United States represents the Nation, and has the right to negotiate a treaty and to protect the dignity of the Nation while it is being negotiated.

MR. SCHURZ. Precisely. So it appears, from the statement of the Senator, that President Madison took possession of West Florida in 1810, by virtue of a treaty which was made in 1819! Now let us see. Here is a message of President Madison addressed to the Congress of the United States, January 3, 1811:

Taking into view the tenor of these several communications, the posture of things with which they are connected, the intimate relation of the country adjoining the United States eastward of the river Perdido to their security and tranquillity, and the peculiar interest they otherwise have in its destiny, I recommend to the consideration of Congress, the seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not see, without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring territory, in which they have in different respects so deep and so just a concern, pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign Power.

I recommend to their consideration also the expediency of authorizing the Executive to take temporary possession of any part or parts of the said territory, in pursuance of arrangements which may be desired by the Spanish authorities, and for making provision for the Government of the same during such possession.—*Annals of Congress*, Eleventh Congress, third session, page 1251.

And here is a proclamation of the President issued on the 27th day of October, 1810:

Whereas the territory south of the Mississippi territory and eastward of the river Mississippi, and extending to the

river Perdido, of which possession was not delivered to the United States in pursuance of the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April, 1803, has, at all times, as is well known, been considered and claimed by them as being within the colony of Louisiana conveyed by the said treaty in the same extent that it had in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France originally possessed it;

And *whereas* the acquiescence of the United States in the temporary continuance of the said territory under the Spanish authority was not the result of any distrust of their title, as has been particularly evinced by the general tenor of their laws, and by the distinction made in the application of those laws between that territory and foreign countries, but was occasioned by their conciliatory views, and by a confidence in the justice of their cause and in the success of candid discussion and amicable negotiation with a just and friendly Power;

And *whereas* a satisfactory adjustment, too long delayed, without the fault of the United States, has for some time been entirely suspended by events over which they have no control;

And *whereas* a crisis has at length arrived subversive of the order of things under the Spanish authorities, whereby a failure of the United States to take the said territory into its possession may lead to events ultimately contravening the views of both parties, while, in the meantime, the tranquillity and security of our adjoining territories are endangered, and new facilities given to violators of our revenue and commercial laws and of those prohibiting the introduction of slaves——

I will not read the whole document——

Considering, finally, that the acts of Congress, though contemplating a present possession by a foreign authority, have contemplated also an eventual possession of the said territory by the United States, and are accordingly so framed as in that case to extend in their operation to the same:

Now *be it known*, that I, James Madison, President of the United States of America, in pursuance of these weighty and

urgent considerations, have deemed it right and requisite that possession should be taken of the said territory in the name and behalf of the United States.—*Ibid.*, page 1258.

Thus it appears that no new treaty had anything to do with it, that there was no question of an inchoate right, no question of any right that the President of the United States claimed to derive from any act of his own, but a right derived from an old treaty with France, which had been duly ratified, and which had become the supreme law of the land, and the possession being at the same time endangered by an adverse revolutionary movement. The Secretary of the Navy may possibly have been a little at sea with regard to his facts, geographical as well as historical. Did he perhaps confound the West Florida case with the East Florida case? In the latter indeed an "army" was moved into that territory, but not by the President of his own motion, at his own arbitrary pleasure upon the assumption of inchoate rights created by him, but in pursuance of an act of Congress, authorizing the President to "take possession of, and occupy all or any part of the territory lying east of the river Perdido and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi territory," and, "in order to maintain therein the authority of the United States, employ any part of the Army and Navy of the United States which he may deem necessary."

This act was approved January 15, 1811, and if the Secretary wishes to acquaint himself with the document he will find it in the third volume of the *United States Statutes-at-Large*, page 471. In pursuance of this act of Congress, General Matthews, with a military force, was sent into the territory, and in his orders, which I have here, that act was referred to as the legal basis of the whole enterprise. The Secretary of the Navy may there discover in what manner such business was transacted

by Presidents whose supreme rule of action was the Constitution of the Republic, and in what manner our Executive now ought to have acted in the San Domingo case.

There is still one sentence in the Secretary's letter, which I cannot refrain from referring to, for it is of great import. It is the following:

Under the orders of the Executive, it is a part of the duty of those ships of your fleet which are at any time cruising in the waters of San Domingo to maintain this status against every Power, and while we would not yield the right to interfere with it to the most powerful Government, we cannot concede that right even to the weakest.

So there is, after all, something in what the Senator from Wisconsin said yesterday, that our menace was not directed against Hayti alone, but that even a possible conflict with greater Powers was contemplated in the program. Sir, it was indeed not entirely without the limits of possibility. Is not the debt of the republic of San Domingo rather in a confused state? Are not Englishmen somewhat concerned in it by loans? And might not the British Government, in consideration of the interests of some of its subjects, accidentally make a claim against the Government of San Domingo and try to enforce it, our arrangements with Baez notwithstanding? Might not in a country with a lawless Government like the Dominican republic, by wrongs inflicted upon foreigners, grave complications arise with Powers more formidable than Hayti, in which we would suddenly find ourselves involved? And the Secretary bravely defies the most powerful nations of the world.

Sir, look at this. By the President's arbitrary act, for the success of a scheme in which neither Congress nor the people of the United States take any interest,

to jeopardize the peace of this Republic, as the Secretary of the Navy himself confesses! Sir, is not that a recklessness most appalling? Have you ever heard of it that the Executive of this Republic in any juncture of its history involved with such levity the country in unknown and dangerous responsibilities at his own arbitrary pleasure?

So much for the letter of the Secretary of the Navy. I find in it such a jumble of glaring misstatements of facts, and of illogical Constitutional doctrines, that I have come to the conclusion the letter was properly addressed to a seaman, for the Secretary of the Navy probably himself felt that his story was well fit to be told to the marines. The Secretary—for whom I have profound respect as a gentleman, and whom I cherish highly as a friend and a most excellent companion—the Secretary, if he goes on in that way, is in great danger of acquiring the reputation of a profound Constitutional lawyer among sailors, and of a mighty sailor among Constitutional lawyers!

I deem it scarcely necessary to say a single word in reply to the argument brought forward by the Senator from Wisconsin yesterday, that the President's belligerent interference on the island of San Domingo was not reprehensible because it was really an act of benefaction to those people in preserving the peace there and in keeping them from shedding one another's blood. Will that Senator really make us believe that the President usurped the war power of Congress merely for philanthropic purposes, merely acting upon the impulses of his benevolent good nature? Sir, can a Senator of the United States, making such an argument, possibly be in earnest? If the people of the United States really consider it their mission to employ their guns in maintaining peace among the different nations of this and the other hemi-

sphere, does the Senator from Wisconsin, or any other Senator, think the American people, against the principles of their own Constitution, would leave it to the philanthropic impulses of the President alone, of one man, to decide when those philanthropic impulses shall be given vent to, when the guns of the United States shall be sent upon such a belligerent peace mission? Does it not occur to the Senator that if we give such discretionary power to our Chief Magistrate in spite of our Constitution, that Presidential benevolence, that philanthropy of the nineteen-inch caliber might involve us unaware in any trouble that is going on in any part of the world? If I know anything of the people of the United States, they respectfully beg to be excused. Really, sir, this chapter in the Senator's speech, with due respect to his ability be it said, does not rise to the dignity of an argument.

But even the pretext of intentions and purposes merely benevolent, when you look at the facts, appears utterly without foundation. Had the President been actuated only by such motives, they could easily have found other more useful and more magnificent theaters of action. Why did he not show the least desire to interfere in some of the revolutions which have happened on the continental part of this hemisphere during his Administration, or a desire to send his philanthropic artillery down to Paraguay, where blood was flowing in streams, in order to interfere in a war in which, against our desire, we came so near being involved? No, sir; it will not do to tell this benevolence story to an intelligent people. What was done was done to further, by force of arms, if need be, a pet scheme of the White House, in which neither the Congress nor the people of the United States had shown the least interest. It was for this that the war-making power of Congress was usurped, that the Constitution,

in one of its most essential and vital points, was invaded, and that the peace and the honor of this Republic were recklessly put in jeopardy.

And now let me say to the Senators who have attempted to defend these things that they have undertaken a hopeless, I might almost say an utterly impossible, task, and to judge from appearances they feel it. However eloquently the Senator from New Jersey may speak of the personal merits and great services of General Grant, all of which we recognize; however deeply the senior Senator from Wisconsin may dive into the treasures of ancient lore, and however frequently the Senator from Indiana may quote Calhoun's dispatch to Shannon, it is all in vain. You cannot justify what is wrong. You cannot hide what is clear and patent to every eye in this Republic. You cannot defend what is indefensible. Give it up, gentlemen; let this case stand or fall upon its own merits. Others may follow in the footsteps of those who have already spoken, and they may heap abuse upon the Senator from Massachusetts and myself, abuse more bitter than already has been showered upon us. That also will be all in vain, gentlemen. Neither legal quibbles nor personal vituperation will alter a single fact in the case; it will not close the eye of a single honest and patriotic man in this country.

To-day I read in a newspaper that my only object in stepping forward in this debate was to injure the President in the opinion of the people. Sir, I am too well aware of the peculiar position which General Grant holds in this country, not to know that his Administration cannot be broken down, unless it breaks down itself; and what it has accomplished in that direction falls upon its own responsibility. No, sir; I have not spoken because I have any personal feeling against the President, for I have not, but because I have a very strong personal

feeling for the fundamental laws of this country and for the cause of Constitutional government; because, I believe that it is time, at last, in the face of these glaring facts, that we should do our utmost to dispel that most dangerous confusion of ideas which represents to us the United States, the Government and the person of the President as one and the same thing; it is high time to check the growth of irresponsible power which is gradually and with a cat-like step creeping upon us in various forms. That is the object for which I am struggling; it is the impulse which I obey; and I desire to have it understood.

Senators, this is no small question. Do not indulge in that delusion; the country will not regard it so. Never in the history of this Republic would this subject have been lightly treated. There never was a time when it should be treated more seriously, for Congress never had to confront a stronger attempt at what might properly be called personal government. In the history of France you read of Louis XIV., how he entered the Parliament in session slapping his whip upon his riding-boots, and proclaiming, "I am the State." What do you see here? You see the Executive stepping before the people and proclaiming, "I am the war-making power of this Republic." That is the fact, gentlemen, which we have to deal with.

Recently I expressed my apprehension that the annexation of the tropics might lead to military usurpation. Is there anybody on this floor who will still deny it? It is with military usurpation that it has commenced. We have heard Senators speak of extending the blessings of republican government to San Domingo. I would respectfully suggest to those Senators, it is time to see to it that the integrity of republican government be preserved at home. In the face of these facts we have a solemn duty to perform. Put the mildest, put the

most charitable construction upon all these acts—do not call it a crime what the President has done, do not call it a misdemeanor, call it by the mildest term—an involuntary mistake—and still that great duty remains. It is the duty to vindicate the Constitution of the United States.

Sir, what was the oath we took before entering upon the discharge of our duties in this Chamber? It was that we should support the fundamental law of this country. So we have sworn; and we are now called upon to uphold the Constitution in one of its most essential points. The power to declare and initiate war is one of the highest attributes of sovereignty. More than any other, it involves the welfare, the peace and the honor of a people. Therefore this power was expressly lodged in that branch of the Government in which the sovereignty of the people is most comprehensively represented: in the Legislature. It cannot be otherwise in a truly republican government. This is a *conditio sine qua non* of republican institutions. Let that power pass into the hands of the President, and the dearest interests of the people are at the mercy of one single man.

I ask you, Senators, has not the power of the Executive, through the immense patronage at his disposal, become alarmingly great already? Is it not to a fearful extent already encroaching on the independence of the Legislature of this Republic, and exercising a most dangerous influence upon the morality of our public life? Permit the Executive, in addition, to arrogate to itself the war-making authority, and you create a one-man power in the new world stronger and more dangerous in some respects than you find it in some of the constitutional monarchies of the old. Some newspapers have been indulging in extravagant statements about the despotic power of the Emperor of Germany. Why, sir, the

Emperor of Germany cannot declare war without the consent of the Federal Council. The Emperor of Germany cannot remove, at his arbitrary pleasure, the officeholders of the empire.

Concede to the President, in addition to the patronage which he wields, the war-making power, or even so much of it as he arrogates to himself, and you are in a fair way of making him in some respects more absolute than the Emperor of Germany himself, only that we shall elect our monarch every four years; and continuing to descend on the dangerous slope, it is very questionable how long you will enjoy that pleasure. But you say you will not concede to the President any such power. Not concede it! But will you permit it to be taken? What a trifling play with words and facts would that be! In the face of what has been done, we are told that we shall not undo it, and shall not even make a demonstration of our disapproval. So, at least, I interpret the speeches of the Senators from New Jersey, Indiana and Wisconsin. Is not this strange? Has the President grown so great that we must submit to everything that proceeds from him? Or has Congress grown so small that we dare not refuse our acquiescence in the command from above, even if it appears in the form of a violation of the fundamental law? Indeed, if there be anything more alarming in all this than the transgressions of the Executive, it is the indifference, nay, the willingness to surrender which we notice in so many representatives of the people.

The Senator from New Jersey made a touching appeal yesterday. He recounted to us all the services rendered by General Grant, how his image is engraven on the hearts of many hundred thousands of people, and how universally he enjoys the confidence of the country. If it be so, if the President does enjoy the confidence of the country, is that an argument why he should be permitted

to overleap the Constitutional limitations of his power and to usurp the prerogatives of another branch of the Government? If he does possess the confidence of the people, is that a reason why he should be permitted to abuse it? If so, I shall join in the prophetic exclamation of one whose name is never pronounced here without respect, almost amounting to reverence. I mean William Pitt Fessenden. He uttered these words in a debate to which I have already called the attention of the Senate. It was in the year 1859, when President Buchanan asked of the Congress of the United States the power to protect by belligerent measures the safety of United States citizens on the Panama transit route; it was on that occasion that William Pitt Fessenden uttered the following memorable words:

I hope the time never will come when we shall have a man at the head of this Republic who has so much the confidence of the people that we shall be willing to invest in him powers, and trust them to his discretion, which the Constitution has vested in us. It was for wise purposes that our wise ancestors said the people should judge of the propriety of making a war against another people. As I said before, I hope the time will never come when we shall have a President in whose hands we shall be ready to trust so much power.

Thus Mr. Fessenden, of whom friend and foe agree that he had the pride and independence of a true man and the conscience of a true representative of the people. Remember once more the subject of that debate. President Buchanan asked for power by warlike means to protect the safety of United States citizens abroad; and not only his political opponents denied this power, but even the Senators of his own party, and foremost among them Jefferson Davis, protested against intrusting even a President who was a mere tool of the slave-power with

such discretionary authority. But here, gentlemen, the question is not to protect the safety of American citizens. Here the question is to protect a usurper, Baez, in a foreign country. And, now, you speak of the confidence with which we shall surrender such powers to the Executive! It is humiliating, indeed, that Republican Senators should have to take a lesson of independence of spirit even from Jefferson Davis and his partisans.

If you raise the question of confidence, we are not called upon to ask whether the President possesses it; but the proper question to ask is whether, in view of this act and to this extent, it is safe to give it to him. What has he done? In order to further a scheme of his own, he has ordered naval commanders to commit warlike acts without the authority of Congress. Thus he transgressed his Constitutional powers and usurped those of the National Legislature; he jeopardized the peace and the honor and the safety of this Republic. Doing this, he has either proved that he does not understand the Constitutional limitations of his power, or that he is reckless enough knowingly and willfully to break through them. In either case, if he does possess the confidence of the people, it is, in view of these acts, high time for the people to consider whether that confidence is safely bestowed. The people may well ask themselves if the President, impelled by such inducements as the San Domingo scheme offered, went so far, how far he may be inclined to go under the impulse of temptations still stronger.

Sir, I do not speak of the President without that respect which is his due. Nor do I put upon the things he has done a harsh construction. The President's education was that of military life. He was unused to the operations of the checks and balances of power which constitute the rule of civil government. If the habits of peremptory

command on the one side and of absolute obedience on the other impressed themselves strongly on his mind, it was not his fault. So he was elected President, and suddenly transferred to the complex duties of the most responsible civil position of this Republic. If his temper is not such as to shake off the force of life-long habits with ease; if it is not supple enough to accommodate itself to a position no longer one of undivided power and responsibility, it may be called his misfortune; but let it not, by a confidence beyond reasonable bounds, become the misfortune of the American people. Confidence, is your cry? In his cradle every American has learned to repeat by heart the grand old watchword, "Vigilance is the price of liberty." Have the people so utterly forgotten it? But if the people had forgotten it, we as the guardians of the rights and liberties of the people, have no right to forget it. In view of a flagrant infraction of the Constitution of the Republic, of a usurpation of power, we have no right to be lulled by the confidence game.

Sir, it was with astonishment and mortification that I heard the just criticism passed by the Senator from Massachusetts upon the President's act denounced as a blow struck at the Republican party! The Republican party! What, sir, is Ulysses S. Grant the Republican party? Is the San Domingo scheme the Republican cause? Is that most preposterous and dangerous doctrine, that the President may acquire the war-making power by a sleight-of-hand, the Republican platform? Republican Senators would do well to pause before they commit themselves on so fatal a position. If it has come to this, if you really could make the people of the country believe that fidelity to the Constitution and republican government, that hostility to the San Domingo scheme and to usurpation, means hostility to the Republican party,

then you will find that Presidential party uncomfortably small. I warn my Republican friends not to identify the cause of their party with one man and with the acts of one man. I warn them not to impose such a tax upon the consciences of honest and independent people.

So far the responsibility for all this rests upon the President alone. There let it rest. But you relieve him by an approval of his acts, and you will load that responsibility upon the back of the Republican party. And here I boldly assert that any party which assumes such a responsibility must inevitably break down under the burden. As long as republican institutions are dear to the hearts of the American people, no party in this land can bear such a load with impunity. No party in a Republic like ours, among a noble and independent and liberty-loving people like ours, can hope to maintain itself with unmanly submission to that which is wrong, even if that wrong be committed by its chief.

The mere fact that a Republican President did those acts, the Republican party can endure; but what the Republican party cannot endure is to place itself in the attitude of having committed those acts itself. And I venture to predict, that the time is not very far [off] when those will be looked upon as the truest Republicans who did not hesitate to expose themselves to suspicion and vituperation and obloquy in order to relieve the Republican cause of this most intolerable burden—for the Republican party will be once more the party of independent men.

The Senator from Wisconsin in a fine strain of classic eloquence likened the Senator from Massachusetts to Brutus striking his dagger into Cæsar's breast after Casca and Cassius had already done their work. It was a beautiful figure, and the likeness is better than the Senator from Wisconsin thought. To be sure, the

dagger was not leveled at the breast of Republicanism, but the weapon went straight into the heart of Cæsarism; and the Senator from Wisconsin, scholar as he is, will remember that the world has long been agreed to call Brutus "the noblest Roman of them all."

And now I appeal to Senators, what are we to do under these circumstances? Can we do less, I ask them most candidly, than endeavor to undo, as far as now in our power lies, the iniquity which has been perpetrated? Can we do less than express our disapproval in ever so mild a form? Can we, in the face of that solemn oath which we have sworn at that desk, do less? I see here many Senators sitting around me who were upon this floor in the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. I would ask those who voted for his conviction on charges insignificant by the side of the facts now before us, on evidence dim and uncertain by the side of this open documentary confession—I ask them, can those Senators now do less than what it is proposed to declare in the resolutions before us? I would ask Senators whether they are willing to let it go out to the world that the Constitution of the United States may be invaded not only with impunity, but even without the poor satisfaction of a protest?

Have you considered what the consequences of your submission to these things will be? Have you thought of the meaning of your acquiescence? It will mean simply this: you tell the President of the United States, "Go on, sir, without fear; whatever powers you may desire to claim for yourself, claim them; in whatever way you may break through the Constitutional limitation of your authority, do it; you can always rely upon a ready apology and justification upon the floor of this your ever-faithful Senate." Such a precedent we are about to set for all time to come. Is any Senator here prepared to stoop to that attitude?

Our duty seems to me clear as sunlight. We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to the people who sent us here, we owe it to posterity, to whom we have to transmit these republican institutions unimpaired, to look that duty boldly in the face. I know it is very hard to pronounce judgment in a case like this. The acts we are discussing are the acts of *our* President. We elected him, and we had hoped with cordiality to support his Administration from beginning to end. We would gladly exonerate him from all blame if we could; and yet our duty remains the same; and it is this duty that tests our metal. It is no great thing to watch and restrain within the Constitutional limits of his power an Executive to whom you are politically opposed. There is nothing brave, nothing to be proud of in that. But to watch with conscientious care that your friends in power do not encroach upon the rights and liberties of the people, arrogating to themselves illegitimate authority, that is the thing which marks the true and faithful guardian of the laws, the thing which distinguishes the patriot from the mere partisan. If I see the danger of usurpation looming up anywhere, it is in that blind and reckless party spirit which will complacently wink at and be ready to defend any wrong when perpetrated by a friend, which it would most violently denounce when merely attempted by a political opponent. While it is a hard, I say, therefore, it is a stern and a proud duty.

But this is not all. The Chief Magistrate, whose acts we now consider, is not only our President, and, as we have fallen into the habit of calling him, not only the official chief of our party; he is also a man who has well deserved of this Republic, whose name is identified with some of the heroic pages of our history, and whose fame, perhaps, is an object of somewhat tender solicitude to the American people. I, sir, would be the last man to be

unmindful of the great services he has rendered. Not one of us, I am sure, is inclined to forget the deeds he did in the field for his country, and because we are not inclined to forget those deeds we cannot but deplore most sincerely that, after having contributed so much to the salvation of this Republic in war, he has done things so dangerous to republican institutions in peace.

The American people are enthusiastic admirers of war-like glory; but I should be loath to blame the American people for not permitting their enthusiasm to close their eyes to the short-comings of their heroes on other fields of action. In this respect they are by no means peculiar. The President, if his political acts meet with censure, is in distinguished company. I repeat, I would be the very last man on earth to detract from that just renown which he has earned; but there were men before him who had won great renown on the field of battle and then failed in the high responsibilities of civil life. No man in modern history has given so much glory to the arms of old England as the Duke of Wellington; and yet all that glory could not protect his windows against the stones thrown by multitudes of indignant citizens when, as a minister, he had forfeited the favor of the people. The vote of the House of Commons which drove him from power did not wipe out the glories of the Peninsular campaign nor dim the luster of Waterloo; but all the Peninsular glories, and the luster of Waterloo, were not strong enough to give success and popular approval to the Duke's civil administration. Our disapproval of a Presidential act of General Grant will not diminish our appreciation of the capture of Vicksburg and the victory of Richmond; but the laurels of Vicksburg and Richmond cannot make his acts now under discussion Constitutional, nor can they turn a Presidential blunder into an act of wisdom.

If the Duke of Wellington was a great captain and a poor minister, the British people show their gratitude by remembering his brilliant successes in war and generously forgetting his failures in peace. If the Duke of Wellington could rise up from the dead to-day, hale and hearty, the British people would make him general again, but they would make him minister no more. And if General Grant meets with a similar fate at the hands of his most appreciative fellow-citizens, he has no reason to complain of "the ingratitude of republics."

Sir, I do not want this Republic to be ungrateful. No, sir, let us pay all our debts of gratitude to the utmost farthing. In our school-boy days we were apt to grow enthusiastic over the stern republican spirit of ancient Greece and Rome. In the history of Greece we read of Miltiades, who saved the independence of his republic on the field of Marathon, and then died in chains. In the history of Rome we read of Manlius, who, by his resolute bravery, repulsed the barbarians from the Capitol, and on the very theater of his exploit he was precipitated from the Tarpeian rock. And of neither of them is it recorded that he was guilty of acts more dangerous to republican liberty than those we have been now discussing.

Sir, nothing could be farther from my mind than to recommend the punishment inflicted upon the Greek and the Roman hero as examples worthy of imitation. However much more grievous the transgressions now before us may be than those of Miltiades and Manlius, surely nobody here thinks of chains and Tarpeian rocks. Let all these evil deeds pass without the correction which the Constitution provides for them. We all are ready, even in our judgment, to temper justice with gratitude and charity. Yes; let us be grateful. It is true, he who has deserved well of the Republic should never forget,

as Washington never forgot it, that the highest reward of a true republican consists in the greatness of his country and the assured rights of his fellow-citizens. But if he wants more, let him have more. Give him riches with a lavish hand; cover him all over with gold; steep him in luxuries; but let not your gratitude to one make you unmindful of your duty to all. I beseech you, let not gratitude seduce you to throw the laws of the Republic at his feet.

No nation deserves to be free and great, no nation will remain free and great—nay, sir, that nation has already ceased to be free and great that will pay a debt of gratitude at the expense of its Constitutional rights and liberties.

Senators, do not underrate the importance of this subject. The consequence of your action in this case may be felt for good or evil throughout the whole future of this Republic. Do not indulge in the pleasant delusion that you are permitted to dismiss this business with a mere shrug of the shoulder. Let us not, I entreat you, attempt to shirk our responsibility by evasive expedients. I have heard it rumored that a motion will be made to lay these resolutions on the table, or to avoid action by dilatory tactics. Sir, I trust it may not be so. On an occasion like this the people have a right to expect that their representatives should have the courage of a great duty. Let this first precedent of acquiescence in an act of usurpation by a successful soldier pass into our history, and you will have struck a blow at the cause of Free Government that will resound throughout the earth. The nations of the world will ask: Have the American people become so tired of their Constitutional rights that the guardians of the Constitution can permit them to be invaded not only with impunity, but even without a remonstrance? The question will be repeated: Is it true then, what so frequently has been said, that the

United States issued from their first revolution as a Republic only by accident, an accident depending upon the sublimely unselfish spirit of Washington, who, instead of grasping the crown, modestly retired to the plow of Cincinnatus? But, on the other hand, you vindicate the Constitution against the President, a President of your own choice—and the world will understand that in this Republic at least no man can grow so great as to overtop the majesty of the laws; that here at least republican institutions are safe, for they are in the keeping of men who “know their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain.”

TO E. L. GODKIN

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1871.

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Let me give you, confidentially, my views on the situation as it now stands, and, in return, let me ask for an expression of your opinions, in the same confidence, of course.

I know quite well that the economic question is going to play a great part in our politics, and I shall endeavor to perform my share of the labor,—but it is questionable—and here I express Mr. Trumbull’s opinion as well as my own—whether it would be prudent for us, situated as we are, to put ourselves too prominently forward in connection with the “Free-Trade League.” The cause of “Revenue-Reform” is making excellent progress in Congress and I expect we shall be able to achieve a considerable success at the next session. But it is desirable for us to appear on the field of action as men who are not controlled by, and not even connected with, outside combinations. In such an attitude we shall be stronger. Moreover, we are now engaged in a piece of business which is very delicate as well as very important.

The Republican party is, as you well know, at present



controlled in its official capacity by the office-mongers who go through thick and thin with the Administration and who find in the Administration their only rallying point and strength. Under their leadership the Republican party, which after all contains the best popular elements is rapidly going to perdition. In order to save the vitality of the Republican party that leadership must be broken up, and to accomplish this it is necessary that the party at large should be convinced of the impracticability of Grant's renomination. As soon as that is done, the cohesive force of the controlling office-monger element is gone. They will scatter and lose their power in the party to a great extent. Then the liberal and vigorous element of the Republican party, who alone can save its future usefulness, will have a chance to assume control of the organization and shape its future policy. We have already made considerable headway in that direction, and I expect to find the Chandlers and Conklings and Camerons, and still more those whom they lead, in a demoralized condition next winter after they have been exposed to the breeze of public opinion, in the country.

In this respect the removal of Sumner from the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee was an important affair, and—I hope you will pardon the suggestion—I was somewhat sorry to see the *Nation* throw cold water upon it. The repeated interference of the President in the affairs of the Legislature had become very offensive, and in the Sumner case it appeared in so cynical a shape and the submissive spirit of the Administration men so abject, that a strong demonstration was necessary. Besides, Sumner's knowledge and experience in matters connected with our foreign relations are almost indispensable to the Committee. He also shows a great deal more tact and reliable judgment in that branch than you would suppose from outside observation.

The debate on Sumner's San Domingo resolutions will certainly not remain without effect and, taking it altogether, we have good reason to hope that in a few months the track will be tolerably clear for the Liberals. In the meantime such organizations inside of the Republican party as we started in Missouri and as have now been established in Ohio under the leadership of ex-Secretary Cox, ought to be encouraged by the independent press. I expect to see similar things spring up in other States, and when the preliminary movements of the next Presidential election come on, such organizations may be strong enough to represent a formidable balance of power. In this manner, I think, much can be accomplished for civil service reform, revenue-reform and other good things, and we may be able to hold the patronage-politicians and corruptionists at bay.

I have given you now, as well as I can in a hurried way, the general drift of my ideas about the present situation of affairs, and I should be very happy to have your thoughts on the same subject.

I was glad to see the *Nation* strike so vigorously at the insane Ku-Klux legislation now under discussion in Congress. I hope we shall be able to defeat, if not the whole, at least the worst features of it.

I sent you my speech on the Sumner resolutions, and I think the tendency of some of the points it contains may appear clearer to you in the light of this note.

TO JACOB D. COX

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1871.

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I was delighted when I read of the association you have formed. It is just the thing to be done under existing circumstances. That the platform you adopted, and

which agrees in substance with our liberal Missouri platform, has the approval of a majority in the Republican party, I do not doubt a moment. If we only succeed in rallying those who think alike, the Republican organization will in truth be the *new party* of the future. Similar associations ought to be organized all over the country, and I hope we shall see them soon crop out here and there.

The great incubus pressing upon the party, the Administration with its train of officers and office-mongers, is now in a fair way of being shaken off. Unless I greatly mistake the signs of the times, the superstition that Grant is *the* necessary man, is rapidly giving way. The spell is broken, and we have only to push through the breach.

As for San Domingo, I am confident that no treaty of annexation can pass this body. The President may try to press the treaty for the lease of the Bay of Samaná, a comparatively innocent thing. We shall resist that also and I think we can defeat it too.

The President, as I understand, is as stubborn as ever, and seems determined to risk his all upon that one card. He seems to have a genius for suicide.

I suppose you have already thought of spreading your organization all over your State. Perhaps you might take care of Indiana too.

My speech on Sumner's resolutions will be out in pamphlet form in a day or two. I shall send you as many copies as you may desire.

I shall be happy to hear from you again.

FROM C. G. MEMMINGER¹

CHARLESTON, April 26, 1871.

I write a line to thank you for the frank expression of your views contained in your letter of 21 inst. It verifies the

¹ Secretary of the Treasury of the Confederate States, 1861-64.

judgment I had formed of your real desire to promote the good of our common country. As I am seeking the same object, you will pardon my trespassing on your time. I really think you can suggest something that may advance our common object.

I think you are right in saying that if we had originally adopted a different course as to the negroes, we would have escaped present difficulties. But if you will consider a moment, you will see that it was as impossible, as for us to have emancipated them before the war. The then President [Johnson] held up before us the hope of a "white man's government," and this led us to set aside negro suffrage. We might probably even have procured what was then called "impartial suffrage," but it was natural that we should yield to our old prejudices.

The practical question remains, what shall we do now? To await the education of the negro is like waiting for the millennium. Unless some more speedy remedy is proposed, the country here will be ruined. Nothing but hope of improvement can restrain our people. You can scarcely believe the utter vileness of our rulers, or the suffering of our people. In this city, one-half the rent of a well situated house is consumed by taxes and insurance; and as to fine houses, they are worse. As executor I sold at auction a few days ago for \$11,000 a house for which \$25,000 had been offered in 1866. The whole rent of the house for the last three years has not paid the taxes.

This cannot continue, and I have the hope that if we could call a constitutional convention, some check at least could be devised. Even minority representation would be a gain. But it is not possible that we could get a tax qualification for the voter. But we can do nothing without the aid of Congress or of some of the Republican party.

With much respect, yours very truly.

TO CHARLES SUMNER

CHICAGO, Aug. 14, 1871.

My dear SUMNER: I send you my speech [at Chicago, August 12, 1871], which was carefully considered and produced upon my audience the very best effect.

You tell me in your letter that the Republican party must be saved. I am convinced that it can be done only by making it the party of reforms and by suppressing the bad influences governing it. And that requires the utmost decision of action. We must convince the people that we *mean business*. At any rate, I do mean business, and am "going to fight it out on this line." Let me know what you think of it.

THE NEED OF REFORM AND A NEW PARTY¹

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—When the kind invitation which called me here was published in the papers, some over-zealous partisans, who had long been doubting my orthodoxy, threw up their hands in holy horror, exclaiming: "You see now how far he is gone: some of the most prominent rebels in Tennessee are among those who invite him, and yet he accepts their invitation." I plead guilty to the charge, and more than that. While I am happy to meet the steadfast Union men, who, in the hour of peril, faithfully supported the National cause, I am equally happy to stretch out my hand to all men who, having stood against us during the civil war, are now ready to work for the "restoration of universal peace, harmony, friendship and true brotherhood." And had I lost a brother in the great conflict, and were to meet here the man who took his life, my hand and heart would be open to him, did he show himself ready to work with me for that great end. And thus I thank you, Unionists and Confederates, Republicans and Democrats, native and adopted citizens, white and black, fellow-citizens, all, I thank you, from my whole heart, for the friendly welcome you have given me. And my gratitude for this high honor I can show in no better form than by laying before you, in what I am going

¹ Speech at Nashville, Tenn., Sept. 20, 1871.

to say, the sincerest feelings of my heart and the maturest convictions of my mind, without fear and partiality.

I have been called here by no selfish aspiration. You can give me nothing that would promote my fortunes. I can not be a candidate for the Presidency, owing to a benignant provision of the Constitution, which declares foreign-born citizens ineligible—a high Constitutional privilege I might call it, for it exempts us from that most malignant of all moral diseases—a disease almost sure to kill whomsoever it attacks—the Presidential fever. Neither do I come here as a partisan to coin a little capital for this or that political organization; for the welfare of the American people stands to me above all party interest. I have, then, nothing to ask of you but that you hear me, not for my cause, but for your own—for that of our common country.

You have invited me to discuss before you the present condition of public affairs and the problems they impose upon us. I will state them as they appear to my mind in brief review.

The civil war left behind it an alienation of feeling between those lately arrayed against each other, which is dangerous to the internal peace of the country, and stands in the way of a fruitful coöperation of the social elements. It ought to be disarmed and gradually extinguished by a just, generous and conciliatory policy. In the first line, a general amnesty, the removal of political disabilities, which ought to have been granted long ago, should no longer be delayed.

The new order of things established by the war, whose essence consists in the equality of rights, is still being disturbed by adverse aspirations. It ought to be wisely developed and firmly maintained and secured by the coöperation of all good citizens.

Times of great peril and trouble have fostered the habit

of unconstitutional assumptions of power, and alarming acts of usurpation have taken place. We ought to return without delay to the sound practices of Constitutional government, and local self-government ought to be restored to that freedom which belongs to it under our Constitutional system, and which it needs to develop all its blessings.

Great abuses have grown up in our civil service. The system of government patronage has scandalously demoralized our political life, and most injurious examples are given by selfish partisans in high places. The civil service ought to be reformed, the abuses of the patronage abolished, and all good citizens should coöperate to restore our public life to the purity and high tone of the first years of the Republic. Shameless corruption, open and covert, has developed itself in many places. There ought to be a general house-cleaning, to knock off the dust and to extinguish the vermin.

Our system of duties on imports is such as to favor some material interests enormously at the expense of others, and to enrich the few by oppressing the many. It ought to be so adjusted as to benefit the National treasury only, instead of privileged individuals and corporations.

The people are onerously taxed to promote the payment of the National debt with unnecessary rapidity; the taxes ought to be reduced as much as will be consistent with a conscientious discharge of our liabilities, so as to give the business interests of the country time to recuperate and to overcome the exhaustion and losses caused by the war.

The business interests of the country are suffering under the uncertain and fitful fluctuations of values caused by an irredeemable currency. We ought to return as speedily as possible to specie payments, in order to obtain a fixed measure of values and to gain a secure basis for our National credit.

Corporations of tremendous power have grown up, which already exercise an almost uncontrollable influence in our public concerns. That influence ought to be guarded against with all the means within the power of the people, and in the first line the donation of public lands to such monopolies, to the disadvantage of the laboring people, ought to be stopped.

These views of the condition of public affairs, and the problems to be solved, are shared by millions of people at the North, especially the political school to which I belong, called the "Liberal Republican," and, if I mistake not, by this assembly. I shall endeavor to show, in the course of my remarks, that some of the measures proposed are of special interest to the people of the South.

And now I desire to impress upon your minds, a truth of which you of the South should never lose sight. The North possesses in this country the preponderance of population, and of political power, and yet it is equally certain that the chances of a liberal, progressive, reformatory policy among the Northern people depend in a great measure, if not altogether, upon the attitude of the South, especially that part of the Southern population which was, in the war, arrayed on the Confederate side; and their intentions, their aspirations, their movements, are the object of anxious observation. As long as disorders prevail in the Southern States, or as long as dangers seem to threaten from that quarter, the Northern mind, however much inclined to yield to its liberal and progressive impulses, will always be disturbed and clogged by the apprehension that every bold reformatory venture might, in some way, jeopardize that which was accomplished by the civil war.

You will permit me, therefore, as a sincere and faithful advocate of a liberal and progressive policy, to speak to you, men of the South, on the very important part you

do and might play in the great political evolution of our days, and in doing so I shall express myself with that unreserved frankness which you certainly expected of me when you called me here. I believe we have met for a candid consultation, and not a mere exchange of compliments.

It is necessary in the first place, that we should understand the exact truth as to our present situation. Illusions may be more pleasant, but only the truth is useful. Look around you, then, with an unclouded eye.

The people of the South have succumbed in a great contest. It was the contest between two antagonistic organizations of society, the one represented by slavery, the other by free labor. I will not go into a disquisition on the origin of the struggle; neither will I take pains to disprove that mere political intrigue or a mere difference of economic interests or of political doctrines concerning the rights of States were at the bottom of the quarrel. They were merely incidental. It is certain that without the antagonism between free labor and slavery the civil war would not have happened, and it was just that antagonism which determined the final result of the struggle. You were not defeated by accident. Your soldiers fought most bravely. Your military leaders were most able and heroic. Your material resources were most ample to carry on a defensive war of indefinite duration in so vast a country as yours. Your armies, your material means, your intelligence, your bravery and the advantages offered by your country were greater than those of Spain when she held the great Napoleon in check—far greater than those of the poor Mexicans when they forced the army of Napoleon the Little away from their shores, and rid themselves of foreign dominion. In fact, neither of those nations could be compared with you in any respect. Nor was there a prospect wanting to induce some great foreign

power to vent its jealousy against the American Republic in helping you to accomplish its disruption. Why, then, did you fail? It was not owing to this or that blunder of your Government, nor to this or that mishap in your military operations. The great developments of history do not turn upon trifles. No, the very thing that brought on the struggle brought on your defeat—slavery. The Governments of England and France would in all probability have availed themselves of any pretext to help you in crushing their dangerous rival, but in the face of the public opinion of the world they did not dare openly to espouse your cause, for the simple reason that it appeared as the cause of slavery. And why did not your disasters in the field, inspire your people to still greater efforts, to sublimer sacrifices and to the determination never to give up the contest, as the people of Spain and Mexico were inspired by misfortunes which made their further struggles appear utterly hopeless? You have heard the reason frequently, many perhaps without appreciating it,—it expressed itself in the significant popular saying that the contest for slavery “was the rich man’s war and the poor man’s fight.” And the poor men *would* fight as long as the shout of victory flattered and excited them; but under the chilling wind of misfortune the inspiration vanished and the sobered spirit of the masses manifested itself in those fearful desertions from your armies just at the moment of greatest need. And then that bravery which would have graced the best of causes, was all in vain. No, do not disguise from your minds this great historic fact: it was slavery that isolated you in the world; it was slavery that broke the perseverance of your people; it was slavery that defeated you.

Well, the struggle is over and wise men will profit by its teachings. Let us look at them as sober and candid men. If it is true what I have said, that the very cause

which produced the struggle also defeated your efforts, must it not be equally true that that cause is hopelessly lost and can never be revived? Is it not absolutely certain that every attempt to revive it must inevitably result in new disasters, disasters more terrible still, perhaps, than those which have already passed over you? You say you do not think of reviving it. Very well. But I go further, and affirm that as the cause of slavery is irretrievably lost, so you can not attempt to restore or maintain anything that has any affinity to slavery, without great injury to yourselves. Let me explain my meaning.

That slavery could not have survived the war must be clear to every thinking mind. The emancipation of the slaves brought on a new order of things in the South. Your social and political organization had to be adapted to free labor. What could that organization be? It could be only an organization based upon the principle which is the very life element of free labor society—the principle of equal rights. And here I have to express my opinion upon a matter which has been the source of great dissatisfaction and acrimonious feeling in the South. I mean the so-called reconstruction measures. It seems to have been the prevailing impression in the South that the reconstruction measures were the offspring of a spirit of hatred and vindictiveness animating the Northern people. I assure you, and I know whereof I speak, that nothing could be farther from the truth. An overwhelming majority of the people of the North and of Northern Republicans never hated the people of the South, not even during the war. And when the war was over, they followed a course which presented itself to their minds as a stern necessity. They followed it with hesitation and diffidence. I invite you to examine it. The time has arrived when the two great sections of the country should become just to each other, in dispassionate feeling and

calm judgment. And they will as soon as they honestly try to understand each other. Let us endeavor to do it now.

To appreciate the merits of the reconstruction question, you must for a moment place yourselves in the situation of the victorious party immediately after the close of the war. You would, as they did, at once have recognized the duty of solving two great problems: First, to protect those in the South who during the war had been, and then were, friends of the Union, black as well as white; and secondly, to fix and secure the logical and legitimate results of the war, so that they should not be upset by reactionary movements and become the subjects of new and dangerous struggles again. The people of the North felt that duty. I felt it, and I ask any candid man among you, had he been in our places, would he not have felt it?

Consider now in the face of what circumstances those duties were to be performed. You certainly remember them well. The Unionists living in the South were to be protected. The disasters of the war, the terrible disappointments, the dreadful losses and sufferings you had endured, the bewildering perplexities which were surrounding you, had still more embittered the feelings of many of your people against the conqueror. The new order of things, free labor with all its new relations of rights and duties, was to be established and developed in the South, while all the traditions of her people, all their accepted notions as to what could be done with the colored race, all their ways of thinking and working, were still those of the slavery system, and while the distressing necessity of providing for the pressing wants of to-day and to-morrow seemed to drive you, to force into your service as much as possible of the labor which had just been liberated. Was it not so? I speak of the things which I then saw in the South—for I traversed these

States for several months—not with any desire to harrow up old sores; nothing could be farther from my mind. But I desire, in justice, to say that the attitude of the Southern people at that time was the natural result of their situation. After the terrible disasters and the bewildering changes, which had taken place with such stunning rapidity, we had no right to expect anything else. But were we not obliged to face the truth, and to act accordingly? I ask again, what would you have done under such circumstances? Would you have left the Unionists living in the South and the freedmen, after having emancipated them and promised to protect them in their freedom, would you have then left them unprotected, at the mercy of resentments and passions, inflamed by past disasters, and present sufferings and perplexities? Think of it. I appeal to you as Southern gentlemen, who pride yourselves upon your honor: if you had been victorious and conquered the North, would you a single moment have forgotten your obligations of honor to those who had aided you in the struggle, and were then living among your late enemies, unable to protect themselves? You would have gone further, perhaps, than we. Let your own feelings as gentlemen sit in judgment.

And further, what would you have done towards establishing and securing free labor in the South? Would you have left the business with confidence to the late master-class, who, although slavery had been struck down in the war, were quite naturally still acting upon the traditional conviction that only the old system was rational and tenable, and that the new system could not and would not work? Would you have expected that, if all political rights and privileges were left in the exclusive and untrammelled possession of the master-class, they would be used for anything else than the restoration of, as much as possible, the old system of slavery? Would you have

closed your eyes to the fact that they actually were so used when legislative and municipal bodies were for a time left free to act upon their own instincts? Would you not have apprehended that new causes of dissension and conflict would thus speedily arise? I appeal to you as sensible men. Think of it, and you will find far less of the motive of vindictiveness in what took place.

You have greeted me here as a friend of the Southern people, and so I am; and I affirm that I was just as sincere and warm a friend of the Southern people when, after the close of the war, I followed this course of reasoning. The actual state of the Southern mind, with the passions of the war still alive and aggravated by stinging misfortune, and with its sincere belief in the utter impossibility of the success of free labor with their laboring population, will necessarily lead the Southern people to attempt all possible experiments, except that of free labor in its true form; and yet free labor must be maintained, secured and developed, or we shall at some future day have to fight the old battle over again, which would be a most disastrous misfortune to the country in general, and to the South in particular. What is to be done? There is this alternative: either we must go on protecting free labor and the rights of free laborers through the power of the National Government, which would result in continual interference of the National authority in State concerns, and the gradual undermining of local self-government, or we must enable free labor to protect and regulate itself by giving the free laborer the political means with which to maintain his rights; and then the development of free labor may soon be left to the operations of local self-government. And this can be done only by guaranteeing, through the Constitution of the Republic, to all citizens, the emancipated class included, those political privileges with which a free man maintains his rights. And hence I advocated


the Constitutional amendments guaranteeing equal rights before the law, and impartial suffrage. And as delay threatened increased difficulties, I favored their speedy enactment and adoption.

I know that when I reasoned thus the motive of hatred and vindictiveness, so foreign to my nature, had no share in my conclusions. I was, on the contrary, most sincerely convinced that the speedy and irreversible settlement of the question on this basis would be the greatest attainable blessing to the country, and especially to the South. This may appear a bold and startling assertion to some of you, in view of the practical difficulties which, in the South, have sprung from this very settlement. Those difficulties I know well, and I do not under-estimate them. They arose naturally from the revolution of a labor system, and from the introduction into the body-politic of a large number of voters, a considerable portion of whom are uneducated and inexperienced, and who, in many instances, permit themselves to be led by unscrupulous politicians, much to the detriment of public interest. I recognize the full significance of this fact, and shall, in another part of my remarks, discuss the means by which its evil consequences may, in a great measure, be modified. But I invite you now to contemplate the difficulties which certainly would have arisen had this mode of settlement not been adopted. No thinking man can doubt what would have happened. A large portion of the Southern people would have persistently refused to recognize the exact truth as to their situation. They would have continued to waste their energies in useless efforts to preserve as much as possible of the old system of labor, and to keep up that confusion in the working of the social machinery, which is now gradually subsiding. Those acrimonious political struggles, which we witnessed three and four years ago, would have been indefinitely extended.

The doubt and agony of the Southern mind as to what was to be, would have been cruelly prolonged; the whole country would have been kept in a state of feverish agitation; and, finally, what would have been the result? Not the gradual, steady and peaceful advancement of the emancipated class toward the position they now occupy, for their education would have been strenuously resisted, and only fitful and jerking experiments would have been made in the heated atmosphere of political struggles; not the establishment of a system intermediate between slavery and free labor, for about one thing nobody should indulge in any delusion—the people of the North would have uncompromisingly resisted any attempt to subvert or adulterate free labor in any form, and the tendency to strengthen the powers of the General Government for that purpose would have been irresistible. No, the final result would have been just this: The South would have remained the scene of persistent, violent, fruitless, disastrous efforts to baffle the logic of things; the energies of her people would have been wasted in useless and self-tormenting attempts to escape the inevitable and to accomplish the impossible; the confusion and agony of an uncertain state of things would have been indefinitely prolonged; the whole country would have been kept in anxiety and alarm by the reagitation of the old questions; the power of the National Government would have been increased beyond all measure at the expense of local self-government; and finally, after all this, we should, by the very necessity of all things, have been forced to fall back upon just that settlement which has actually been adopted. And why? Because in a republic a social and political organization, based upon equal rights, is the one which most naturally suggests itself; it is the only possible, the only tenable one, for it is the only one in harmony with truly republican institutions and genuine self-government.

There is a logic ruling human affairs from which there is no escape. The civil war extinguishing slavery furnished a terrible proof of this truth.

And now, if finally you would have had to come back to the same settlement virtually which has been effected, I ask you, in all candor, is it not, after all, much better for you and for all of us that we should have arrived at that fixed state of things by a short road, than by those tortuous, dark and dangerous paths? Is it not better that, without unnecessary loss of precious time, we should clearly know: this is the order of things we have to deal with; these are the necessities surrounding us; these are the problems we have to solve; these are the difficulties we have to contend with; these are the advantages we can achieve; this is the direction in which our social system must develop itself? I ask, is it not better that we should now clearly know all of this, instead of continuing painfully to grope in the dark? and that we should now be able frankly to join hands in a common effort to turn circumstances, such as they are and must be, to our common good and advantage? I have discussed reconstruction from this point of view, in order to show you that the motives which dictated it were, after all, not those of hatred and vindictiveness; that the object pursued was not the humiliation of the Southern people; that those objects were recognized as necessary by men whose hearts were full of sincere and fraternal sympathy, and that what was done should not stand in the way of a complete restoration of friendly feeling. I know it is human nature, when we are defeated in a great struggle, to feel and resent every exertion of power on the part of the victorious as a wilful, arrogant, malignant outburst of an offensive spirit. Had the people of the North been in your place, their feelings would probably have been the same. But had you been in the place of the people of the North, would



your feelings and views of duty have been very different from theirs?

Is it not well, then, that in clearing away the wreck of past struggles, we should, with them, clear away those resentments which were born of the passions of those struggles, and which should not survive them? Is it not well that we should endeavor to become just to one another in our hearts? Is it not time that, upon the basis of the new order of things, evolved by a great conflict, we should join hands again for the achievement of a common National future?

But I am told that the National Government had no Constitutional power to do what it did in the way of reconstruction; that it resorted to revolutionary proceedings, and so on. Yes, that is, in a certain sense, my view of the case also. But were those proceedings not the offspring of a revolutionary situation, into which, in spite of ourselves, the civil war had thrown us? And has it not always, in history, been characteristic of revolutionary situations that the accomplishment of necessary ends was considered of far greater importance than the absolute regularity of the means employed? I would certainly not admit all that was done during and immediately after the war as valid precedents, to be followed in times of peace. But suppose you do call all that has been achieved a great revolution, is it the part of wise men to deny that revolutions also have their rightful place in history, and to reject the results evolved by a great revolution as such? Would it, in our case, be wise in the face of the fact that those very results, although rejected on account of their doubtful origin, would then finally still have to be restored by a painful and dangerous operation? Will it not be infinitely more prudent and patriotic to accept those results as accomplished facts, and to make the best of them, instead of venturing into the confusion, agony and distress

of their inevitable reproduction? Let everybody consult his common-sense. The answer can not be doubtful.

But you tell us that the revolutionary period has fostered the habit of using arbitrary power, and that thereby the rights of all of us are threatened. Yes, it has produced that dangerous tendency; yes, by that tendency not your rights alone, but the rights of us all, the principles of Constitutional government, are threatened. It is unquestionably true that things are done with impunity, and almost without censure, well calculated to alarm every true friend of free institutions; and it is time that thinking men should seriously consider how, by concerted and determined action, they can prevent that tendency from undermining our whole Constitutional system. Now that the exigencies of great public peril are over, and the results of the war are firmly imbedded in the fundamental law—now, indeed, is the time to arrest it, lest the people drift into a laxity of Constitutional notions, from which they can not recover. And in order to arrest it, we must not recoil from vigorous means. When I, the other day, in a public speech in Chicago, declared that I would not support President Grant for reëlection, on account of the flagrant violations of the Constitution he has committed in the San Domingo case, a great many of my Republican brethren were shocked beyond measure, and raised the cry of high treason against the party, while some of the feeble in mind exclaimed that my making such a declaration was a sure sign that I must have been disappointed in the matter of patronage. I may assure them that I spoke with cool and mature deliberation; for it will not do to trifle with such cases.

I will not here argue the San Domingo matter over again, but I will say simply this: when the President orders the Navy of the United States to a foreign country, and, without condescending to ask Congress for authority,

instructs our naval officers to protect and defend the chief of a foreign government against any foreign enemy, and even against his own subjects and countrymen, and when he does this, not only while negotiations are going on with that foreign government, which negotiations, however, would not confer upon the President the autocratic power to resort to measures of war at his own pleasure, but even after the results of such negotiations, in the shape of a treaty, have been formally and solemnly rejected by the Senate, and we have no relations with that foreign government and people but the ordinary relations of peace—when a President does that, then he arrogates to himself one of the most important powers belonging to the representatives of the people. He violates the Constitution in one of its most vital points, and he constitutes himself the arbiter of peace and war for this great Republic. And when I am asked to endorse such an act by supporting that President for reëlection, and thus to aid in sanctioning, by a popular vote, such an act as a precedent, a precedent which, if taken as a rule of Constitutional construction, would authorize the President alone to initiate a war under almost any circumstances, and make this Republic virtually a monarchy as to the question of peace or war, then I, as a faithful citizen of this Republic, who have sworn to support its Constitution, say, “I will not do it.” I will not help to reëlect an officer whose reëlection, sanctioning his previous acts with popular approval, will be a justification and encouragement to all future Presidents in committing acts of usurpation reaching still farther. I will not help in paving the way for the advent of irresponsible personal government in this Republic. And when I am told that by such opposition other grave interests may be jeopardized, I answer that I am very doubtful whether the wanton levity with which our Presidents are to be permitted to play with

the peace and honor of the people, and the general decay of Constitutional notions, do not constitute, in their inevitable consequences, as great a danger, and perhaps even greater, than any now within sight. And when I am tauntingly reminded by pliable partisans that the people do not care much about these Constitutional questions, I answer that, if there are many who do not care about the integrity of their republican institutions, this constitutes only a stronger reason why those who do care should make themselves heard, and act with determination. I am frequently told that declarations like those I have made are apt to prove ruinous to a public man. Be it so, I take the risk, for I am in earnest, and I am sure the day will come when many of those who now shrug their shoulders at my protests and predictions will, to their sorrow, admit that I was right, unless this tendency be speedily arrested.

But this is not all. You will tell me that the usurpations of the Executive do not constitute the only danger in this direction; that local self-government is exposed to grievous encroachments, and that you want your rights. And I tell you there are many millions of men at the North who respond that you shall have your rights—all the rights which they possess, and are determined to claim and maintain. Their rights shall be yours, as yours shall be theirs. Let us understand one another.

It is certainly true that local self-government has been invaded by measures adopted by the General Government, but I do not admit, what has frequently been asserted on the Democratic side, that a fatal blow at local self-government was struck by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution. On the contrary, I assert that, under the Constitution as amended, local self-government can be maintained, and can develop all its blessings more successfully even than ever before. I have

all my life been a strenuous advocate of local self-government, and of State rights, as far as they are the true embodiment of local self-government, but I have always insisted upon the true article. I do not only believe that the people have the right and the ability to govern themselves; neither do I see in local self-government only a mere method of the administration of local affairs; but I cherish it as one of the great educational agencies of our political system. In the matter of administration, local self-government is by no means always successful. We have occasionally great and costly failures to deplore, but however costly and troublesome they may be, they are nothing compared with the blessings local self-government confers. It is the great fountain from which the popular mind draws its healthiest and most invigorating inspirations. There is nothing better calculated to make a man understand and protect his interests, nothing more inspiring and instructive to the mind and the heart of the citizen, than the independent management of his own affairs upon his own responsibility; and there is nothing more inspiring and invigorating to a community of men than free coöperation for common ends, on a common responsibility, in which the interest of each individual is involved. That is what puts men upon their own feet. When they have accustomed themselves to depend on their own wisdom and energy for success, and to blame themselves, and not others, for failure and mishap in private and common concerns, then they will become truly independent beings, such as the citizen of a democratic republic ought to be. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that as many responsibilities as possible should be laid at the door of every citizen by local self-government. From this point of view, I see in the new amendments to the Constitution, justly construed, nothing hostile to the cause of true local self-government. What does true

local self-government consist in? It consists in a political organization of society, which secures to the generality of its members—that is to say, as nearly as possible to the whole people—the right and the means to coöperate in the management of their common affairs, either directly or, where direct action is impossible, by a voluntary delegation of powers. It ceases to be true self-government in the same measure as the means of taking part in the management of common affairs are confined as an exclusive privilege to one portion of the people, and are withheld from the rest. And how is self-government exercised? By means of the suffrage. To make self-government genuine, general and secure, therefore, the right of suffrage must be made secure to the generality of the citizens. You limit the right of suffrage by arbitrary exclusion, and just in that measure you impair the integrity of self-government. You protect every citizen in the free exercise of suffrage, and you do the best thing calculated to make self-government a general and living reality.

And now what is, in this respect, the object of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments? Simply to secure to every citizen those civil rights which make him a free-man and the suffrage which enables him to participate in the functions of self-government. But you say the amendments have limited the rights of the States. So they have, but in what point? Not, strictly speaking, in the administration of their local affairs, but only in this direction: they have prohibited the States from depriving one class of citizens of rights which another class of citizens enjoy; from conferring all governmental powers upon one class and excluding another from all participation in self-government; in other words, from transforming self-government into the privilege of one set of people to govern another. You are thus irresistibly driven to the conclusion that the amendments, instead of encroaching

upon self-government by imposing certain prohibitions upon the States, rather put self-government upon a broader basis. I openly confess, I never called that one of the requirements of true self-government that the States should have the power to transform it into an exclusive privilege. True State-rights should, in my opinion, consist in the power of a State to assert and protect the right of local self-government against unconstitutional encroachments on the part of the central authority, but by no means in the power of arbitrarily stripping a portion of its citizens of the rights, which, under the régime of true self-government, they should enjoy. With greater plausibility might it be said that the Constitutional amendments not only limit the rights of the States, but confer greater powers upon the Central Government, the exercise of which might tend to dangerous centralization. That by the clause giving Congress power to enforce the amendments by appropriate legislation the powers of the General Government have been enlarged, I will not question. How far I will not now discuss, nor do I consider it necessary; for it is my conviction that not in the rightful exercise of those powers, but in their abuse, lies the danger which threatens our free institutions, and where the abuse begins it will in each case not be difficult to determine if we construe the new amendments, in conjunction with the rest of the Constitution, in the light of the spirit which pervades the whole. In this respect the new amendments are by no means peculiar. There are many more powers enumerated in the Constitution whose rightful exercise is harmless and beneficent, but whose abuse is dangerous. We may oppose and neutralize the spirit which brings forth those arbitrary abuses of power, and succeeding in that we need not trouble ourselves about the authority conferred by any provision of the Constitution as it stands. Where you

see personal government, or arbitrary, irresponsible power established on the ruins of free institutions, the fault lies hardly ever in the fundamental law, but in the unscrupulousness of those in power, in the cowardice and venality of politicians, and in the careless levity of the masses who are too indifferent to the value of what they possess to exercise that vigilance which is the price of liberty. No, the Constitution as it is to-day contains more guarantees and safeguards of human freedom and rights than any constitution ever devised by human wisdom. If under it the American people lose a particle of their liberties they will have themselves to blame.

Many of you will point to the Ku-Klux law as a dangerous stretch of the powers of the Central Government, and the offspring of the new Constitutional amendments. I myself call that law a dangerous stretch of the central power. I most earnestly spoke against it as such; and having spoken and voted against it in the Senate, I am now free to say that I do not consider it the offspring of the new Constitutional amendments; for I believe a similar law would have been passed under the same circumstances, and a sufficient pretext of power would have been screwed out of the Constitution, even without these amendments. This being a matter of special interest to the South, I will explain myself more fully. Let me tell you, and I wish you to consider it well, that the mere cry for Constitutional government is not sufficient to arrest the tendency you see embodied in the Ku-Klux act. That law was enacted to stop the acts of violence and persecution inflicted by a certain class of the Southern population upon Republicans and colored people, and in order to bring the perpetrators of those acts to the punishment they deserve. That in many localities such acts have been perpetrated, not, perhaps, to so fearful an extent as is asserted by interested parties, but still in considerable number, no well-informed

person will deny, and I may say that I have Southern and Democratic testimony to prove it. That those acts almost uniformly passed without adequate punishment is equally certain; that they deserve punishment no just man can doubt. The circumstances adduced in extenuation of those crimes I will hereafter discuss. They do not affect the facts nor their criminal character.

Now, that the Ku-Klux law with its characteristic features so obnoxious to our Constitutional system was not justified by those acts, I have already stated as my deliberate opinion on the floor of the Senate as well as here, and on every appropriate occasion. I opposed it, not because I did not recognize the evil, but because I considered the remedy in its consequences more dangerous than the evil. But I express also my deliberate conviction when I predict that all the efforts in the way of argument which the defenders of Constitutional government may put forth will not suffice to prevent the reënactment of the Ku-Klux law, or even eventually the passage of measures still farther reaching if those acts of lawlessness and bloody violence continue.

Do not understand this as anything like a threat on my part; for I shall go on opposing such measures as long as my faith in the inherent virtues of local self-government holds out. I merely express a most sincere and anxious apprehension; an apprehension which every well-informed man will share with me, that by certain circumstances the difficulties which the defenders of sound Constitutional principles have to encounter, will become almost insupportable.

Look the matter squarely in the face. A large majority of the Republicans at the North have long ceased to cherish any feelings of unkindness to the Southern people. They sincerely desire concord and fraternal harmony. They would gladly abstain from anything that looks like

harsh intermeddling with your local concerns; they would even have forced their representatives in Congress to act according to those sentiments but for one thing, and that one thing consists in the occurrence of the very acts of violence and persecution which the Ku-Klux law is intended to check and punish. And if there are demagogues and advocates of centralized government among the leaders of the Republican party, who would devise such legislation for the mere purpose of serving party interests, or of unduly strengthening the Central Government, they would have been rendered powerless by their own constituents long ago, had not the feelings and sympathies of those constituents been affected by the harassing tales which came from some of the Southern States, and which could not be denied. In other words, violations of sound Constitutional principles and encroachments upon local self-government in this direction would have been easily prevented, had not, by a number of most reprehensible occurrences, grave doubts been raised in the popular mind as to whether local self-government affords sufficient guarantees for that security of life and property and individual rights which every American citizen claims as his due. The impression was produced that it did not, and as long as this impression is suffered to exist, the tendency to accomplish by the arm of the Central Government what local self-government appears to be unable to accomplish, will grow stronger every day; it may grow so strong as to render all efforts to stem it by argument utterly useless, for that tendency will be fed and supported by human sympathies and emotions of which nobody will deny that they spring from the generous impulse to aid the persecuted and helpless, an impulse which would be as strong in you as in them under corresponding circumstances. This is the truth and cannot be too clearly understood.

What then, are the means to stem this current? A change of the party in power, some will say. Well, let me tell you that the very acts of violence and outrage complained of will do more than anything else to prevent a change of party, aye, to render it impossible. No, there is but one means to neutralize the centralizing tendency, and that means is in the hands of the Southern people themselves. Yes, let the Southern people demonstrate that local self-government *can* be relied upon to afford that security of life and property and individual right which every American citizen, however humble, may claim, and the public mind will no longer countenance the interference of the Central Government in local affairs by the appliances of the monarchical police state. The honest men who insist upon the equal protection of all in every part of the Republic will no longer be dragged into the support of such unconstitutional stretches of power, and we can easily take care of the demagogues who would perpetuate such things merely for partisan advantage. That is the way, and the only certain way, to check the centralizing tendency in this direction. In one word, the Constitutional rights of States and the local self-government of the people will be best secured if the people everywhere see to it that the rights of every individual be secured in every community through local self-government. And how can this be accomplished? You have asked me, in your letter of invitation, to make you such admonitory suggestions as I might deem judicious and seasonable. I shall avail myself of this privilege with sincerity and frankness. In order to attain the great object I spoke of, one thing, in my opinion, is necessary. Let the good and honest men of the South, who are willing, sincerely, to accept and develop for the common good the new order of things, throw off the old animosities of party; let them combine to suppress lawless excesses and to extinguish

the spirit which produces them; to secure everybody in the enjoyments of his rights; to make law and justice prevail; to put down corruption, and to give their States economical, honest, good government. This requires political organization. Well, let them organize upon such a platform and they will soon command strong working majorities. More efficiently than it can be done by Congressional legislation, they can establish that good government and give their States peace and good order by an honest and determined common effort. As soon as that effort is made they will see millions of honest people at the North, who now look upon them with apprehension, ready, glad, eager to strike hands with them, recognizing the glorious fact that the civil war is indeed over, and the rights of all will be respected by all in the common brotherhood of the American people. But such an effort, demonstrating an honest resolution, will accomplish more. You want immigration, and complain that it does not come. You want capital, and complain that it stays away. Why is this so? I ask you, Are not your fields fertile and lands cheap enough to invite the immigrant? Are not your resources and industrial opportunities tempting to the capitalists? Yes, you say, but there is no confidence. And why is there no confidence? Because the world believes there is still a lurking disposition in the South to upset or materially change the new order of things. This may be so or not. If it is, you should yourselves render that disposition powerless for mischief. If it is not, you should by the very strongest means at your disposal demonstrate the fact that you have risen above the seductions of partisan spirit. That is the way to conquer the distrust of the world and to gain the confidence which the South stands so much in need of, and that is the only way. And why should such a union and organization for that

purpose not be formed? What are the difficulties in the way? Let us see.

I am asked how can you expect those who took part in the rebellion, but who are now willing to fulfil all the duties of good citizenship—how can you expect them to step voluntarily forward in such a work while as a class they are still by the system of political disabilities stigmatized as outcasts? I deeply appreciate the feeling manifested in this objection, and I have been one of those who, since the logical and legitimate results of the war were embodied in the Constitution, never lost an opportunity to denounce that system of disabilities as odious and worse than useless, and strenuously urged its abolition. I was one of those who in the State of Missouri broke through all the traditional rules of party discipline, jeopardizing all their political fortune to secure to all citizens of that State, irrespective of their attitude during the war, rights equal to those of all other citizens.

But what if, in spite of our honest efforts, we have not succeeded yet to remove all the disabilities imposed by the fourteenth amendment? Should you therefore not combine to suppress all lawless violence and to give good government to your State? Should you punish yourselves because others have so far proved unable to rise up to the level of a generous and sound statesmanship? Besides, the only objection to general amnesty still finding some response in public opinion at the North, rests upon nothing but just the occurrence of those lawless disorders and the inefficiency of local self-government at the South in suppressing them. Do you not see that if the good men of the South, overleaping party barriers, do put down those disorders, the last plausible argument against amnesty will vanish into nothingness? If there still are vindictive demagogues at the North, do you not see how you can most efficiently cross their purposes by depriving them

of their last stock in trade by doing that which is best for yourselves? There is no surer way for you to secure your rights, to strengthen your friends and disappoint your enemies, than in gaining the confidence of all honest men by well-doing.

But now I encounter the objection that in many of the Southern States the colored people, forming a large portion of the voting body, are blindly following the lead of unscrupulous and rapacious demagogues, and that this circumstance would render such a combination as I advocate in many respects powerless. I appreciate the greatness of that difficulty, but am equally certain that it can be overcome. I shall state my opinion without reserve. It is certainly true that so-called carpet-bag government has in many instances been most scandalous. That the colored people should to a great extent have fallen into the hands of unscrupulous demagogues is very sad, but not at all wonderful to me. Something more than their inexperience in public affairs was the cause. After their emancipation and enfranchisement the colored people very naturally felt great anxiety about their new rights. Before them they saw the old master-class disgusted with the new state of things, and maintaining an attitude of seeming or real hostility to those new rights. On the other hand they saw before them men loudly and ostentatiously promising to protect them. Was it astonishing that the colored people should have thrown themselves into the arms of those in whose keeping they believed their new rights secure? Would it not have been different had the Southern whites at once frankly and without reserve recognized and protected the new rights of the enfranchised class, thus gaining their confidence?

You will tell me that this could hardly have been expected, under the circumstances, and I admit that. But what was not done then, may it not be done now?

If much misgovernment was caused by the delay, may not now much evil be prevented by wise, although tardy action? Are the colored people so inseparably bound to the unscrupulous demagogues among their leaders that they cannot be cut loose? I do not believe it. There are too many intelligent and honest men among them, and they are rapidly learning something. Look around you. Are not a great many of the colored people becoming aware of the mischievous use that has been made of their confidence? Are not the thieves everywhere falling out among themselves, and fiercely fighting each other? Is not so-called carpet-bag government everywhere on the point of breaking down? And the only strong bond which still binds many of the colored people to the unscrupulous among their leaders, consists in those very acts of lawless violence which make them afraid, and which, by a united effort, you can suppress. Can such a united effort fail to relieve the colored people of their fears, and to command the support of a great many of them? Such complications are not peculiar to the South, or to political communities in which the colored people constitute a strong element. Look at what is going on in New York. The Tammany robbers are no carpet-baggers, and their constituents are no negroes. But the bags of the Tammany men are ten times bigger with plunder than any bags in the South, and their Democratic followers have supported them through thick and thin, with more stubborn obedience than you observe in the colored voters. What happens? Finally the honest men take courage and unite, the citizen begins to rise above the partisan, and they are in a fair way to overcome difficulties of more intricate a nature than would stand in the way of the united law and order men of the South. That a large number of voters in the South are uneducated, ignorant and inexperienced, I readily admit, and you certainly will also

admit that they are not to blame for it. The evils springing from that circumstance I appreciate. How can they be remedied? Certainly not by killing and whipping negroes in the Ku-Klux style, using misgovernment as a plea of justification, just as little as similar evils in New York could be cured by killing or whipping poor Irishmen on account of the rapacious misrule of Tammany. By such doings things are made only worse. No; the best way to neutralize the evils growing from popular ignorance in States like yours is to establish and enforce an efficient system of public education, and I am sure whatever preconceived opinions may still stand in the way of this idea, the Southern people will, in the long run, not fail to recognize that, although it may have appeared good for a slave to be ignorant, it is certainly good for a freeman to be intelligent and well informed. It is educated, intelligent labor that free-labor society demands. I have frequently been told that colored people can not be educated up to as high a standard as white men. Without going into an argument on that point, I will merely observe that some people, of whatever race, can not be educated up to as high a standard as others; but it is the evident and imperative interest of free-labor society, and of a republican community, that every human being should be educated up to as high a level as he can reach. And in promoting popular education, I see another great blessing which the movement I am advocating might confer upon these States.

What other obstacle can there be standing in the way of a combination promising to bear such beneficent fruit? There is one which ought to be easiest to overcome, but is, perhaps, the most formidable. It is party spirit. How will such a movement affect the chances of the Republican or the Democratic party? I am sure, as soon as the subject is suggested, this question will be uppermost in

the minds of thousands of men. I have a simple answer to it. If a combination of the good, honest, law-abiding and progressive men of both parties can give peace, order, security and good government to these States; if it can close our useless and distracting struggles about the results of the war; if it can overcome the spirit which sows distrust and mischief; if it can allay old animosities and revive fraternal feeling in the whole country; if it can serve the great cause of local self-government and sound Constitutional principles—then I solemnly declare, I do not care how it will affect the chances and interests of any of the existing parties; it will be utterly indifferent to me whose political fortunes it may advance. And I am sure it can do all these things; and it is furthermore my deliberate conviction, that in no other way these great objects can be so efficiently promoted. I have frequently expressed the opinion that neither the Democratic nor the Republican party, as they now stand in most of the Southern States, can give them peace and good order, and restore that confidence, inside of these States and outside, which your interests so imperatively demand. The Democratic party can not, because it is, in too great a measure, influenced by the reactionary and violent element of society; and the Republican party can not, because, having been in too many of the Southern States, under the lead of unscrupulous and rapacious men, it has too many sins to answer for and too many resentments to encounter, and can not command sufficient moral power; but a combination of the good and well-intentioned men can, and the time has at last arrived when selfish party spirit should no longer be permitted to stand in the way of the great interests of the people. Never were circumstances more urgent than after a great civil war and social revolution, when the sudden transition from one order of things to another has unsettled so many

traditional notions, and produced problems so vast and far-reaching as to call for the unbiased consideration and the most unselfish and devoted efforts of every citizen; and never were circumstances more propitious, for the people of the two sections are at last approaching a state of mind permitting them to become just to one another in their hearts, forgetting the differences which divided them, over the great interests they have in common.

And thus I appeal most earnestly to the public-spirited, wise and generous men of the South, whatever their party standing may be, to unite without delay for a common effort, that local self-government demonstrate its ability to maintain public peace and order everywhere, and to afford security to every human being for his life, his property and his rights; that lawless violence be repressed and punished; that the fear which makes the weak and simple-minded mere instruments in the hands of the designing and unscrupulous, be dispelled; that the distrust which stands in the way of your comfort and prosperity be transformed into confidence; that the wounds of the past be healed by wise administration, and that Southern society which has been so fearfully racked by tremendous convulsions, be firmly put upon the road of progressive improvement. I make this appeal with the whole sincerity of a patriotic heart, deeply convinced that Southern men who unite in such a movement will most surely do that which is best for the Southern people themselves, and that the effect of their action will reach even much farther. I said at the beginning of my remarks that the chances of a liberal, reformatory, progressive policy at the North depend in a great measure upon the attitude of the South; and by the movement I have discussed you will relieve those misgivings and apprehensions which still are clogging the best impulses of the Northern mind, and infuse a new, freer and healthier

spirit into our whole political life. But still more: you will render a signal service to the cause of self-government and free institutions throughout the world, for in thus wisely providing for their own needs, the Southern people will prove in the eyes of mankind that there are no disasters ever so crushing; that there is no social confusion ever so perplexing, that there are no evils ever so grave, for which self-government, exercised by a brave and intelligent people, does not evolve natural and efficient remedies. Is not this object worthy of the noblest ambition? The Southern people are proud of the bravery of their soldiers, which shone brightly in many a contest. They will have reason to be prouder still of that moral bravery which breaks through cherished traditions; throws aside old prejudices, with bold resolution rises manfully above the disappointments and heart-burnings of the past, and unites friend and foe for the achievement of a great common future.

This is the simple advice which, in response to your kind invitation, I venture to give as to the manner in which I think a fruitful social and political development can be secured in the Southern States. It applies with equal force to their participation in our National politics. About that I shall express my opinion with equal freedom. We stand at the threshold of a Presidential election, the result of which will determine the character of our National Government for four years, perhaps for a much longer period. Some Southern papers counsel you to keep aloof from the great political movements of the country, to lie in wait and support that party which makes the highest bid for your favor. What does this mean? Does it mean that maintaining an attitude of sullen dissatisfaction with the new order of things, you should quietly watch for an opportunity to form a coalition for the purpose of overthrowing that new order of things in whole or

in part? Is it an effort to keep alive false hopes by pleasant delusions? Then it would be most insidious advice, which cannot be followed without bringing on new confusion and disaster.

No, it would neither be wise nor manly in you to fold your arms waiting for something to turn up. The Southern people are able to exercise a powerful influence in the political movements of the country, and to do it now. It is their glorious privilege, nay, their duty to do so. Let it be done in the right direction. They can, indeed, not do it by continuing to worship the defunct gods of the past, who are still like mischievous goblins haunting the land and disturbing the imagination of men. A reactionary policy would condemn the South to irretrievable impotency as long as it is pursued. But the Southern people can regain a great and most salutary influence by boldly stepping into the front rank of those who by progressive reforms strive to perfect the commonwealth upon the basis of the new order of things. I have already shown that by establishing peace, order, law, good government and the full security of the rights of all, you can relieve the reformatory impulses of the people of the clog of sinister misgivings and apprehensions. But you can do far more. You can inspire, quicken and help in directing those impulses by active participation. Can wise men fail to see and appreciate the intimate correspondence between the great general interests in controversy and those most nearly concerning the South? I do not speak of Constitutional questions alone. I need not show you more elaborately that upon their decision you can exercise a vast influence if, and only if, you put yourselves upon the ground of the Constitution as it is; for those who waste their strength in contesting the validity of the Constitution as it is, will not be apt to produce an impression in interpreting it.

But why should you sit still and sullenly silent while a fight is going on against the oppressive policy of high protective duties on imports, which has burdened you as well as us enormously, increasing the cost of so many of the necessities of life and of the requisites of labor, and is thus continually taking money from the pockets of the many to put it, not into the public treasury of the people, but into the pockets of the privileged individuals and corporations, whom it benefits? Do you not feel its exhausting weight in every shirt and coat that covers your backs; in the shoes that protect your feet; in every pound of iron and steel in your agricultural implements; in every lock and bolt that fastens your doors; in every shingle-nail in the roof of your houses that shields you from rain and sunshine, and in every grain of salt you eat? You must have discovered by this time, by practical experience, the fallacy of the favorite argument addressed by protectionists to an agricultural people, that the artificial fostering of certain branches of industry will benefit the great agricultural interest by providing a home market for agricultural products. The farmer need only put his hand into his own pocket, or look at the price-lists of agricultural products, to ascertain that while the protective policy enormously enhances the price of almost everything the farmer is obliged to buy, the price of that he has to sell is no higher, nay, in many instances rather lower, than before, and it requires but little experience in the art of ciphering to discover that this is a losing business. More than this, the man who looks beyond the horizon of the farm must by this time have been struck by the fact, that under this same system of protection our ship-building has been annihilated, our commercial flag is disappearing from the seas, and our export trade is crippled and enormously overbalanced by our imports, while our coasts and frontier

lines swarm with smugglers, and our customhouses with unfaithful officers.

And now, if you appreciate and care for your own interests, should you not, with spirit and alacrity, lend a helping hand in bringing on the downfall of this oppressive and mischievous policy, and in introducing a system of revenue which gives at least the public treasury, and through it the people at large, the benefits of what burdens we have to bear?

Why should you sit still and inactive, while questions concerning the National debt are agitated—questions which, by way of taxation, come home to you just as directly as to everybody else? I know efforts have been, and are being made, to enlist the interest of the Southern people in this matter, by persuading them that the repudiation, complete or partial, of the war debt of the United States, would be to their advantage. I entreat you, do not permit yourselves to be led astray by so fatal a delusion. The people of the United States will never disgrace themselves by repudiating any of their just obligations, and no political party will ever advocate such a measure without reducing itself at once to utter impotency. Believe me, when I say that the man who asks the Southern people to support this or that party, on a platform that has a grain of repudiation in it, simply invites you to join a funeral procession, and to resign your political influence for an indefinite period. And by repudiation, I do not mean only a downright refusal to pay what we owe, but any and all of those subterfuges by which the original understanding between the borrower and the lender is to be violated—that insane and dishonest proposition, for instance, which saw the light again in Ohio, to pay off the bonds with a new issue of greenbacks—to pay off an interest-bearing certificate of debt with other certificates of debt which bear no interest, the values of

the latter, at the same time, being destroyed by an excessive augmentation of their number. But while the honest and wise men of the South will reject such schemes, as dishonoring the good name of the American people, as destroying our credit and throwing the whole financial system of the country, and all our business interests into disastrous confusion, would it not also be a prudent thing for them to aid in the establishment of a policy which, instead of hurrying on the payment of the National debt with uncalled-for haste, and for that purpose burdening the people with taxes unnecessarily onerous, would lighten the burden of taxation to a point still amply sufficient for the discharge of our obligations as they come due, and permit the exhaustion caused by the war to be overcome, and the business interests of the country to recuperate, before we indulge in the fancy to do a big thing by paying off the debt at the rate of over a hundred millions a year? Do not you need the alleviation of the burden of taxation as much, and more, than the North? Why not step forward, then, and help in a movement to bring it about?

Why should you sit still and fold your arms, while a movement is set on foot to reform the civil service of the Government? Has not the South suffered as much and even more, under existing abuses, than the rest of the country? And are not your interests, therefore, in intimate connection with the interests of all? Nay, you especially should insist upon the demanded reform. Look at it. The patronage, that system of selfish and arbitrary favoritism, has made the public offices the mere spoils of the victorious party. The officers of the Government have become a political army, commanded by one man and his satellites. It rests with the President to use his power to appoint and to remove as a machinery of corruption and intimidation. Our great political contests

have descended from the high level of contests of great principles and policies, and become, to a vast extent mere scrambles for spoils and plunder, appealing to the meanest instincts of human nature, instead of the noblest. And these mean instincts have gained a terrible influence in our political life. They are feeding and developing that reckless party spirit, which is so ready to place the selfish considerations of personal or party advantage above the best interests of the people. The standard of political morality stands distressingly low; the feelings of official honor and responsibility have become fearfully blunted; the performance of lick-spittling sycophancy before the dispensers of favor are growing more unrepugnant and disgusting every day; the levity with which dishonorable practices are judged by public opinion is alarming to behold; and the far-reaching evils wrought by this demoralization will only increase as the Government grows more powerful, and the interests expand with which it has to deal. No thinking man can witness this spectacle without feeling that a thorough reform is demanded, not only by the interests of the service itself, but by the dignity of republican government and the safety of republican institutions. But to you of the South it seems to me particularly important. You complain that you have in these States a large number of uneducated and inexperienced voters, easily led by designing men for mean, selfish purposes. How necessary is it, then, especially here, that that class of mercenary motives, which is fed by the patronage and the demoralization connected with it, should be as much as possible removed from your political life! You say that the affairs of your States have to be painfully extricated from the slough of disaster and confusion, and that problems of extraordinary difficulty confront you. How desirable it is then, especially for you, that political life should be raised to a higher

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moral standard; that a loftier feeling of honor should be made to prevail; that the unprincipled mercenary be discouraged in his designs, and the purest and best elements of the people be again attracted to the political field. Think of this, and why should you not actively and vigorously help in pushing the movement of reform beyond the point which it has officially reached now—the point where high-sounding professions are made in high places to tickle the popular ear, while the old abuses are, without a blush, carried on in practice! Have you not every reason to be the most devoted advocates of a reform calculated to save you from the fangs of official rapacity, and restore to our political life once more the purity and high tone of the earlier and better days of this Republic!

And thus turn your eyes wherever you will, your own true interests, as well as those of the whole country—for they are but one and the same—call loudly on you to turn your backs upon the past; to face boldly and with manly resolution the problems and duties of the present and future, and to join hands with those who pursue the same ends of public good.

And who are they? About the relative position of the political parties now in existence, as well as the formation of a new party, I have frequently expressed my opinion, and recent events have rather confirmed than changed it. Viewing situations like ours in the light of history and philosophy, the following conclusion inevitably presents itself: When a republic, whose political institutions are based upon the self-government of the people, has passed through a civil conflict resulting in a great transformation of the social and political order, there are two things to be done. First, the results of that conflict are to be so fixed and fortified in the political institutions of the country as to be protected against reactionary at-

tempts; and, secondly, republican government being essentially a government of public opinion, carried on through the instrumentality of parties, in its general and also its local operations, the opinion even of those who succumbed in the civil conflict is as much as possible to be reconciled to those results, so as to permit their peaceable and successful working. The first of these two tasks can, of course, only be performed by the party which was victorious in the conflict, for it is the only one whose views and purposes are sufficiently identified with its results. This must be evident to every fair-minded man. But the second task, which is essentially one of reconciliation, and whose main object is gradually to put in the place of reactionary desires a disposition to accept without reserve, and to develop in good faith the new order of things, requires the employment of moral influences, which possibly both the existing parties, as they issue from the struggle, may not have at their command. The defeated party, which, in the great conflict, struggled against the changes which ensued, can not perform that task, as long as it has not made the people forget its past career and purposes by so completely and unequivocally identifying itself with the new order of things that its success and advent to power would not in the least excite or encourage any reactionary tendency; or, in other words, unless the task were already virtually accomplished. The victorious party will be fitted better for it in so far as the maintenance of the new order of things already forms part of its policy; but it will not succeed unless, by a policy that is just, generous and unselfish as well as firm, it contrives to disarm the prejudices and gain the confidence of its defeated opponent; to divert their minds from the memory of that which they have lost by demonstrating and developing the advantages of what has been gained; to engage their attention in the promotion of common

interests, and thus to overcome that repugnance natural to the defeated, to accept without reserve that which comes from the hand of a victorious opponent.

But if those requirements be not filled by either, then the creation of a third, a new party, would be needed—a party composed of those elements of both the old which, according to their tendencies and aims, belong together; of men who, in good faith and without reserve, pledge themselves to maintain the existing order of things, and to develop it by a progressive and reformatory policy for the common good. Such a new organization would have this great advantage: Not having, as such, been a party to past conflicts on either side, it would, as an organization, have no record to explain or defend; it would be embarrassed by no traditions, and address itself at once to living questions; it would stand solely upon the merits of its present purposes; in furtherance of these purposes, old opponents would meet upon a neutral ground, and its success would neither furnish the least encouragement to reactionary desires on one side, nor would it, on the other, in working upon public opinion, have to overcome the traditional animosities prevailing between the old parties.

Now, apply this to our present situation. The Democratic party in some of the Northern States, appreciating the utter impossibility of success with a profession of faith like its last National platform, has resolved to take a new departure, by recognizing the Constitutional amendments embodying the results of the war. In a speech recently delivered in Chicago I greeted this movement as a favorable sign of the times; but I expressed also the opinion that inherent difficulties would stand in the way of its success as a party movement. But, instead of repeating my own words, I will quote those of a writer who recently addressed a communication to the New Orleans

Bee, signing himself "An Old Line Democrat." It is a paper of rare ability and force, giving evidence of a clear and vigorous mind. After having shown that any reactionary attempt would be fruitless and disastrous, he goes on to say:

Appreciating this view of the situation, the Democratic party in some of the Northern States are resolving to take a new departure. Now, the leaders in this new departure movement are either sincere or they are not. If they are sincere, they accept the cardinal principles of the Republican party as a part of their own faith, and differ only in some questions of administrative policy. A Democrat, therefore, may as consistently vote for a Republican who agrees with him in questions of public policy as for one of his own number. If they are not sincere, then their purpose is to obtain power through deception, and proceed to carry out the views proclaimed by the straight Democracy. That is, they will inaugurate such reactionary legislation as will arouse the suspicions and indignation of the whole North, and bring down upon the South the evils of renewed agitation of the old questions, invite more remorseless interference in her local affairs, and perhaps lead to her reduction as permanent military territories, if it does not precipitate us again in the horrors of another war. The Northern leaders may enjoy the spoils of success, but the South will be left to hold the hot end of the poker; for it may be set down as a fixed fact that the North understands the situation as well as the South and at the first appearance of reaction and counter revolution in respect to the results of the war, she will spring forth to resist it in whatever shape it comes. But the effect of the new departure will not be to increase the chances of the Democratic party for power, but rather to reduce them. It will dishearten the old ranks of Democracy, while the moral effect will confirm doubtful Republicans, and add to their ranks fresh recruits.

This is the language of "An Old Line Democrat," and it seems to me, although rather strong in expression, he

is, in all essential points, not far from the truth. If you want proof of the fact that the new departure has not strengthened the Democratic party, look at the results of the recent elections, and I have no doubt the elections which are to come this fall will only add to the number of Democratic defeats. These things are not the result of accidental circumstances, as some party papers try to make out. The defeats come not because the Republican party has grown morally stronger, but because the Democratic party has grown morally weaker. It is felt to be essentially a party of the past. Many Republicans are dissatisfied with their organization; but they do not go over to the Democrats because they feel it would be like jumping into yesterday, and a yesterday, too, which they did not like. Thus, these defeats are not accidents, but symptoms of decomposition. The new departure, however wise in principle, could not secure the sincere assent of the whole party, because it could not at once unteach what had been taught for so many years. And however honestly intended by those who started it, it could not command any confidence outside of the party, because, in order to secure support inside, it had to represent the movement itself as a mere maneuver for obtaining power. Feeling that it had lost its footing in the actual state of things, the Democratic party has tried the new departure as a sort of flying machine; but its traditions and former professions and performances cling to it as a dead weight, and the tail is too heavy for the kite. Neither will the fairest promises in the Democratic platform, whatever their value may be in other respects, avail much to secure success. Party platforms are like promises to pay, like notes of hand. It requires credit to have them discounted. The Democratic party has lost that kind of credit which would make its mere promises in words a current paper in the market. And however good the

names of those who may indorse it, they will only endanger their own credit, as the indorsers of a distrusted firm. I say these things without any prejudice, *sine ira et studio*, simply because they are true. The proof of their truth you can read in current events.

But more than that. Whatever that party may do will appear, however justly or unjustly, as an open or covert attempt to bring on the possibility of a reaction. Most people outside of it would regard it so, and what is worse, a large number of its members, especially in the South, would look at it decidedly in that light. It is so with the new departure, and it would be still worse without it. Its success would, therefore, in spite of its professions, be an encouragement to reactionary desires. For this reason I should consider a Democratic victory a great misfortune, especially for the South. To the North it would be far less threatening in its consequences than to you. I do certainly not think that the overthrow of the results of the war would be accomplished, for a serious attempt would at once call powers into action which would speedily overwhelm it. It would be utterly hopeless and in vain. But the disturbance and confusion caused by the new attempt would be misfortune enough, and the weight of that misfortune would fall directly and almost entirely upon the South; for what the South needs most is the repose of a settled state of things. Everything that has the element of disturbance in it must be hurtful and disastrous to you. For these reasons the Democratic party appears to me unfit for the performance of the task which is now to be accomplished.

And now the Republican party. About it also I expressed my opinion at Chicago. I said that it had the advantage of already being identified with the new order of things; that indeed corrupt practices and insidious influences had invaded it; that a false party spirit had

seriously blunted its capacity for good; but that a majority of the elements composing the party are sound; that their impulses are generous, liberal, progressive and healthy in every sense, and that these impulses had only to become the controlling ones to enable that party to achieve by a generous, broad and enlightened policy those conquests of conciliation and persuasion which are necessary for our future peace and successful development. I still entertain that hope. But if such hope should be disappointed, if the policy should prevail of securing party success by keeping fresh the old issues and by pushing the differences of the past into the foreground, if it should fail to appreciate its conciliatory mission, if it should place itself under the dominion of selfish and tyrannical interests—in one word, if it should not succeed in making the third party superfluous, then it seems to me the time would have come for a new organization to step forward—the truly National party of the future, of a composition and with a policy such as I have described.

Can it be formed? It will not be difficult as soon as the attitude of the old parties will have demonstrated its necessity. I apprehend it appears already desirable to a very large number of thinking men all over this country. It may be there all of a sudden, and, unless I am greatly mistaken, the tendency is breaking through the skin of the body-politic in all directions. As to myself, I have only in view the accomplishment of certain ends of public policy. I want this to be a country of true freemen. I want to see the equal rights of all efficiently protected in every part of this Republic. I want to see the Constitution of the country as it is, conscientiously enforced and observed by the government as well as the citizens. I want peace to prevail and fraternal feeling to unite again the hearts of all Americans. I want the morality of our political life raised to a higher standard. I want a just

distribution of our public burdens and an honest and economical administration of our affairs. By the instrumentality of what party these ends be secured is to me utterly indifferent, provided they are accomplished. Did I consider it most likely that the Democratic party would do it, I should join that party at once, and the cry of "renegade" would have no terrors for me; but I do not think so. If the Republican party meets the case, I shall be very glad, for it would be turning a strong organization, already existing, to good account. But if a new party does it better, my views of public interest and duty will not permit me to be long in choosing. These interests and duties are so great that the prejudices and speculations of party spirit should kick the beam when put in the other scale, and I am confident there are millions of patriotic citizens in both sections of the country who cherish the same sentiments, and will be ready to act accordingly as soon as action is called for.

Shall I tell you what my ideal would have been of the development which our affairs should have taken in a period like this? A wiping out of all past differences and animosities so complete, a fusion of all political elements as formerly divided so general, a desire for National harmony and good feeling so commanding and so unalloyed by selfish aspirations, as to render possible the unanimous election to the Presidency of a man whose broad and generous National spirit would appeal to the hearts of all patriots, whose respect for the Constitution and laws would command the confidence of all well meaning men, and the purity of whose character and whose high principles as a gentleman would insure the infusion of a new moral spirit into our political life. The influence, which on this side and the other have contributed to keep us far from the realization of this ideal, I will not again discuss. They should in any event not prevent us from

using the means we possess to move forward in the direction of the same end.

But you, men of the South, I entreat again to make a beginning without delay. You can not overestimate the importance of the things which depend on your action. If you, by a hearty and well directed coöperation of all the good and patriotic elements of your population, succeed in demonstrating the tendency and ability of local self-government, as exercised by you, to secure the supremacy of law, to protect the equal rights of all, even the lowliest among you, to restore general confidence and to put society upon the road of progressive improvement, the greatest difficulties will be removed which stand in the way of an harmonious and happy future. Upon the basis of the new order of things you will build up your States to new greatness and prosperity. The hearts of all good men in the North will fly to you with the warmth of renewed affection, and the voice of the South will be heard in the councils of the Nation with greater respect and confidence than ever before.

And now I desire to say a word to the young men of the South, who will shape her destinies in years to come. Your lives are still before you, full of promise and opportunity. Look at the circumstances which surround you. The field of action upon which you are to move is so glorious, indeed, as to excite the loftiest ambition. What nobler task could there be assigned to any generation of men than, after a period of disaster and distress, the inauguration of a new era in the life of a people; to rise above all the animosities of the past; to throw off the traditional and now obsolete notions peculiar to an absolved period; to ascertain with a clear eye the great opportunities offered by a new order of things, the result of a great revolution; to enlist all the social forces, from the highest to the humblest, in the great work of common

advancement and prosperity; to raise the social body to a higher level of civilization and efficiency, by educating the ignorant and encouraging the feeble in their efforts; to invite into your midst by a hearty welcome all who may be willing to contribute their energies to your common fortunes, and thus to make these States again a tower of strength and an ornament to the American Republic, which, in spite of all its enemies, is destined to be the great republic of the future? Can there be a nobler mission than this? How is it possible, then, that to the hearts and minds of the young generation there should be any charm in the idea to sit there in sour idleness, moping and grumbling and growling with childish obstinacy at everything that is, because an enterprise that could not succeed has failed, or to squander their years of usefulness in a hopeless chase after the shadows of the past, which can never regain their substance?

There are two pictures of the future of the South which should be always before your eyes, for either of them you may make a reality. Here is one: Sullen dissatisfaction with the new order of things, kept alive by the false hope of a reaction; the energies of the people wasted by vain efforts to accomplish the impossible, and lurking distrust as to what may come to-morrow, keeping the immigrant away from your field, and foreign capital from your industries; the development of your prosperity impeded, and the social organism disturbed by the changing contests of restless factions—uncertainty, discomfort, decay, everywhere, and perhaps self-government failing to accomplish its great ends, the heavy hand of the military power thrust into your local concerns to maintain peace and order. Does not your imagination recoil? And here is the other: The South, relieved of the incubus of slavery and everything akin to it, lifted out of her distress and confusion by the enlightened public spirit of her own citizens, working

in harmony with the spirit of the age; her resources drawn to light, her prosperity developed beyond any degree formerly known by an harmonious coöperation of all the social forces; the rights and liberties of her citizens protected under the beneficent rule of self-government; her society, in all its ranks and spheres, raised to a higher order of civilization by an efficient system of public instruction for all classes; a free spirit of inquiry, quickening and invigorating popular intelligence; her enemies silenced and put to shame by the well-doing of her people; her power in the councils of the Nation restored, and more than ever a power for good; a South marching abreast with the progress of the world to the achievement of the great American destiny!

Young men of the South, how can you hesitate in choosing between lives squandered in vain attempts or sullen contumacy, and lives ennobled by generous efforts for your own welfare, and that of your country and mankind? Open, then, your doors and windows wide, open wide your hearts and minds, to the bracing air and the light and sunshine of the new era. Do not fail to appreciate the noblest and most inestimable privilege that is given to a freeman, the privilege to be useful to his country.

Republicans of the South, a word to you. What have we been struggling for? For the restoration of the Union; for a true and lasting peace; for the revival of fraternal feeling throughout the Nation. That was and is my aim as a Republican. Is it not yours? The accomplishment of that great end stood to me higher than all mere partisan advantage; does it not to you? But if it does, how can you hesitate to grasp, for rigorous coöperation, the hands of those who may be willing to work with you for the same great ends? Must it not be clear to you that these great ends will be best promoted by enlisting all the forces that will serve the common interest?

Or is there any interest that, to you, as Republicans, can stand higher than this? *Can* there be any interest higher than this to a patriot? Let us take care, Republicans of the South, lest the charge that partisan selfishness influenced the motives of Republicans, be not strengthened by your attitude when the highest interests of the country point out so clearly the true course to be followed.

A word to the Democrats of the South. Not to those will I appeal who still are dreaming the dark dream of revenge, nor to those who have so lost themselves in the mazes of obsolete theories that they have become unable to find the points of the compass in the world of to-day. But to you I speak, who honestly desire the welfare of all, and in the confusion of our political contests search for the means to accomplish it. Many of you have honored me with high praise for the independence of spirit with which I have disregarded my party standing, risen up against party discipline to secure to all my fellow-citizens their rights, and to promote the brotherhood of the people. I appreciate that praise most sincerely, and it will be a happy day to me when, to all of you, I shall be able to return the compliment. A happy day, indeed, not for me alone, but for the whole country, when on one side and the other that partisan bigotry is broken which strives to make freemen slaves to the opinions of others, to cover corruption and tyranny with artful defense and to stifle in our hearts the courage to act upon our impulses. Party! What more should it be than a mere engine to accomplish objects of public good? What is the divinity of that idol that, even when it stands in the way of the public good, we should sacrifice upon its altar our best convictions of right and wrong, and thus our usefulness and self-respect? What high-born and mysterious power is it, that it should force us to present the pitiable spectacle of men who, in the face of great duties and opportunities,

are controlled by small, paltry considerations? Truly, if ever, the time is now when the narrow-minded partisan should make room for the independent man and the patriot.

My friends, I shall now take leave of you. Some opinions I have expressed may have run against those which many of you entertain, but they come from a mind earnestly seeking for the truth, and from a heart full of the anxious desire to see healed the wounds struck by past conflicts, and the whole American people once more united in the proud consciousness of a common nationality. I entreat you give what I have said a candid consideration. The whole measure of my ambition will be filled if I succeed in doing something to remove the questions so deeply involving the peace and happiness of the American people from the feverish atmosphere of partisan passion and selfishness, and to bring on that condition of things which will dissolve stubborn prejudices, melt away old resentments and open our minds and hearts wide to a just understanding of our duties—a new era of good feeling.

FROM F. T. REID AND OTHERS

NASHVILLE, TENN., Sept. 21, 1871.

Dear Sir: We, formerly Confederate soldiers, wish to express to you our high regard for yourself, and our profound and warm admiration of the unselfish, unpartisan, cultured and patriotic address delivered by you in this city yesterday.

We admire the manly, independent spirit which refuses obedience to party when in conflict with one's convictions of duty and right. We pledge you that we have a faith, which no words can express, in the sublime significance, mission and destiny of the American Republic; that we honor and revere the National flag as the assured herald of that day when all

the races of men, of all ranks and conditions, will be redeemed and delivered from all species of political and mental thralldom.

We wish to turn our backs on all sectional parties, and on all parties groping in the moonlight of the past, and to ally ourselves with any party that will be animated with the spirit of civil and religious toleration, broad and elevated patriotism, not bounded by State lines, and inspired with pride and an abiding faith in the genius of free institutions.

We are, we assure you, with the highest respect and regard,

Your obedient Servants,

FRANK T. REID,

GEORGE E. PURVIS,

NEILL S. BROWN, JR.,

T. M. STEGER,

N. BAXTER, JR.,

and about two hundred others.

TO F. T. REID AND MANY OTHERS

NASHVILLE, TENN., Sept. 23, 1871.

Gentlemen: I have received your letter, and, without affectation, I may say that I can not find words strong enough to describe the joy it has given me. The spontaneous expression of such sentiments as your letter contains, coming from you as late soldiers of the Confederate Army, may well be called an event of great significance in the history of our days. When your former comrades, as you do now, rally once more around the flag of the American Republic as the symbol of universal freedom, equal rights and Constitutional government; when they declare that they will turn their backs upon all parties "groping in the moonlight of the past," and discountenance that partisan spirit which is so apt to obscure human reason, and to blur the best moral impulses of the human heart; when they once more fully recognize the identity of their true interests with those of our great common

country, then every patriotic citizen will feel that the regeneration of the South is certain to be accomplished by her own people.

If there is still lurking here and there a spirit which keeps alive feelings of animosity and distrust, and which, by means of social proscription, or intimidation or violence, strives to impede the development of a free public opinion, you can render it harmless by your influence and example.

If there are still disturbances of the peace and order of society occurring, calculated to produce the impression that the security and the rights of citizens can be sufficiently protected only by the interference of the General Government, in your local concerns, you can dispel that impression by devoting your energies to the enforcement of the laws, thus proving the capacity of local self-government to accomplish its legitimate end here as well as elsewhere.

If there is still an apprehension as to a secret design to subvert the logical and legitimate results of the war by reactionary movements, you will remove that apprehension by demonstrating that the *young South* has risen above old prejudices and obsolete aspirations, and is determined to build up again the prosperity and power of these States on a basis in harmony with the progressive spirit of the age. Men of courage and convictions like you will do nothing by halves; they will not look back when they have put their hands to the plow; and I assure you your efforts will have the sincerest appreciation, hearty applause and energetic support of every true friend of liberty and free institutions. Your rights will be safe in the security of the rights of all; your power will be strong in the restored brotherhood of all Americans, and the Republic will be proud of all her sons.

I am, gentlemen, with fraternal greeting, your friend and fellow-citizen.

FROM CHARLES SUMNER

Private.

BOSTON, Sept. 25, 1871.

My dear General: I have not seen your Nashville speech complete,—but admire the extract much.

I doubt if Jefferson Davis and his compeers ought to have the license of officeholding again. I have always said that when the time had come, nobody should outdo me in generosity to the South. You insist that the time has come.

Your statement against Grant is most powerful. The more I think of him and his doings, the more I feel his incompetency and wrong-heartedness. I tremble for my country, when I contemplate the possibility of this man being fastened upon us for another four years. What can be done to make this impossible? I also tremble when I think of reconstruction, with Liberty and Equality, committed for four years to the tender mercies of the Democrats. Which way is daylight?

Hooper has a letter from Washington, which says, that the State Department has distributed the balance on hand among the Venezuela claimants, according to their certificates! But this is only an incident to the flagrant demoralization which prevails. What next?

I wish a President with a little common sense, common justice and common liberality, who is not always brutal or vindictive. Think of the Presidential quarrels—ending in indignity to two members of the Cabinet—the Chairman of a Senate Committee—distinguished Senators—a Minister to London—the dean of the diplomatic corps, an excellent friend who has returned home embittered to [against?] our country—and now the Russian Minister, whose Government, I am assured, has approved his course entirely;—to say nothing of numerous other cases. Verily we have “a man of quarrels” for President.

I hope Mrs. Schurz and your children are well, not forgetting the infant Astyanax.

Let me hear from you and give me your vista of the Future. The New York and Massachusetts conventions this week may have an important influence. Ever yours.

TO JACOB D. COX

St. Louis, Sept. 27, 1871.

I returned from Nashville yesterday and found your kind letter of the 23d inst. here. I cannot tell you how cheering your kind words were to me. It is a great encouragement to have the approval and confidence of good men, when we struggle against such odds. Party-spirit is a terrible obstacle to overcome, but it must be attempted. What I can do in that direction shall certainly be done at whatever risk,—and I hope, when the crisis comes, we shall have the coöperation of the honest and courageous element of our people.

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I believe your attitude in your State canvass was just right. It is extremely desirable that this fall the Democrats should be beaten everywhere, so as to take from the minds of the Southern people the last delusion as to the possibility of a Democratic triumph. I think the people of the Southern States are ripe for a total revolution of public opinion. My experiences at Nashville were in that respect of the most encouraging kind, as you may have concluded from the address of the Confederate soldiers. You will probably in a few days see a New Departure movement beyond the lines of any party organization springing up in Tennessee which, I hope, will spread all over the South. Nothing would promote that tendency more powerfully than Democratic defeats this fall.

In this connection I would suggest that an effort be made to raise some funds for the circulation of documents in the Southern States. Much can be accomplished in that way, and we ought to have, *as soon as possible*, a sort of a committee to attend to such things.

I shall be very happy to hear from you concerning all these matters.

TO CHARLES SUMNER

St. Louis, Sept. 30, 1871.

Confidential.

My dear Friend: I send you a copy of my Nashville speech as it appeared in the *Republican Banner* of that city. It is so horribly disfigured by typographical errors that I do not like to look at it myself. In some passages the sense is entirely changed—for instance "Senate" for "South" etc.—but at any rate you can make out the drift of the argument.

Grant and his faction carry at present everything before them by *force majeure*. The organization of the Republican party is almost entirely in the hands of the officeholders and ruled by selfish interest. In all you say about Grant, you are unquestionably right. You ask me, what can be done to avert the calamity of another four years of such rule? I answer, we must act with energy. I am fully determined not to sit still. I doubt now whether we can prevent his nomination. The men who surround him stop at nothing. But I shall not support him. Neither shall I support the Democrats. Far from it. But I think,—in fact I firmly believe,—in case of Grant's nomination we shall have a third movement on foot strong enough to beat both him and the Democrats. I have commenced already to organize it, and when the time comes, I think it will be ready for action.

My speech will show you how, in my opinion, the Southern people can be led upon the road of well-doing. The effect of my uncompromising defense of the Republican policy of reconstruction and of the candid advice I gave, was astonishing. Especially the young men were touched to the heart. Have you seen the letter [of September 21st] addressed to me by the 220 Confederate officers and soldiers? I am convinced that [that] language came from sincere feelings. I know human nature and am not

easily deceived. You ask me, whether I think the time has come for a general amnesty? I am profoundly convinced that a general amnesty would bring forth many similar manifestations. The political disabilities, involving a *point d'honneur*, stand in the way of the coöperation of many well-meaning people in putting down the Ku-Klux outrages and similar excesses.

A very large number of Southerners, especially young men who have become disgusted with their old leaders, care nothing about the Democratic party; but they detest Grant. They are sincerely willing to uphold the new order of things *in every direction*, if they are generously treated. I enclose the heading of a subscription list, the program of an association which I started when at Nashville. It will be composed of Republicans and former rebels—in fact of all who are willing to work for the objects stated. How do you like that platform? Does it not contain everything you ever fought for? Well, this organization will soon make its public appearance—and I would ask you not to mention the subject to anybody until you see it referred to in the papers. It is intended to establish similar associations all over the South and corresponding ones in the Northern States, and during the winter this can be accomplished. Before the time for holding the Republican National Convention arrives, this will be a power fit to absorb the best elements of both parties,—and there is the prospect of beating the Democrats on one and the personal-government-men on the other side. If I could only impart to you my convictions—and they are very carefully formed and sincere—of the right manner of treating the Southern question, how glad I would be! *You* ought to be the great leader of this movement which will create the party of the future. It is the only manner in which the equal rights of all can be permanently secured in the South. All your Ku-Klux

[laws] and enforcement-laws avail nothing, if we do not find the means to control public opinion, and this is the way to do it. A great many men of property and enterprise in the Southern States begin to feel that they must protect the equal rights of all citizens, put down disturbances, in one word, maintain the new order of things, in order to protect their own interests. A great many of the young men desire now to build up their own future in the same direction. We must encourage them in their efforts, instead of repelling them by distrust and insult. Far from intending to give up or to compromise a single principle we ever contended for, this is the way in which their triumph can be permanently secured.

I know that in the efforts I am now making, I have the hearty sympathy of large masses of people, not only Democrats by any means, but Republicans who are not corrupted by the patronage or frightened by official terrorism. Here in the West you can observe clearly how this movement is disintegrating the Democratic party. Our action in this State last fall has disorganized that party altogether. The late rebels are doing admirably well. They pronounce themselves without reserve for the new order of things; the old Democratic leaders can do so little with them that they despair of their own party.

Now, I am working for substantial results, and I see many cheering signs of the times. The great evil we have to overcome is that party spirit which turns everything to selfish advantage and has created a sort of terrorism to which but too many submit.

Before the public, it seems, I am working alone in the direction I have taken. I should be glad to hear a sympathetic voice now and then, but in any event I shall struggle on, supported by the consciousness of fighting for a good cause and by strong hopes. I should be very glad to hear from you on these things. . . .

TO JACOB D. COX

ST. LOUIS, Oct. 14, 1871.

I have received your kind letter of the 7th inst. and am happy to see that you appreciate the character and tendency of the movement recently inaugurated at Nashville. The best citizens of that place, of both parties, are in it, and I hope to see it spread in a short time over the whole State. Similar organizations are being started in Texas; I have letters from Louisiana and Mississippi expressing the desire to do the same thing, and if the matter is pushed with the necessary energy, we may see an association of this kind in every Congressional district of the South before next spring. We shall have one here at St. Louis, with branch associations all over the State. There are "Reform Clubs" in a great many Northern cities; and in my opinion an effort should be made to unite in them the progressive men of both parties and then to establish a central committee to give the proper correspondence to the movement North and South. I shall, probably, speak at Louisville on Wednesday, and deliver a lecture on Civil Service Reform at Cincinnati on Thursday. I hope to see you on that occasion and to exchange views.

Would not the "Central Republican Association" be now prepared to open its ranks to progressive Democrats and to work in harmony with the movement commenced in the South? It would be a great step ahead and give a powerful impulse to similar endeavors in the Northern States. Let me ask you to take the matter into consideration.

ST. LOUIS, Oct. 22, 1871.

In our conversations at Cincinnati I forgot to mention one reason—and it is one of the most important—why

your organization should adopt the plan adopted at Nashville, of uniting the liberal elements of both parties. It would be a powerful encouragement to those men in the Southern States who are willing to coöperate in the same manner for the purpose of suppressing lawless disturbances and reforming public sentiment. They need sympathy and encouragement, and nothing would give them more of it than the consciousness of not standing alone,—of being a link in a great chain. I consider the movement so happily begun in the South as extremely important. If disturbances are repressed and a healthy influence is exercised upon public opinion there by Southern men themselves, it will not only have a most salutary effect on the spot, but it will relieve us all over the country of some of the greatest difficulties we have to contend with.

I submit this point to you for consideration and would ask you to urge it at your meeting with the liberal Democrats next Thursday. I hope you will be able to organize for united action.

TO WILLIAM FOLLENIUS¹

WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 20, 1872.

In reply to your letter of the 3d instant, I beg to assure you that I should be happy to attend the meeting of the Liberal Republicans of Missouri on the 24th, did not my official duties render it impossible for me to leave Washington at the present time.

You ask me to give you my views on the political situation, and I shall do so with great pleasure. You are certainly right in saying that the same principles which the Liberal Republicans of Missouri inscribed upon their banner in 1870 are now in issue on the larger field of

¹ Then a State senator at Jefferson City, Mo.

National politics. That great measure of peace and reconciliation, the removal of political disabilities, is still the subject of controversy. Although it may be said with certainty that public opinion in all parts of the country is turning in its favor, yet the obstacles which so long have stood in its way, whether they consist in adverse opinions conscientiously formed, or stubborn resentments clouding the better judgment of men, or a narrow-minded partisan spirit ready to sacrifice the public good to selfish ends, are by no means overcome.

It is desirable that the friends and advocates of this most salutary policy should unite in a vigorous effort to promote its success, and the voice of no class of men is in this respect entitled to greater consideration than that of the Liberal Republicans of Missouri. They can point with pride to the results which their wise and conciliatory action, overleaping the barriers raised by partisan spirit, has produced in their own State; for it can be said without the least exaggeration, while in no State during the evil days of the Republic, the civil war was carried on with more relentless ferocity, and society was more fiercely convulsed by political passion, there is not one to-day in which more unbroken peace and order prevail, in which the rights of the emancipated slave are more completely respected, in which the revival of fraternal feeling is more general and in which all classes of society, in spite of their former animosities, move and work together in more cordial harmony. When the same spirit, which has been so fruitful of good in Missouri, inspires our National legislation, we may hope to see similar results accomplished even in those unfortunate communities where the reminiscences of the civil war are still kept alive by violent disorders, and where the evils growing from corruption and profligate misgovernment, no doubt in a great measure owing to the exclusion of a numerous class of intelligent

and influential men from the management of the public business, trouble and exasperate even the well-disposed.

The subject of civil service reform, which also formed a prominent feature of our platform in 1870, has attracted the attention of the people in a higher degree than ever before. That the President has adopted and promised to carry out a plan of reform proposed to him by the Civil Service Commission must by no means be taken as an indication that the cause of reform is now safe. The announcement made by the President was at first received by many of his most ostentatious partisans with a triumphant smile, as a clever flank march to checkmate those who demanded a searching inquiry into the abuses of the Government. But no sooner was the faintest beginning made of carrying that system of reform into effect, than it revealed at once a most determined and active opposition inside of the Administration party, not only to the plan of reform proposed by the Commission, which may, indeed, be considered liable to criticism and capable of great improvement—but to any reform of the civil service calculated to do away with that most prolific source of corruption and demoralization, the patronage. Attempts may be looked for to discredit the cause of civil service reform by the difficulties and failures which may attend the examination of candidates now to be instituted and by holding up before the people the idea of reform in every shape as a demonstrated impracticability and mischievous delusion.

It is not improbable that in the political contests now before us a trick will be resorted to which is not unknown among the contrivances of parties to secure popular support—the trick of opening a prospect of reform through one influence, and the defeat of that reform through another, for the purpose of catching reformers and spoils-men in one net. It is the duty of the true friends of civil

service reform, who want the real thing and not a mere delusive shadow, to be untiring in their watchfulness, and to unite in an earnest effort, so that the people be not deceived by such a double game, which would be certain to result in the disappointment of our hopes. I say this, not as if I desired to throw doubt upon the intentions of those who devised and initiated the proposed system, but to express my misgivings as to the dangerous efforts which will be made to render genuine reform impossible, and to urge its true friends to come to an intelligent understanding as to the steps to be taken for the promotion of so great an object; for I have long considered the reform of the civil service, the destruction of the corrupting and demoralizing influences of the patronage, the elevation of the moral tone of our political life, as one of the most important problems, second, perhaps, to none among those we have to solve for the success and perpetuation of our republican institutions.

Since we declared ourselves in our platform of 1870 in favor of a revenue system that would do away with unjust discrimination in favor of some industrial interests, and to the detriment of others, National legislation in that respect has undergone no material change, nor does there seem to be an immediate prospect of a change such as we desire. Apparent concessions may be made by the favored interests and the advocates of the policy which benefits them, but the existing system is likely to be maintained for the present in its essential features, unless the people manifest their desire for a thorough reform of that system in so emphatic a manner as to make resistance impossible. And here again it is eminently desirable that those who think alike should make their influence felt by intelligent and energetic coöperation.

It cannot be too often repeated that the Executive usurpations of power which have occurred and the passage

of laws enabling the National Government to set aside the most essential guarantees of the liberties of the citizen, and to invade the rightful domain of local self-government, and the readiness with which such things were submitted to under the influence of party discipline, should convince us how necessary is a speedy return to sound Constitutional principles. Constitutional government is so great a boon, and so difficult to be regained when once lost, especially when the appreciation of its importance is once weakened in the popular mind by the habit of acquiescence, that no effort should be spared to stem the current before it becomes irresistible. We should not permit any consideration of partisan advantage to divert our minds from a duty which we owe to our own safety, as well as to those who are to enjoy the blessings of free government in the country after us.

One of the healthiest and most encouraging signs of the times we find in the overthrow of that combination of public robbers in New York whose hold upon power seemed to defy all attempts at resistance or opposition. The successful coöperation of honest men, without distinction of party, to which it at last succumbed, indicated the commencement of a moral revolution in politics, and nothing could be more desirable than that this revolution should not be confined to the limits of one State or one political organization. An imperative demand for honest government is indeed beginning to be heard all over the land. Public opinion has with significant unanimity sustained those who insisted upon a thorough investigation of the abuses of the Government, and it is to be hoped that the work of purification will not be arrested before it has overcome that partisan spirit which for its own selfish ends is still endeavoring to belittle and whitewash corrupt practices, and to shield men who participated in them, or who rendered them

possible by knowing toleration. It is time that corruption should be rooted out at any cost.

With the close of the war we entered upon a new period of our National development. New duties and new problems are confronting us and imperatively demand our attention. The old battlecries and catchwords of political parties are gradually becoming obsolete. They will disappear entirely as soon as the public mind is satisfied that the logical and legitimate results of the war, the great guarantees of equal rights as embodied in the last three amendments to the Constitution, are safe beyond peradventure. I am satisfied that any attempt to overthrow them will result in utter failure, although it might lead to temporary confusion and disaster.

We Liberal Republicans look upon those results of the war, Constitutionally guaranteed, as the very basis of the new order of things, and we shall, as patriotic citizens, always sustain them with unwavering fidelity. This is the first article of our political program. But I trust, also, that those who are sincerely devoted to great ends of public good, will not let mere party dictation, which in our days has so frequently developed a despotic tendency, or an artful revival of the old warcries without sufficient occasion, deter them from following the course pointed out by their sense of duty, nor permit themselves to be used as mere tools for purposes of which their consciences do not approve.

GENERAL AMNESTY ¹

MR. PRESIDENT:—When this debate commenced before the holidays, I refrained from taking part in it, and from

¹ Speech in the U. S. Senate Jan. 30, 1872. The Senate had resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. No. 1050) for the removal of legal and political disabilities imposed by the third section of the fourteenth article of amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

expressing my opinions on some of the provisions of the bill now before us, hoping as I did that the measure could be passed without difficulty, and that a great many of those who now labor under political disabilities would be immediately relieved. This expectation was disappointed. An amendment to the bill was adopted. It will have to go back to the House of Representatives now unless by some parliamentary means we get rid of the amendment, and there being no inducement left to waive what criticism we might feel inclined to bring forward, we may consider the whole question open.

I beg leave to say that I am in favor of general, or as this word is considered more expressive, universal amnesty, believing as I do that the reasons which make it desirable that there should be amnesty granted at all, make it also desirable that the amnesty should be universal. The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. SAWYER] has already given notice that he will move to strike out the exceptions from the operation of this act of relief for which the bill provides. If he had not declared his intention to that effect, I would do so. In any event, whenever he offers his amendment I shall most heartily support it.

In the course of this debate we have listened to some Senators, as they conjured up before our eyes once more all the horrors of the rebellion, the wickedness of its conception, how terrible its incidents were and how harrowing its consequences. Sir, I admit it all; I will not combat the correctness of the picture; and yet, if I differ with the gentlemen who drew it, it is because, had the conception of the rebellion been still more wicked, had its incidents been still more terrible, its consequences still more harrowing, I could not permit myself to forget that in dealing with the question now before us we have to deal not alone with the past, but with the present and future interests of this Republic.

What do we want to accomplish as good citizens and patriots? Do we mean only to inflict upon late rebels pain, degradation, mortification, annoyance, for its own sake, to torture their feelings without any ulterior purpose? Certainly such a spirit could not by any possibility animate high-minded men. I presume, therefore, that those who still favor the continuance of some of the disabilities imposed by the fourteenth amendment, do so because they have some higher object of public usefulness in view, an object of public usefulness sufficient to justify, in their minds at least, the denial of rights to others which we ourselves enjoy.

What can those objects of public usefulness be? Let me assume that, if we differ as to the means to be employed, we are agreed as to the supreme end and aim to be reached. That end and aim of our endeavors can be no other than to secure to all the States the blessings of good and free government and the highest degree of prosperity and well-being they can attain, and to revive in all citizens of this Republic that love for the Union and its institutions, and that inspiring consciousness of a common nationality, which, after all, must bind all Americans together.

What are the best means for the attainment of that end? This, sir, as I conceive it, is the only legitimate question we have to decide. Certainly all will agree that this end is far from having been attained so far. Look at the Southern States as they stand before us to-day. Some are in a condition bordering upon anarchy, not only on account of the social disorders which are occurring there, or the inefficiency of their local governments in securing the enforcement of the laws; but you will find in many of them fearful corruption pervading the whole political organization; a combination of rascality and ignorance wielding official power; their finances

deranged by profligate practices; their credit ruined; bankruptcy staring them in the face; their industries staggering under a fearful load of taxation; their property-holders and capitalists paralyzed by a feeling of insecurity and distrust almost amounting to despair. Sir, let us not try to disguise these facts, for the world knows them to be so, and knows it but too well.

What are the causes that have contributed to bring about this distressing condition? I admit that great civil wars resulting in such vast social transformations as the sudden abolition of slavery are calculated to produce similar results; but it might be presumed that a recuperative power such as this country possesses might during the time which has elapsed since the close of the war at least have very materially alleviated many of the consequences of that revulsion, had a wise policy been followed.

Was the policy we followed wise? Was it calculated to promote the great purposes we are endeavoring to serve? Let us see. At the close of the war we had to establish and secure free labor and the rights of the emancipated class. To that end we had to disarm those who could have prevented this, and we had to give the power of self-protection to those who needed it. For this reason temporary restrictions were imposed upon the late rebels, and we gave the right of suffrage to the colored people. Until the latter were enabled to protect themselves, political disabilities even more extensive than those which now exist, rested upon the plea of eminent political necessity. I would be the last man to conceal that I thought so then, and I think now there was very good reason for it.

But, sir, when the enfranchisement of the colored people was secured, when they had obtained the political means to protect themselves, then another problem began to

loom up. It was not only to find new guaranties for the rights of the colored people, but it was to secure good and honest government for all. Let us not underestimate the importance of that problem, for in a great measure it includes the solution of the other. Certainly, nothing could have been better calculated to remove the prevailing discontent concerning the changes that had taken place, and to reconcile men's minds to the new order of things, than the tangible proof that that new order of things was practically working well; that it could produce a wise and economical administration of public affairs, and that it would promote general prosperity, thus healing the wounds of the past and opening to all the prospect of a future of material well-being and contentment. And, on the other hand, nothing could have been more calculated to impede a general, hearty and honest acceptance of the new order of things by the late rebel population than just those failures of public administration which involve the people in material embarrassments and so seriously disturb their comfort. In fact, good, honest and successful government in the Southern States would in its moral effects, in the long run, have exerted a far more beneficial influence than all your penal legislation, while your penal legislation will fail in its desired effects if we fail in establishing in the Southern States an honest and successful administration of the public business.

Now, what happened in the South? It is a well-known fact that the more intelligent classes of Southern society almost uniformly identified themselves with the rebellion; and by our system of political disabilities just those classes were excluded from the management of political affairs. That they could not be trusted with the business of introducing into living practice the results of the war, to establish true free labor and to protect the rights of the emancipated slaves, is true; I willingly admit it. But

when those results and rights were constitutionally secured there were other things to be done. Just at that period when the Southern States lay prostrated and exhausted at our feet, when the destructive besom of war had swept over them and left nothing but desolation and ruin in its track, when their material interests were to be built up again with care and foresight—just then the public business demanded, more than ordinarily, the coöperation of all the intelligence and all the political experience that could be mustered in the Southern States. But just then a large portion of that intelligence and experience was excluded from the management of public affairs by political disabilities, and the controlling power in those States rested in a great measure in the hands of those who had but recently been slaves and just emerged from that condition, and in the hands of others who had sometimes honestly, sometimes by crooked means and for sinister purposes, found a way to their confidence.

This was the state of things as it then existed. Nothing could be farther from my intention than to cast a slur upon the character of the colored people of the South. In fact, their conduct immediately after that great event which struck the shackles of slavery from their limbs was above praise. Look into the history of the world, and you will find that almost every similar act of emancipation, the abolition of serfdom, for instance, was uniformly accompanied by atrocious outbreaks of a revengeful spirit; by the slaughter of nobles and their families, illumined by the glare of their burning castles. Not so here. While all the horrors of San Domingo had been predicted as certain to follow upon emancipation, scarcely a single act of revenge for injuries suffered or for misery endured has darkened the record of the emancipated bondmen of America. And thus their example stands unrivalled in history, and they, as well as the whole Ameri-

can people, may well be proud of it. Certainly, the Southern people should never cease to remember and appreciate it.

But while the colored people of the South thus earned our admiration and gratitude, I ask you in all candor, could they be reasonably expected, when, just after having emerged from a condition of slavery, they were invested with political rights and privileges, to step into the political arena as men armed with the intelligence and experience necessary for the management of public affairs and for the solution of problems made doubly intricate by the disasters which had desolated the Southern country? Could they reasonably be expected to manage the business of public administration, involving to so great an extent the financial interests and the material well-being of the people, and surrounded by difficulties of such fearful perplexity, with the wisdom and skill required by the exigencies of the situation? That as a class they were ignorant and inexperienced and lacked a just conception of public interests, was certainly not their fault; for those who have studied the history of the world know but too well that slavery and oppression are very bad political schools. But the stubborn fact remains that they *were* ignorant and inexperienced; that the public business *was* an unknown world to them, and that in spite of the best intentions they *were* easily misled, not infrequently by the most reckless rascality which had found a way to their confidence. Thus their political rights and privileges were undoubtedly well calculated, and even necessary, to protect their rights as free laborers and citizens; but they were not well calculated to secure a successful administration of other public interests.

I do not blame the colored people for it; still less do I say that for this reason their political rights and privileges should have been denied them. Nay, sir, I deemed

it necessary then, and I now reaffirm that opinion, that they should possess those rights and privileges for the permanent establishment of the logical and legitimate results of the war and the protection of their new position in society. But, while never losing sight of this necessity, I do say that the inevitable consequence of the admission of so large an uneducated and inexperienced class to political power, as to the probable mismanagement of the material interests of the social body, should at least have been mitigated by a counterbalancing policy. When ignorance and inexperience were admitted to so large an influence upon public affairs, intelligence ought no longer to so large an extent to have been excluded. In other words, when universal suffrage was granted to secure the equal rights of all, universal amnesty ought to have been granted to make all the resources of political intelligence and experience available for the promotion of the welfare of all.

But what did we do? To the uneducated and inexperienced classes—uneducated and inexperienced, I repeat, entirely without their fault—we opened the road to power; and, at the same time, we condemned a large proportion of the intelligence of those States, of the property-holding, the industrial, the professional, the tax-paying interest, to a worse than passive attitude. We made it, as it were, easy for rascals who had gone South in quest of profitable adventure to gain the control of masses so easily misled, by permitting them to appear as the exponents and representatives of the National power and of our policy; and at the same time we branded a large number of men of intelligence, and many of them of personal integrity, whose material interests were so largely involved in honest government, and many of whom would have coöperated in managing the public business with care and foresight—we branded them, I say, as outcasts, telling them that

they ought not to be suffered to exercise any influence upon the management of the public business, and that it would be unwarrantable presumption in them to attempt it.

I ask you, sir, could such things fail to contribute to the results we read to-day in the political corruption and demoralization, and in the financial ruin of some of the Southern States? These results are now before us. The mistaken policy may have been pardonable when these consequences were still a matter of conjecture and speculation; but what excuse have we now for continuing it when those results are clear before our eyes, beyond the reach of contradiction?

These considerations would seem to apply more particularly to those Southern States in which the colored element constitutes a very large proportion of the voting body. There is another which applies to all.

When the rebellion stood in arms against us, we fought and overcame force by force. That was right. When the results of the war were first to be established and fixed, we met the resistance they encountered, with that power which the fortunes of war and the revolutionary character of the situation had placed at our disposal. The feelings and prejudices which then stood in our way had under such circumstances but little, if any, claim to our consideration. But when the problem presented itself of securing the permanency, the peaceable development, the successful working of the new institutions we had introduced into our political organism, we had as wise men to take into careful calculation the moral forces we had to deal with; for let us not indulge in any delusion about this: what is to be permanent in a republic like this must be supported by public opinion, it must rest at least upon the willing acquiescence of a large and firm majority of the people.

The introduction of the colored people, the late slaves, into the body-politic as voters pointedly affronted the traditional prejudices prevailing among the Southern whites. What should we care about those prejudices? In war, nothing. After the close of the war, in the settlement of peace, not enough to deter us from doing what was right and necessary; and yet, still enough to take them into account when considering the manner in which right and necessity were to be served. Statesmen will care about popular prejudices as physicians will care about the diseased condition of their patients, which they want to ameliorate. Would it not have been wise for us, looking at those prejudices as a morbid condition of the Southern mind, to mitigate, to assuage, to disarm them by prudent measures and thus to weaken their evil influence? We desired the Southern whites to accept in good faith universal suffrage, to recognize the political rights of the colored man and to protect him in their exercise. Was not that our sincere desire? But if it was, would it not have been wise to remove as much as possible the obstacles that stood in the way of that consummation? But what did we do? When we raised the colored people to the rights of active citizenship and opened to them all the privileges of eligibility, we excluded from those privileges a large and influential class of whites; in other words, we lifted the late slave, uneducated and inexperienced as he was,—I repeat, without his fault,—not merely to the level of the late master class, but even above it. We asked certain white men to recognize the colored man in a political status not only as high but even higher than their own. We might say that under the circumstances we had a perfect right to do that, and I will not dispute it; but I ask you most earnestly, sir, was it wise to do it? If you desired the white man to accept and recognize the political equality

of the black, was it wise to embitter and to exasperate his spirit with the stinging stigma of his own inferiority? Was it wise to withhold from him privileges in the enjoyment of which he was to protect the late slave? This was not assuaging, disarming prejudice; this was rather inciting, it was exasperating it. American statesmen will understand and appreciate human nature as it has developed itself under the influence of free institutions. We know that if we want any class of people to overcome their prejudices in respecting the political rights and privileges of any other class, the very first thing we have to do is to accord the same rights and privileges to them. No American was ever inclined to recognize in others public rights and privileges from which he himself was excluded; and for aught I know, in this very feeling, although it may take an objectionable form, we find one of the safeguards of popular liberty.

You tell me that the late rebels had deserved all this in the way of punishment. Granting that, I beg leave to suggest that this is not the question. The question is, what were the means best calculated to overcome the difficulties standing in the way of a willing and universal recognition of the new rights and privileges of the emancipated class? What were the means to overcome the hostile influences impeding the development of the harmony of society in its new order? I am far from asserting that, had no disabilities existed, universal suffrage would have been received by the Southern whites with universal favor. No, sir, most probably it would not; but I do assert that the existence of disabilities, which put so large and influential a class of whites in point of political privileges below the colored people, could not fail to inflame those prejudices which stood in the way of a general and honest acceptance of the new order of things. They increased instead of diminishing the dangers and

difficulties surrounding the emancipated class. And nobody felt that more keenly than the colored people of the South themselves. To their honor be it said, following a just instinct, they were among the very first, not only in the South but all over the country, in entreating Congress to remove those odious discriminations which put in jeopardy their own rights by making them greater than those of others. From the colored people themselves, it seems, we have in this respect received a lesson in statesmanship.

Well, then, what policy does common-sense suggest to us now? If we sincerely desire to give to the Southern States good and honest government, material prosperity and measurable contentment, as far at least as we can contribute to that end; if we really desire to weaken and disarm those prejudices and resentments which still disturb the harmony of society, will it not be wise, will it not be necessary, will it not be our duty to show that we are in no sense the allies and abettors of those who use their political power to plunder their fellow-citizens, and that we do not mean to keep one class of people in unnecessary degradation by withholding from them rights and privileges which all others enjoy? Seeing the mischief which the system of disabilities is accomplishing, is it not time that there should be at least an end of it? Or is there any good it can possibly do to make up for the harm it has already wrought and is still working?

Look at it. Do these disabilities serve in any way to protect anybody in his rights or in his liberty or in his property or in his life? Does the fact that some men are excluded from office, in any sense or measure, make others more secure in their lives or in their property or in their rights? Can anybody tell me how? Or do they, perhaps, prevent even those who are excluded from official position from doing mischief if they are

mischievously inclined? Does the exclusion from office, does any feature of your system of political disabilities, take the revolver or the bowie-knife or the scourge from the hands of any one who wishes to use it? Does it destroy the influence of the more intelligent upon society, if they mean to use that influence for mischievous purposes?

We hear the Ku-Klux outrages spoken of as a reason why political disabilities should not be removed. Did not these very same Ku-Klux outrages happen while disabilities were in existence? Is it not clear, then, that the existence of political disabilities did not prevent them? No, sir, if political disabilities have any practical effect, it is, while not in any degree diminishing the power of the evil-disposed for mischief, to incite and sharpen their mischievous inclination by increasing their discontent with the condition they live in.

It must be clear to every impartial observer that, were ever so many of those who are now disqualified, put in office, they never could do with their official power as much mischief as the mere fact of the existence of the system of political disabilities with its inevitable consequences is doing to-day. The scandals of misgovernment in the South which we complain of, I admit, were not the first and original cause of the Ku-Klux outrages. But every candid observer will also have to admit that they did serve to keep the Ku-Klux spirit alive. Without such incitement it might gradually by this time, to a great extent at least, have spent itself. And now, if the scandals of misgovernment were, partly at least, owing to the exclusion of so large a portion of the intelligence and experience of the South from the active management of affairs, must it not be clear that a measure which will tend to remedy this evil, may also tend to reduce the causes which still disturb the peace and harmony of society?

We accuse the Southern whites of having missed their chance of gaining the confidence of the emancipated class when, by a fairly demonstrated purpose of recognizing and protecting them in their rights, they might have acquired upon them a salutary influence. That accusation is by no means unjust; but must we not admit, also, that by excluding them from their political rights and privileges we put the damper of most serious discouragement upon the good intentions which might have grown up among them? Let us place ourselves in their situation, and then I ask you, how many of us would, under the same circumstances, have risen above the ordinary impulses of human nature to exert a salutary influence in defiance of our own prejudices, being so pointedly told every day that it was not the business of those laboring under political disabilities to meddle with public affairs at all? And thus, in whatever direction you may turn your eyes, you look in vain for any practical good your political disabilities might possibly accomplish. You find nothing, absolutely nothing, in their practical effects but the aggravation of evils already existing and the prevention of a salutary development.

Is it not the part of wise men, sir, to acknowledge the failure of a policy like this in order to remedy it, especially since every candid mind must recognize that by continuing the mistake, absolutely no practical good can be subserved?

But I am told that the system of disabilities must be maintained for a certain moral effect. The Senator from Indiana [Mr. MORTON] took great pains to inform us that it is absolutely necessary to exclude somebody from office in order to demonstrate our disapprobation of the crime of rebellion. Methinks the American people have signified their disapprobation of the crime of rebellion in a far more pointed manner. They sent against the

rebellion a million armed men. We fought and conquered the armies of the rebels; we carried desolation into their land; we swept out of existence that system of slavery which was the soul of their offense and was to be the corner-stone of their new empire. If that was not signifying our disapprobation of the crime of rebellion, then I humbly submit, your system of political disabilities, only excluding some persons from office, will scarcely do it.

I remember, also, to have heard the argument that under all circumstances the law must be vindicated. What law in this case? If any law is meant, it must be the law imposing the penalty of death upon the crime of treason. Well, if at the close of the war we had assumed the stern and bloody virtue of the ancient Roman, and had proclaimed that he who raises his hand against this Republic must surely die, then we might have claimed for ourselves at least the merit of logical consistency. We might have thought that by erecting a row of gallows stretching from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, and by making a terrible example of all those who had proved faithless to their allegiance, we would strike terror into the hearts of this and coming generations, to make them tremble at the mere thought of treasonable undertakings. That we might have done. Why did we not? Because the American people instinctively recoiled from the idea; because every wise man remembered that where insurrections are punished and avenged with the bloodiest hands, there insurrections do most frequently occur; witness France and Spain and the southern part of this hemisphere; that there is a fascination in bloody reckonings which allures instead of repelling—a fascination like that of the serpent's eye, which irresistibly draws on its victim. The American people recoiled from it, because they felt and knew that

the civilization of the nineteenth century has for such evils a better medicine than blood.

Thus, sir, the penalty of treason as provided for by law remained a dead letter on the statute-book, and we instinctively adopted a generous policy, adding fresh luster to the glory of the American name by doing so. And now you would speak of vindicating the law against treason, which demands death, by merely excluding a number of persons from eligibility to office! Do you not see that, as a vindication of the law against treason, as an act of punishment, the system of disabilities sinks down to the level of a ridiculous mockery? If you want your system of disabilities to appear at all in a respectable light, then, in the name of common-sense, do not call it a punishment for treason. Standing there, as it does, stripped of all the justification it once derived from political necessity, it would appear only as the evidence of an impotent desire to be severe without the courage to carry it out.

But having once adopted the policy of generosity, the only question for us is how to make that policy most fruitful. The answer is: We shall make the policy of generosity most fruitful by making it most complete.

The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BUCKINGHAM], whom I am so unfortunate as not to see in his seat to-day, when he opened the debate, endeavored to fortify his theory by an illustration borrowed from the Old Testament, and I am willing to take that illustration off his hands. He asked: "If Absalom had lived after his treason and had been excluded from his father's table, would he have had a just reason to complain of an unjust deprivation of rights?" It seems to me that story of Absalom contains a most excellent lesson, which the Senate of the United States ought to read correctly. For the killing of his brother, Absalom had lived in banishment from

which the King, his father, permitted him to return; but the wayward son was but half pardoned, for he was not permitted to see his father's face. And it was for that reason, and then, that he went among the people to seduce them into a rebellion against his royal father's authority. Had he survived that rebellion, King David, as a prudent statesman, would either have killed his son Absalom or he would have admitted him to his table, in order to make him a good son again by unstinted fatherly love. But he would certainly not have permitted his son Absalom to run at large, capable of doing mischief, and at the same time by small measures of degradation inciting him to do it. And that is just the policy we have followed. We have permitted the late rebels to run at large, capable of doing mischief, and then by small measures of degradation, utterly useless for any good purpose, we incited them to do it. Looking at your political disabilities with an impartial eye, you will find that, as a measure of punishment, they did not go far enough; as a measure of policy they went much too far. We were far too generous to subjugate the hearts of our late enemies by terror; and we mixed our generosity with just enough of bitterness to prevent it from bearing its full fruit. I repeat, we can make the policy of generosity most fruitful only by making it most complete. What objection, then, can stand against this consideration of public good?

You tell me that many of the late rebels do not deserve a full restoration of their rights. That may be so; I do not deny it; but yet, sir, if many of them do not deserve it, is it not a far more important consideration how much the welfare of the country will be promoted by it?

I am told that many of the late rebels, if we volunteer a pardon to them, would not appreciate it. I do not deny this; it may be so, for the race of fools, unfortunately, is not all extinct yet; but if they do not appreciate it,

shall we have no reason to appreciate the great good which by this measure of generosity will be conferred upon the whole land?

Some Senator, referring to a defaulting paymaster who experienced the whole rigor of the law, asked us, "When a poor defaulter is punished, shall a rebel go free? Is embezzlement a greater crime than treason?" No, sir, it is not; but again I repeat, that is not the question. The question is whether a general amnesty to rebels is not far more urgently demanded by the public interest than a general pardon for thieves. Whatever may be said of the greatness and the heinous character of the crime of rebellion, a single glance at the history of the world and at the practice of other nations will convince you, that in all civilized countries the measure of punishment to be visited on those guilty of that crime is almost uniformly treated as a question of great policy and almost never as a question of strict justice. And why is this? Why is it that a thief, although pardoned, will never again be regarded as an untainted member of society, while a pardoned rebel may still rise to the highest honors of the State, and sometimes even gain the sincere and general esteem and confidence of his countrymen? Because a broad line of distinction is drawn between a violation of law in which political opinion is the controlling element (however erroneous, nay however revolting that opinion may be, and however disastrous the consequences of the act) and those infamous crimes of which moral depravity is the principal ingredient; and because even the most disastrous political conflicts may be composed for the common good by a conciliatory process, while the infamous crime always calls for a strictly penal correction. You may call this just or not, but such is the public opinion of the civilized world, and you find it in every civilized country.

Look at the nations around us. In the Parliament of Germany how many men are there sitting who were once what you would call fugitives from justice, exiles on account of their revolutionary acts, now admitted to the great council of the nation in the fullness of their rights and privileges—and, mark you, without having been asked to abjure the opinions they formerly held, for at the present moment most of them still belong to the Liberal opposition. Look at Austria, where Count Andrassy, a man who, in 1849, was condemned to the gallows as a rebel, at this moment stands at the head of the imperial Ministry; and those who know the history of that country are fully aware that the policy of which that amnesty was a part, which opened to Count Andrassy the road to power, has attached Hungary more closely than ever to the Austrian Crown, from which a narrow-minded policy of severity would have driven her.

Now, sir, ought we not to profit by the wisdom of such examples? It may be said that other Governments were far more rigorous in their first repressive measures, and that they put off the grant of a general amnesty much longer after suppressing an insurrection than we are required to do. So they did; but is not this the great Republic of the new world which marches in the very vanguard of modern civilization, and which, when an example of wisdom is set by other nations, should not only rise to its level, but far above it?

It seems now to be generally admitted that the time has come for a more comprehensive removal of political disabilities than has so far been granted. If that sentiment be sincere, if you really do desire to accomplish the greatest possible good by this measure that can be done, I would ask you, what practical advantage do you expect to derive from the exclusions for which this bill provides? Look at them one after another.

First, all those are excluded who when the rebellion broke out were Members of Congress, and left their seats in these halls to join it. Why are these men to be excluded as a class? Because this class contains a number of prominent individuals, who, in the rebellion, became particularly conspicuous and obnoxious, and among them we find those whom we might designate as the original conspirators. But these are few, and they might have been mentioned by name. Most of those, however, who left their seats in Congress to make common cause with the rebels were in no way more responsible for the rebellion than other prominent men at the South who do not fall under this exception. If we accept at all the argument that it will be well for the cause of good government and the material welfare of the South to readmit to the management of public affairs all the intelligence and political experience in those States, why, then, exclude as a class men who, having been Members of Congress, may be presumed to possess a higher degree of that intelligence and experience than the rest? If you want that article at all for good purposes, I ask you, do you not want as large a supply of that article as you can obtain?

Leaving aside the original conspirators, is there any reason in the world why those Members of Congress should be singled out from the numerous class of intelligent and prominent men who were or had been in office and had taken the same oath which is administered in these halls? Look at it. You do not propose to continue the disqualification of men who served this country as foreign Ministers, who left their important posts, betrayed the interests of this country in foreign lands to come back and join the rebellion; you do not propose to exclude from the benefit of this act those who sat upon the bench and doffed the judicial ermine to take part in the rebellion;

and if such men are not to be disfranchised, why disfranchise the common run of the Congressmen, whose guilt is certainly not greater, if it be as great? Can you tell me? Is it wise even to incur the suspicion of making an exception merely for the sake of excluding somebody, when no possible good can be accomplished by it, and when you can thus only increase the number of men incited to discontent and mischief by small and unnecessary degradation?

And now as to the original conspirators, what has become of them? Some of them are dead; and as to those who are still living, I ask you, sir, are they not dead also? Look at Jefferson Davis himself. What if you exclude even him—and certainly our feelings would naturally impel us to do so; but let our reason speak—what if you exclude even him? Would you not give him an importance which otherwise he never would possess, by making people believe that you are even occupying your minds enough with him to make him an exception to an act of generous wisdom? Truly, to refrain from making an act of amnesty general on account of the original conspirators, candidly speaking, I would not consider worth while. I would not leave them the pitiable distinction of not being pardoned. Your very generosity will be to them the source of the bitterest disappointment. As long as they are excluded, they may still find some satisfaction in the delusion of being considered men of dangerous importance. Their very disabilities they look upon to-day as a recognition of their power. They may still make themselves and others believe that, were the Southern people only left free in their choice, they would eagerly raise them again to the highest honors.

But you relieve them of their exclusion, and they will at once become conscious of their nothingness, a nothingness most glaringly conspicuous then, for you will have

drawn away the veil that has concealed it. I suspect that gentlemen on the Democratic side of the House, whom they would consider their political friends, would be filled with dismay at the mere thought of their reappearance among them. If there is anything that could prevent them from voting for universal amnesty, it might be the fear, if they entertained it at all, of seeing Jefferson Davis once more a Senator of the United States.

But more than that: you relieve that class of persons, those old misleaders, of their exclusion, and they will soon discover that the people whom they once plunged into disaster and ruin have in the meantime grown, if not as wise as they ought to be, certainly too wise to put their destinies in the hands of the same men again. I hope, therefore, you will not strip this measure of the merit of being a general amnesty to spare the original plotters this most salutary experience.

So much for the first exception. Now to the second. It excludes from the benefit of this act all those who were officers of the Army or of the Navy and then joined the rebellion. Why exclude that class of persons? I have heard the reason very frequently stated upon the floor of the Senate; it is because those men had been educated at the public expense, and their turning against the Government was therefore an act of peculiar faithlessness and black ingratitude. That might appear a very strong argument at first sight. But I ask you was it not one of the very first acts of this Administration to appoint one of the most prominent and conspicuous of that class to a very lucrative and respectable public office? I mean General Longstreet. He had obtained his military education at the expense of the American people. He was one of the wards, one of the pets of the American Republic, and then he turned against it as a rebel. Whatever of faithlessness, whatever of black ingratitude there

is in such conduct, it was in his; and yet, in spite of all this, the President nominated him for an office, and your consent, Senators, made him a public dignitary. Why did you break the rule in his case? I will not say that you did it because he had become a Republican, for I am far from attributing any mere partisan motive to your action. No; you did it because his conduct after the close of hostilities had been that of a well-disposed and law-abiding citizen. Thus, then, the rule which you, Senators, have established for your own conduct is simply this: you will in the case of officers of the Army or the Navy waive the charge of peculiar faithlessness and ingratitude, if the persons in question after the war have become law-abiding and well-disposed citizens. Well, is it not a fact universally recognized, and I believe entirely uncontradicted, that of all classes of men connected with the rebellion there is not one whose conduct since the close of the war has been so unexceptionable, and in a great many instances so beneficial in its influence upon Southern society, as the officers of the Army and the Navy, especially those who before the war had been members of our regular establishments? Why, then, except them from this act of amnesty? If you take subsequent good conduct into account at all, these men are the very last who, as a class, ought to be excluded. And would it not be well to encourage them in well-doing by a sign on our part that they are not to be looked upon as outcasts whose influence is not desired, even when they are inclined to use it for the promotion of the common welfare?

The third class excluded consists of those who were members of State conventions, and in those State conventions voted for ordinances of secession. If we may judge from the words which fell from the lips of the Senator from Indiana, they were the objects of his particular

displeasure. Why this? Here we have a large number of men of local standing who in some cases may have been leaders on a small scale, but most of whom were drawn into the whirl of the revolutionary movement just like the rest of the Southern population. If you accept the proposition that it will be well and wise to permit the intelligence of the country to participate in the management of the public business, the exclusion of just these people will appear especially inappropriate because their local influence might be made peculiarly beneficial; and if you exclude these persons, whose number is considerable, you tell just that class of people whose coöperation might be made most valuable, that their coöperation is not wanted, for the reason that, according to the meaning and intent of your system of disabilities, public affairs are no business of theirs. You object that they are more guilty than the rest. Suppose they are—and in many cases I am sure they are only apparently so—but if they were not guilty of any wrong, they would need no amnesty. Amnesty is made for those who bear a certain degree of guilt. Or would you indulge here in the solemn farce of giving pardon only to those who are presumably innocent? You grant your amnesty that it may bear good fruit; and if you do it for that purpose, then do not diminish the good fruit it may bear by leaving unplanted the most promising soil upon which it may grow.

A few words now about the second section of the bill before you, which imposes upon those who desire to have the benefit of amnesty the duty of taking, before some public officer, an oath to support the Constitution, that oath to be registered, the lists to be laid before Congress and to be preserved in the office of the Secretary of State. Sir, I ask you, can you or any one tell me what practical good is to be accomplished by a provision like this? You

may say that the taking of another oath will do nobody any harm. Probably not; but can you tell me, in the name of common-sense, what harm in this case the taking of that oath will prevent? Or have we read the history of the world in vain, that we should not know yet, how little political oaths are worth to improve the morality of a people or to secure the stability of a government? And what do you mean to accomplish by making up and preserving your lists of pardoned persons? Can they be of any possible advantage to the country in any way? Why, then, load down an act like this with such useless circumstance, while as an act of grace and wisdom it certainly ought to be as straightforward and simple as possible?

Let me now in a few words once more sum up the whole meaning of the question which we are now engaged in discussing. No candid man can deny that our system of political disabilities is in no way calculated to protect the rights or the property or the life or the liberty of any living man, or in any way practically to prevent the evil-disposed from doing mischief. Why do you think of granting any amnesty at all? Is it not to produce on the popular mind at the South a conciliatory effect, to quicken the germs of good intentions, to encourage those who can exert a beneficial influence, to remove the pretexts of ill-feeling and animosity and to aid in securing to the Southern States the blessings of good and honest government? If that is not your design, what can it be?

But if it be this, if you really do desire to produce such moral effects, then I entreat you also to consider what moral means you have to employ in order to bring forth those moral effects you contemplate. If an act of generous statesmanship, or of statesmanlike generosity, is to bear full fruit, it should give not as little as possible, but it should give as much as possible. You must not do

things by halves if you want to produce whole results. You must not expose yourself to the suspicion of a narrow-minded desire to pinch off the size of your gift wherever there is a chance for it, as if you were afraid you could by any possibility give too much, when giving more would benefit the country more, and when giving less would detract from the beneficent effect of that which you do give.

Let me tell you it is the experience of all civilized nations the world over, when an amnesty is to be granted at all, the completest amnesty is always the best. Any limitation you may impose, however plausible it may seem at first sight, will be calculated to take away much of the virtue of that which is granted. I entreat you, then, in the name of the accumulated experience of history, let there be an end of these bitter and useless and disturbing questions; let the books be finally closed, and when the subject is forever dismissed from our discussions and our minds, we shall feel as much relieved as those who are relieved of their political disabilities.

Sir, I have to say a few words about an accusation which has been brought against those who speak in favor of universal amnesty. It is the accusation resorted to in default of more solid argument, that those who advise amnesty, especially universal amnesty, do so because they have fallen in love with the rebels. No, sir, it is not merely for the rebels I plead. We are asked, shall the rebellion go entirely unpunished? No, it shall not. Neither do I think that the rebellion has gone entirely unpunished. I ask you, had the rebels nothing to lose but their lives and their offices? Look at it.

There was a proud and arrogant aristocracy planting their feet on the necks of the laboring people, and pretending to be the born rulers of this great Republic. They looked down, not only upon their slaves, but also

upon the people of the North, with the haughty contempt of self-asserting superiority. When their pretensions to rule us all were first successfully disputed, they resolved to destroy this Republic, and to build up on the cornerstone of slavery an empire of their own in which they could hold absolute sway. They made the attempt with the most overweeningly confident expectation of certain victory. Then came the civil war, and after four years of struggle their whole power and pride lay shivered to atoms at our feet; their sons dead by tens of thousands on the battlefields of this country; their fields and their homes devastated; their fortunes destroyed; and more than that, the whole social system in which they had their very being, with all their hopes and pride, utterly wiped out; slavery forever abolished, and the slaves themselves created a political power before which they had to bow their heads; and they, broken, ruined, helpless and hopeless in the dust before those upon whom they had so haughtily looked down as their vassals and inferiors. Sir, can it be said that the rebellion has gone entirely unpunished?

You may object that the loyal people, too, were subjected to terrible sufferings; that their sons, too, were slaughtered by tens of thousands; that the mourning of countless widows and orphans is still darkening our land; that we are groaning under terrible burdens which the rebellion has loaded upon us, and that therefore part of the punishment has fallen upon the innocent. And it is certainly true.

But look at the difference. We issued from this great conflict as conquerors; upon the graves of our slain we could lay the wreath of victory; our widows and orphans, while mourning the loss of their dearest, still remember with proud exultation that the blood of their husbands and fathers was not spilled in vain; that it flowed for the

greatest and holiest and at the same time the most victorious of causes; and when our people labor in the sweat of their brow to pay the debt which the rebellion has loaded upon us, they do it with the proud consciousness that the heavy price they have paid is infinitely overbalanced by the value of the results they have gained: slavery abolished; the great American Republic purified of her foulest stain; the American people no longer a people of masters and slaves, but a people of equal citizens; the most dangerous element of disturbance and disintegration wiped out from among us; this country put upon the course of harmonious development, greater, more beautiful, mightier than ever in its self-conscious power. And thus, whatever losses, whatever sacrifices, whatever sufferings we may have endured, they appear before us in a blaze of glory.

But how do the Southern people stand there? All *they* have sacrificed, all *they* have lost, all the blood *they* have spilled, all the desolation of *their* homes, all the distress that stares *them* in the face, all the wreck and ruin *they* see around them, all for nothing, all for a wicked folly, all for a disastrous infatuation: the very graves of their dead nothing but monuments of a shadowy delusion; all their former hopes vanished forever; and the very magniloquence which some of their leaders are still indulging in, nothing but a mocking illustration of their utter discomfiture! Ah, sir, if ever human efforts broke down in irretrievable disaster, if ever human pride was humiliated to the dust, if ever human hopes were turned into despair, there you behold them.

You may say that they deserved it all. Yes, but surely, sir, you cannot say that the rebellion has gone entirely unpunished. Nor will the Senator from Indiana, with all his declamation, make any sane man believe that, had no political disabilities ever been imposed, the

history of the rebellion, as long as the memory of men retains the recollection of the great story, will ever encourage a future generation to rebel again, or that, if even this great example of disaster should fail to extinguish the spirit of rebellion, his little scarecrow of exclusion from office will be more than a thing to be laughed at by little boys.

And yet, sir, it is certainly true that after the close of the war we treated the rebels with a generosity never excelled in the history of the world. And thus in advising a general amnesty it is not merely for the rebels I plead. But I plead for the good of the country, which in its best interests will be benefited by amnesty just as much as the rebels are benefited themselves, if not more.

Nay, sir, I plead also for the colored people of the South, whose path will be smoothed by a measure calculated to assuage some of the prejudices and to disarm some of the bitternesses which still confront them; and I am sure that nothing better could happen to them, nothing could be more apt to make the growth of good feeling between them and the former master-class easier than the destruction of a system which, by giving them a political superiority, endangers their peaceable enjoyment of equal rights.

And I may say to my honorable friend from Massachusetts [Mr. SUMNER], who knows well how highly I esteem him, and whom I sincerely honor for his solicitude concerning the welfare of the lowly, that my desire to see their wrongs righted is no less sincere and no less unhampered by any traditional prejudice than his; although I will confess that as to the Constitutional means to that end we may sometimes seriously differ. But I cannot refrain from expressing my regret that this measure should be loaded with anything that is not strictly germane to it, knowing as we both do that the

amendment he has proposed cannot secure the necessary two-thirds vote in at least one of the houses of Congress, and that therefore it will be calculated to involve this measure also in the danger of common failure.

I repeat, it is not merely for the rebels I plead; it is for the whole American people, for there is not a citizen in the land whose true interests, rightly understood, are not largely concerned in every measure affecting the peace and welfare of any State of this Union.

Believe me, Senators, the statesmanship which this period of our history demands, is not exhausted by high-sounding declamation about the greatness of the crime of rebellion, and fearful predictions as to what is going to happen unless the rebels are punished with sufficient severity. We have heard so much of this from some gentlemen, and so little else, that the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether this is the whole compass, the be-all and the end-all, of their political wisdom and their political virtue; whether it is really their opinion that the people of the South may be plundered with impunity by rascals in power; that the substance of those States may be wasted; that their credit may be ruined; that their prosperity may be blighted; that their future may be blasted; that the poison of bad feeling may still be kept working where we might do something to assuage its effects; that the people may lose more and more their faith in the efficiency of self-government and of republican institutions; that all this may happen, and we look on complacently, if we can only continue to keep a thorn in the side of our late enemies, and to demonstrate again and again, as the Senator from Indiana has it, our disapprobation of the crime of rebellion?

Sir, such appeals as these, which we have heard here so frequently, may be well apt to tickle the ear of an unthinking multitude. But unless I am grievously in

error, the people of the United States are a multitude not unthinking. The American people are fast becoming aware that, great as the crime of rebellion is, there are other villainies beside it; that much as it may deserve punishment, there are other evils flagrant enough to demand energetic correction; that the remedy for such evils does after all not consist in the maintenance of political disabilities, and that it would be well to look behind those vociferous demonstrations of exclusive and austere patriotism to see what abuses and faults of policy they are to cover, and what rotten sores they are to disguise. The American people are fast beginning to perceive that good and honest government in the South, as well as throughout the whole country, restoring a measurable degree of confidence and contentment, will do infinitely more to revive true loyalty and a healthy National spirit, than keeping alive the resentments of the past by a useless degradation of certain classes of persons; and that we shall fail to do our duty unless we use every means to contribute our share to that end. And those, I apprehend, expose themselves to grievous disappointment, who still think that by dinning again and again in the ears of the people the old battlecries of the civil war, they can befog the popular mind as to the true requirements of the times, and overawe and terrorize the public sentiment of the country.

Sir, I am coming to a close. One word more. We have heard protests here against amnesty as a measure intended to make us forget the past and to obscure and confuse our moral appreciation of the great events of our history. No, sir; neither would I have the past forgotten, with its great experiences and teachings. Let the memory of the grand uprising for the integrity of the Republic; let those heroic deeds and sacrifices before which the power of slavery crumbled into dust, be forever held in

proud and sacred remembrance by the American people. Let it never be forgotten, as I am sure it never can be forgotten, that the American Union, supported by her faithful children, can never be undermined by any conspiracy ever so daring, nor overthrown by any array of enemies ever so formidable. Let the great achievements of our struggle for National existence be forever a source of lofty inspiration to our children and children's children.

But surely, sir, I think no generous resolution on our part will mar the luster of those memories, nor will it obliterate from the Southern mind the overwhelming experience, that he who raises his hand against the majesty of this Republic is doomed to disastrous humiliation and ruin. I would not have it forgotten; and, indeed, that experience is so indelibly written upon the Southern country that nothing can wipe it out.

But, sir, as the people of the North and of the South must live together as one people, and as they must be bound together by the bonds of a common National feeling, I ask you, will it not be well for us so to act, that the history of our great civil conflict, which cannot be forgotten, can neither be remembered by Southern men without finding in its closing chapter this irresistible assurance: that we, their conquerors, meant to be, and were, after all, not their enemies, but their friends? When the Southern people con over the distressing catalogue of the misfortunes they have brought upon themselves, will it not be well, will it not be "devoutly to be wished" for our common future, if at the end of that catalogue they find an act which will force every fair-minded man in the South to say of the Northern people: "When we were at war they inflicted upon us the severities of war; but when the contest had closed and they found us prostrate before them, grievously suffering,

surrounded by the most perplexing difficulties and on the brink of new disasters, they promptly swept all the resentments of the past out of their way and stretched out their hands to us with the very fullest measure of generosity, anxious, eager, to lift us up from our prostration?"

Sir, will not this do something to dispel those mists of error and prejudice which are still clouding the Southern mind? I ask again, will it not be well to add to the sad memories of the past which forever will live in their minds, this cheering experience, so apt to prepare them for the harmony of a better and common future?

No, sir; I would not have the past forgotten, but I would have its history completed and crowned by an act most worthy of a great, noble and wise people. By all the means which we have in our hands, I would make even those who have sinned against this Republic see in its flag, not the symbol of their lasting degradation, but of rights equal to all; I would make them feel in their hearts, that in its good and evil fortunes their rights and interests are bound up just as ours are, and that therefore its peace, its welfare, its honor and its greatness may and ought to be as dear to them as they are to us.

I do not, indeed, indulge in the delusion that this act alone will remedy all the evils which we now deplore. No, it will not; but it will be a powerful appeal to the very best instincts and impulses of human nature; it will, like a warm ray of sunshine in springtime, quicken and call to light the germs of good intention wherever they exist; it will give new courage, confidence and inspiration to the well-disposed; it will weaken the power of the mischievous, by stripping of their pretexts and exposing in their nakedness the wicked designs they still may cherish; it will light anew the beneficent glow of fraternal feeling and of National spirit; for, sir, your good sense as well

as your heart must tell you that, when this is truly a people of citizens equal in their political rights, it will then be easier to make it also a people of brothers.

FROM SAMUEL BOWLES¹

SPRINGFIELD, MASS., Mar. 22, 1872.

The Democrats in Connecticut are making but a weak fight, and the probability now is that the Republicans will carry everything which will add to the acclaim for and acquiescence in Grant, and do a great deal to depress the Cincinnati movement. Two things stand very greatly in the way of this reform movement; first, the indisposition of the great body of Republican leaders, who really agree with you and me in the abstract, to speak their minds and take position against Grant, even within the party; and, second, the continued existence and pretensions of the Democratic organization. If the Democratic leaders would and could call a National Convention, to meet in May and formally throw up the sponge, making no nominations, but simply inviting their followers to find "their own" wherever they could, there would be no difficulty at once in organizing a great reform party, with the best elements of the Republican party as its leaders. But the average Republican is still haunted by the ghost of the Democracy, and in the absence of a frank and courageous movement on the part of such men as Dawes and Garfield, and Governor Hawley, this feeling seems destined to carry General Grant through another campaign. Here in Massachusetts, we can make no demonstration until Sumner speaks his mind. There are plenty ready to follow him—there are few to lead without him.

¹ Editor of the Springfield, Mass., *Republican*.

THE AIMS OF THE LIBERAL-REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT¹

Nobody can survey this vast and enthusiastic assembly, gathered from all parts of the Republic, without an emotion of astonishment and hope—astonishment considering the spontaneity of the impulse which has brought it together, and hope considering the great purpose for which it has met. The Republic may well congratulate itself upon the fact that such a meeting was possible. Look at the circumstances from which it has sprung. We saw the American people just issued from a great and successful struggle, and in the full pride of their National strength, threatened with new evils and dangers of an insidious nature, and the masses of the population apparently not aware of them. We saw jobbery and corruption stimulated to unusual audacity by the opportunities of a protracted civil war, invading the public service of the Government, as well as almost all movements of the social body, and we saw a public opinion most deplorably lenient in its judgment of public and private dishonesty. We saw the Government indulging in wanton disregard of the laws of the land, and resorting to daring assumptions of unconstitutional power, and we saw the people, apparently at least acquiescing with reckless levity in the transgressions, threatening the very life of our free institutions. We saw those in authority with tyrannical insolence thrust the hand of power through the vast machinery of the public service into local and private affairs, and we saw the innumerable mass of their adherents accept those encroachments upon their independence without protest or resentment. We saw men in the highest places of the Republic employ their power and opportunities for selfish advantage, thus stimulating the

¹ Speech on taking the chair as permanent president of the Liberal-Republican Convention, Cincinnati, May 2, 1872.

demoralization of our political life, and by their conspicuous example, and the loud chorus of partisan sycophancy, drown the voice of honest criticism. We saw part of our common country, which had been convulsed by a disastrous rebellion, most grievously suffering from the consequences of the civil war; and we saw the haughty spirit of power refusing to lift up those who had gone astray and were now suffering, by a policy of generous conciliation and the statesmanship of common-sense. We observed this, and at the same time a reckless and greedy party spirit, in the name of a great organization, crowned with the laurels of glorious achievements, striving to palliate or justify these wrongs and abuses, to stifle the moral sense of the people, and to drive them by a tyrannical party discipline not only to submit to this for the present, but to perpetuate it, that the political power of the country might be preserved in the hands of those who possessed it. He who calmly and impartially surveyed this spectacle could not fail to be deeply alarmed, not only at the wrongs that had been and were being perpetrated, but at the subjugation of the popular spirit which did not rise up against them.

The question might well have been asked, have the American people become so utterly indifferent to their true interests, to their National harmony, to the purity of their political life, to the integrity of their free institutions, to the very honor of the American name, that they should permit themselves to be driven like a flock of sheep by those who assume to lord it over them? That question has now found an answer. The virtue, the spirit of independence, the love of liberty, the republican pride of the American people are not dead yet and do not mean to die, and that answer is given in thunder-tones by the convention of American freemen here assembled. Indeed, those who three months ago first raised their voices, did

so with an abiding faith that their appeals could not remain without response, but the volume of that response has now far exceeded their anticipations. The crust of narrow prejudices, of selfish partisanship, which but yesterday seemed to stop every free pulsation of the popular heart, is suddenly burst asunder. The patriotic citizen rises above the partisan. We begin to breathe again as freemen. We dare again call things by their right names. We have once more the courage to break through the deceptions with which the popular mind has been befogged; we feel once more that our convictions of right and wrong are our own, and that our votes belong to the country, and thus we defiantly set our sense of duty against the arrogance of power, like the bugle blast of doomsday. The summons is resounding North and South and East and West. The conscience of the people, which seemed dead, has arisen. From every point of the compass the hosts are flocking together, and here we are, let me hope, ay, I do hope, with fearless determination, to do our whole duty, as if nothing could withstand a movement so irresistibly inspiring. Indeed, the breath of victory is in the very air which surrounds us, and that victory will not escape from our grasp if we are true to our mission, but you must bear with me if in this hour of enthusiasm, when our hearts are big with proud presentiments, I address to you a word of soberness.

We have a grand opportunity before us, grand and full of promise. We can crush corruption in our public concerns; we can give the Republic a pure and honest Government; we can revive the authority of the laws; we can restore to full value the Constitutional safeguard of our liberties; we can infuse a higher moral spirit into our political life; we can reanimate in the hearts of the whole people in every section of the land a fraternal and proud National feeling. We can do all this, but we can

do it only by throwing behind us the selfish spirit of political trade. We obey the purest and loftiest inspirations of the popular uprising which sent us here. A great opportunity; it is as great as the noblest ambition might desire, but equally great—nay, to my mind, fearful—is the responsibility it brings with it, an opportunity like this momentous period in the history of a nation. An uprising of the people such as we behold will not occur every day, nor every year, for it must spring from the spontaneous impulse of the popular mind. Disappoint the high expectations brought forth by that spontaneous impulse, and you have not only lost a great opportunity, but you have struck a blow at the confidence which the people have in themselves, and for a long time popular reform movements will not rise again under the weight of the discredit which you will have brought upon them. Is it possible that such should be the result of our doings? It is possible, if we do not rise to the full height of our duty. It is possible, if, instead of following the grand impulse of the popular heart, we attempt to control and use this movement by the old tricks of the political trader, or fritter away our zeal in small bickerings and mean, selfish aspirations. We have come together to give shape, point and practical productive force to this great upheaval of the popular conscience. It is our business to lay down certain principles and propositions of policy, and we have to present to the suffrage of the people, men for the highest offices of the Republic, who, if elected, are to carry those principles and propositions into a living reality.

As to our platform, we shall be wise enough to keep in mind those things which a republic stands most in need of. The very fact of our having come together is proof of our substantial agreement. Let us only, in what we promise to the people, be honest and straightforward

and not attempt to cheat those whom we ask to follow our lead, by deceitful representations. As to the men whom we shall present for the high offices of the Government, let us, I entreat you, not lose sight of the fact that great reforms, the overthrow of inveterate abuses, the establishment of a better order of things are not accomplished by mere promises and declarations, but require the wise and energetic action of statesmen if this is to be truly a reform movement, and if it be not merely on paper. But it must be embodied in the men we trust with the power to infuse the spirit of reform into practical action. If you want to know how reforms are not executed, look at those now in power. You will hardly excel them in the profusion of high-sounding professions and you will never excel them in the art of how not to do it.

Reform must become a farce in the hands of those who either do not understand it or do not care for it. If you mean reform, intrust the work to none but those who understand it and honestly do care, and care more for it than for their own personal ends. Pardon me if I express myself on this point with freedom and frankness. I have not, I assure you, come here for the purpose of urging the claims or advancing the interest of any one man against all others. I have come here with sincere and ardent devotion to a cause, and to use my best endeavors to have that cause put under the care of men who are devoted to it with equal sincerity and possess those qualities of mind and heart which will make it safe in their keeping. I earnestly deprecate the cry we have heard so frequently, "Anybody to beat Grant." There is something more wanted than to beat Grant. Not anybody who might, by cheap popularity, or by astute bargains and combinations, or by all the tricks of political wirepulling, manage to scrape together votes enough to be elected President. We do not merely want another,

but we want a better President than we now have. We do not want a mere change of persons in the Administration of the Government; we want the overthrow of a pernicious system; we want the eradication of flagrant abuses; we want the infusion of a loftier moral spirit into our political organization; we want a Government which the best people of this country will be proud of. Not anybody can accomplish that, and, therefore, away with the cry, "Anybody to beat Grant"; a cry too paltry, too unworthy of the great enterprise in which we are engaged. I do not struggle for the mere punishment of an opponent, nor for a temporary lease of power. There is to me a thing no less, nay, more important even than our success in this campaign, and that is that the American people shall not be disappointed in the fruits which our victory is to bear. If we should fail to select men who will carry out the beneficent reforms we contemplate, then, let me say it boldly, it would be better had this movement never been undertaken; for continuance of those in power who possess it now would mean only a reformatory movement deferred and an opportunity lost. Still, while our failure now would mean a great reform movement sunk to the level of a farce, a great opportunity lost and the hope of a people turned into discouragement and disgust, let us discard at least the fatal error into which many seem to have fallen, that no statesmanship is required to conduct the affairs of a great government.

I candidly believe the people are waking up to the truth, for, unless I greatly mistake the spirit of this day, what the people now most earnestly demand is, not that mere good intentions, but that a superior intelligence, coupled with superior virtue, should guide our affairs; not that merely an honest and a popular man, but that a statesman be put at the head of our Government. In selecting candidates for office, politicians are accustomed to discuss

the question of availability. What does availability mean in our case? Let us look for the best men we have, and from the very best let us select the strongest. The people earnestly desire a thorough reform of our Government. They want not only a change, but a change for the better. They want also, therefore, to be assured that it will be for the better, and that the best candidate is likely to be the most available. If we present men to the suffrages of the people whose character and names appeal to the loftiest instincts and aspirations of the patriot-citizen, we shall have on our side that which ought to be and now I trust will be the ruling arbiter of political contests, the conscience of the Nation. If that be done, success will be certain. Then we can appeal to the minds and hearts, to the loftiest ambition of the people, with these arguments and entreaties which spring only from a clear conviction of right. Then we shall not appeal in vain for their support to those of our fellow-citizens who hitherto were separated from us by party divisions, who desire honestly to work for the best interests of the country in this crisis, and whom we shall welcome with fraternal greeting in this struggle for a great cause, whether they call themselves Democrats or Republicans. Then we shall successfully overcome those prejudices which now confront us, and the insidious accusation, that this great Convention is a mere gathering of disappointed and greedy politicians, will fall harmless at our feet, for we shall have demonstrated by our action that we were guided by the purest and most patriotic of motives. And this can be done.

Let us despise as unworthy of our cause the tricky manipulations by which, to the detriment of the Republic, political bodies have so frequently been controlled. Let us, in the face of the great things to be accomplished, rise above all petty considerations. Personal friendship and

State pride are noble sentiments; but what is personal friendship, what is State pride, compared with the great duty we owe to our common country, and the awful responsibility resting upon our action as sensible men? We know that not every one of us can be gratified by the choice of his favorite; many of us will have to be disappointed; but in this solemn hour our hearts should know but one favorite, and that is the American Republic.

Pardon me for these words of warning and entreaty. I trust nobody will consider them misplaced. I fervently hope the result of our deliberations will show that they were not spoken in vain. I know that they have sprung from the most anxious desire to do what is best for our country, and thus I appeal to you with all the fervor of anxious earnestness. We stand on the threshold of a great victory, and victory will surely be ours if we truly deserve it.

TO HORACE GREELEY

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1872.

My dear Sir: Having been somewhat active and prominent in the movement which resulted in your nomination, I deem it due to you as well as to myself to state to you with entire candor my views on the present state of things. Whatever may come, there shall be honesty between us.

The proceedings of the Cincinnati Convention have, in some very important respects, disappointed the expectations of many earnest friends of the National reform movement. This movement, as you know, originated in its organized form with a number of courageous men in the West, who had no other object in view than the reunion of the whole people and a genuine reform of existing abuses. It comprised mainly two elements, the revenue

reformers, so-called, and the Germans who joined it *en masse*. They both had in view something more than the defeat of General Grant. Then the movement expanded and was joined first by the revenue reformers in the East and finally by a considerable number of men with whom opposition to the Administration was the main impulse, among the latter a good many politicians in the traditional acceptation of the term.

These elements met at Cincinnati for coöperation. The only claim this irregularly constituted Convention had on popular sympathy and support consisted in its rising above the moral level of existing political organizations. Mutual concessions were required to hold together the somewhat heterogeneous multitude. The revenue reformers gave up the distinctive demand which formed part of the original platform of the movement. They did it, not without reluctance, but yielded for the sake of harmony. I, myself, advised a conciliatory course and it was adopted. This would have been well, had the nomination for the first place on the ticket been in harmony with the spirit of mutual concession. I need not say to you, that it can scarcely be considered so. But even this might have appeared in a better light, had not something worse happened, which tainted the moral character of the proceedings. You know the history of the Convention.

On Friday morning the Cincinnati *Commercial* informed the public that Frank Blair and Gratz Brown had arrived the night before and effected an arrangement between your and Brown's friends, by which Brown should withdraw as a candidate for the Presidency in your favor and then take the second place. I did not at first believe the story. But in the Convention the piece was enacted in literal accordance with the program announced; trade and delivery appeared in the open light of day. I am very far from suspecting you of having been a party

to this arrangement. I believe in you as a pure and honest man. But the managers of this case did not act as you would have acted. The impression was circulated among my friends that I favored the bargain, and even now I find myself accused in some newspapers of having been a party to it. This is one of those cases in which appearances are almost, if not wholly, as bad as facts. And nobody can read the proceedings of the Convention in the light of surrounding circumstances without concluding that, on its very face, the first fruit of the great reform, so hopefully begun, was a successful piece of political huckstering and that the whole movement had been captured by politicians of the old stamp.

A compromise on the revenue question might have been carried out without giving great offense. It seemed even demanded by higher considerations. But the appearance of political trickery could not fail to shake the whole moral basis of the movement.

That this should be extremely painful to me, having worked in good faith not for mere temporary success but for higher aims, you can readily understand. But, while my personal feelings may be of little moment, the consequences of all this are more serious. It may be said that such things are forgotten after the first three days of a campaign. It will hardly be so in this case, for the whole character and aspect of the movement is changed.

Of the three elements which met for coöperation at Cincinnati, the one which had least to do with originating the movement and which came in after it had grown to be formidable and promising, seemed to have shaped, by the usual appliances of the political trade, all the practical results so far obtained. The reform movement has furnished another illustration of the demoralization of our political life, and as such it stands there to-day. Its

management differs in nothing from the practices it professed to condemn. In its present shape it does no longer appeal to that higher moral sense which we hoped to have evoked in the hearts and minds of the people. Its freshness and flavor are gone and we have come down to the ordinary level of a campaign of politicians.

I want you to understand that I do not allude to your own character and reputation. They stand above suspicion, and nothing could be farther from my intentions than to throw the least shadow of a doubt upon them. But you appear now, after what has happened, as the leader of an army which, in the essential points, is looked upon as no better than those we expected to fight and whose victory is of very doubtful promise. No wonder that a great many men, and these among the very best we had there, went away from the Convention, not with mere disappointed expectations as to their own choice, but with the sting of moral disappointment in their hearts.

The effect was immediate. I will not speak here of the revenue reformers who found themselves in a somewhat ridiculous position, but about a class of people [who] cared less about the tariff than about the moral tendency of the movement. The first solid mass that joined us were the Germans, East and West. They went into the movement enthusiastically with their whole hearts and for no selfish purpose—Democrats and Republicans both, almost to a man, ready to give up their party affiliations. In some Western States they formed the whole backbone of the movement. When the Convention opened, we had nearly the whole German vote with us; there were but few exceptions, in some places none at all. When we came out of that Convention, that force was almost entirely lost to us. In saying this, I do not exaggerate. Information received from all parts of the

North since my arrival here only confirms my first impressions. Some German delegates from the Eastern States thought they might still go with the movement, but they were few, and men of little influence. After the adjournment I dined with the most prominent German leaders of the West, all old personal friends of mine, and I found them not only dissatisfied, but also fully determined to oppose the ticket with their whole strength, and deaf to argument—unwilling, as they said, to be the victims and tools of Frank Blair and New York politicians and to further the designs of Frank Blair and New York politicians. The German newspaper editors I met, were of the same mind. I heard of only one who was considering the question whether he should support the ticket with anything like favor. My own partners inquired by telegraph, whether they should come out for the ticket; I answered in the affirmative and have since received two despatches suggesting a doubt as to whether it will long be possible to do so consistently with the interests of the paper. To the best of my information, my paper is to-day the only German journal in the country which has come out for the ticket. Yesterday and to-day I have received piles of German papers which all sing the same song. The German Democratic press, at the opening of the Convention, thoroughly on our side, clamors partly for a straight party nomination, partly for a new reform movement. This is a sober statement of the facts as far as I have been able to look over the field.

Whether it will be possible, in any appreciable measure, to correct this, I do not know, but I seriously doubt it, for the moral elements which attracted the Germans to the movement, are so seriously compromised that I, myself, in appealing to them, could not use the same arguments I used before and in which the whole attraction consisted. Mere political talk, after the old fashion, will

fall flat. Something might, perhaps, by hard labor be effected, but I apprehend nothing, like what we suddenly lost on Friday last, can be regained if the movement remains in its present shape—for suspicion and disgust have taken the place of the grand spirit which prevailed down to the last day of the Convention. Those of the Germans who do not retire entirely from the field, will probably flock to the Reunion and Reform Associations whose convention at Cincinnati stood ready to endorse our nominations; but on Friday, as soon as the results of our proceedings were known, resolved to appoint a committee with instructions to call a National Convention for the purpose of making nominations of their own.

What the consequences will be, you can easily calculate. I see that Governor Palmer promises you 75,000 Republican votes in Illinois. Do not permit yourself to be deceived by such wild talk. In no State is the reaction among the Germans, who form a very considerable element of the Republican party, more decided than in Illinois. In the other Northwestern States the condition of things is no better. You may ask me whether I cannot rally these forces again; I might, if the character of the movement were now what it was a week ago. But not only the moral power of the cause is seriously, if not fatally, impaired; but also I should find my most intimate personal friends who for sixteen years have worked with me, not only not on my side, but on the other, seeing in me, as some German papers express it, a victim instead of a victor.

I will not go into a detailed statement of my views as to the prospects, which in a very great measure depend on the action of the Democratic Convention, but not wholly so. I speak only of what I know; as to the rest you undoubtedly receive from other quarters information which will appear to you more valuable than my opinions.

I should not be troubled by any difficulties in the way, did I still see and feel the same moral force as before, by which to combat and overcome them. But all is changed. That element which was least inspired with the great and noble tendencies of this movement stands before the people as its controlling power, and that element cannot conduct a campaign like this successfully. The question is whether, as the matter now stands, those elements which in a moral sense formed the backbone of the movement, can [be] brought into the foreground again, so as to inspire confidence. I doubt it. To restore impaired confidence is difficult. I thought it my duty to tell you all this, just as I see and feel it. Believe me, I have not painted in dark colors, perhaps to give myself in your eyes a certain sort of importance. That is not one of the weaknesses I possess. I give you my real thoughts and feelings, frankly and honestly, without exaggeration. I have always honored and admired you and shall, I trust, always be your sincere personal friend, whether you regard me so or not. To tell you things which must be unpleasant to you, is a very painful task to me, but they must be told now, before we go further in this business. I assure you, I did not go to Cincinnati to have anybody in particular nominated, and therefore I do not mourn over the defeat of a favorite. I did not advise your nomination, because I foresaw certain difficulties. But these difficulties have been rendered immeasurably more grave by the manner in which your nomination was brought about. My whole heart was and is in the cause I have so laboriously worked for, and it is with a grief, which I cannot express, that I see a movement so hopefully begun, so noble and so promising, dragged down to the level of an ordinary political operation and stripped of its moral power.

How much of it can be saved, I do not know yet.

Neither do I see clearly whether it is best to go on in the direction we have taken, or to begin again at the beginning. I confess frankly to you that I cannot tell yet what I shall do for my part. I ask you only to believe that whatever I may do, will not be dictated by any selfish motives, but by the sincerest regard for you and by my best convictions of duty. I shall be happy if you will speak to me with the same frankness which has inspired every word of this letter.

I am, my dear sir, very sincerely yours.

FROM SAMUEL BOWLES

SPRINGFIELD, MASS., May 8, 1872.

My dear Senator: I enclose you some of the things I have been writing in criticism and review of the Cincinnati Convention. I presume you have already had the same explanation that I give of Brown's infamous conduct. I had it from one of his friends and delegates, who told me the whole story. He has only hurt himself; he cannot hurt you. His friends ought to demand of him a personal apology, both to you and Grosvenor, and such good behavior as will give security for returning sense.

The thing seems to be going anyhow. Indeed I don't know but what you are right that anything would have gone. New England is very cold towards it as yet. We have got to be warmed up from the outside. Other men may have got more of its honors. But the two men who gained most character out of Cincinnati are yourself and Mr. [Charles Francis] Adams, and I am sure time will show it. Anyhow, you have made me more than ever your friend and admirer, and I am

Most cordially yours,

SAMUEL BOWLES.

TO SAMUEL BOWLES

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1872.

Private.

I have received your letter and the newspaper slips inclosed in it, and I am very grateful to you for the kind things you say of me. Believe me, I appreciate the approval and friendship of a man like yourself very highly and I find great encouragement in it, especially in my present situation which is surrounded with unusual perplexities.

I cannot yet think of the results of the Cincinnati Convention without a pang. I have worked for the cause of reform, in the largest sense of the word, in good faith. I was frequently told at Cincinnati that I might exercise a decisive influence upon the selection of the candidates, and probably it was so. I did not do it, because I considered it a vulgar ambition to play the part of a President-maker and because I desired that the nomination should appear as the spontaneous outgrowth of an elevated popular feeling, which would have made it stronger and more valuable. Everything seemed to promise so well. And then to see a movement which had apparently been so successful, beyond all reasonable anticipations, at the decisive moment taken possession of by a combination of politicians striking and executing a bargain in the open light of day—and politicians, too, belonging to just that tribe we thought we were fighting against—and the whole movement stripped of its higher moral character and dragged down to the level of an ordinary political operation; this, let me confess it, was a hard blow, and if I appear in the light of a defeated party, I do under such circumstances not object.

Well, we have now to deal with facts. The Cincinnati ticket is evidently gathering strength, but nobody can

tell yet what new emergencies the confusion now prevailing may bring forth.

Who told you that pretty, dramatic story about my return to Judge Stallo's house? It is not quite correct. I did not say: "I am overwhelmed and discouraged." I never say such things. I found my friends there in a state of great dejection, and, referring to the University to be built in front of Judge Stallo's house, I said: "Now let us talk about the University." But it is needless to say the conversation about the University did not get under way; we were too full of what had happened, and the piano helped us along.

Let me hear from you as often as you feel like it.

TO HORACE GREELEY

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1872.

Your two letters¹ have reached me. I thank you for the remark at the close of your note of yesterday that if there was anything in your letter of the 8th that seemed to imply a lack of appreciation of my position and services you pray me to believe that the implication does injustice to your intentions. I am not sensitive about such things, I am only anxious that the reform movement, which I have zealously served to promote, should bear as good fruit as possible, and it was that anxiety which dictated my letter of the 6th. There is

¹ Of May 8th and 10th. The former is printed in full in Schurz's 3 *Reminiscences*, 350-51. The only important paragraph in the letter of the 10th was: "If there was any sentence in my letter of the 8th that seemed to imply a lack of appreciation of your position and services, I pray you to believe that the implication does injustice to my intention. I am sure that you have ever meant to do the right, though your judgment on important points differs widely from that of

Yours,

HORACE GREELEY."

one thing I desire you to know and depend upon. Whatever difference of judgment there may be between us I shall, in our intercourse, always tell you the truth exactly as I understand it, without color or concealment; and if there be anything unpleasant in it, I shall tell it to you directly instead of to other people and rely upon your good sense and generous impulses for a just appreciation of my motives. In that way I can serve the cause I have at heart and you, personally, better than in any other. I tried the same thing with Grant when he made his first mistakes, and failed. Were he not so narrow-minded as he is, he would probably now remember with regret some interviews I had with him.

I wish to dispel some misapprehensions you seem to be laboring under. If you believe the "revenue reformers," or, if you prefer the word, the "free-traders," spent money to bring delegations from the South to Cincinnati, you are surely mistaken. The Southern delegates brought on in that way were in the Davis interest. I know of what I speak. The free-traders did not spend a penny. Those from New York, of whom you say that they were no Republicans, were very [few] in number and exercised no influence.

On the whole, I think that element is entitled to great consideration. In the West it started and directed the movement and made it strong; without it the movement would never have assumed its great proportions. In the Convention its conduct was honorable throughout and conciliatory, and now it ought not to be disregarded or treated with neglect.

As to the Germans in the West, the temperance question is not the only nor the main difficulty, nor the tariff question either. They went in for reform in the best and largest sense of the term. What they found most objectionable in the Convention and its results was the appearance of the movement being taken possession of and

used by just that class of politicians they thought they were fighting against. Whether right or wrong, that was the impression, and just there is the difficulty in enlisting the best men and their best efforts in the support of the Cincinnati ticket. If such apprehensions can be allayed, it will help very materially. From the large number of letters I have received, I enclose you one coming from an American; you will pardon me for withholding the signature as I have no right to give it. Most of the letters I have of this kind are from Germans whose support would be very valuable.

If you would in your letter in reply to the notification of your nomination say something to disarm such apprehensions, in strong and unequivocal language, for instance, pledge yourself to appoint, at once after coming into power, a civil service commission to determine removals and appointments, the latter to [be] made strictly in accordance with the rule laid down in the civil service resolution, the 6th in the Cincinnati platform, it would undoubtedly have a good effect. You are certainly right in saying that there is no hurry about your letter. Its importance cannot be overestimated. All I care about is that this movement should have the greatest possible success, not only in the campaign, but in its ultimate results, and you will not misinterpret me when I say that although I abstained in the Convention from exerting any influence in favor of this or that candidate, I feel some personal responsibility in the matter.

TO HORACE GREELEY

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1872.

I have received your letter of yesterday. I return to you the amended letter of notification, together with an official copy of the platform.

You say in your letter: "I shall write my reply next week, I should have done it sooner, but it seemed best to wait till it should be reasonably certain that I am not to be compelled to decline. I now see my way clear."

When I wrote to you on former occasions, I did not believe that you would consider the contingency of being compelled to decline at all. Had I thought so, I should have said something on that subject. I do not know under what circumstances you would have felt yourself compelled to decline, but in the same spirit of frankness which dictated my former letters, I would now observe that I do not see your way clearer to-day than it was ten days ago. I speak from the point of observation which I occupy.

You are evidently strong in the South. That was to be expected. But the South is not the battlefield of this campaign. You would probably on a fair vote carry all the Southern States but two, South Carolina and Mississippi. But if the election should depend upon the Southern vote, it would not be difficult for the managers of the other side to create disturbance in the South here and there, and to have the vote of a couple of Southern States thrown out on some pretext. What then would follow, nobody can tell. The result of the election must, therefore, not depend on the South.

In the North the campaign has been comparatively dead. There have been but few ratification meetings and the speeches delivered on such occasions have furnished little, if anything, to make an impression upon the popular mind. The progress which seems to have been made is only apparent. Some men and some papers, which immediately after the Cincinnati Convention spoke of nothing but disappointment, have since given in their adhesion, but we see there only some of the ground which was lost, regained, but no positive gain made, nor by any

means all regained that was lost. Moreover, the support regained is to a very great extent only conditional. "As between Grant and Greeley, for Greeley." This is especially the tone of the German press, with a more or less pronounced desire for another alternative. At best, this sort of negative adhesion is not the spirit which will make a vigorous campaign.

This applies equally to another class of Liberal Republicans,—and here I do not speak of the free-traders merely, who formerly were very zealous in the movement, and who now say that on all the issues of principle except one, on which they cut loose from the regular Republican organization, the Liberal Republican candidate for the Presidency has always been against them; and the one exception is the amnesty question, which is only an ephemeral one. And here again free-trade plays but a very subordinate part. I will give you an example. The reelection of Senator Ferry in Connecticut was represented as a Liberal Republican victory. I have it from Ferry's own lips that he will not only not vote for you, but if he exerts any influence, will throw it against you, even at the risk of reelecting Grant; and this not as a free-trader, for I really do not know whether he is one, but partly because he does not want to betray the principles he has been fighting for and partly because he believes that your Administration would be exposed to influences dangerous to the interests of the country. I tell you this by his permission, because *you* should know it. I know of many men of equal worth and importance who are of a similar mind, Republicans, who speak somewhat in the tone of the letter I communicated to you and which you returned with the remark that the writer was probably not a Republican.

As for the Democrats, the chances seem to be, to-day, in favor of the acceptance of the Cincinnati ticket by the

Baltimore Convention, if the alternative is between you and Grant. There will, however, be strong opposition, not only from Bourbons, who always insisted upon a regular Democratic ticket, but from some of the best elements of the Democratic party, who were heartily with us in the reform movement until the Cincinnati ticket appeared. From what I can learn I conclude that their oppositional feeling is growing stronger rather than weaker and it is difficult to foresee the result. It will certainly appear still more doubtful, if the Convention should not be confined to the alternative, "Greeley or Grant."

There is now a probability that another Liberal Republican ticket will be in the field before the meeting of the Baltimore Convention, and that probability is growing stronger every day. What the action of the Baltimore Convention will be, with a second nomination more in harmony with the Cincinnati platform before it, I will not venture to predict. The chances of such a new movement may at first sight appear slim; but this is the season of sudden revolutions in our political life, and unexpected results are the order of the day. At any rate, the breaking up of the alternative "Greeley or Grant" by a third element, is likely to change the whole character of the situation and, as I understand, the new movement has been taken in hand by men of influence—not merely free-traders—who have considerable backing and will go forward publicly as soon as they have agreed upon the precise plan of operations. So I am informed on good authority.

It seems to me, therefore, that the situation is by no means clearly developed yet, and if you ever thought of making your acceptance depend upon contingencies—which I do not suppose you did—there is just as much reason now for waiting as there ever was. In fact, the decisive

complications seem to be now imminent. I do, however, not presume to offer any advice to you, especially since you might, after all I have written you, consider me somewhat prejudiced in the matter. I have, from the beginning, made it a point to tell you, with entire candor, how I feel and what I think about this business; and now, if the developments of the campaign should be such as to disappoint your hopes, it will not be my fault if you are deceived about the real state of things.

FROM E. L. GODKIN

NEW YORK, May 19, 1872.

Private.

Is there no way out of the wretched mess into which these Cincinnati nominations have plunged us? If the matter be left as it stands, it will be impossible for any one to speak of "reform," during the next fifteen years, without causing shouts of laughter.

No man of standing and character can take the stump for Greeley without putting his whole future in peril. His election, every man of sobriety and thoughtfulness concedes, would be a National calamity of the first magnitude. If it occurs it will be the triumph of quackery, charlatanry and recklessness, over the sober common-sense which has thus far saved the republican government on this continent. I do not know whether you are aware what a conceited, ignorant, half-cracked, obstinate old creature he is; but you must know enough to feel that we did at Cincinnati a most serious and dangerous thing. It was a shocking mishap. I assure you this feeling about the matter deepens every day. Can nothing be done to make amends?

Did you read the address to the people of the great State of New York the other day signed, in behalf of the "reformers," by John Cochrane and Theodore Tilton the biographer of Mrs. Woodhull! Has it really come to this complexion with us?

FROM HORACE GREELEY

NEW YORK, May 20, 1872.

Private.

I have yours of the 18th. The corrections you make in the letter of notification shall be followed.

I thank you for the frankness of your view of the situation. That it does not accord with mine only proves that your advices differ from mine. I am sure that is all.

Now let *me* speak.

I fully understood Mr. Ferry. His officeholders have their necks in the noose—they are threatened with destruction for his sake—and he must save them if he can. He may cause himself to be universally detested; he cannot stop Connecticut going for the Cincinnati ticket at Baltimore and in the choice of President. Keep this letter, and see if I am not right.

Baltimore is far more certain to adopt and ratify the Cincinnati ticket than you are to support it heartily. New York will vote it solid; New England nearly so; the South ditto. Here is enough without looking further. We shall carry this State by more than fifty thousand majority—good judges say seventy-five to one hundred thousand.

New York and the fifteen ex-slave States choose nearly half the electors. None of these can be carried by legal votes against the Cincinnati ticket, which will have the votes of Connecticut and New Hampshire, and of Rhode Island also if Sprague says so.

I believe our chance is even for the votes of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the Northwest. But for German hostility, it would be *more* than even. As it is, Trumbull and Palmer *may* be beaten in Illinois, but I don't believe it.

I shall accept unconditionally.

TO E. L. GODKIN

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1872.

Private and Confidential.

I have just received your letter of yesterday. I feel just as you do; and I have some reason to believe that this

feeling is spreading among those who after their first painful astonishment thought it best to acquiesce in the Cincinnati nominations.

You ask me whether anything can be done to make amends. I think the best thing to be done is that proposed by the *Evening Post*: to make another nomination, and to resort to that end not to the dangerous machinery of a convention, but to get up a meeting of "notables." Several Democrats of high standing and influence have called upon me to discuss with me the same thing. They feel that the Greeley movement will either swamp or break up their Convention, and that the acceptance of another candidate put forward by Liberal-Republican leaders with some backing would be a good compromise between the endorsement of Greeley and a "straight nomination." I learn that a movement in the direction of the *Evening Post* plan has been commenced in New England, but I do not know how far it is developed. I have been urged to take the lead in the matter, but, although I am willing to take any risk to aid a good cause, I feel also that the fiasco at Cincinnati has seriously injured my influence, and that I cannot put myself forward again without danger to the object to be attained, while I can do much as a supporter.

At the same time I am sure, if we can assemble fifty or a hundred men of recognized standing in the political and social world between the 20th and 30th of June, a great impression could be produced on the public mind, and the Democrats would be very likely to follow their lead.

Could you not come to Washington with as many of our friends as you can induce to accompany you, for a consultation? I should go to New York at once, but I cannot leave my place here so shortly before adjournment. Consider this and come if you can, and as soon as possible.

Immediately after my return from Cincinnati I wrote to Mr. Greeley, giving him my views and feelings on the subject without the least concealment. I told him also that I did not know yet what I would do, but I believe it made no impression upon him. I agree with you that the situation is perplexing and humiliating in the extreme, and I would do anything to escape from the necessity of supporting Greeley against Grant, feeling as I do that the latter must be beaten in order to break up that party despotism under which we are suffering and which would only be confirmed and fortified by his reëlection. But I cannot act alone. I should be very glad to see you here.

TO W. M. GROSVENOR

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1872.

Confidential.

I have received your letters of May 28th and 31st and June 2d. They came all at the same time. You are rather hard on me. I think I have about as much at stake in this business as any one, but I look at things from a different point of view.

1. I do not think that, as things now run, success is certain or even very probable. There is evidently a reaction against the white hat, which may become very dangerous in the Baltimore Convention. The opposition in the Democratic ranks is becoming more determined every day, and unfortunately it is not confined to men like Voorhees, the Bourbons, but many of the best men of the party, who before the Cincinnati Convention were heartily with us, are in it. A split of considerable dimensions at Baltimore is no longer improbable, and we can scarcely hope to make up by gains from the Republican ranks what is thus lost on the Democratic side.

2. The free-trade people *are going to do something,*

and you cannot prevent them. Their following is not large, but if they place the nomination of Charles Francis Adams before the country, it will find an echo outside of their distinctive ranks, while, as *their* man, Adams will only serve to break the lines of the whole movement. I know what is going on, and this thing will come.

3. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that an effort be made to unite the opposition forces. I can do more in that direction than any other man, but I cannot do it if I now take part in the campaign. The difficulty really consists in there being no harmony between our candidates and the true spirit of the movement; and the worst of it is that this cannot be denied. A good many of the opponents of Greeley think that something can still be done to restore to the movement its original character. I, myself, think there is one chance in ten. But it is certain that as long as it is thought that something still can be done to that end, the opposition forces will not unite. And we are exposed to accidents which we shall not be able to control.

4. Under such circumstances, I think it wise that an effort be made to get the representative men of the different opposition elements together. There is a conference proposed, to take place at New York some time about June 20th, to which prominent Greeley men and Anti-Greeley men are invited to consult together—probably also some prominent Democrats who are likely to exert an influence in the Baltimore Convention. At that conference the question will be discussed, whether it is desirable to change the alternatives of the campaign, whether it is possible to do so and, if so, how it is to be done. If the question of possibility is answered in the negative, many of those who now hold off will consent to do the only thing by which Grant can be defeated. Nothing will satisfy them that this must be done, except

that all other possibilities are exhausted. I feel very much the same way. When you tell me that I must necessarily make a vigorous speech for the Cincinnati ticket *now*, I have simply to say that I can advocate the election of that ticket *only* upon the ground that it is the *only* way to beat Grant, and that there is absolutely no chance for another practicable alternative.

If I attempted to ratify now, the words would stick in my throat. It is against my nature and I cannot do it. I shall do my best when the issues are finally made up.

Now, you must be at that conference in New York. I shall have you notified more particularly; and if you can suggest the names of some prominent Liberals in Missouri, Illinois and Indiana, whose standing and reputation are such as to add weight to their advice and action, I wish you would do so.

Do not blame me for my silence. I cannot speak now, and your hard words cannot make me speak. These four weeks since the Cincinnati Convention are among the unhappiest periods of time I ever went through. What loss of reputation I may suffer by a course which many do not understand, will be little compared [with] the disappointment caused by the loss of so great an opportunity as we had.

It is my intention to leave Washington on Friday night, unless developments in the Senate render it probable that Congress will sit beyond June 10th. I want very much to go to St. Louis and I hope I shall be able to do so.

Last Sunday, Sam Bowles was here. He thinks just as I do. This evening, I shall see Horace White who, as is reported to me from New York, is pretty much of the same mind.

FROM HORACE WHITE¹

BREVOORT HOUSE, NEW YORK, June 9, 1872.

My dear Schurz: I went up to Waldo Hutchins's house last night and spent the evening with him and Greeley. Of course I cannot go into particulars now. Greeley made the impression on me of a sincere, confiding man. He argued like a baby with me about his right to write that letter² to you in answer to the one you wrote to him, since as he said he didn't nominate himself at Cincinnati—had no communication with Gratz Brown or any of his friends thereon, etc., etc. He ended by acknowledging that he had done wrong and authorizing me to go down to the *Tribune* office to-day and insert an article saying that his correspondence had become so voluminous that he could not undertake to answer any more letters. His Astor House headquarters are to be broken up immediately.

Hutchins said he would guarantee that nobody should go into the Cabinet, either the first time or any other time, whom Trumbull and myself should say was an unfit or improper person.

Greeley said that if Congress, at its next session, would pass a civil service law bringing the service under the English or Prussian system *as to permanence* he would hold up both hands for it.

The answer I have received from Chicago shuts the door to my signing the call for the 20th of June meeting, although I shall attend it. I will explain how the door is shut at some future time, but there is now no alternative.

FROM HORACE WHITE

CHICAGO, June 15, 1872.

Yours of yesterday is received. You may rely upon my being in New York on the 20th. I have just written to Palmer

¹ Then editor of the *Chicago Tribune*.

² Letter of May 8, 1872. See 3 *Reminiscences*, 350-51.

urging him to come. I wrote to Trumbull to the same effect yesterday.

I am much disappointed that you did not receive my letter concerning my interviews with Greeley and Hutchins.¹ I should be still more disappointed if it were lost. The substance of it was that Greeley renewed upon me the impression that he is a sincere man with right instincts upon all moral questions. Indeed I felt some sense of having wronged him in my thoughts—in assuming for instance that John Cochrane would have more influence with him than Trumbull. We talked half an hour about the letter he wrote to you, and he acknowledged finally that he had misconceived your purpose in writing to him as you did, but maintained with some show of reason that you had misconceived his political attitude as regards the Gratz Brown performance. I did not see your letter to him—in fact, I refused to see it, since, for the purpose of *my* argument, it made no difference what you said. The next morning, after this particular conversation, he said he thought you had more political influence than he (Greeley) had with the *Tribune* thrown into the bargain. And I am sure he did not say this to be repeated to you, because it was dropped incidentally in some talk about the last State election in Connecticut.

What he said on the subject of civil service reform was satisfactory to me and would be so to you if you had, as I now have, the faculty of believing that he is a sincere man.

But I hope you will receive the other letter in New York.

Godkin, in the *Nation* of this week, seems to have committed himself to Grant in one of the profoundest *non sequiturs* I have ever seen. I am sorry for this, but I fear that it cannot be helped. It will be a strange sight to see the *Nation* giving up the cause of reform *in totidem verbis*, while Schurz and Trumbull and Sumner do not despair of the Republic.

¹ This was the letter of June 9th, which was received later and is printed *ante*.

TO E. L. GODKIN

PITTSBURGH, June 23, 1872.

Private.

I regret not to have had an opportunity to talk with you after the conference. I called at the *Nation* office yesterday, but did not find you.

The conference had doubtlessly convinced you that there was no escape from the Greeley-Grant alternative, when we met. Any attempt to nominate a new ticket would simply have increased the confusion and put the "third" candidates into an unenviable, perhaps even ridiculous, position, without even furnishing to those who want to vote neither for Greeley nor for Grant an opportunity to make a respectable demonstration of conscience; for a third ticket would probably not live as long this year as the Frémont ticket did in 1864. The spirit of the conference demonstrated all this very clearly.

I do not know how much weight you attach to the reasons I gave for supporting Greeley as against Grant. It is a point of view, which, I know, is but little appreciated in the Northeastern States, but appeals very strongly to those who are in contact with the South and feel the full importance of the problem which consists in the pacification and regeneration of that part of the country. The question is whether that problem is to be solved by Ku-Klux laws or by moral influences, and in this respect there is something in this campaign which does not depend on the individuality of the candidates. I intend to speak on that subject as soon as possible, and I wish I could prevail on you not to fix the course of the *Nation* so irrevocably that it cannot be changed, until the campaign shall have fully developed its tendencies and possibilities.

As you know, I am very far from denying the importance of what you say about Greeley personally. But I think some of the danger you apprehend may in a

measure be averted. I had a conversation with Greeley before I left, and I think—in fact I am confident—I can make Greeley commit himself to certain *specific* reform-measures, publicly and in a manner so binding, that, if elected, he will not be able to escape from his pledges or even to quibble about them without breaking down his Administration at once. He is not sanguine enough to think that the Baltimore Convention will, by endorsing him, absolutely insure his election or that he can depend on the “politicians” alone for his success. The matter will come out when I make my first speech, in a fortnight or three weeks, and I should be glad if you would suspend final judgment for a little while. The influence of the *Nation* is so great and valuable that it ought not to redound to Grant’s benefit as long as on the other side the possibilities are not all exhausted. I tell you the above in confidence, not to be used in public until it is fully developed. I regret the course taken by the *Evening Post*. Its article of yesterday, intended to prove that Greeley’s election would be the restoration of the Democratic party of 1860 to power, is certainly wrong in its conclusions, and I think we shall soon practically prove it to be so.

I shall be at St. Louis to-morrow night and should be very glad to hear from you.

TO HORACE GREELEY

St. Louis, Mo., June 26, 1872.

In your letter of acceptance, you promise a thorough reform of the civil service in general terms. The question, how the problem of civil service reform presents itself to your mind is one of great interest; and I would suggest, if it be consistent with your views of propriety, that you

give me such explanations as will put your intentions in this respect in a clear light.

FROM E. L. GODKIN

LENOX, MASS., June 28, 1872.

I have carefully considered all you say about Greeley, and I can assure you nothing would give me more pleasure than the thought that I might in some way be enabled to support you in supporting him, because you will believe me when I say that you are the one man in American politics who inspires me with some hope about them.

But I maturely considered what I could and would do about Greeley, when he was first nominated. If any possibility of standing by him had offered itself, I would, in view of the part I had taken in creating the state of public feeling which had led to the Convention, have seized upon it eagerly. But I saw no such chance, and the more I think about him, the more satisfied I am that I can have nothing to do with him. The conference in New York confirmed me in this opinion.

If you got the pledges you speak of from Greeley, and he broke them, *as I believe he would*, it would be no consolation to me that our opposition would immediately be raised up against him. I have gone through this once, and to go through it again would utterly destroy what little influence I possess, even if my reason allowed me to entertain the idea. I supported Grant with far better guaranties than Greeley offers, and he made fine promises and broke them, and good appointments and reversed them, and I have, in consequence, been for three years in opposition. I cannot afford to go through this process again. Greeley would have to change his whole nature, at the age of sixty-two, in order not to deceive and betray you, and you will not be able to atone for your support of him under present circumstances, by *then* arraying yourself against him. You will simply bring your judgment into discredit, and lay yourself open to the suspicion of having

been disappointed by him in some personal way, and politics will be in a far worse condition than they were in the spring of 1872, because the small band of reformers who then inspired the country with some hope, will have fallen into disrepute and become ridiculous. Moreover, Greeley's conduct in taking this nomination, and the arts by which he is seeking to promote his election, satisfy me that he is more dishonest than I thought he was.

I understand perfectly the difference there is in your position and mine. It is very difficult for you, or any man who is practically engaged in politics, to make up his mind to allow himself to be thrown out of the current whatever it be, and thus to be rendered, at least temporarily, powerless. But I cannot divest myself of the idea that you are to some extent sacrificing the future to the present in accepting Greeley under any circumstances. The Cincinnati Convention did a great deal for your reputation and influence, but it was through the fact that you were plainly disappointed—that you were no party to the wretched folly which nominated Greeley, and that you sought really to elevate politics. In fact it carried you far towards that moral position which, when combined with such oratorical gifts as you have, gives a man an unshakable hold on the people and *forces* him on any party which wishes to succeed. It has given Sumner, donkey as he is, the wonderful weight which he has possessed for twenty years. I am afraid—pardon me as a sincere friend and admirer for saying so—that by taking up “anything to beat Grant,” you are going to set yourself back, for the long run, however successful the expedient may be temporarily. Four years to a man as young as you is nothing, and the foundation of the really new party will not come for four years. Greeley's Administration will be nothing but a series of wretched intrigues, out of which no new organization can grow. It will make a great difference to you, whether when the foundations of the new party come to be laid, as the foundations of all new parties must be laid in solid and positive principle and conviction, you come to the work with an unquestioned reputation for the highest principle, added to your power as an orator, or

come simply as a man so hostile to Grant that he tried to make [a] "reform President" out of poor old Greeley and failed miserably.

What I seek is not a sham break-up of parties, such as the Greeley movement promises, but a real break-up, involving something more than the construction of a new party machine out of the pieces of the old ones. But I see no hope of this from electing Greeley. Bowles, White and the rest are to me preaching the very doctrines now, against which we have been all thundering for three years. They are accepting blindly a grossly unfit candidate at the hands of a bellowing Convention and are going to support him solely because he is "available"; not because they have the smallest reason to expect from him any support of their principles, but because he promises a change of officers, and they are denouncing as silly and dishonest all those who, having supported the Cincinnati Convention for better things, now refuse to "fall into line," as they call it. If this be not the old "party tyranny," pray what is it?

I shall look for your speech with great interest and trust it may not appear till I get back from my holidays. I am going off yachting for three weeks, heartsick of politics.

Be assured of my continued esteem and my earnest good wishes. I am so persuaded of the possibilities of every kind that is good, which are open to you, that I am intensely anxious you should make no mistake. This must be my excuse for the freedom with which I am writing. Keep yourself for the great party of the future, if you can, and believe me

Very cordially yours.

THE ADDRESS OF THE LIBERAL REPUBLICANS¹

The Administration now in power has rendered itself guilty of a wanton disregard of the laws of the land and

¹ This served as introduction to the first Liberal-Republican campaign document, issued probably in June, 1872. That it was written by Schurz is proved by the rough draft in pencil in the Schurz MSS.

of powers not granted by the Constitution. It has acted as if the laws had binding force for only those who are governed and not for those who govern. It has struck a blow at the fundamental principles of Constitutional government and the liberties of citizens. The President of the United States openly uses the powers and opportunities of his high office for the promotion of personal ends; he has kept notoriously corrupt and unworthy men in places of power and responsibility to the detriment of the public interests; he has used the public service of the Government as a machinery of partisan and personal influence and interfered, with tyrannical arrogance, in the political affairs of States and municipalities; he has rewarded with influential and lucrative offices men who had acquired his favor by valuable presents, thus stimulating the demoralization of our political life by his conspicuous example; he has shown himself deplorably unequal to the task imposed upon him by the necessities of the country and culpably careless of the responsibilities of his high office.

The partisans of the Administration, claiming to be the Republican party and controlling its organization, have attempted to justify such wrongs and palliate such abuses to the end of maintaining such partisan ascendancy. They have stood in the way of necessary investigations and indispensable reforms, pretending that no serious fault could be found with the present administration of public affairs, thus seeking to blind the eyes of the people. They have kept alive the passions and resentments of the late civil war, to use them to their own advantages. They have resorted to arbitrary measures in direct conflict with organic law, instead of appealing to the better instincts of the latent patriotism of the Southern people by restoring to them those rights the enjoyment of which is indispensable for the successful administration of their local

affairs, and would tend to a more patriotic and hopeful National feeling. They have degraded themselves and the Name of their party, once justly entitled to the confidence of the nation, by a base sycophancy to the dispenser of Executive powers unworthy of Republican freemen; they have sought to stifle the voice of just criticism, to stifle the moral sense of the people and to subjugate public opinion by tyrannical party discipline; they are striving to maintain themselves in authority for selfish ends, by an unscrupulous use of power which rightfully belongs to the people and should be employed in the service of the country. Believing that an organization thus led and controlled can no longer be of service to the best interests of the Republic, we have resolved to make an independent appeal to the sober judgment, conscience and patriotism of the American people.

FROM HORACE GREELEY

NEW YORK, July 8, 1872.

Yours of the 26th ult. only reached me three days ago. I respond as promptly as I may.

I pass over the allusion to my political associates, barely remarking that an imputation so vague can never be specifically repelled. Charity is a virtue rarely exemplified in politics, and most men live and die in the undoubting conviction that their political opponents are the greatest scoundrels unhung. I trust that my age and your experience have lifted us above such prejudices, enabling us to realize that the many sincerely desire the greatest public good, even when mistaken in their choice of means. I know who my friends are better than my traducers do, and fear no scrutiny as to the integrity or patriotism of any to whom I give my confidence. And, should any such ever seek to swerve me from the path of rectitude, they would cease to be regarded by me as friends.

The problem of civil service reform is rendered difficult by a misalliance between the Executive and the Legislative branches of our Federal Government. Those Members of Congress who favor the Administration habitually claim and are awarded a virtual monopoly of the Federal offices in their respective States or districts, dictating appointments and removals as interest or caprice may suggest. The President appoints at their bidding; they legislate in subservience to his will, often in opposition to their own convictions. Unless all history is unmeaning, this confusion of Executive with Legislative responsibilities and functions could not fail to distemper and corrupt the body-politic.

I hold the eligibility of our Presidents to reëlection the main source of this corruption. A President should be above the hope of future favor, the fear of alienating powerful, ambitious partisans. He should be the official chief, not of a party, but of the Republic. He should dread nothing but the accusing voice of history and the inexorable judgment of God. He should fully realize that Congress in its own sphere is paramount and nowise amenable to his supervision, and that the heartiest good-will to his Administration is perfectly compatible with the most pointed dissent from his inculcations on the very gravest questions in finance or political economy.

"It is the first step that costs." Let it be settled that a President is not to be reëlected while in office, and civil service reform is no longer difficult. He will need no organs, no subsidized defenders. He will naturally select his chief counselors from the ablest and wisest of his eminent fellow-citizens, regardless alike of the "shrieks of locality" and the suggestions of a selfish policy. He will have no interest to conciliate, no chief of a powerful clan to attach to his personal fortunes. He will be impelled to appoint, as none will deny that he should appoint, men of ripe experience in business and eminent mercantile capacity to collect, keep and disburse the revenue, instead of dexterous manipulators of primary meetings and skillful traffickers in delegates to nominating conventions. No longer an aspirant to place, the President

will naturally aim to merit and secure the approbation of the entire people, but especially of the eminently wise and good.

As to the machinery of boards of examiners, etc., whereby the details of civil service reform are to be matured and perfected, I defer to the judgment of a Congress unpervverted by the adulterous commerce in legislation and appointments, which I have already exposed and reprehended. Up to this time our experience of the doings of boards in this direction has not been encouraging; and this, I am confident, is not the fault of the gentlemen who have tried to serve the public as commissioners. In so far as they may have failed, the causes of their ill-success must be extrinsic. Had they been accorded a fairer field, I am sure they would have wrought to better purpose. A thinker has observed that the spirit in which we work is the chief matter; and we can never achieve civil service reform until the interests which demand shall be more potent in our public counsels than those which resist even while seeming to favor it. That this consummation is not distant, I fervently trust; meantime I thank you for your earnest and effective labors to this end.

WHY ANTI-GRANT AND PRO-GREELEY¹

FELLOW-CITIZENS:—Standing before my constituents, I deem it my duty to give an account of my public conduct, the motives which have governed it and the ends it is intended to subserve. I can do this in no better way than by expressing fully and frankly my views on the events which have produced the present extraordinary situation of our public National affairs—events in which I took a small part—and also to state what I consider it my duty as a patriotic citizen to do, in order to promote the interests of the public. It has been my misfortune to displease many with whom I coöperated on the political

¹ Speech at the Temple, St. Louis, Mo., July 22, 1872. Copied from the *St. Louis Daily Globe*, July 23, 1872.

field for many years, and from whom I now, with great regret, find myself separated. To the attacks with which some of them endeavor to overwhelm me, I have but one answer. I have never considered my party the supreme arbiter of my sense of duty; I have always seen in politics aims far higher than the success of the organization to which I belonged; and I have never believed that a party, even if it be my own, has a right to stand in the way of the public good. This has throughout my public life been my supreme rule of action, and I trust it always will be, to whatever consequences it may lead as to my political fortunes. On this ground I shall appeal to your sober judgment.

When I was honored with a seat in the Senate of the United States, I expected to support the Administration which then came into power. The tasks it was called to perform were of unusual importance. The civil war was over. Its logical results, the abolition of slavery and the organization of free-labor society in the South, were just being reduced to political form and embedded in the Constitution of the Republic. It remained to fortify those results by reconciling to them the minds of the Southern people, so that their development could be securely left to the working of local self-government instead of the rule of force. To this end, a wise and generous policy, appealing to the best instincts of human nature, was required to assuage the passions and animosities the war had left behind it, and to make those who had been overcome in the conflict of arms, as much as possible satisfied with the new order of things. During a great period of public danger the Constitutional restrictions of power had not infrequently yielded to commanding necessity; the law had been overrun by the exigencies of the moment, and the people had become accustomed to a government of force. It was necessary to restore

the integrity of Constitutional government and make the laws respected by the governing party as well as those who were governed. Great abuses had crept into the public service, aggravated by the irregular practices of warlike times. The public interest imperatively demanded a thorough reform. The people were loaded down with enormous burdens, and while willing to bear all for their country, they looked for reasonable relief by a sound financial policy.

While these problems were uncommonly perplexing, the incoming Administration was favored with extraordinary opportunities. The ruling party had wielded almost undisputed power. It had a great history behind it from which it might have drawn a noble inspiration for new efforts aiming at something higher than selfish advantage. It had conquered under a banner of peace. There was an abundance of character and talent in its ranks to fit it for the work of reform. The newly elected President had the confidence of the country in advance. The masses of the people were well disposed. The greatness of the task to be performed, as well as of the possibilities presented, could scarcely fail to excite the noblest ambition. A success great enough to be the envy of the world was within reach. It did not require very great men to see and appreciate such opportunities, but it required what I might call the genius of smallness to lose them all.

More than three years of the Administration are now behind as a part of the history of the Republic. And what has become of our hopes? A disappointment which makes further hope appear like mockery. This Administration, which commenced its career under such happy auspices, has in so alarming a degree developed some of the very worst tendencies of our political life, that its continuance in authority appears as a danger and menace to our free institutions. In no period of our history,

perhaps, has the selfishness of power and the grasping greed of party stood more insidiously, stubbornly and conspicuously in the way of manifest duty.

Let us take a survey of the field and trust to the evidence of our senses. The first great object of our policy should have been to renationalize the South; to revive among the Southern people feelings calculated to attach their hearts again to the fortunes of this Union; for, let us not indulge in the delusion that the holding together by force of its component parts is a basis upon which a republic can safely rest or long endure. It requires that bond which binds together the hearts of the people and not their bodies only. And to create that bond was for us the highest object of statesmanship. We read of King Frederick William II. of Prussia, the father of Frederick the Great, that he was fond of occasionally cudgeling such of his subjects as displeased him. One day while walking in the streets of Berlin, he saw a man hurriedly turn a corner at his approach; the King overtook him and asked, "Why did you run away from me?" "Because I was afraid of your Majesty," replied the trembling burgher. "Well you rascal," said the King, "do you not know that I want my subjects to love me and not to fear me?" And to produce that love, he gave him a sound drubbing. Such methods of creating sentimental attachments may have passed more than a century ago in a despotic kingdom, but in a country like this love is not inspired by caresses of that kind. And even in Prussia they have long since come to the conclusion that it requires very different methods to build up and hold together a great empire. In order to revive patriotic feeling and National attachment in the South, we had to convince the people that we were their friends and not only their conquerors, that we had their welfare at heart, and not only our advantage. Only when we made them

believe in the purity and unselfishness of our intentions could we hope to regain their affection.

Let us see what was done by the Administration and the ruling party. The great social revolution grown up out of the war had resulted by logical necessity in the enfranchisement of the colored people. Only by the exercise of political rights can the free laborer maintain his independence. But the colored voters, untutored and inexperienced, fell under the leadership of unscrupulous adventurers. I do not say that this could have been entirely prevented. It was one of the usual consequences of great social revulsions. But its effect might well have been limited in time and extent by a wise policy. As it was, a system of robbery and ruinous misgovernment ensued which has hardly a parallel in history. Most of those States were, with incredible rapidity, burdened with enormous debts without any equivalent. Scores of millions disappeared as by magic, in the capacious darkness of private pockets. Impoverished as those States were by the war, they were now stripped naked. The public expenses became absurdly extravagant, the taxes unbearable. Under such loads industry was discouraged and flagged; enterprise sank down with hopeless despair; production diminished; and incredible as it may seem, while the rest of the country was prosperously progressing, the value of property in many of those States appeared in the census of 1870, after five years of peace, far below the figures exhibited by the census of 1860. Such have been the effects of so-called carpet-bag government in the South.

Who was responsible for this? Those governments were, and are at this moment carried on in the name and under the auspices of the Republican party. It was through them that the Southern people felt the touch of the ruling power. It was in them that they saw its

spirit working. Was that impression wrong? Consider impartially what reasons they had for it. While the most reckless and rapacious of political bloodsuckers were thus plundering those communities, a system of political disabilities was maintained which excluded a large number of the intelligent property-holding men from eligibility to office, and thus from active participation in the administration of public affairs; a large number of those who had the greatest stake in good government were thus told that it was no business of theirs. While in this way, on the one side, the work of the plunderers was facilitated, it was not wonderful that on the other the summons—you shall love this Government! did not meet with an enthusiastic response. The removal of political disabilities, although its good effect could not have been doubted, was studiously put off until it could no longer be denied, aye, until the Cincinnati Convention had shown that the question could be trifled with no longer; and when amnesty was granted, it was done with such useless restrictions and with such a grudging grace as to make it appear that those who gave it would much rather have withheld it. It was simply the first victory of the Cincinnati movement.

Look over the legislation of Congress touching the late insurrectionary States. Study it attentively,—the bayonet law, the Ku-Klux law, as they now present themselves in retrospective view. The ends that legislation was to reach were apparently good. Grave and most reprehensible disorders had occurred in the South. Voters had been terrorized in the exercise of their rights. Innocent and inoffensive persons had been cruelly persecuted, oppressed, maltreated, killed by organized bands of marauders. The laws I spoke of were ostensibly intended to protect the rights of citizens and to repress such disorder. Well-meaning persons, to whom, even when opposing the passage

of those laws, I always gave credit for good intentions, were drawn into their support by their generous sympathies for those whom they considered in peril. But what was the character of those laws, what their effect and what the great aim of some of the master-spirits who designed them? Not only did they, in protecting the rights of some, break down the bulwarks of the citizen against arbitrary authority, and by transgressing all Constitutional limitations of power, endanger the rights of all; not only did they awaken in the breasts of many, however well disposed, the grave apprehension that a government or a ruling party assuming so much would stop at nothing, but such measures served directly to sustain in power the very adventurers who by their revolting system of plunder were violently keeping alive the spirit of disorder which that legislation was to repress. Some of the very worst of that thieving fraternity have been constantly hanging around Congress bawling and pressing for the extremest measures, with no other view but that every such act would be likely to give them a new lease of power and extended freedom to steal. How much they care about the protection of the rights of citizens and the lives of innocent persons, I do not know, but I am certain that they value such laws especially as a political machinery to control ballot-boxes and as receiving an extension of their plundering license. How well those laws serve that purpose you will learn by studying the history of the South during the last few years. I have been informed that at this very moment in a certain part of North Carolina over five hundred indictments, found in some way under that legislation, are held by the United States authorities *in terrorem* over the heads of so many voters and their friends, to make them vote and exert their influence at the impending State election as the managers of the Grant party direct.

It is thus that the ruling party makes itself felt in those States; it is in this light that the majesty of the National Government appears to those people, not as a friend to lift them up from their prostration, to guide them out of their errors with a generous hand and to make them look up to the National flag as a symbol of justice and fairness equal to all; not that—but as the ally and the abettor of the robbers who suck their blood, as the mainstay of a system which drains their resources, blasts their hopes, emasculates their energies, mocks their enterprise and condemns them to utter poverty, distress and ruin.

You, honest Republicans, whose ears have been assiduously filled only with horrible Ku-Klux stories, and whose minds are unversed in the mysteries of party management, you may look with surprise at this dark picture. You understand that the affection of those people cannot be successfully invited by the cry, "You must love us if it takes your last penny." You ask, how is it possible that so wicked a game should be carried on by the leaders of a party wont to boast of its great principles. It would be impossible had not that party fallen under the control of a selfishness so unscrupulous as to put party success above the best principles it ever possessed.

You must know that "carpet-baggerdom" is exceedingly faithful to the party, except, perhaps when its leading spirits, quarrelling over the spoils, fall out among themselves. It lives upon party fidelity and it preaches it as its political gospel. It relies upon the virtue of party fidelity to cover a multitude of sins. It sends its representatives to Congress strong enough in number to make up majorities. They are the staunchest and most zealous supporters of the Administration for value received. They are the household troops, always ready to march forward and backward, and to wheel to the

right and to the left as the Administration managers direct. There are exceptions as there are white crows, but they are few. Whatever legislative scheme the Administration may set up, by whatever means of partisan tyranny in caucus or in Congress the opposition of independent men is to be put down, those household troops can be counted on. They faithfully aid the Administration in governing the country, in governing you. For that they receive their patronage, and by that patronage the Administration aids and sustains them in their States. They distribute it among their retainers who are equally faithful. Thus they organize their home forces through whom they rule the party at home. These forces are at their service and through them at the service of the Administration. Thus their system furnishes votes in Congress, delegations to National Conventions boiling over with enthusiasm for the renomination of the President, and it is expected to furnish electoral votes to continue him in power. I suspect, however, it will not furnish enough. In the meantime carpet-bag government, upheld by the patronage of the Government, and by the countenance of the ruling party, lustily plies its trade and fills its pockets; and you, honest Republicans, wonder why the late rebels will not become loyal enough to vote the Republican ticket.

But to me this seems certain: as long as party ascendancy is maintained by such means, as long as party selfishness stands in the way of honest government, as long as the National power appears as the ally and abettor of corruption and robbery in the South, that hearty reconciliation, that universal restoration of cordial feeling which this country stands much in need of, and which every patriotic citizen must desire with the whole ardor of his soul, cannot and will not come. As long as a system prevails which sacrifices the welfare of a part of

the people on the altar of party advantage, we shall be met with distrust and alarm, for it is not from such sources that affection springs. I should be the last man to excite such distrust, and I may say without boasting, that I have done my share to remove it. And, having done this, I may throw the responsibility for the failure upon those who love the possession of power more than the accomplishment of the high objects for which that power should have been exerted. I charge the Administration and those who control the Republican party that by their partisan selfishness they have shown themselves utterly unfit to encourage and develop the good impulses slumbering in the Southern people, and thus to solve the great problem of National reconciliation. I assert that thus they have disappointed the hopes and forfeited the confidence of the American people, and that the power they wield has become barren of good, and fruitful of danger in their hands.

The partisan selfishness which sacrificed the great opportunity of renationalizing the South, has shown its evil tendency no less glaringly upon another field. The people looked to this Administration for a thorough reform of the abuses which had crept into the public service. Corrupt and unworthy officers had to make way for better men. Public servants had to be made aware that the interests of the people should be the highest object of their action; that to the Republic they owed their undivided devotion and their best efforts, and that they had no right to claim any advantage from their offices beyond the strict allowance of the law. Honor and duty should be their watchword. It was expected of the President that he would inspire all with his example.

The first period of the Administration when the Government was so conspicuously employed to make provision for relatives and personal favorites, which we cannot

think of without shame and humiliation, we should be glad to forget, remembering only the many good appointments that were made, had the sequel been better than the beginning, but the disgrace of a nepotism more scandalous than anything the history of this Republic knows of—a nepotism which taught every public servant that in the opinion of the Chief Magistrate they might without impropriety exhaust their official opportunities to make themselves and their kinsfolk comfortable, was followed by practices more directly touching the character and integrity of our institutions. I will not speak here of the cases of embezzlement, defalcation, fraud and downright thieving which occurred under this Administration, and the number and magnitude of which as they accumulated startled the tax-paying people.

There were things more deeply affecting our public morals. I will give an instance characterizing the practice. The President, who in his inaugural address had promised that he would have no policy against the will of the people, fell in love with a scheme which he pursued much longer than was necessary to convince any sensible man that it was not in accordance with the will of the people. I mean the acquisition of Santo Domingo. He pledged himself through his aide-de-camp—and it may be worthy of note that here for the first time the President's aides-de-camp appear as diplomatic agents of the United States—the President, I say, pledged himself through his aide-de-camp to the ruler of Santo Domingo, “privately to use his influence in order that the idea of annexing the Dominican republic to the United States may acquire such a degree of popularity among the members of Congress as will be necessary for its accomplishment.” It has been said that the President did not authorize such a pledge, but there is no reasonable doubt that he lived up to it, and it is no secret in Congressional

circles that among his efforts to make the Santo Domingo scheme "popular among members of Congress," the patronage played its part.

This is a grave assertion, but I have better reasons for it than mere suspicion. It has frequently been charged that I would not have made opposition to President Grant could I have had all the patronage I wanted. I never noticed the assertion, but when the President himself makes with regard to me the same charge, as he is reported to have done in an interview recently published, I feel compelled to make a statement, which but for this, I should probably have withheld:—

When the Santo Domingo scheme was pending, two gentlemen in somewhat intimate relations with the White House, came to me, each one separately, soliciting my support to the project and telling me that I could have all the patronage I wanted if I would aid the President. In January last, having been slandered by the Administration press, and taunted on the floor of the Senate concerning the motives of my opposition, I inquired of one of these gentlemen whether his remarks concerning the Santo Domingo scheme and the patronage were authorized by the President. I quote the language of his reply referring to this subject:—

Regarding the conversation you refer to in your note I remember it was with the knowledge and consent and after I had had a conversation with him [the President] that I called upon you and had the conversation you spoke of. My impression is that the President desired your support for the Santo Domingo scheme and wished to be on such terms with you that your support would be obtained. I do not now remember any particular language used at my interview with the President and would not hazard doing him an injustice by attempting to quote from memory, but the impression made upon my mind by the interview was fixed and distinct.

This statement seems to indicate that I had a chance for more patronage than I wanted, had I concluded to serve the President at the expense of my convictions of duty. If one of us was in the market, it was not I.

But the abuse of the patronage appeared in its most hideous form when the nomination for the next Presidential term became a matter of urgent interest. In the meantime the demands for civil service reform had arisen with singular force from the people, and found a voice in the press and on the floor of Congress. It threatened to become a popular cry and could not with safety be disregarded. The President took it up, and reform was promised. A commission was appointed, a gorgeous array of rules and regulations drawn, the reform was solemnly and with a grand flourish announced to commence on a day certain. And now look at the condition of the civil service! General Butler, one of the President's fastest friends, declares that civil service reform is a humbug. The General does not surprise me, for this civil service reform is certainly a humbug as great as General Butler can make it.

Show me the oldest man among us. Does he remember a time when the civil service of the country was more completely a political machine than it is now? Does he remember a time when the service appeared more like a thoroughly drilled and disciplined organization of political agents than to-day? Does he remember a time within the whole range of his recollection when the public interest was more shamelessly overruled by political exigencies? Some time ago the President, forced by the public voice to make a show of decency, permitted it to go out that his brother-in-law Casey, the collector of customs at New Orleans, notoriously one of the worst officers in the service, had been requested to resign. The heart of the country was touched by so unheard of a

thing as the dismissal of a brother-in-law. It was a joyous surprise, for nothing seemed now impossible. Well, it turned out that nothing was impossible, for, as if to make merry of the public, a few days afterward it was announced that a delegation of politicians of Louisiana had urgently requested the President to retain his brother-in-law Casey in office. The President succumbed, of course, without a struggle, for he had no policy to enforce against the will of the people. The notorious Casey is collector of customs in New Orleans to-day, and the comedy of his resignation appears as a mere mockery of the public conscience. Why is Casey retained in spite of his bad character? Is it merely because he is the President's brother-in-law? That undoubtedly is a great virtue, but Louisiana politicians know another reason. Casey has filled the customhouse with the managers of political organizations, white and black, collected from all parts of the State, who draw pay from the Government, although their principal, and in some instances their only occupation, consists in running the political machine in the President's interest under Casey's direction, and Casey's removal would throw the whole machinery into utter confusion. And thus Casey stands there impregnable in his office, a proud monument of civil service reform.

Civil service reform and this Administration! The Lord deliver us! The pen which wrote the message laying before Congress the new civil service regulations was not yet dry when it signed another paper ordering their suspension. The old traffic in offices continued without a blush. For months and months and from one end of the country to the other the whole official force has been engaged in pulling wires to dragoon the party into the renomination of the President. At this very moment, the whole civil service of the country, from the

Cabinet minister down to the meanest postmaster, is converted into a vast political agency to secure the President's reelection. The Attorney-General spent many weeks, if not months, thousands of miles away from his office to "fix" his State of Oregon. The Secretary of the Interior has almost become a stranger to the walls of his Department. The Secretary of the Treasury has taken the stump in North Carolina to sing the praises of his master; the Secretary of the Navy, if I am rightly informed, will soon give the cause of his chief in like manner the moral support of his guns, and the money of the Government, as we are assured on good authority, is poured like water into the contested States to effect what the eloquent urgency of Cabinet ministers cannot accomplish. I need not tell you of the business the subordinate officers of the Government are now so arduously engaged in. Woe to the unfortunate place-holder who dares to call his soul his own and to utter a doubt as to the perfections of his master! He will soon learn that men can be reformed out of office as quickly as into it.

Civil service reform! Never have worthless favorites or political agents been kept in profitable and responsible places in bolder defiance of principle and public opinion. Never has the political conscience of the officeholder been more despotically controlled. Never has the hand of the National Executive through the patronage been more insolently thrust into the business of legislation as well as the local politics of the States—of which we here in Missouri have an interesting tale to tell. Never have the officers of the Republic appointed to the service of the country more generally become the servants of a party and of a man. And when, under such circumstances, we hear of the civil service reform inaugurated by this Administration, we have a right to call it an impudent mockery of the popular understanding, a barefaced

jugglery attempted upon an intelligent people, the prostitution of a great cause. I trust the American people will show their appreciation of it by commencing the reform at the top.

And yet, bad as this all may be, it is by no means the worst feature of the case. Bad as that policy may have been which, throwing aside those moral agencies apt to bring forth a fruitful coöperation of the best elements in the South, and to reunite the country in National feeling, delivered the Southern people over to their plunderers and tormentors; bad as the frauds and abuses may have been which disgraced our public service; bad as the management of the patronage may have been which in the highest place set a demoralizing example of selfishness, strove to corrupt legislation and transformed the whole service into a vast political agency; bad as the contempt of law and the violations of the Constitution may have been, which have grown into a most dangerous habit under this Administration—far worse, of infinitely more alarming import is the circumstance that the Republican party, the party once so noble in its impulses and so fearless in its actions has been so completely subjugated by the Administration and its political managers, as not only to lose its ability to rise up against such misdeeds and abuses, but even the spirit to discriminate between right and wrong and to call things by their right names. Whatever wrongs and abuses may exist they can be corrected as long as we have the courage to seek the truth and to recognize it. But a political party which fails to recognize abuses as such has lost the moral ability to correct them. Its very ascendancy will thenceforward stand in the way of true reform.

Is that the condition of the Republican party under this Administration? Let us see. Some Republicans

undertook in a conspicuous place to denounce the abuses of the Government and to bring about their correction. You have heard, perhaps, of certain debates in Congress last winter which greatly disturbed the equanimity of the party managers. Flagrant wrongs in the New York customhouse were revealed and an investigation insisted upon. What happened? The men who denounced the abuse were vilified as enemies and traitors to the Republican party. But the voice of the people made itself heard, and after much maneuvering and wrangling the Administration leaders perceived that to refuse an investigation would be dangerous, and it was granted. But not one of the men who denounced the evils was put on the committee. The investigation was made. A mass of testimony put the existence of those evils beyond a doubt. The efforts of members who virtually constituted themselves the attorneys of those in power were in vain. The truth could not be entirely smothered. It was clearly and beyond cavil established that bribery and corruption had prevailed on a large scale; that the customhouse, with its legion of officers, had in the most unscrupulous and tyrannical way been used as a machinery to control the politics of the State, and this in the name of the President, that a most scandalous practice called the general-order business, by which the mercantile community was mercilessly plundered, and which had been previously denounced by the merchants, by Congressional committees and by officers of the Treasury Department itself, was still in full operation, and that the person most benefited by it was one of the favorites of the President, and, having acquired this source of unrighteous gain on the strength of a general introduction written by the President himself, maintained his position with mysterious power and a most singular success against all efforts to correct the evil. All this the testimony made

clear. Well, what was to be done? The committee made its report, which is before the country. It is a wonderful performance. That there were bribery and thieving, could scarcely be denied. Bribery and thieving were bad; but bribery and thieving had always existed; and now there was nobody in particular to blame for it. That the customhouse had been controlled by political influence, and had made itself felt in politics, could not well be denied. But it had always been so, and besides, why should not officers take part in politics? Thus the transformation of the customhouse into a political machine was right after all, and nobody to blame. And as for the scandal of the general-order business, some little irregularities may have occurred, but the enemies of the Administration and the Republican party have been basely slandering the innocent persons involved, and, on the whole, nobody to blame. This is a virtuous Administration, and there is the end of it. And all this in the very face of the most conclusive testimony. And Leet and Stocking, the favored parties, are, with some modifications of the system, in the general-order business to-day.

An investigation was demanded of the sale of arms to French agents during the French-German war. Again the men who advocated the inquiry were held up as traitors to the Republican party, as enemies of their country and as monsters of wickedness generally. Again not one of those who denounced the scandal was appointed a member of the investigation committee. The inquiry was made. The testimony showed, in the clearest manner, that the laws of the country regulating such sales had been systematically trampled under foot; that, in direct violation of the orders of the War Department, prominent officers had indulged in direct transactions with well-known French agents, and that under the very

eyes of the Department large quantities of arms had been delivered to such agents after they had been discovered, an act recklessly endangering the national standing of the Government. All this was proven so clearly that no sensible man could doubt it. And what does the committee report? The officers of the War Department construed the law for themselves, and they knew best what was for the public interest, and as to their direct transactions with French agents they had a right to do what they did do, and nobody to blame. And in order to make so pleasant a conclusion possible we are told that laws may be violated if in the opinion of the officer the violation is more profitable than the observance, and a doctrine of international law is set up, which, if applied to our Alabama claims, would throw us out of court amid the laughter of the universe. But at any cost the Administration must be protected.

Certain charges were made against the Secretary of the Navy. An investigation is ordered. It is clearly proven that he paid out a large sum of money in direct violation of the express language of a statute. But what is the report of the committee? He may have reasonably thought the claimant equitably entitled to the money, and construed the law for himself accordingly. Nobody to blame, and the Administration is virtuous. Certain Government officers at New Orleans, one of whom, at least, is near to the heart of the President, are charged with a scandalous abuse of official power, in interfering with the politics of the State, and other rascality. An investigation is had. Only fragments of the testimony have reached the public, making it certain that the inquiry is terribly damaging to those officers and the Administration. And what does the committee do? It does not report at all, trying to convince the people that nobody is to blame, by burying the truth in secrecy. The same

policy is followed with regard to the inquiry in the disappearance of important official documents from the War Department. I venture to say that the report of neither of these two investigations will see the light before the Presidential election. The people must restrain their curiosity, and rest meanwhile in the belief that there is nobody to blame.

And now, what does all this mean? What does it mean that, when the abuses of the Government or the shortcomings of the Administration come into question, systematic whitewashing is cultivated as one of the fine arts, nay, as a party duty? What does it mean that the President can so flagrantly transgress his Constitutional powers as he did when ordering the Navy to protect the ruler of Santo Domingo, by force of arms, against any foreign assailant, and even against his own subjects; that the President may ever so wilfully violate the laws of the land and the commands of public decency; that the officers of the Administration may do things ever so arbitrary and mischievous; that the public service may show ever so many evidences of corruption and abuses ever so gross, and that then independent criticism is silenced with the charge of party treason, and every resource of ingenuity is exhausted on the floor of Congress, as well as by the party press, to justify the wrongs committed, to protect the guilty parties, to conceal the truth and to throw dust into the eyes of the people? What does it mean that you see men of even high public station, who might be presumed to respect themselves, openly, before the people, defend the scandals of Presidential nepotism, and the devotion to high and responsible officers of present-makers, things so disgraceful in a republic that no man with the pride and spirit of an American citizen should be able to mention, and far less to defend, the humiliating fact without feeling the blush

of shame tingle in his cheeks? What does it mean, this reckless abandonment of truth and right and decency and manly pride?

It means that the party is to be served at any cost. It means that a party so controlled and animated by such a spirit demands any sacrifice for partisan success. It means that neither the restoration of fraternal feeling between the different portions of the American people, so needful to our National existence and welfare, nor our abhorrence of that system of wholesale robbery and scandalous misrule prevailing in the South, nor the sanctity of the Constitution and the laws of the country, nor the interests of the people as they are bound up in the honest and economic administration of public affairs nor even the pride and honor of the Nation must stand in the way of the effort to elect a candidate and to retain partisan power. It means that a Republican must not presume to serve his country by speaking the truth, if he wants to remain in good party standing. It means that a selfish party despotism has developed itself, which, by all the resources of reward and punishment, appeals to the low and sordid instincts of human nature, dragoons the ambitious into obedience by the terrors of a falsified and subjugated public opinion, and attempts to drag into its net the well-meaning by artful and systematic concealment of the truth, and fraud and deception; a party despotism which renders true reform impossible, by making it a partisan duty to whitewash abuses instead of correcting them, by obscuring our moral appreciation of right and wrong and teaching us to see in selfish advantage the supreme rule of action.

Do you want to discover the full power of demoralization of that despotism and the whole degradation of its victims? Look at them as they are lying at the feet of President Grant. I should prefer not to speak of him,

did he not stand there as the embodiment and personification of the pernicious system which derives from his individuality its peculiar character. Gratitude for his military services and respect for his office have long restrained many from expressing their real opinions concerning him. I shall be the last man to forget or to carp at the great services he has rendered in the field of war. The honors he has won, the laurels he has gathered, shall not be touched. But now he is a civil officer, and he asks us to continue him at the head of the civil government of this Republic. With this question his laurels have nothing to do. There are no battles to be fought and no strong places to be taken. And now it becomes our duty to tell the truth concerning him, as we understand it. I shall do so with frankness, but not without moderation.

General Grant came into office under circumstances of extraordinary promise. He had, as General-in-Chief, directed the closing operations of the war. His success had centered upon him the gratitude and esteem of the loyal people, and in granting to the defeated foe a generous capitulation, he had, in a high degree, won even their respect and confidence. There was scarcely a man in the Nation to whose voice they would have more willingly listened, when admonishing them to submit to the inevitable, to accommodate themselves in good faith to the legitimate results of the war, to respect the rights of their neighbors, however humble, and to develop for the common good the opportunities presented by the new order of things—such admonitions being accompanied by work and acts of conciliation and good-will. No man could have done more to revive their best and most patriotic impulses, to quiet their apprehensions, and assure their minds as to the safety of their rights as citizens, to make them feel that they were not to be the step-children of

the Republic, to inspire them with new interest in its fortunes, thus neutralizing their heartburnings and animosities, giving the peace of measurable contentment to their country, and restoring the long-lost cordiality of feeling between the different parts of the Union.

President Grant's position was equally fortunate in other respects. He had never been identified with party strife. Its entanglements, animosities and resentments were foreign to him. He owed his elevation to no particular set of politicians to whom he might have been bound by a debt of gratitude. He was not borne aloft on the shoulder of faction, while the very opposition he had to encounter as a candidate was respectful in the appreciation of the services he had rendered. No President would have had less difficulty to overcome in relieving the country of the curse of narrow-minded, selfish, partisan rule, in distributing the offices of the Government with a single eye to the true interests of the public service and in thus inaugurating his Administration with a reform elevating the whole tone and temper of our political life.

When he ascended the Presidential chair it may be said that the whole people surrounded him with a cordial offer of their confidence and willing aid in all he might do to give the country good government. There was not a statesman in this Republic who would not have been ready, nay proud, to serve him at his call. He might but have willed it to gather the very flower of political wisdom and virtue around the council-board of his Cabinet to aid his inexperience, and the disposition of the popular mind in his favor was such that from the very ranks of the opposition he might have reinforced his supporters. The Nation stood ready to applaud every movement in the right direction. To support such an Administration conducted on such principles and faithfully serving such

ends, would have been not only the duty but the delight of every patriotic citizen. Accidental mistakes would have been readily forgiven. The evidence of pure motives and honest efforts would have easily silenced factious clamor.

Truly, since the organization of the Government no man had more power for good; no President, save Washington himself, was elected under more flattering auguries, and there is probably not one whose performances stand in more glaring contrast to his opportunities.

There is nothing so apt to dazzle the eyes of the multitude as military glory. Even the most discerning minds cannot easily resist its charms. We are fond of believing that a man who has successfully commanded an army must be able to govern a nation. But that universality of talent is but rarely met with. I venture to say that it is not in this instance. This is not a harsh judgment, for General Grant has his failings in common with some of the greatest captains in history. His career as President warrants the conclusion that he has never been able fully to appreciate the difference between military command and the complex duties and responsibilities of civil administration. I doubt whether it has ever become clear to his mind what the Presidency means in our system of government.

When that high office was presented to him, he took it as a sort of National reward, an accommodation, a place in which, after his military exploits, he might make himself comfortable. His mind seems to have been but little disturbed by the great duties and perplexing problems he was to take in hand. It may appear somewhat startling at first sight, that, as one of his friends, Colonel Forney, once informed the public, he should then have stipulated for a second term on the ground that one would not pay in point of emolument. This financial view of the case was indeed quite unusual, but if he did but look

upon the Presidency as an accommodation, he naturally desired that it should not be a losing business; and some of his friends, who have readily entered into his spirit, actually use this mercantile argument in favor of his reëlection.

His first duty was to form his Cabinet. The exigencies of the times urgently demanded that he should pick his Constitutional advisers from the ablest and most enlightened statesmen of the Nation. He asked nobody's advice, but made the selection himself. When the Cabinet was announced, it was the wonder of the world. The State Department was first given to a personal friend by way of a compliment, soon to be exchanged for a less responsible and more comfortable position. The gentleman appointed Secretary of the Treasury was at once discovered to be disqualified by the law; and as for the Secretary of the Navy, a wealthy burgher of Philadelphia, he said of himself that he did not know what he was appointed for, and had good sense enough to insist upon being speedily relieved of this troublesome business for which he had neither fitness nor taste. In the course of time some changes were made; men, who by their independent spirit and enlightened sense of duty, threatened to become troublesome, had to make room for others whose ascension to the Cabinet made that great council of state still more wonderful. It is impossible to draw from the traditions of the Government, or from the exigencies of the times, a principle or theory of a political character upon which so curious a Cabinet could have been constructed. But however little in its composition the great interests of the country might have been consulted, the President, true to the accommodation idea, consulted his own convenience, and selected men for the most important positions of the Government whom he desired to please and who pleased him with their company.

He looked upon it as his personal affair which concerned nobody else. A painful but still reluctant apprehension was then dawning upon the minds of some that the conduct of this great Government had fallen into the hands of a trifler. The distribution of offices was now in order, and the President began at once to shower the sweets of his official patronage upon his relatives and personal friends. He had probably never heard of nepotism, and was undoubtedly the last man to feel the indecency of his conduct. Regarding the Presidency as an accommodation to him, and its appendages as a sort of personal property, he did not see why he should not increase his own comfort by making his kinsfolk and favorites comfortable with the offices of the Republic. Likewise it did not strike him as scandalous to reward men who had given valuable presents, with high and responsible dignities. He simply liked to please those who had pleased him—that was all. He found it unreasonable, therefore, that in the gratification of that desire the opinions of others should stand in his way. He surely believed that the fault-finders were meddling with things which belonged to him, and were no business of theirs. Neither did he find it reasonable that the man to whom the Presidency had been given as a reward should be hampered by legal obstructions; and when he found an old and wise statute standing in the way of the appointment of his first Secretary of the Treasury, and the tenure-of-office act troubled him in distributing the patronage, he simply said to Congress, "Just repeal me these laws!" That the repeal of such laws might lead to very mischievous consequences troubled him little; they stood in his way, and that was enough for him.

Soon after his accession to power he gave his mind, not to the great problems the solution of which the people anxiously looked for, but to a project of his own

—the acquisition of San Domingo. A subject of such importance as the incorporation with our political system of a tropical country, with an utterly heterogeneous people, called for the most careful and earnest consideration. It is believed that the Secretary of State did not favor the scheme, and the State Department, whose office it is to conduct all the diplomatic affairs of the Government, was unceremoniously set aside. The President commenced a personal negotiation with Baez, the ruler of San Domingo, which he intrusted to one of his young aides-de-camp, whose zeal he had reason to believe equal to his own. The extraordinary character of this proceeding did not trouble him; he wanted to have the thing done, and to do it an aide-de-camp was better than a secretary of state. The aide-de-camp made a sort of personal treaty between the two potentates, in which the President was pledged to propitiate the favor of Congress for the scheme by lobbying influence. This disgraceful engagement would have revolted the sensibilities of any President having the dignity of his high office and the honor of the Nation at heart. But President Grant was so far from disapproving of it that, instead of marking that aide-de-camp with his displeasure, he continued to employ him in confidential missions for the same object. Nay, in compliance with the stipulations of that agreement, he actually did descend to the rôle of a lobbyist. I have seen him in that capacity myself. How could a President lower himself so far? Why, if nobody else wanted Santo Domingo he did, and he employed the means most congenial to his practical mind. He went farther. Baez, the other party to the arrangement, being in danger of being driven from power, which would have spoiled the scheme, General Grant concluded that his friend Baez must be sustained at any price. The method was simple. He ordered the Navy

of the United States to belabor with shot and shell anybody who might attack Baez, even if it be that usurper's own subjects. The warships of the United States were virtually placed at the disposal of a foreign potentate. But could he order acts of war without the authority of Congress? Did he not know that the Constitution vests the war-making power in Congress? Perhaps he did not know; at any rate he did not care. He considered it his business. The Senate by a solemn vote rejected the treaty of annexation. The President in his message told the Senate that this was a great folly, and kept the warships of the United States at the disposal of Baez with instructions to shoot and slaughter as occasion might require. When it at last appeared that there was absolutely no hope for the project, its opponents being supported by the whole American people, he temporarily abandoned it—undoubtedly to take it up again if he should be reëlected. And now, the Constitution violated; a precedent set, which, if taken as a rule, will place the peace of the Republic at the mercy of one man's whims or ambition; the Presidential dignity dragged into the dust; the honor of the Nation sullied—for what? To further a personal scheme of the President, in which nobody took any but a negative interest—neither the Cabinet, nor Congress, nor the American people—nobody but the President, his aides-de-camp and a few speculators of dark reputation. What the President's motives were in so violently pushing this scheme, I do not know. Certainly the main reason with which he advocated it in his message—that the productions of San Domingo would pay the National debt—was so supremely childish as to make the very schoolboys laugh. But he wanted it, and neither the Constitution nor the dignity of his high office nor the honor of the Nation should stand in the way of a thing he wanted.

Looking at the Presidency as a reward and an accommodation, why should he not make the most of it? Thus the case presented itself to the Presidential mind. He occasionally recommended other things in his messages, amnesty, civil service reform, financial measures and so on. Had he pressed these things with half the zeal he devoted to the Santo Domingo scheme he might have accomplished much; but anybody could ridicule civil service reform and call amnesty a National crime without losing his favor. There was the difference between a thing the President wanted and others he cared little about.

Another thing he wants is his reëlection. According to his friend Colonel Forney he must have a second term to make the first one pay expenses. He started out with a show of independence from political influence, which at first the people were inclined to applaud. Numerous pointed stories, some true and some false, were circulated about it. But it was soon discovered that for his future success he needed organized partisan support. It was easily had. The required alliances formed themselves by natural gravitation. Soon we find him surrounded by political managers, the Camerons, the Chandlers, the Mortons, the Conklings, the Butlers etc., ready to do his work, if he would do theirs. It was a matter of congeniality. The interests of the President and of such political chieftains identified themselves without difficulty, he aiding them with the Executive influence in controlling their States for themselves, and they giving their aid in controlling the party for him. One hand washed the other. This was gradually developed into a system, all coöperation being welcome, even such as that of Governor Clayton of Arkansas. There were everywhere people of some influence willing to work for a consideration; and thus the system was gradually

extended, until at last the caucuses of Congress, as well as the civil service and the whole Republican party throughout the land, were completely under its control. Then that peculiar party despotism grew up which ostracized everybody who refused to obey its commands. It gave birth to a new sort of party orthodoxy, whose first tenet it was that President Grant must be reëlected. The strictest fidelity to Republican principles was worth nothing, unless coupled with fidelity to the man. Opposition to Grant constituted high treason against the party for which there was no quarter. Everything else could be forgiven, but not this. Thus the Republican organization has become a personal party, absolutely subjugated to the interests of one individual. A Republican Administration degenerated to an alarming extent into personal government. Let the President do what he pleases, he finds complete protection in his faithful party.

And the sting of personal government is sometimes felt very keenly, even by the faithful. The President does not spare their feelings. He tests sometimes the utmost capacity of their servile spirit, for his selfishness is distressingly frank and ingenuous. They want him to appear to the best advantage, but he does not understand what they mean, and they have to submit.

They feel that his nepotism disgraces the Government, but in spite of all the pretensions of reform with which they seek to cover him, he cannot be prevailed upon to remove any of his relatives from office, even under the most aggravating circumstances. He keeps his brother-in-law Casey in place, although that man is universally known as one of the most worthless officers in the land. He keeps his brother-in-law Cramer, who made the diplomatic service of the United States ridiculous, at Copenhagen. And so on. No, I will not wrong him.

He did dismiss one of his kinsfolk, a Dr. Lampher, who had to resign a place in the revenue service in consequence of some gross swindling operations; in spite of that, the same man was appointed by the President to a place in a land-office in Washington Territory, where he had control of a considerable amount of Government money; but when the said Lampher also indulged in a fraudulent use of the public funds, even the good heart of the President could not hold him, and so one member of the family went by the board. But he is the only one. Whether the faithful like nepotism or not, they must do their best to defend it.

Neither did the most prominent of the faithful like the appointment of the celebrated Tom Murphy as collector of customs in New York. I have it on good authority that Tom Murphy's appointment was not pressed by political influence. But the President liked Tom Murphy. Tom Murphy's nature was congenial to him, and by way of expressing his personal regard and friendship, the President made Tom Murphy collector of customs. It must be admitted that Tom Murphy requited that act of Presidential tenderness by successfully pulling the political wires for his friend Grant.

The faithful are also distressed by the criticism the President provokes by his fondness for light amusement and his sporting propensities. But the President is not partial to the cares of government. The Presidency was in his opinion not given to him that he should overwork himself. No sooner does Congress adjourn than he is off for Long Branch, as a boy is eager to escape from his schoolroom. He decidedly prefers the delights of a horse-race to the tedious work of a Cabinet meeting. The Secretaries, inspired by his example, run away also, and so we hear from time to time that the Administration is out of town. I have actually seen foreign Ministers in

the capital of the Nation looking for the Government of the United States as for a lost child or a horse strayed or stolen. Such a thing was never heard of in our past history. The great business of the Government has never been so cavalierly dealt with. It is the closest approach to the habits of royal courts this country ever witnessed. The faithful do not like to see the President use his office for his own comfort in so barefaced a manner. But as they cannot prevent it they have to defend it, and they do it with self-sacrificing heroism. Even Louis Napoleon was not more slavishly served than Grant is by his men. Neither was Louis Napoleon in his misfortune more eagerly deserted than Grant will be as soon as he is beaten. But he will be praised and obeyed and supported by his political troops as long as he holds power in his hands.

I will not wrong President Grant. He is by no means a monster of iniquity. He is simply a man who makes use of his high official position to suit his own convenience regardless of other interests. He does not sit in his closet a designing usurper, gloomily pondering how he may subvert the free institutions of the Republic. Neither does he ponder how he may preserve them. He does not ponder at all. He simply wants to carry a point, and when, as in the San Domingo case, the Constitution happens to stand in his way, he just walks over it. He does not mean to break down the authority of the laws; he simply wants them not to hamper him in his doings. He does not mean systematically to outrage the public sense of decency by nepotism and low associations, to corrupt the service and to degrade our political life. He only wants to make his relatives and favorites comfortable, to associate with men who are congenial to him and to take the best care of his interests he can. He is not incapable of occasionally doing a good thing. He prefers

a good appointment to a bad one, other things being equal. He undoubtedly desires that affairs should go well, his own welfare included. The cry for civil service reform growing popular, he came very near being a civil service reformer. He started probably with good intentions, and would perhaps have carried them out had he not found it to be his interest to control the political machine in the old way for his reelection. Then the absolute command of the civil service machinery appeared to him much more useful than civil service reform. He would probably have consented to let the Ku-Klux law drop by its own limitation, but considering his interest in the pending campaign he did not blush to urge his friends in Congress to continue in his hands the most alarming power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus while his own reelection is pending. He does not mean to be a despot, but he wants to have his will.

Such is the character of his personal government. We should be doing it too much honor by calling it Cæsarism. It is not inspired by any grand, lofty and long-headed ambition, by the insatiable desire of genius to do brilliant deeds and to fill the world with the splendor of a great name, like that of Julius Cæsar and Napoleon. It is absolutely barren of ideas and originality, bare of striking achievements, void of noble sentiments and inspiring example. It is simply dull and heavy, stupid and stubborn in its selfishness. Those who submitted to the rule of Cæsar and Napoleon could say, at least, that they were bowing their heads before the magnificence of towering intellect and wonderful activity, but here there is nothing to warm the heart or to seduce the imagination, and still less, to lift up our moral nature; and the vilest sycophant of President Grant cannot give as an excuse for his abasement, that he finds in his personal government anything to admire. We see nothing

but a man who wants to possess, exercise and hold power for his own convenience, and submission to whose rule means loss of self-respect.

And yet, such as it is, this personal government has succeeded in so throwing its coils round the ruling party that the latter can neither breathe nor move except by permission. It has so completely subjugated the will and conscience of that party, that in it criticism has become dumb; that respect for the Constitution and laws, that love of truth, right and justice, that honest zeal for the public welfare and even the pride of manhood are paralyzed by the one supreme object to preserve partisan power in the power of one man. Ask those who in that party honestly strove to arrest the current of usurpation and corruption, and they will tell you that they found themselves running against a combination of despotism and submission as against a wall, deaf to the appeals of reason and inaccessible to shame. As one of them I have stood on the floor of Congress myself, and I know whereof I speak. I have stood there, startled at the stolid cynicism with which, to shield those in power, the most evident facts were denied, the most obvious conclusions rejected, the light of truth itself turned into darkness. I have stood there amazed at that cowardly courage, born of desperate causes, with which, to justify the abuses and misdeeds of the Government, principles were set up and doctrines advanced such as would make every friend of popular freedom grow pale and the Fathers of the Republic turn in their graves. I have stood there overwhelmed with shame and sadness at the very degradation of manhood I saw before me. I have stood there bowed down by the conviction that under the pressure of such influences the struggle for good government must become a vain folly, and that we shall soon have to fight for the very existence of republican institutions. Such is the

rule which at this moment controls the Republican party; and through it the American people. And this rule we are asked to continue.

As for myself, I shall not help in doing it. I cannot help it. I have been a humble and faithful worker in the Republican ranks from the beginning of my public life, and my political associations were dear to my heart. But this perverted organization is not the Republican party which had my allegiance. I came to this country from a foreign land to enjoy the blessings of republican government and to live in the moral pride of a free man. I cannot sacrifice both to a party which has been false to itself. I have always believed that true progress grows out of a free and manly contest of opinions, and I cannot aid in tightening round the American people that network of organized selfishness, that snakish coil of power which is to stifle every free aspiration, and to bind the people down to a will not their own. It is my profound conviction that this network must be broken through, this despotism must be destroyed, the people must be inspired once more with the breath of independent opinion, we must have the emancipation of political conscience, and now is the time to strike for it.

Have you thought of it, how a condition of things, such as now surrounds us, could develop itself? It is not a new story. Every period of great effort and excitement in the life of a nation is followed by one of apathy and indifference. It is then that bad precedents ripen into vicious habits of thought, into tame acquiescence in wrong, into indolent submission to the arrogance of power—in one word, into those dangers to which not seldom free institutions succumb. Such periods test the spirit of a free people, and through such a period we have just been passing. The civil war, with its gigantic efforts and terrible commotions, had put the energies of the

people to an enormous strain. The reconstruction period imposed another heavy tax upon the remaining active interest in public affairs. Having arrived at a fair promise of settlement, people, under a sense of fatigue, were inclined to let things take their course. They did not want to alarm themselves. The Constitution might be violated; the laws broken; things might be done which at other times would have provoked the fiercest indignation; now they received but a passing notice. A part of the country could be most cruelly oppressed and plundered; in another part people could be aroused only by what they encountered at their own doors. They followed the lead of party by habit and without troublesome discrimination. And in such a season of apathy could the arbitrary tendencies of the Government and the greed of politicians knit those meshes in which party and people were to be led captive.

But, fortunately, the American people sleep neither very fast nor very long. They stretched their limbs and became sensible of their fetters. It was indeed time to wake up, that the spell be broken. The people instinctively felt this and thus originated the movement which rose into action at Cincinnati. Determined men cleared with a bound the prison walls of party, and resolved to be their own masters. Thus the Cincinnati Convention came together. That convention was not the product of a mere scheme of politicians. There have been but few periods in the history of this Republic when such an enterprise was possible. It becomes possible only when the popular mind is made restless by profound discontent and an irrepressible instinct demanding a change. The Cincinnati Convention sprang from that instinct. With astonishing rapidity the movement assumed dimensions far beyond the expectations of those who first endeavored to give it shape and direction. It would not confine

itself to the limits of a select circle, nor be hemmed in by the details of a political reform program formed by its first leaders. It swept into its current multitudes of different ways of thinking in many things, but meeting together in one impulse; to reunite the whole American people in the bonds of reconciliation and fraternal feeling, and to shake off the personal government and party despotism now hovering over the country. Acting upon that impulse it put forth its declaration of independence from party rule, and nominated Horace Greeley and Gratz Brown as its candidates for the President and Vice-President of the United States.

Fellow-citizens, it is the custom of public speakers in election campaigns to exhaust their whole ingenuity in picturing the cause they advocate as the absolute good and that of the opposite party as the absolute evil. That custom I shall not follow. As I speak of the other side without exaggeration, I shall speak of my own without reserve. The results of the Cincinnati Convention have dissatisfied some of those who until then earnestly sympathized with the movement. I should be recreant to the truth and unjust to my own feelings did I deny that those results were not satisfactory to me. I have endeavored to lift up that Convention to the very highest appreciation of its duties and opportunities, as I conceived them. I desired that its action should be not only above reproach, but also above suspicion. I wanted its declarations of policy as well as its candidates to be such that every candid man in the land would accept them, not only as an assurance of National reconciliation and of relief from selfish partisan rule, but also as a full guarantee that the victory of the movement would furnish an Administration approaching the ideal of good government as near as human wisdom, integrity and earnest efforts can carry it. I desired a platform, therefore, covering

with equal clearness and decision all the points of the reform the Republic stands in need of, and candidates whose known opinions, predilections and past conduct conflicted with none of them.

It has been publicly noticed, far more than the little importance of my personal attitude called for, that for some weeks after the Cincinnati Convention I remained silent. I will tell you frankly the motives which governed my conduct. I remained silent, not as if I had, under existing circumstances, for a single moment doubted the necessity of overthrowing the iniquitous power which now rules us, but because I thought of a possibility still to make the movement all that it could be desired to be, and to unite all the forces which it should have gathered under its banners, for energetic, harmonious and successful coöperation. Had I found that possibility to exist, it would have found me willing to do my best. That it did not exist became clear to my mind after careful, mature, anxious weighing of all the circumstances surrounding us. And when I had reached that conclusion, I felt it my duty to act upon it with promptness and decision.

Thus I am warranted in saying that my course in this campaign has not been lightly chosen. I have suffered no personal feeling to enter into my decision. I have permitted no pressure to hurry me on. I have long and with painful anxiety considered how I could render the best service to my country that I am capable of—an anxiety rendered more painful still by the disagreement of some valued friends. My convictions of duty have been of slow growth, but they are clear and firm. I feel that I am right, and being right I shall go ahead.

We hear it said by our opponents that an Administration under the lead of Horace Greeley will give us no reforms, but threatens to leave things in as bad a condition

as they are now. And, by the way, it seems there are some people who but recently found in Horace Greeley much to praise, many good qualities to admire, but who, since his nomination for the Presidency, have discovered that he is the origin of all evil and the sum of all villianies. We will let that pass. But as to the prospect of reform under his Administration—suppose for argument's sake he could not be relied upon to carry out the pledges he has given by accepting the Cincinnati platform as his own program of policy—can we forget that the overthrow of that party despotism which now prevails, stifling the voice of truth, condemning honest criticism as treason, concealing or whitewashing wrongs or abuses instead of correcting them, can we forget, I say, that the overthrow of that party despotism is the condition precedent of all reform? Is it not true that no thorough reform can be thought of until that is accomplished? What have you to hope for, if by the reëlection of President Grant you prove that such things as have been done, can not only be done with impunity, but that in spite of them the sanction of popular approval may still be successfully claimed? Do you think that the law-breakers and corruptionists, or the Administration which countenanced them, or the party managers who protected them, will be made better men if they receive the encouragement of success? Are you simple enough to believe that the party tyrants will relax their sway, if you show them that such an insurrection against their rule, as that of Cincinnati, is of no avail, and that they really hold, not only their organization, but the American people in the hollow of their hands? Do you hope for more courageous and more successful resistance in Congress, when you have shown the advocates of reform there that they are abandoned by the people, that their efforts are hopelessly doomed to failure and that the ruling power has them

entirely at its mercy? Do you expect to infuse a better spirit into our political life, when you teach your politicians and public men that the safest thing they can do for their own success is to become the tools of such party managers as now rule us? I appeal to your sober judgment. If you honestly want reform, this is the first thing needful; you must break the subjugation of individual conscience in politics; you must make elbow room for independent criticism and a free contest of opinions; you must put down that partisanship which knows none but selfish ends and tends to make men mere parts of a machine; you must promote, with all the means in your power, the unsettling and disintegration of the old party organizations now existing, and no man of impartial judgment will deny that in this respect the success of the Cincinnati movement will prove a powerful dissolvent.

And now, I repeat, suppose Mr. Greeley were dishonest enough to break his pledges and to try on his part to continue the practices now prevailing—have you considered what situation he would be in? Could President Grant have safely indulged in his performances, but for the ever faithful, obedient and well-drilled party organization at his back, in and out of Congress, a party organization every member of which was whipped into the belief that every misdeed of the Administration must be concealed, or whitewashed, or defended, for the sake of preserving party ascendancy? But for this, General Grant would soon have become aware that the Presidency means business, and not pleasure; the just criticism of the opposition would have ground him to powder before the second year of his Administration; and as he is so sensible of his own interests, he would soon have found it to his interest to mend his ways. Even General Babcock would have told him to be careful.

And where is the ever faithful party organization in

Congress that Mr. Greeley would have at his back? Not the regular Republicans, who now are drilled to the business, for they will be in the opposition, and have violent spasms of virtue. Not the Liberals, for, had they been inclined to submit to corrupt and arbitrary practices, they would not have broken loose from Grant, under whom they had a tempting opportunity to make the submission and whitewashing business profitable. Not the Democrats, for they will not be foolish enough to think that they could serve their party interest by shielding the sins of a President not their representative. No! The Cincinnati candidate in the Presidential chair will not be in a situation to sin with impunity. Every serious error on his part will call forth the thunder of a hundred batteries, and he will have no household troops to cover him with their bodies. Let your imagination construct the very ideal of a President and put him in his place—even he could not sleep on a bed of roses. The Cincinnati candidate in the Presidential chair will have no party at his back, unless he wins the favor of the American people; and he can win that favor only by deserving it.

Thus the defeat of President Grant and the success of the Cincinnati movement will indeed be the first condition precedent of reform; for it will remove that thralldom which has made the National Capitol a whitewashing laundry; the impunity of misgovernment will be at an end; the voice of independent criticism will ring with refreshing freedom through the land and strike the ear of the highest; the truth will be heard in the White House as well as in the market-place; those in power will become sensible again of their responsibilities, and the enlightened will of the people will be a power again in the Government.

Thus it will be if, as his opponents pretend, Horace Greeley were weak or faithless enough to forget his professions. It may be said that this would, in a certain

sense, be a gain of a negative character only. No, it would be a positive gain of immense value. But is it true, as is asserted, that positive reforms may be as little expected under Greeley's Administration as under Grant's? Let us see. I am in favor of a reduction of the tariff to a revenue basis. On that point I should have been glad to see the Cincinnati platform more clear and decided. It refers that question to the Congressional districts, and Mr. Greeley declares, although a protectionist himself, that he will strictly respect the will of the people as expressed through Congress. I will admit that the nomination of a pronounced revenue reformer would have given a more vigorous impulse to that movement. But where is the reason why the friends of that reform cannot push their efforts with the same hope of success? Is not the prospect now that they will be stronger in the next Congress than they have been for the last twelve years, and does not the Cincinnati movement work powerfully in that direction? It may look curious, not to say absurd, that the chances of revenue reform should be promoted by a movement headed by one of the most pronounced protectionists; but does not everybody know such is practically the fact? And do not those whose pockets are most profited by high protective duties plainly see and acknowledge that fact? Let the tariff reformer be wise enough to learn from his enemies. What does it mean that those protectionist associations of Pennsylvania who revere pig iron as their supreme being turn against Horace Greeley, the former apostle of their economic creed, and seek refuge under the wings of the Grant party? What does it mean that every monopoly that sucks the blood of the people kneels before the same shrine? The monopolists know what they are doing. They carry a sensitive instinct in their pockets. They are well aware that the movement of the people,

although headed by a protectionist, will tend to relieve the burden of the people; and they are equally well aware that monopoly finds its surest and most natural bulwark in a party which is controlled by organized selfishness. Where, then, is the interest of those who have tariff reform at heart? Is it with that party under whose banners the organized monopolies of the country have united because they are certain to control it? Or is it with that movement whose whole tendency is in their favor, no matter what the predilections of its Presidential candidate may be? Let them go into the Congressional districts and push their chances instead of acting like a man who would rather starve than eat with a spoon he does not like.

I now come to a question of still greater importance, for it touches the moral tone and character of the Government, the reform of the civil service. Here again every fairminded man knows what we have to expect from the reëlection of President Grant. The very attempt that was made in his name, so ostentatious in its parade, and so well meant by the gentleman who planned its program, has been turned into cruel mockery by the spirit pervading his Administration. The manner of its execution, which left the civil service a more servile political machine than it was ever before, stands there as conclusive proof that nothing is to be hoped from him but a policy that serves his interests, as he understands them. If that is called reform, it is reform backwards.

The opponents of Mr. Greeley assert that nothing better is to be expected from him. It might be said in reply that his long career as a journalist has been a continual war against corruption, and that, whatever they may say of his character, that low, grovelling, sordid selfishness, from which so much of the demoralization of our public service has sprung, is not in its composition.

But I shall make no flattering promises for a Presidential candidate. I came very near doing that once, in good faith, for General Grant, and I have been sick of it ever since. I shall never do it again, whatever my private opinions of a candidate's good qualities may be. I prefer to let the candidate speak for himself.

Having the cause of civil service reform very earnestly at heart, I addressed this letter to Mr. Greeley:

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Here, then, Mr. Greeley stands distinctly pledged to the following practical points: To construct a Cabinet, not of mere clerks, or personal favorites, or political wirepullers, but of statesmen; to abolish the traffic in offices between Congress and the Executive; to select for public position, not political minions or tools, but men of integrity, experience and business capacity; to transform the civil service of the country from a political machine into a business establishment.

These things the President can do himself. The enactment of a law permanently regulating the civil service remains, of course, with Congress.

Well, the program thus laid down means the practical reform of the civil service, as I understand it. As the abandonment of such pledges by him who made them would be inextinguishable disgrace, so their faithful execution will be an invaluable blessing to the country; and, solemnly renouncing the prospect of a reelection, what other interest or ambition should he have than to leave at the self-imposed close of his official career an honored name behind him?

As for myself, any Administration continuing the abuses which now prevail would, in that respect, have

¹ For Schurz's letter of June 26, 1872, and Greeley's answer of July 8, 1872, see *ante*.

my determined opposition, for whatever my course in this campaign may be, I was a freeman yesterday, I am a freeman to-day, and I shall be a freeman to-morrow. But the man who knows that he was not my favorite choice as a candidate and that nothing attaches me to his fortunes but my belief in his honest desire and his great ability and opportunities to do good, may be assured that in every effort to carry out the program here laid down, I, as well as the many abler men who think as I do, will stand faithfully and resolutely by his side with active coöperation.

I know there are reformers who say that because the results of the Cincinnati Convention did not come up to their standard, it is now best to let things run in their old grooves; to permit existing evils to develop themselves until they become so bad that people will see the necessity of doing the very best thing to correct them. I esteem the motives and character of some of those who say so, but I cannot accept their judgment. The theory that the greater the evil and the more violent the reaction, the greater also the permanent improvement which that reaction will produce, is historically false. It is especially false when applied to an evil as we now contemplate, consisting in a system of policy which subjugates great political organizations to selfish interests, turns men into machines and deprives them of the elements of self-respect. The longer such a system prevails, the more it will demoralize the popular conscience, and the less the chances of true reform will grow. Reform is not a matter of general principle and theory only, but to a great extent of practical detail; and the true friend of reform will not content himself by waiting for great occasions, and until the public mind has reached a level sufficiently high; he will not at once throw down his gun when he meets a reverse, but he will watch every possibility that presents

itself; he will put his knife into every crevice he can find, he will endeavor to develop every opportunity he can lay his hand on, thus to accomplish step by step what cannot always be accomplished at a bound and with a grand flourish of trumpets. This is what I conceive to be the duty of every true friend of reform. This I consider to be my duty. I shall, therefore, not lose myself on that superlative height of criticism—proud as that eminence may be—because the practical struggles of facts and ideas are not to be lost sight of. I want to accomplish good results, and therefore I stand where I am. I see an opportunity before me to gain a step in the right direction, and if I can aid in successfully developing it, I shall feel that I have done some service to my country.

And now, finally, I approach a subject which is, if possible, of still higher importance to us all. Seven years have elapsed since the close of the civil war. No thinking man can have watched the progress of things in the South without having gathered instructive experience. It must have become clear to all of us that the development of the new order of society there cannot be secured wholly by an extraneous pressure, which would involve a change in the nature of our institutions, but must ultimately be left to the workings of local self-government.

Two things are now settled and evident: First, that the equality of rights, irrespective of race or color, the enfranchisement of the emancipated class which sprung as a local necessity from the great revolution, and which stands embodied in the Constitution of the Republic, is an irreversible fact. Every sane man recognizes that. There are certainly but few individuals in the South who close their eyes against it. The other thing is, that the rule of unprincipled and rapacious leaders at the head of the colored population has resulted in a government of corruption and plunder, and gives no promise of improve-

ment. I will not throw the blame upon the colored people, who entered the political field without experience and a just understanding of their true interests, and more than once I publicly expressed the opinion that much of the mischief might have been averted had the Southern whites at the start, instead of leaving the field to unscrupulous adventurers, won for themselves the confidence of the colored people by assuring them in good faith the security of their new rights. However that may be, the result is known. In some States the carpet-bag governments have already broken down, and in others they cannot much longer endure. They have made it inevitable that in most, if not all of them, the control of local affairs should presently fall into the hands of those classes which, to a great extent, stood against us during the civil war. It cannot be avoided, unless you adopt a system of interference which will subvert the most essential principles of our government. To those classes, then, will in a great measure the task be confided of developing the new order of things. It must be our dearest wish, as it is our highest interest, that this task be well performed. And we should assiduously bring to bear upon them all the moral influences within our reach to make them do it well.

Are they ready to receive such influences in the right spirit? Southern society has been gradually undergoing a change. The old political leaders who brought on secession, and now stick to their old creeds, are dropping by the wayside. The young element which has gone through the practical school of war is coming to the front. They know that something has happened. They know that something has been decided. They know that this decision cannot be overthrown again, and that it would be foolish to squander their time in trying. They know that they have lost efforts behind them, and that they

have a life before them which can be made useful. They are leaving in the rear their old leaders who are still groping among the ruins of the past, and they begin to stand upon their own feet. They are inclined to march forward and to develop the opportunities of the new order of things. They are capable of a new, honorable and patriotic ambition, for they feel that this is after all their country, and that their fortunes are bound up in the fortunes of this our common Republic. They want to be recognized as American citizens again in the fullness of an American citizen's rights. This is the young South which is lifting its head.

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And what does it mean that the same class hailed with delight the Cincinnati movement, and that, as is reported, it was that Southern influence which pressed the nomination of Horace Greeley at Cincinnati and at the Baltimore Convention? Does it mean that they cling to their old prejudices, and still dream of a reaction? Do they not know as well as you, that Horace Greeley has all his life been the fiercest antagonist of those prejudices, and even went so far as to advocate measures for the protection of the loyalists and colored people in the South which alarmed us by the unconstitutionality? They know it well. They know that the man they want to make President will not give up his life-long convictions which made them his enemies. But they know also that he was one of the first who stretched out the hand of reconciliation, one of the first to plead for right and justice against the scandalous robberies and oppressions of their carpet-bag governments.

No, their situation is easily understood. They are tired of marching in the rear of the times. They want to break loose from the past and turn their faces to the future. . . .

Will the people of the North coldly tell them: "We will have nothing to do with you; we care for partisan power and not for your friendship and well-doing!" Are there dissatisfied Liberals who will tell them: "Well, we would have taken you by the hand had the Cincinnati Convention nominated this or that man; but now you will have to submit for another four years, and we may then, perhaps, be in a condition to do something for you."

Fellow-citizens of the North, is it possible that at a moment when the joy of National reconciliation, a reconciliation on the ground of all you fought for, may illumine the whole Republic if you but will it—is it possible that you should think of things small and paltry by the side of so great a consummation? Is it not clear to you, that that reconciliation you will find the best, nay the only safe guarantee for future peace and harmonious progress, and that we can never hope successfully to solve the other great problems pressing upon us, until this one is disposed of? Have you considered what the consequences will be, if you throw those who approach you with warm hearts and patriotic intentions back into a sullen despondency, a despondency which must spring from the belief that whatever evidence they may give of good will, it will be rejected?

Honest Republicans, are you still troubled by doubt? Do you still ask: "Will it be safe to trust them?"

A journal of this city addressed the question to me, how the colored people of the South would be protected by legislation if, in consequence of this movement, the majority in Congress should change? I will answer. We had the same movement in this State; the majority in the legislature did change; and how were the colored people of Missouri then protected by legislation? No legislation was needed to protect them. They were amply protected by the spirit of the people, as it issued

from that movement. I remember the predictions that were made then to frighten us, that the "red handed rebel" would rise up again in bloody ferocity, and make it impossible for Union men and colored people, to live in some parts of this State. Well, the people of Missouri were not frightened; they did trust; they "clasped hands over the bloody chasm" in 1870. Their trust was not in vain. The rebels were enfranchised. They became not only voters but good citizens again; the rights even of the lowliest among us were more secure and sacred than ever, and we have lived as friends and brothers since. Here it is history. Let the American people profit by the lesson. Look at the South to-day. Is not the Liberal movement leading old enemies together in friendship and inspiring all hearts with new hope? Is it not already doing more to prevent disorder and violence than penal laws and violence could do? If you want the peace of Missouri everywhere, let her example of hearty reconciliation be everywhere followed.

Again, Republicans, you ask me, "Shall we not be swallowed up by the old Democratic party?" Oh! the old Democratic party with Horace Greeley for the Presidency and the Cincinnati platform as its creed! So you recognize the old Democratic party! I suspect it does not recognize itself. Do you fear to be swallowed by that old Democratic party? Why, the Democratic party has been swallowed up itself by the new era. Nobody need fear that I would lead him from the Republican into the Democratic camp, for I do not intend to go there myself. And unless I greatly mistake the tendency of the times, the day is not very far off when there will be but little of an old Republican camp to go from, and but little of an old Democratic camp to go to. This period is pregnant with new formations, which need but the electric spark of opportunity to spring into shape. This

is the time for independent action, and those who think as I do, will not, after having shaken off the shackles of one old party, take upon their limbs the shackles of another. No party can do what the Democratic party has done, without dropping its historical identity. I honor the patriotic spirit of the men who achieved so tremendous a revolution, and in the great work before us I hail with joy and cordiality their alliance. But the party that has done this cannot return to its old grooves. It is impossible. The first attempt would shiver it into atoms.

No, Republicans, let no such fears disturb you. The result of this movement must be a non-partisan Administration, which in itself will be of the greatest blessing to this country. And all men of my way of thinking will devote their best efforts to that end.

What then can hold you back! Is party fealty so strong, is party service so sweet, is party triumph so sacred that you should know no higher duty? And you who would have joined this movement, had it met your highest expectations, are your disappointments so all absorbed that you can neither see the evils of which we now may rid ourselves, nor appreciate the greatest opportunities for good which invite us? Be careful that the response you give be worthy of patriotic citizens.

I shall now take leave of you, commending what I have said to your candid consideration. As for me, I have faith in the spirit and good sense of the American people. They feel instinctively that they have arrived at a turning point; that they have to elect between that torpid submission to narrow-minded party rule which, like dry-rot, deadens the body-politic—and free, fresh and stimulating contests of opinion which will embrace the whole people once more with a healthy, progressive influence. It is the choice between stagnation and

movement. I trust that the revolution which has begun will neither go back nor stop. Let those who want to serve the cause of free government throw themselves resolutely into the waves with the courageous confidence that the genius of the American Republic will lead to a happy issue.

FROM HORACE GREELEY¹

NEW YORK *Tribune*,
NEW YORK, Nov. 10, 1872.

Private forever.

My dear Sir: I wish I could say with what an agony of emotion I subscribe myself

Gratefully yours,

HORACE GREELEY.

Hon. CARL SCHURZ,
St. Louis, Mo.

TO HORACE WHITE

[No date. Probably about Nov. 15, 1872.]

My dear White: I have received your letter of the 10th inst. That you should have felt the sting of defeat keenly, I understand very well. Whatever there was of disappointment and mortification for me in this great failure, I fully anticipated six months ago after the Cincinnati Convention. You remember well with what purposes we went into that gathering. They had the respect and sympathy of the best men of the nation. We were defeated in our best aspirations. The result could not have been more unfortunate. Those who brought about that result proved the worst enemies of the reform movement and of Mr. Greeley too. I esteem him highly

¹ Apropos of his defeat.

to-day, as I always did, although disagreeing with him on some points, as a man of eminent ability and honest intentions. But he could in the very nature of things not be the representative of the Cincinnati movement. His record stood in contradiction to some important points in our program, and the manner in which his nomination seemed to be brought about—although I am sure it was a surprise to him—gave the whole transaction the appearance of a bargain, such as are made and executed by the most ordinary class of politicians. It was the country's misfortune, it was ours and it was his.

You remember what conversations we had at Washington about that business. It was a fearfully hard thing for me to support the action of the Cincinnati Convention; I should not have been able to do so, had I not been convinced that our forces could not be concentrated upon any other candidate; that after all Mr. Greeley, if elected, would have given the country a far better Administration than his opponents predicted,—better even than many of his friends anticipated, and that by his success great dangers and evils would have been averted. But with all this, the movement had lost all its charm. People had expected much of it, and therefore did not appreciate what they had. We designed it to be a campaign of ideas, and it became a campaign of personalities. We wanted it to become a fight for positive principles, and it became a mere fight against an Administration. When we hoped that in spite of all these drawbacks and difficulties we still could succeed, the result has shown that we hoped too much.

You ask me what in my opinion should now be done. It is perfectly clear to my mind. We should virtually do the same thing after the reëlection of Grant, that we should have done after the election of Greeley. We should continue to struggle for the realization of the ideas

embodied in our original program and be governed by no other consideration.

There are many good men in the Republican party who entertain the hope that General Grant's second Administration will avoid the blunders and faults of the first. We may not share that hope and have good reasons for our distrust. But if contrary to our expectations General Grant should adopt a reform policy in any direction, we should have the manliness to recognize whatever good there may be in his measures and exert ourselves to develop it.

We want the civil service and the revenue system reformed; we want economy and honest government secured; we want a policy of reconciliation adopted with regard to the South; we want centralization prevented. We do not care who does it, provided it be done. And let us be ready to accord to whoever does, the credit for the doing. In one word, we should make no factious opposition.

At the same time we should advise the people to be watchful, so as not to be deceived by shams and false pretenses. And if General Grant's second Administration makes attempts of that kind, we should boldly denounce them. And if after all the promises which have been made for him, General Grant's second Administration proves merely a continuance of the dangerous tendencies of the first, we should offer an opposition, loyal and candid, but also firm and fearless. The Administration party is now so overgrown in size and strength, it may be so intoxicated with success and power, that the people will soon recognize the necessity of such an opposition as I have described, whatever the state of public opinion may be to-day.

We should maintain our entire independence of the old organized parties. (Necessity of parties without records.) The Republic has entered upon a new period

of its history. What the country now stands most in need of, is parties without records. Only when such parties exist will it be possible to discuss and decide public questions strictly upon their own merits. Now they are decided in most cases upon side-issues more or less false, which in itself is a great misfortune.

There are many honest Democrats sincerely attached to the principles we advocate. They should now at last recognize the fact that their old party organization is too much encumbered with its traditions and its history to serve as an efficient instrument in carrying those principles into reality, or even to act as an efficient opposition where opposition is needed. Attempts will be made to reorganize the old Democratic party, but I believe such attempts will fail, as I think they ought to fail. It cannot be reorganized on anything like its platform of 1868. One of the great and most beneficial results of the last Presidential campaign, consists in the fact that there is no national party in existence now that has not distinctly in its platform recognized the results of the war as embodied in the Constitution, and a step backward in this respect is impossible. But if it is attempted to reorganize the Democratic party upon the basis of the Liberal program, sensible men, who have the ideas embodied in that program sincerely at heart, will at once discover that the means employed will be an impediment to the accomplishment of the ends contemplated.

TO E. L. GODKIN

ST. LOUIS, NOV. 23, 1872.

Private.

How cruel you are! The *Nation* makes me responsible for the disaster at Cincinnati, because I "had an opportunity to retrieve it, and missed it." The truth is that

the disaster might easily have been prevented, had not our friends, probably you and I among the rest, considered the nomination of Mr. Adams certain until the last ballot was taken. And when Greeley had a majority of the votes, a not inconsiderable number of the supporters of Adams changed to his side, many left the hall before the result of the ballot was announced and a demonstration on the spot had become impossible. In fact, the consternation was so great that scarcely anybody seemed to have a definite idea of what should or could be done. I did not find three of our friends together in spite of diligent search after the event.

Moreover, I had a reason for not putting myself too prominently forward in making a nomination, which perhaps few others will appreciate. I am foreign born, a circumstance which is thrown into my face but too frequently. I should not play the rôle of a President-maker, and it would not have been desirable for any candidate in this case to appear as *my* nominee. I had encountered so much of this kind of prejudice already, that I did not consider it wise to provoke it. Just in that sort of business I must appear as a follower. This feeling had much to do with determining my conduct at Cincinnati and afterwards. Still, I will not say now that it would not have been better to disregard such considerations in that emergency, if anything could have been effected. But we are all so much wiser after the event than before.

At the New York conference I came to the conclusion that it was too late for anything but a mere demonstration, and that there was no man upon whom measurably to unite the elements of the opposition, except Greeley. A third nomination then would probably have induced the Baltimore Convention to nominate a straight-out Democrat, which would have materially impeded the

much-to-be-desired disintegration of that party. I will admit also, that I had much better hopes of Greeley in case of his success than you had, while Grant's reëlection appeared to me so heavily fraught with danger to the future of our republican institutions, that I could not, even indirectly, favor his success. His second Administration will show whether I was justified in these apprehensions. I fear I was.

But while taking this opportunity to suggest that you spare the slain and wounded after the fight, whose lot is by no means the most enviable, I really write for another purpose.

I shall be at New York next Friday and Saturday and possibly Sunday. I should be glad to exchange views with you about certain things likely to come up in Congress this winter, expecially the civil service matter, the postal telegraph bill etc. I shall probably not be in a situation to do much if anything of importance this winter, but things may possibly take such a turn as to make it necessary for the defeated to take position, and I should be very glad to act in concert with you. Having missed you several times at your office, I would ask you to be kind enough to inform me, by addressing a line to me, care of Dr. Jacobi, 110 West 34th St., when I shall be sure to find you.

Grant has made a good beginning in which we must certainly support, and if our support is superfluous, applaud him. But the true test is still to come.

TO W. M. GROSVENOR

Boston, Dec. 25, 1872.

I am astonished to hear that "nearly all of my friends" should be in favor of [General Frank P.] Blair's reëlection.

Do they remember the interests of the cause for which we work? Blair's first election was the first blow which staggered the Liberal movement. You must have felt with me, how severe that blow was. That election appearing as the first fruit of our victory in Missouri deprived the movement of half of the credit it deserved, and placed us on the defensive.

Again, Blair's appearance and intervention at Cincinnati destroyed, at the decisive moment, with the character of that great enterprise also its chances of success. He was the evil genius whose very touch was destruction.

And now Missouri, the State which, with its respectable majority for the Cincinnati ticket, stands there as the only real stronghold and representative of Liberalism, is to turn the success achieved at the election into the personal endorsement of the same man who, more than any other, made the Cincinnati Convention the "slaughter house" of the most splendid opportunities of our times. I have none but kindly feelings for Blair personally; he is a good fellow and all that. But I must confess, I cannot comprehend how those who care anything about the future of the Liberal movement, can be willing, after all the experiences we have gone through, to sacrifice its character and chances again by putting forward once more as a leader him who destroyed it, and by putting on its back that bundle of mischief and misfortune, under which it has already once broken down.

I have so far studiously abstained from meddling with the Senatorial contest, because I think it improper to interfere in an election which is to give me a colleague. But if any of my friends favor Blair's return in such a way as to make it appear as if I agreed with them, I shall feel in duty bound, so as not to be drawn into the contest on the wrong side, to say publicly what I have here written confidentially to you, in whatever way it may affect my

personal fortunes. If my own reelection two years hence depends on my favoring or appearing to favor the return and endorsement of those who perverted and destroyed that great movement which, if conducted according to our idea, would have saved the Republic from so wretched a situation as the present,—then I say without hesitation, I cannot pay such a price for a seat in the Senate. We have now to deal with a condition of things too serious to be trifled with. And I entreat you as a true friend, not to involve yourself in this thing. You will compromise your own future and some day keenly regret it. It is for your own sake as well as that of interests greater in importance than your or my fortunes, that I speak so earnestly.

I conclude from other advices I have received that most of my friends think about this matter very much as I do and believe the election of some other candidate eminently probable. I shall write to Preetorius about this matter to-day. . . .

ELECTION OF SENATOR CALDWELL¹

MR. PRESIDENT:—Every Senator who has spoken upon the subject before us has treated it as a matter of most painful interest; and quite naturally so, for nobody could approach it without reluctance. It is hardly possible that there should be the least personal or political bias in this debate, at least none unfavorable to the gentleman most nearly concerned. As far as I know, the conduct of the Senator from Kansas on this floor has been uniformly inoffensive and courteous. He has, I presume, no personal enemy here. We also know that in case he should

¹ Speech in the U. S. Senate, March 14, 1873, on the resolution declaring that Alexander Caldwell was not duly and legally elected a Senator from the State of Kansas.

be removed from his seat in the Senate, the legislature of Kansas is certain to put a successor into his place who will be of exactly the same party complexion, and there can, therefore, be no political loss or gain involved in a change as to party strength on this floor. If there ever was a case which might be treated upon its own merits, it is this.

We have to meet here, first, a question of law; secondly, a question of fact; and then, also, what I might call a question of policy as to the rigorous or lenient application of the law to the facts and the person.

In discussing the question of law, I invite the Senate to assume a state of facts as fully established. Suppose a person has taken his seat here, elected by a State legislature, presenting when he appeared among us regular credentials in the correctest form, and proving by the unusual evidence that in his election every prescription of law had been fully complied with. Suppose, then, it is subsequently shown that the election of that person was effected and carried by gross bribery; suppose a clear case discloses itself of a purchase with money of a seat in the Senate of the United States. Then the question arises: Has the Senate any power to protect itself by the exclusion of such a person?

An argument has been submitted by the Senator from Kansas, and as that argument goes further in its assumptions than any other, I will discuss it first.

He says the Senate cannot unseat that person by declaring the election invalid, because the Senate has not the Constitutional power to go behind the regular certificate of election, signed by the governor and bearing the great seal of the State; and, secondly, he says that the Senate cannot expel such a person by a two-thirds vote, because the act of bribery was committed before that person was a Senator, and the jurisdiction of the Senate cannot date

back to an offense committed antecedent to the election; *ergo*, the Senate has absolutely no power at all in such a case. If I understood the argument submitted by the Senator from Kansas correctly, these were its salient points. What follows? The Senate must sit still, and with absolute quietness and submission suffer not only that person to take his seat, but, as the case may be, must suffer one after another of these seats to be filled by men who have acquired them by bribery, purchase, fraud and not by honest election, for to each one of those cases the same reasoning will apply which is now applied to this. However outrageous their proceedings, however glaring their corrupt practices may have been, we must treat such political merchants as brother Senators; we must suffer them to exercise the same influence upon the legislation of this Republic which is exercised by others; and all this, no matter what may become of the honor of the highest legislative body of this Republic; no matter what may become of the confidence of the people in their law-makers, and therefore of their respect for the laws; no matter what may become of the purity and integrity of representative government and of republican institutions.

This, sir, is the argument submitted by the Senator from Kansas. It would seem to me as if the mere statement of the consequences which necessarily must flow from such an assumption would in itself be sufficient to show that in the very nature of things it cannot be correct; that the wise men who made the Constitution of this country cannot have left the highest law-giving body of the land in so pitiably helpless a condition. The mere supposition appears on its very face absurd.

Now, in inquiring into the power of the Senate to act upon such a case, I shall not consume any time in a discussion of the English precedents which have been quoted here, and this partly for the reason that I am not as learned

and have not made myself as familiar with their details as others; but mainly because I consider those precedents by no means conclusive, when we have before us a document which gives us all the law we need; and that is the Constitution of the United States.

The Constitution provides in the first place that the Senate, as well as the House of Representatives, shall have the discretionary power to expel a member by a two-thirds vote. That power is not limited to this or that offense; but it is vested in the discretion of each house of Congress, and it has already been demonstrated with irrefutable arguments that although an act of bribery by which a person lifted himself into one of these seats was indeed antecedent to his becoming a Senator, nevertheless that act of bribery, being the very stepping-stone upon which he rose into his legislative office, is so intimately connected with his becoming and being a Senator that the two things cannot be separated; that therefore this power to expel a member must necessarily apply. This is so clear, so self-evident, that not a word more is required.

But the Constitution of the United States provides also that "each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members"; and in discussing that clause I shall give particular attention to the remarks submitted to us to-day by the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Scott].

It strikes me that in this discussion one thing, with regard to the meaning of the Constitutional clause just quoted, has been overlooked; and that is the very important fact that this clause of the Constitution applies to both houses of Congress exactly alike; that its meaning for both houses of Congress must be exactly the same; for it reads that "*each* House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members." No difference is made between the two.

What, then, can that clause of the Constitution mean? We have to judge of three different things: first, of the "qualifications," and what they are the Constitution itself states; then of the returns, and what they are we all know; but we have also to judge of the *elections*—"elections" kept distinct from "qualifications," and from "returns." The qualifications may be complete; the returns may be in the most perfect order upon their face; and yet the Senate as well as the House of Representatives, both under the same clause of the Constitution, which must necessarily mean as to both houses the same thing, have to apply their judgment also to the election of their respective members. What does it mean, I ask? Must it not mean that the judgment of each house shall not only go to the forms, but also to what I might call the essence, of an election? Has not each house to judge whether that which pretends to be an election is in truth and reality an election or not? If the word "election" in that clause of the Constitution means anything, it must mean that; if it does not mean that, it means nothing. Now does anybody question, has anybody ever doubted, that the House of Representatives has always held so under the Constitutional clause which applies to both houses alike? The House of Representatives has always exercised the power, under this clause, to judge whether a man had been really and honestly and legally elected by a majority of the legal votes cast. Has it ever been questioned that the House of Representatives had the power, under this clause, to declare an election illegal and void, if that election had been controlled by bribery and fraud? As far as I know, nobody in the world has ever questioned it; and you will notice that power was exercised by the House of Representatives by virtue of identically the same clause of the Constitution under which we, as Senators, are to exercise our judgment.

Now, one thing has been accepted as a legal maxim from time immemorial, and that is, that fraud vitiates a contract, vitiates a bond, a judgment. Who will deny that fraud would vitiate also that which we might call a conditional relation between a constituency and a Representative, and the Legislative branch of the Government? But if each house is Constitutionally the judge, not only of the qualifications and of the returns, but also of the essence of an election, must it not have power to judge whether an election is vitiated by fraud or not? The House of Representatives has always acted on that principle by virtue of the Constitutional provision conferring upon the Senate and the House the same power in the same language. Then I will ask, why not the Senate?

But it is objected that the position of a Senator is widely different from the position of a Representative; that a Senator represents a State; that the election of a Senator by a State legislature according to law is the conclusive act of a State sovereign in its sphere, and that, if duly certified, it cannot be questioned. It is claimed that there is a certain mysterious power attaching to the great seal of a State affixed to a certificate of election which is foreign to the certificate of election of a Representative. I need not say to the Senate that I am as firm an advocate and defender of Constitutional State-rights and of local self-government as any member of this body; but I affirm that the Constitution does not give a State sovereign control over its Senators, but it does just the reverse. True, the Constitution provides "that the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof for six years, and each Senator shall have one vote." In so far Senators may be regarded as the representatives of their respective States, and undoubtedly they are. But the Constitution does not regard the election of a

Senator as in every respect a matter of discretion with the State. The Constitution does not permit a State to appoint a Senator just as it pleases. The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate by law the manner in which Senators shall be elected, just as it gives Congress the power to regulate by law the manner in which Representatives shall be elected. The only difference is as to the place of election. Congress has made such laws, prescribing on what day of the session of a legislature the election of a Senator shall be proceeded with, how the votes shall be taken in both branches separately, how in joint convention, and so on.

Why does the Constitution put the election of Senators thus under the control of Congress just as it does the election of members of the House of Representatives? Because the Constitution does not regard a Senator as a mere diplomatic agent of the State, of one sovereignty near another sovereignty, appointed to take care of the interest of that State only, and remaining under the control of that State. By no means. The Constitution regards the Senate of the United States not as an assembly of State agents, but as a branch of the Legislative department of the General Government. It regards a Senator here as being appointed to take part in legislation concerning the interests of all the States and of all the people, and, when once elected as a member of that Legislative department, that Senator is, during his Constitutional term of office, entirely, completely out of the control of his State, just as the member of the House of Representatives is out of the control of his district constituency.

The Constitution indeed provides that the number of Senators from each State shall be two, undoubtedly to preserve as much as possible a certain equality of the influence of the different States upon the legislation of the country. It indeed provides that Senators shall be

elected by the State legislatures, looking upon the legislatures as more representative of the individuality of the States, and also possibly to secure to the highest law-giving body of this country a superior class of men. But in point of fact it is absolutely certain, and it cannot be denied, that, while the constituencies are different, the relation of a Senator, when once elected, to his constituency is in no essential point different from the relation a member of the House of Representatives to his, and I defy denial of this fact. Neither the Senator nor the Representative can be recalled. The Representative and the Senator are equally out of the reach and the control of their respective constituents. With regard to the Senator, therefore, the sovereignty of the State becomes utterly inoperative as soon as the fact of his election is accomplished. When the Senator has once been elected, even before he is sworn into office at that desk, the State has no power to reconsider that election, nor to recall him.

And now, sir, when it is discovered that the election of a Senator has been effected by fraud or bribery, has a sovereign State the power to undo its own act to set itself right? Not at all. Not even the discovery made before the Senator has taken his seat would enable the legislature to reconsider its election. It can, in such a case, only memorialize the Senate of the United States, setting forth the facts, and then the Senate only can act in the case upon its own knowledge and judgment, for the Senator has passed entirely out of control of his State, and entirely within the control of the Senate. Thus, when the people of a State have been defrauded, say by the purchase of a senatorial election, they are, with all their sovereignty, bound hand and foot, and not the State, but only the Senate, can furnish the necessary relief.

Now if the Senate, by virtue of its Constitutional powers, does declare a fraudulent election invalid, does that con-

stitute what was called here an encroachment upon the rights of the State? Let us see. In what would such encroachment consist? Not in this, that the Senate in declaring such an election invalid arrogates a power to itself which belongs to the State, for no such power ever belonged to the State, and certainly you cannot encroach upon a power which does not exist. You might just as well say that I arrogate to myself your right to draw upon my deposit in a bank, or that I encroach upon your right to educate my children. Nor can that pretended encroachment consist in this, that the State is thereby deprived of its elected representative, for, in the case I have assumed, first, that representative is not legally elected; secondly, it must be presumed, in common-sense and decency, that the State would rather desire to be relieved of a representative who has defrauded it, (and I include in the term representative Senators also), and that it would itself annul its own act if it had the power to do so, which it has not; and, thirdly, the State is not deprived of its representation nor of its choice, for upon the unseating of a member for such a cause a new election will be ordered in the State at once; the whole matter is turned over to the State legislature for its action, and it may elect the same person turned out by the Senate if it so sees fit.

The whole pretense, therefore, of an encroachment on the sovereign and rightful powers of the State vanishes into utter nothingness. The State retains unimpaired the full scope of its Constitutional powers and rights. The Senate by annulling an election carried by fraud or bribery only does by virtue of its Constitutional powers what the State would be glad to do, but cannot; and when that is done the whole matter is turned over to the State once more for a new election, and the State after all is the final arbiter. The exercise of this power by the Senate does, therefore,

not impair, but, looking at it without prejudice, you will find that it virtually protects the rights of the States.

I have now endeavored to show, in a way at least satisfactory to myself, if to nobody else, that the power to act as the judge of the election of its members means the same thing for both houses of Congress; secondly, that it covers for both houses of Congress alike the power to vacate a seat filled by an election carried by fraud or bribery; third, that by the exercise of that power by the Senate, no Constitutional rights of the States are impaired.

But, sir, we are reminded that the resolution now before us for our action has no precedent in the history of the Senate. I admit that; but Senators will be obliged to admit also that the disclosures here made have no precedent in the history of this body; and for the honor of the American people I will suppose that were there a precedent for the one, there would be precedent for the other; that if such a case had ever been disclosed to the American Senate, then the American Senate would have found a remedy and would not have hesitated to apply it.

But if there is no precedent in our past history, is it not time to make one? All precedents are once made for the first time, and I hope, if such a duty devolves upon us, we shall not shrink from it.

It is said, also, that the acceptance of the doctrine upon which this resolution is based would arm a bare majority with dangerous powers. Sir, there is certainly the possibility of an abuse of the power. I feel it keenly. There is no power on earth ever so carefully guarded but is liable to abuse. It is the nature of power. But I invite Senators to consider whether the danger on the other side is not more to be dreaded than the danger on this. What will be the consequence if, under circumstances such as are now surrounding us, we do reject

that doctrine which gives us the power to declare a seat vacated upon the ground of bribery? Look around you. It is not from Kansas alone, it is from different States, that rumors reach us of the election of Senators by bribery, undoubtedly groundless in some cases, utterly so, I hope; but, in other cases, bearing a very serious appearance. Do we not all know that after two senatorial elections within a few months, those who had presented themselves as senatorial candidates were arrested upon charges of bribery and are now under indictment? I am very far from desiring to prejudge any of those cases; but the testimony here before us discloses a tendency of a most alarming nature, which I am afraid is not confined to one State nor confined to one portion of the country.

Here I come to the question of fact. We have been advised by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. CARPENTER] to read this testimony, and then to form our own conclusions. I have followed that advice, or rather I acted upon my own impulses in doing so before the advice was given. I have read this testimony, every line of it, as carefully and conscientiously as it was possible for me to do; and now, sir, what do I find here? I find a man unknown to the political world. After the learned definition of the phrase "political status," which was given us yesterday by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. LOGAN], I will not apply that term; I will simply say that he had not signalized himself by conspicuous public service, that he was unknown to political fame, that he had given no evidence of uncommon ability in a public career; that, in other words, he had not shown those qualities which usually are apt to draw upon a man the eyes of the people with reference to high political office. That may be nothing to the dishonor of the Senator from Kansas, for not all men have had the same opportunities.

But it appears as a fact that he was mainly distinguished by one thing, and that was, an uncommon abundance of money. He appeared as a candidate for the Senatorship surrounded by a horde of those political managers, whose whole political wisdom consists in a knowledge of the low tricks of the trade, in the handling of the appliances of corruption. And behind that group there loomed up one of those great moneyed corporations which now so frequently thrust their hands into the legislation of this country, who have already acquired so dangerous a power, and are threatening to extend it in a still more dangerous degree. He first buys off one competing candidate for \$15,000, cash down, who did engage to transfer to him his following in the legislature, as so many head of cattle. So surrounded he steps upon the scene. The cry goes forth that there is money in that election, much money, money for all who are willing to aid. The presence of the temptation stimulates at once every vicious appetite within its reach; one man who has a vote obtains money for casting it; another learns of it and asks himself why should he cast his vote for nothing. The frequency of the practice blunts the individual conscience, and that legislature is transformed into a market where votes are bought and sold. It is thus, as I read this testimony, that Mr. Caldwell was elected a Senator of the United States.

Now, sir, I find here not a mere isolated instance of the indiscretion of an over-zealous friend, but I find here bribery systematically organized; I find here a bacchanalian feast and riot of corruption. And when you read the testimony your imagination will fairly recoil from the spectacle of baseness and depravity that presents itself.

Well, sir, from the testimony as I find it, one thing has become clear to my mind; it is that this is not one of those cases of bribery in a single instance which we have

heard spoken of as tainting an election, and, therefore, I do not discuss the question whether by a single case of bribery the election would be invalidated. But what has become clear to my mind is, that Mr. Caldwell could never have been elected Senator of the United States but for the corrupt use of money all around him.

In other words, it was the corrupt use of money and nothing else that effected and carried that election. Sir, I ask nobody to believe my mere statement and assertion; I invite every Senator to take this testimony into his own hands, to read it word for word and line after line, and if they do not come to the same conclusion, let them not vote as I shall. If I were a jurymen, acting under the oath of a jurymen, called upon to give my verdict, my verdict would be as I have stated; and let me say to Senators who have discussed the question of the facts that that discussion has strengthened rather than weakened my conviction.

Sir, it is to be feared that cases like this are not entirely isolated, and I beg you to consider that they certainly will not stand alone if you permit a case like this to pass with impunity. Let me ask you what can we do, what shall we do, under such circumstances? What is the duty of those who have arrived, from their study of the case, at the same convictions that I entertain, and I know there are many upon this floor? Shall we say that although the testimony convinces us that here a seat in the Senate has been purchased with money, yet that seat shall be held by the purchaser as if it had been acquired by an honest and fair election? Shall we declare, are you, Senators of the United States, prepared to declare that when a man buys a seat upon this floor, buys the high quality of a Senator of the United States, and pays for it, it belongs to him as his property, and that, according to the fifth article of amendment to the Constitution, no private

property shall be taken for public use without just compensation? Is that the light in which you look at a transaction like this? Shall we increase the temptation already working to so fearful a degree by assuring to the purchaser of a seat in the Senate of the United States full security of enjoyment? Have you considered the consequences of such indulgence? Let me ask your attention to one of them. To-day, Senators, we may still be able, when we know that a seat has been acquired by purchase, to vacate it by a majority vote; but if you encourage this practice by the promise of impunity, do you know how long it will be before so many of these seats are filled by purchasers, that the struggle will become utterly hopeless? This is not a mere dark fancy, not a mere offspring of a morbid imagination.

The country at this very moment is ringing with the cry of corruption. Is it without reason? Never before have the agencies been so powerful which seek to serve private interests by a corrupt use of money, and never before has the field of political life been so well prepared for their work. The same causes will always and everywhere bring forth similar effects. We have had a great civil war. That civil war, with its fluctuations of values and its tempting opportunities for the rapid acquisition of wealth, has left behind it a spirit of speculation and greed stimulated to most inordinate activity. There is prevalent a morbid desire to get rich and to indulge in extravagant enjoyments; and the more it grows the greater will grow also the unscrupulousness of men in the employment of means to attain that end. But more than that. More than ever before has the Government of the United States extended its functions beyond its legitimate sphere; more than ever has the public Treasury been pressed into the service of private interests. Do we not all know it? Do we not see and understand what is going

on around us? I ask you, sir, what is it that attracts to this National capital the horde of speculators and monopolists and their agents who so assiduously lay siege to the judgment and also the conscience of those who are to give the country its laws? What is it that fills the lobbies behind these green doors with an atmosphere of temptation so seductive that many a man has fallen a victim to it who was worthy of a better fate? What is it that has brought forth such melancholy, such deplorable exhibitions as the country witnessed last winter—exhibitions which we should have been but too glad to hide from the eyes of the world abroad? It is that policy which seeks to use the power of this great Republic for the advantage and benefit of private interests; it is that policy which takes money out of the pockets of the people to put it into the pockets of a favored few; it is that policy which, wherever it has prevailed, in every age and every country, has poisoned the very fountains of legislation. Do you think, sir, that the consequences now and here will be different from what they have been at other times and elsewhere? Are not your great railroad kings and monopolists boasting to-day that they own whole legislatures and State governments and courts to do their bidding? Have we not seen some of them stalking around in this very Capitol like the sovereign lords of creation?

Are not some of them vaunting themselves now that they have made and can make profitable investments in members of Congress and in Senators of the United States? Have we not had occasion to admire the charming catholicity, the delicious cosmopolitan spirit with which these gentlemen distribute their favors, as was shown before the Credit Mobilier Committee of the House, when Mr. Durant testified that when he gave money for an election, it was entirely indifferent to him whether the man was a

Democrat or a Republican provided he was "a good man"? And now let them know that a man who has purchased his seat here, or for whom it has been purchased with money, will be secure in the enjoyment of the property so bought, and, I ask you, will not their enterprise be limited only by their desires, and will not the rapacity of their desires be limited only by their opportunities? As long as such evils are permitted to exercise their influence, they will spread with the power of contagion, and nothing but the most unflinching resistance can check the evil.

Such, Mr. President, is our condition. Everybody sees it; everybody feels it; everybody knows it is so; and if we do not, the people of the United States do. And we must not be surprised if now and then the voice of some organ of public opinion comes to us with a loud complaint of the pusillanimity of Congress in dealing with such things. The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. CARPENTER] the other day spoke of it with a somewhat lofty contempt as the clamor of the mob. It may be such sometimes, but let us see what mob it is we have to deal with now. I will read a few newspaper extracts about the Credit Mobilier investigation of the House:

The House of Representatives—

This was written while the proceedings were still going on—

The House of Representatives is presenting just such an opportunity in its treatment of the Credit Mobilier question. It is acting as if it lacked the courage to follow the men who have thrown the first stone. The evidence against Brooks and Ames is overwhelming. It is their own evidence. The only possible ground for excusing them is that what they have done is not bad for Congressmen to do. The case of all Congressmen who have held Credit Mobilier stock is also plain. The stock was an improper one to hold. It created

an interest in defrauding the Government. To refuse to censure the holders of that stock is to say that the Congressional standard of morals is not high enough to condemn it.

Now, gentlemen, do you know what paper published this article? Not the New York *Tribune*, or the *World*, but the New York *Times*.

Here is another, written after the Credit Mobilier proceedings had closed:

The action of the House of Representatives on Judge Poland's Credit Mobilier report, in substituting a vote of censure and condemnation for the resolution expelling Ames and Brooks, and passing over the other inculpated members without notice, fell far short of the just expectations of the country. It was a clear case of moral cowardice, an unmanly shirking of responsibility. After rejecting a resolution which involved a denial of its right to expel Ames and Brooks for the offense with which they were charged, after finding them guilty by a more than two-thirds vote, the House adopted a resolution which virtually declares that a member may offer or accept a bribe and yet not be disqualified from retaining his seat in Congress.

Absolute condemnation must be the verdict of the country on such a lamentable exhibition of moral pusillanimity.

Who was the man who wrote that article? It appeared in *Harper's Weekly*, and I presume was written by our friend the Hon. George William Curtis.

Now, sir, such words are not those of papers which are in the habit of finding fault with the Administration and the majority. The party service rendered by these papers justifies us in supposing that such words were extorted from them by facts which they could and would neither deny nor gloss over; and certainly, when they speak of public sentiment, they will not make that public sentiment appear in a darker color than it really bears.

I do not quote this language as having the least possible direct or indirect bearing upon the merits of the question now before us, but I quote it to show you a fact which to us as to every citizen is of the highest possible public importance. That fact it is useless to disguise, and we had better fully understand and appreciate it; it is that the confidence of the American people in the integrity of their public men is fearfully shaken. That is the truth, and nobody who knows the country will deny it. Whatever you may think of the causes which have brought forth this result, whatever of the justice of this sentiment, one thing is certain; the fact itself is a public calamity; for, as has often been said in these days, and as can never be repeated too often, what is to become of the respect of the people for the laws if they lose their confidence in the law-makers? I say this not in order to cast a slur upon any one, but to admonish the Senate not to forfeit or jeopardize or weaken that confidence which it may still enjoy. But the Senate will weaken that confidence if, with such evidence before its eyes as confronts us here, it refuses to employ that power which it wields for the protection of its integrity; for the people would be justified in thinking that, if we permit seats here to be bought, we cannot, if we were willing, prevent legislation from being sold.

I would listen to the clamor of the mob just as little as any man on this floor; neither would I, in order to gain the confidence of the mob, descend to do a thing which my conviction of duty did not clearly command. I would face the mob without flinching to prevent a wrong. But I would not treat with contempt, I would treat with respect, that popular voice which calls upon me for nothing else but that I should fearlessly do my duty.

I am far from asking anybody who, upon a conscientious examination of the evidence before us, has not

arrived at the same conclusions that have grown up in my mind, to vote as I shall vote; but to those who have formed the same convictions let me say, there is something higher at stake here than the fate of one individual, whom we might regard with sympathy and compassion; something higher also than the danger that might possibly grow from an abuse of power by the majority in vacating seats or annulling elections; and that something is the purity, nay, the very existence of the representative character of our institutions. You speak of partisan recklessness that might unscrupulously employ such a power for its own selfish ends. I know that danger as well as any one knows it; I fear it just as much as any one; I am certainly not inclined to underestimate it; but I entreat you to consider that, by assuring impunity to such offenses as we are here dealing with, by securing the full fruits of their iniquity to those who purchase seats in this body, you will invite to the Senate of the United States an element which, in its very nature corrupt, will be the readiest, the most servile, the most dangerous tool in the hands of reckless partisanship. For you must know that those who feel themselves most vulnerable, those who have to shun the searching light of inquiry, will never have that courage of independence which defies attack, but are apt to be the first to earn, by the most abject and slavish service, refuge and security under the protecting wing of a powerful party. Secure the exclusion from our legislative halls of that class of men who, accustomed to the use of ignoble means, must, in the very nature of things, serve ignoble ends, and you will have secured a much better safeguard against the transgressions of a reckless partisan spirit than by confiding our power within narrower limits than those by which the Constitution has circumscribed it.

I repeat, it is the purity, it is the very existence of the

representative character of our institutions that is at stake; for when it is known that seats in this body can be bought and held by right of purchase, sellers and purchasers will multiply in the same measure as the wealth of this country grows to be plundered, as the interests vary to be subserved, as the rapacity of greed increases to be glutted, and the day will come when this body will represent the blood-suckers and the oppressors of the people, and no longer the people themselves.

Sir, it is at last time that we should look the dangers which threaten this Republic in the face. This Republic has no monarchical traditions; it has no pretenders of historic right to disturb its repose or to plot its overthrow. It is not likely to succumb to the shock of force. But there have been republics before this just as sound and healthy in their original constitution as ours, but which have died from the slower but no less fatal disease of corruption and demoralization, and of that decay of constitutional principles and that anarchy of power which always accompany corruption and demoralization. It is time for us to keep in mind that it takes more to make and to preserve a republic than the mere absence of a king, and that when a republic decays, its soul is apt to die first, while the outward form is still lasting to beguile and deceive the eyes of the unthinking. I hope and trust that we are still far from that point; but I think no candid observer will deny that there have been symptoms of a movement in that direction; and I say it with gladness, there are also symptoms justifying the hope that the downward movement may soon be checked if the checking has not already commenced.

I ask you, what is our office under such circumstances? This is the Senate of the United States. No parliamentary body in the world, not even the House of Lords of Great Britain, possesses such exalted attributes, enjoys

such a plenitude of power, is loaded with such vast responsibilities. No parliamentary assembly has in its past history been more adorned with genius and public virtue. Let no man say that of all parliamentary bodies in the world this is the only one—yes, the Senate of the United States, with all its exalted attributes, with all the plenitude of its power, with all its vast responsibilities—is the only one that has no power to judge whether its members are honestly elected, and to declare an election illegal and void on the ground of bribery, fraud and crime; that this is the only parliamentary assembly on earth which, doubting its own authority, is helplessly to surrender to the invasion of men who purchase with money their way to the highest legislative dignity of the greatest of republics, and, having bought their seats, will sell our laws. When the American people struggle against the power of corruption, their Senate at least should march in the front rank of the advancing column; their Senate at least should hold high its own standard of honor and purity, which is to restore the waning confidence of the masses in the integrity of the law-makers.

Sir, whatever personal disagreements, whatever partisan quarrels, may divide us, upon this, at least, all American Senators should be unanimous. For I entreat you not to forget—and no man who has read the history of the world with profit will or can forget—that when, in a republic circumstanced like this, the power of corruption has grown great, and threatens to become overwhelming, and a movement of the popular mind has sprung up to resist and check it, one of two results will follow: either that movement of healthy reaction will succeed, the social and political atmosphere will be purified and all will go well,—or the movement will fail; a feeling of discouragement, and then of torpid indifference, will settle upon the popular mind; further effort will be dead-

ened by hopelessness, and corruption will riot, not as it did before, but far worse than ever before; and nobody knows where it will end. I need not say to which of these two results the American Senate should use its powers to contribute.

I, for my part, shall vote for this resolution to declare the election of Mr. Caldwell illegal and void. I shall vote for it, clearly convinced, as I am, from my careful reading of this testimony, that Mr. Caldwell's election was effected by the corrupt use of money. I shall so vote, firmly convinced that the Senate of the United States, under the Constitution, does possess the power to declare void an election so carried and effected. If this resolution should fail, and I hope and trust it will not, then I shall vote for the resolution offered by the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. ALCORN] to expel Mr. Caldwell, firmly believing, as I do, that the corruption shown in this case touches his character as well as his election, and clearly unfits him for a seat in the Senate of the United States.

It was with profound regret when I heard the Senator from Illinois [Mr. LOGAN] say that there was here evident an ungenerous and even vindictive desire to persecute Mr. Caldwell, and to sacrifice him as an innocent victim to popular clamor, something like a wide-spread conspiracy to ruin the reputation and the social and political future of that one man. I cannot refrain from repelling this as a most reckless imputation. The Senators whom I know to entertain, with regard to the merits of this case, views similar to my own, are certainly not among the least generous, the least conscientious, and the least honorable of this body. As to myself, I know my own motives. I feel that they need no vindication. Mr. Caldwell has never offended me. I bear him the same kindly feelings that I bear to any fellow-man. Nothing is further from my nature than to harm any human being,

without justice and necessity. Did I believe him innocent, I should not only refrain from everything that might do him harm, but I should be among the first to stand between him and the sacrifice; and even now I assure him it is with the profoundest pain that I see him in his deplorable situation. But, sir, no consideration of personal kindness and sympathy, no emotion of compassionate friendship, can I permit to seduce me, nor should it seduce anybody here, to sacrifice to one individual what is higher than he and higher than all of us—the dignity and the honor of the American Senate, the moral authority of the laws we make, the purity of our representative government, and the best interests of the American people. Whatever sacrifice we may be willing to offer, these things at least should not constitute the victim.

TO O. C. BRYSON

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22, 1873.

I have received your letter of the 17th inst. asking me to use my influence with the Administration to obtain for you the appointment as postmaster at Louisiana [Missouri].

There are several reasons why I cannot comply with your request. In the first place, I have no influence with the Administration. In the second place, my opinions on the civil service are such as to render it impossible for me to advocate the removal of an incumbent merely for the purpose of putting in another man on political grounds. In the third place, I think a newspaper editor should take care to preserve his independence and therefore not accept an official position in which an expression of his true convictions might seriously embarrass him. As an organ of public opinion a newspaper ought to be as

independent as possible. As you state in your letter, you are a young man, and I have no doubt that in the course of your life you will find this good advice.

CURRENCY AND NATIONAL BANKS¹

MR. PRESIDENT:—It will be observed from the statement of the question as it has come from the Chair that the demand made at present by those who desire an expansion of the currency falls far short of what it originally was. It may fairly be assumed that, if we adopt the present proposition, it will serve merely as an entering wedge to prepare the way for greater exaction.

I should not undertake to address the Senate at length on the bill before us but for the last votes on the instructions to be given to the committee, which we took on Friday. I had hoped that from the confused jumble of propositions and counter-propositions, with which this bill had been incumbered nothing would issue that might be seriously detrimental to the best interests of the country. That hope has been turned into something like apprehension, and I feel it my duty now to submit some observations to the Senate.

The Senate has been during these weeks of debate presenting a most extraordinary spectacle. In the second half of the nineteenth century, with the uniform experience of ages before us, in a period of profound peace, with no public dangers pressing upon us the necessity of exceptional measures, with ample resources to defray the expenses of the Government and to develop the resources of the country, the highest legislative body of this Republic,

¹ Speech in the U. S. Senate, Feb. 27, 1874. The Senate had under consideration the bill (S. No. 432) to amend the act entitled "An act to provide for the redemption of the 3 per cent. temporary-loan certificates, and for an increase of national-bank notes," approved July 12, 1870.

which is proud of calling itself the most progressive state of the world, is seriously debating the question whether new issues of irredeemable paper money shall not be resorted to in order to promote the prosperity of the Nation; and such an almost incredible proposition is supported by arguments which will make the civilized world stare if they ever become widely known beyond these precincts.

It has actually been asserted in this body that the precious metals can no longer remain the standard of value in any country. Why? Because the aggregate quantity and value of the precious metals in existence do not equal in value the aggregate amount of all the products of industry and agriculture; an idea just as original and as luminous as it would be to say that a yard-stick cannot remain a standard measure of length because a yard-stick is not as long as a roll of cloth or of carpet whose length is to be ascertained, or because all the existing yard-sticks in the world put together would not have the same length as all the objects whose length is to be measured.

We have been gravely told that conclusive proof of the insufficiency of the amount of currency in this country is furnished by the fact that England and France have a larger volume of currency than we have, and that there are many people in the country who cannot get all the loans and all the discounts which they desire. We have heard it asserted that an irredeemable currency must be a good thing after all, because there are three countries in Europe—Austria, Russia and Italy—whose economic development has been somewhat rapid of late, while those countries have an irredeemable paper currency. Nobody who knows anything about those countries can be ignorant of the fact that the sudden development referred to has been brought about by great and beneficent

changes in their political and social organization, setting free and putting to work all the productive forces of society, and that the leading statesmen of those countries are day and night racking their brains to find means by which to get rid of that curse of an irredeemable paper money, which is here represented as the very source of prosperity. And I would say to the Senator from Indiana, [Mr. MORTON,] who advanced that proposition here, that if he should hold up to those leading statesmen their irredeemable currency as an element of progress, they would receive the assertion with a melancholy smile of derision.

We have been assured here that a sufficient issue of irredeemable paper money will make money as easy in Georgia as it is in England; and that the rates of interest will go down as the quantity of irredeemable currency increases. It has been asserted, in an endless variation of forms, that currency and capital are materially the same thing. But the very climax is reached when we are told that such doctrines, a hundred times exploded as hollow fallacies by the experience of centuries, are in reality the most progressive ideas of this age; that this is the age of railroads and of telegraphs; that society is transformed; and that the notion of the precious metals remaining the standard of value and a medium of exchange is one of those obsolete doctrines which only old fogies will adhere to.

Sir, let us examine a little into the progressive character of these ideas. Here in my hand I hold an edition of Marco Polo's Travels, showing that this progressive idea prevailed in China many centuries ago; and I think it will be instructive to the Senate to learn how much of this progress of ideas lies already behind us.

Marco Polo tells the following story:

Now that I have told you in detail of the splendor of this city of the Emperor's, I shall proceed to tell you of the mint

which he hath in the same city, in the which he hath his money coined and struck, as I shall relate to you. And in doing so I shall make manifest to you how it is that the Great Lord may well be able to accomplish even much more than I have told you or am going to tell you in this book. For, tell it how I might, you never would be satisfied that I was keeping within truth and reason!

The Emperor's mint, then, is in this same city of Cambaluc, and the way it is wrought is such, that you might say he hath the secret of alchemy in perfection, and you would be right! For he makes his money after this fashion:

He makes them take off the bark of a certain tree, in fact of the mulberry tree, the leaves of which are the food of the silkworms; these trees being so numerous that whole districts are full of them. What they take is a certain fine white bast, or skin, which lies between the wood of the tree and the thick outer bark, and this they make into something resembling sheets of paper, but black. When these sheets have been prepared, they are cut up into pieces of different sizes. The smallest of these sizes is worth a half tornesel, the next, a little larger, one tornesel; one, a little larger still, is worth half a silver groat of Venice; another, a whole groat; others yet, two groats, five groats and ten groats. There is also a kind worth one bezant of gold, and others of three bezants and so up to ten. All of these pieces of paper are issued with as much solemnity and authority as if they were of pure gold or silver; and on every piece a variety of officials, whose duty it is, have to write their names and to put their seals. And when all is prepared duly, the chief officer deputed by the Kaan smears the seal intrusted to him with vermillion, and impresses it on the paper, so that the form of the seal remains stamped upon it in red; the money is then authentic. Any one forging it would be punished with death. And the Kaan causes every year to be made such a vast quantity of this money, which costs him nothing, that it must equal in amount all the treasure in the world.

With these pieces of paper, made as I have described, he causes all payments on his own account to be made; and he

makes them to pass current universally over all his kingdoms and provinces and territories, and whithersoever his power and sovereignty extends. And nobody, however important he may think himself, dares to refuse them on pain of death.

So you see they understood then the art of making paper money a legal tender!

And, indeed, everybody takes them readily; for wheresoever a person may go throughout the Great Kaan's dominions he shall find these pieces of paper current, and shall be able to transact all sales and purchases of goods by means of them just as well as if they were coins of pure gold. And all the while they are so light, that ten bezants' worth does not weigh one golden bezant.

Now he goes on to show how the Kaan is able with this money to buy all precious things, and how his treasury is gradually being filled, and then concludes:

Now you have heard the ways and means whereby the Great Kaan may have, and in fact has, more treasure than all the kings in the world; and you know all about it and the reason why.—*Travels of Marco Polo*, vol. i., pp. 378, 379.

Yes, we do know the reason why; and know something of it from our own experience. Now, sir, the first issues of paper money, as they are traced in the history of China by the learned editor of this work, are as old as the beginning of the ninth century of this era; something over a thousand years. When the system had prevailed a certain period, it was found that the paper money became more and more worthless; then new issues were made to take up the old ones, and one piece of the new issue was exchanged for five of the old ones; thus making a settlement on the basis of 20 per cent., the people losing 80 per cent. We are informed that such a proceeding was

twice repeated, and probably a number of such settlements were made of which no knowledge has reached us; so that while the Great Kaan grew rich, the people grew poorer and poorer.

Then under the Ming dynasty the Government found still another method of more efficiently turning the system to the advantage of the ruler; for the Government paid in paper, but took only its dues in the precious metals; and he who would not obey its behests was put to death. The paper money depreciated to almost nothing; and the whole "progressive" system finally broke down. As Marco Polo would say, "You know the reason why."

In 1294 a Persian monarch initiated a similar system, which produced severe distress, greatly impoverishing the people, and he was murdered in a popular revulsion.

I need not go through the whole history of paper money in Asia to show that the progressive idea of superseding the precious metals with paper money, and especially with an irredeemable paper money, was discovered and tried there; and that the progressive gentlemen who reiterate the same idea as a new discovery are just as progressive as the Chinese were over a thousand years ago.

But, sir, the same progressive idea which was tried and exploded there was discovered by the great Scotch financier, Law. Once more, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the same success Law carried it to the full extent of its progressiveness, and had to flee for his life after the bubble had collapsed. Tried and exploded again!

Then we had the French *assignats*. The country was made immensely rich; there were pieces of paper money enough to cover all the land, and to wrap up all the articles bought and sold. Then the collapse came; and at present you find them as wall-paper covering the cottages of French peasants, to serve as warning examples. Tried and exploded once more!

We had our own Continental money, the history of which is familiar to you. Tried and exploded again!

The theory of the progressive system was discussed with more than ordinary thoroughness in the British Parliament in the debates on the report of the bullion committee. Tried and exploded again!

And now, after all these teachings of history, the same progressive ideas appear as something new in the Senate of the United States. But, sir, when these same fallacies, so hoary with age and so overshadowed with the condemnation of experience, are still repeated again and again in the Senate of the United States, in spite of overwhelming refutation on the spot; when they still seem to be believed in by some; and when, finally, the venerable Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CAMERON] rises and tells us that the very fact of the abundance of money in the great centers at the present moment is conclusive proof that there is not enough of it in the country, and when the same Senator tries to make us believe that by voting for inflation we shall, with him, make war upon the monopolists and the wicked speculators and money-changers, then, sir, I may be pardoned if at this late stage of the debate I come forward once more to speak of first principles.

I want it distinctly understood that the object of the remarks I am going to make will be distinctly this: I desire to show, first, that the gentlemen who favor an expansion of the currency labor under an essentially erroneous conception of the nature of the difficulties for which they want to provide; and, secondly, that the remedies which they propose will not effect a cure at all, but will rather aggravate the evil.

An inflation of our paper money is demanded of us in any form, the form of greenbacks, the form of national-bank currency or both combined, but an inflation in any event upon one single ground—that there is at present an

insufficient supply of currency in this land to fill the legitimate requirements of the business of the country. No other reason is given; and upon that ground the American people are to be put through the same experience which has cost ourselves and other nations who have tried it, so dearly, and a gratuitous repetition of which will be justly looked upon by every sensible man in the world as little short of an act of madness.

The assumption that the volume of our currency falls short of the actual requirements of the legitimate business of the country forms the basis and the only basis of all the arguments that are made here in favor of expansion. Is that assumption correct? I deny its correctness. In the first speech I made on this subject I stated a principle which furnishes a test. I said, assuming that the people have confidence in the Government, issuing an irredeemable currency, that currency will not necessarily depreciate or stand at a discount as to gold, as long as it simply supersedes and does not exceed in volume the gold and silver, and the bank currency based upon gold and silver, which would suffice to transact the business of that country; but, the condition of confidence remaining the same, the irredeemable currency will depreciate, will be at a discount as to gold, as soon as its volume exceeds that quantity. When such depreciation steadily continues under the same conditions of confidence, it is a sure sign that the volume of currency is in excess of the real requirements of the legitimate business of the country. I asked this question: if our currency were insufficient, would it have been possible for the general prices of commodities to remain so long at the high inflation point at which they have stood for years? If really the amount of currency were so insufficient as to impede the necessary transactions of the business of the country, is it not certain that the gold in the country, which is now hiding itself,

would have been driven out of its hiding-places to fill the vacuum occasioned by the insufficiency?

The proposition has remained absolutely unanswered. Indeed, very ingenious efforts have been made to obscure the question. Senators have tried very hard to shed a brilliant flood of darkness upon this subject, and in a measure they have succeeded.

We have been told that in France and in England the volume of currency is much larger than here, although neither the population nor the extent of the country equals ours. That may be true; but I ask what are the circumstances determining the volume of currency necessary for the real requirements of the business of a country?

Is it area? Is it extent of territory? Is it the number of square miles? Why, sir, look at all the new territories of the United States, and there is not a man in this body who will assert that, large as they are, they all together combined would require for their business as much currency as the city of Boston. Therefore it cannot be area; it cannot be extent of territory alone.

Is it population? Look at the whole interior of Africa, with its teeming millions of population, and I am sure the business of the whole interior of Africa does not require half as much currency as the single State of Rhode Island. Therefore it cannot be population alone.

I ask then, is it the amount of productions, the number of exchanges and of values involved? But the same amount of production, the same number of exchanges, the same values involved will require far less currency where there are superior facilities of rapid communication, of banking and clearing-house systems, than where they do not exist.

No one of these elements alone, therefore, will determine the amount of currency which is necessary for the business of a country, but all of them combined will.

Of course I use the word "currency" here in the most restricted sense of the term, not including deposits, bills and checks, as some political economists justly do. Where banks and clearing-houses exist, and the use of bills and checks in the transaction of business is common, currency is mainly used for daily running expenses, for the payment of wages and salaries, and for the settlement of balances. Business transactions in which the whole amount of the value of a commodity passes from hand to hand in the shape of money are exceedingly rare.

Let us in this light compare England with the United States. In England, as well as in all European countries, the number of persons receiving salaries and wages is far greater in proportion than in the United States, and every one who is acquainted with those countries knows it. There are large armies there, large navies, which we have not. The number of private servants is much larger than here. The number of operatives and daily laborers is still greater. Now, although the population of the United Kingdom is only thirty-two million, while ours is forty million, yet the number of persons receiving salaries and wages is not only in proportion, but absolutely greater, much greater in England than here; and although wages are higher here than they are there, yet I think I do not venture much when I say that the aggregate amount paid in wages and salaries in England is much larger than it is in the United States.

But there is another point of great importance. The number of exchanges and the values involved in them are, I might say, infinitely greater there than in the United States. When you compare the exports and imports of Great Britain with those of the United States, you will find that the former are about three times as great as the latter. But that does not cover the case. As everybody knows, England is, so to speak, the clearing-house of the

world, and there are probably more balances settled in England than in the rest of Europe put together. In all respects, therefore, where the actual handling of money is required, that use is much more extensive in England than it is in the United States; and if there is a larger volume of currency there, it is because the very nature of the case demands a much larger volume; and yet, as we know, the volume of banking currency has, within the last thirty years, not only not materially increased, but it has, I think, even diminished.

Now go over to France. There the army is still far greater than in England; the navy about the same; the number of persons receiving salaries and wages still larger than in England, and of course far greater than in the United States. As to the amount of business transacted, if you compare the aggregate of imports and exports with ours, you will find that aggregate about one-third larger. But then, sir, there is still another circumstance to be taken into consideration. In no country in Western Europe, I think, is there a smaller proportion of banking facilities than in France. The clearing-house system is unknown there, and the transactions carried on through bills and checks are more limited than in any other country in Western Europe. But, what is still more important, there are no more inveterate hoarders of money in the world than the French. In no country will you find so large a number of people who will put gold or silver in old boxes or earthen pots under their beds as in France. In some parts of France you can scarcely make a peasant take a bank-note, because he still remembers the *assignats*; and, to repeat what I said before, a great many cottages in France are papered with the old *assignats*, to serve to all coming generations as a warning example.

Thus it seems to me that the comparison between these three countries completely fails, because the conditions

of business on which they are based are wholly different. The true test, as I stated it, stands therefore absolutely unimpeached by it.

But I am met with the assertion that in some sections of the country a scarcity of money is sometimes actually felt by legitimate business. That has undoubtedly been so at certain periods. I showed the other day by numerous and impartial market reports that in the business centers of the country money is at present in abundance, if not in superabundance. There has been much excited squirming about this fact on the part of the advocates of inflation, and attempts were made to deny it, but the evidence was so overwhelming that at last gentlemen took refuge in the assumption that this abundance of money in the business centers of the country was owing to the expansion of the currency by the drafts that have been made upon the \$44,000,000 reserve, and that assertion was put forward in a somewhat triumphant manner.

A single statement will suffice to show the falsity of that assertion. On the 15th of February, 1873, the outstanding greenbacks amounted to \$356,000,000, of which the banks in the three cities of New York, Boston and Philadelphia held \$63,797,982. On the 16th of February, 1874, the outstanding greenbacks amounted to \$381,327,327, of which the same banks in Philadelphia, New York and Boston held \$87,228,654. The currency had been inflated to the amount of \$25,327,327, and three cities—New York, Boston and Philadelphia—had absorbed the whole of the increase with the exception of \$1,896,645. This shows that almost the whole increase remained in three cities in the East, and the States of Rhode Island and Connecticut, with their great banking establishments, are not even taken into account. A large portion of the balance undoubtedly remained there, so that probably something far short of a million has gone

West and South of the \$25,000,000 that were put out by the Treasury in addition to the existing volume of currency. It serves to indicate also what will become of further issues, and how they will be distributed. Senators may figure it out for themselves how much would go to each State at that rate, if one hundred millions were put out, and these three cities are to retain so large a proportion.

No, sir; the cause of the abundance in the money market, especially in the Western business centers, is a different one. First, the crops have been very large, and found a very good and ready market. This resulted in a positive increase of the real wealth of the agricultural States. Secondly, the crisis broke down speculation and gambling, and released large amounts employed in floating that speculation and gambling, and those large amounts are now in the loan market. That is the reason why money is abundant in the Western business centers.

But I am willing to admit that the present abundance of money in the loan market is of a precarious nature. As an irredeemable and redundant currency always begets speculation and gambling, it will do so again in spite of the check that was put upon it by the recent crisis. It is already reviving, although carried on, as I am informed, to a certain extent by a different set of persons and in different ways; but its revival will undoubtedly be quickened, as is always the case, by every addition to our irredeemable currency. It may revive more rapidly even than legitimate business does; and as it grows to greater dimensions, it will draw away from legitimate business and press into the service of speculation as large an amount of currency as it can lay hold of. The expansion of speculation, therefore, is likely, nay, it is certain, to reduce the present abundance of money in the loan market, and again to bring forth here and there a feeling of scarcity. This I think will only be a question of time.

But now, sir, I maintain, first, that although there is an excess of currency in the country over and above the real requirements of legitimate business, a feeling of scarcity may, nay, I say, it will, ensue as speculation expands; and, secondly, that this evil will not be remedied, but will be aggravated by inflation.

And here I will call the attention of Senators on the opposite side to the fundamental error which lies at the bottom of all their arguments. From the fact that a scarcity of currency is sometimes felt by legitimate business, they draw the conclusion that the aggregate volume of currency in the country is insufficient for the real requirements of that business. This conclusion is utterly and glaringly fallacious. Gentlemen confound two things which are essentially different from one another. One is an insufficiency of the aggregate amount of currency in the country, and the other is a vicious diffusion of that currency really sufficient and more than sufficient for all legitimate purposes. The difficulty is not that there is not enough currency on the whole; but, first, that one part of the country is not as rich as the other; and, secondly, that legitimate business is apt not to control enough of currency, because illegitimate business, speculation and gambling control too much. This is one of the evils inherent to an irredeemable and fluctuating paper money; and, I repeat, that evil not only cannot be remedied by an inflation of the same paper money, but it will be seriously aggravated by it, for the simple reason that inflation always stimulates speculation and gambling.

The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. MERRIMON] having been quite prominent in this debate, I take his State as an illustration. He complains that in North Carolina the people are impoverished, that business is cramped, that banking capital is scarce, that rates of

interest are high, and so on. All this is true. I sincerely sympathize with the Senator and his people, and he can scarcely be more anxious to do something to aid them than I am. We are entirely agreed as to the object; but now let us scrutinize the means. The Senator wants more paper money for his people, and therefore he advocates an expansion of the currency. At first he advocated an expansion of the legal-tender currency, and I admit that would certainly be the most efficient means. Now suppose it were made; suppose we issue one hundred or two hundred millions of our irredeemable legal-tenders, how will it operate? Gentlemen speak as if the Government of the United States, issuing an additional amount of paper money, were at the same time issuing a proclamation to the country running somewhat in this way: "All ye who are weary and heavily laden, come to me that I may put money into your pockets. You, good farmer, have a mortgage on your farm and cannot pay it, here is the \$2000 you want; pay it back when you can. You, enterprising manufacturer, want to extend your business and employ more workmen; you want, say, \$200,000 or \$300,000; you can have it immediately; here it is. You, good merchant, want to carry on a larger trade and you are cramped by a want of means; there is nothing in the world easier than to help you." Gentlemen, this sounds extremely preposterous, and yet I assert there have been arguments made in the Senate of the United States which would apply only to such a condition of things, and there are thousands and thousands of people in the country who have been made to believe that an issue of additional currency would work in just that way.

But let us see how it will operate in reality. There are only two methods of putting an additional amount of currency afloat. One is by defraying the running expenses of the Government. That will not apply

here, because we shall raise revenue enough for that purpose. The other is by the purchase of bonds of the United States in the market. That will necessarily have to be resorted to. What, then, will the Treasury do? The Treasury goes to buy bonds where bonds are sold; that is to say, the Treasury goes to Wall street. It carries this additional issue of currency there, and there with it buys its bonds. What is the consequence? The additional amount of currency is thrown at once into the very hot-bed of speculation. What will be the first effect? As soon as speculation is revived, to float speculative enterprise such as concentrates there; and if you want to have a proof of the fact that currency so issued will stay in the East, that proof is furnished by the figures which I read to the Senate only a few minutes ago, showing that the banks of only three cities—New York, Boston and Philadelphia—had absorbed the whole of the new issue, of \$25,000,000, with the exception of less than two millions.

Now, sir, how will North Carolina, how will any other Southern State, be benefited by an operation like this? North Carolina will not get any share of the additional currency for nothing. North Carolina will have to buy that additional currency by offering her products in the market where that currency is distributed, just as North Carolina has to do now. She will have to buy that currency, just as she would have to buy it if it were not paper but gold. If the products of North Carolina are in demand, they will be bought, and currency will go to North Carolina in payment thereof as it does now, and only to that extent; no more. But the additional amount issued by the Government being right in the hot-bed of speculation, and having greatly stimulated that speculation, the rule governing the diffusion of currency will be just the reverse of what

it would be under a healthy condition of business. Instead of so much currency being used to float speculation as can be spared from legitimate business, only so much currency will be apt to go into legitimate business as can be spared from floating speculative ventures. Upon the extent of that speculation, therefore, it will depend how large a proportion of currency will go from that center of speculation to North Carolina and other points; and the more extensive that speculation is, the greater the quantity of currency it will strive to press into its service and it will succeed in controlling, and the smaller the proportion, therefore, that will go into the channels of legitimate business. It follows, as a natural consequence, that everything which tends to excite, to stimulate, to increase speculation and gambling, will not remedy, but will aggravate that evil. Now it is a notorious, undoubted fact, a fact not questioned by any sane man, that an irredeemable paper currency will incite speculation and gambling to a fearful degree; nay, that by its fluctuations it will force people into speculation and gambling. The greater the inflation, therefore, the more speculation will control the currency, and the less a proportion will be left for legitimate business. Far from giving greater facilities to the transactions of legitimate business, increased inflation will only tend to increase the want far in excess of the supply. Inflation will increase the want, for it will run up the premium on gold, and have the effect of raising general prices, rendering thereby a greater volume of currency necessary to effect the same exchanges. Inflation will not in proportion increase the supply, for it will drive a larger proportion of the currency into the channels of speculation and divert it from the channels of legitimate business. One hundred millions will not help you, and if you put out two hundred millions it will help you still less, for the

appetite will not be satisfied; it will only be stimulated by the supply.

Now issue more currency, and it will go just as little where you want it to go as it does now. You can issue it; but, mark my words, you cannot force it into the channels of legitimate business, and you cannot force it out of the channels of speculation. The currency you issue will fall under the control of exactly the same class of men who control it now, only in a larger and more oppressive form. With every addition you make, a larger proportion will go into the hands of those who have too much already and use it for bad purposes; and it will increase their power to keep it out of the hands of those who have not enough, and who would use it for good purposes. You are indulging in a dangerous, I might say a childish, delusion if you think that you have any power to prevent new issues from flowing exactly the same way the old issues have gone. Increase the volume of the stream, and you will make it flow only the faster, but not in a different direction. Quibble about it as you may, draw what fancy pictures you will, you cannot deny the stern fact which stares you in the face: **AN INFLATED IRREDEEMABLE CURRENCY IS NOT THE PEOPLE'S MONEY; IT IS THE SPECULATOR'S MONEY.** It will only be a more powerful weapon in the hands of the speculator to cripple legitimate business and to oppress the people the more there is of it. It always has been so, and it always will be so; and the sooner the American people make up their minds to this fact and honestly act upon it, the better it will be for their virtue as well as for their prosperity.

Now, sir, sincerely and profoundly do I sympathize with the people of the Senator from North Carolina, as I do with the people of all the States who are suffering; and I should be most happy to aid them in their distress. But, I repeat, I am profoundly convinced that inflation

will not only not help them, but aggravate the evils of which they are complaining. I would not consent to give them poison, even if they asked me for it.

Senators from the South say their people need more currency. No, sir; there is another thing they need. There is another and far greater difficulty. They need more capital; and they indulge in a most fatal delusion if they think that the trick of watering their currency can supply them with that capital. There are some most obvious causes at the bottom of their difficulties. The people of the South have gone through a wasteful war, which has consumed and destroyed a very large proportion of their wealth, and thus their capital has dwindled away. The waste has been increased in some of the Southern States since the war by very bad government; and finally our tariff and the influences of an irredeemable currency have produced upon them the same depressing effect produced by the same influences everywhere upon the agricultural interest. Thus the people of the South have to make up for a very large deficit, and that deficit cannot be covered by paper promises to pay. If they want to regain their former wealth they must adopt the same methods by which wealth is created elsewhere; they must produce more, much more than they spend, and they must carefully husband and gradually accumulate their surplus earnings. That is the way to create wealth and capital available for future production. It is a somewhat slow and painful process, but it is the only process that will be really effective. This applies more or less to the people of the whole country. It is a hard fact. But sincerely as I deplore the misfortunes and embarrassments of the Southern people, I cannot refrain from saying that they lose very precious time, and waste their energies and their ingenuity if they look to any artificial contrivance for their salvation. They seem to

have made themselves believe that an inflation of the currency will aid them in getting upon their feet again and accelerate their recuperation. I am strongly convinced that it will not, and I have already given some of my reasons. First, I have shown that an inflation of currency will stimulate general speculation, and that this speculation will so divert the currency from legitimate business that the latter, after the expansion, will not only not have a greater but a less proportion of it for its purposes than before; and secondly, inflation will still more depress the agricultural interest, which is the principal source of prosperity in the South as well as the West, than it is depressed now.

I made that argument before when I first had the honor to address the Senate on this subject. That argument has been attacked by several Senators; and I shall therefore restate it, and try to demonstrate its correctness still more clearly.

A considerable portion of some of the most important products of agriculture is exported, and the home price of the whole crop of those specific articles is regulated by the foreign market. That is a universally known and recognized fact. The prices ruling in the foreign market are, first, depressed by the free competition of the whole world; and, secondly, a specie standard prevailing there, they are not driven up by the inflation that has enhanced the prices of all other articles in this country. The farmer or the planter has, therefore, to sell these staple crops at the low prices regulated by the foreign market, while for all the necessaries he has to buy he pays the prices grown up to an exorbitant height, far beyond the premium on gold, by our home inflation. This was my original statement. The correctness of that statement, I say, has been questioned.

The Senator from Massachusetts on my left [Mr. BOUT-

WELL] said that the influence of a depreciated currency does not raise general prices by more than the amount of gold premium if the depreciation of the currency remains steady at the same point. But the difficulty is that the depreciation of the currency does not remain steady at the same point. You might just as well say that when we have a heavy fall of snow late in the winter or early in the spring, there will be no freshets in the rivers, for if the snow does not melt it will not increase the volume of the water. That is perfectly correct; but the difficulty is that the snow will melt, just as an irredeemable and inflated currency will fluctuate and will depreciate. Our experience shows us that the premium on gold in this country has not remained at the same point for a single week, scarcely for a single day.

The Senator from Illinois [Mr. LOGAN] said that he thought the same law was governing the price of an imported article that was governing the price of an exported article in the case of a depreciated and fluctuating currency. Now, sir, I am going to show that the same law does not govern these two things. Let us see how it works. The importer or the wholesale merchant in New York, when putting up his goods for sale, will first add to the gold price the premium on gold. That is universally conceded. But he knows that the premium on gold or the discount on the currency fluctuates, and that if the latter be inflated it will certainly depreciate. If he sells on credit, however short that credit may be, he runs this risk: that the sum he receives in paper money for his goods will not represent the same gold value which the same sum represented at the time when the sale was made; and here an important element comes into the calculation of prices, which has been left out by all the Senators who, taking the opposite view, have discussed this subject. It is the element of risk. The importer,

or the manufacturer, or the wholesale dealer must protect himself against the contingency of fluctuation; and thus he puts upon the price of his goods a certain percentage to cover that contingency. In other words, he makes his customers pay for the gambling risk which he himself has to run. The jobber who buys from the importer or the manufacturer has to put his gambling risk upon the price again, for he runs the same chance. The Western or Southern wholesale dealer who buys from the jobber has to do the same thing once more, for he again runs the same chance. Then the Western or Southern retailer, into whose hands the goods finally pass, has to do the same thing again, if he sells on credit, for he again runs the same chance. Thus two, three or four gambling risks are put upon the price of an article before the commodity, as it issues from the hands of the original seller, passes into the hands of the consumer; and thus the rise in the price of commodities goes far beyond the premium on gold, especially when the fluctuations of the currency, as inflation will always make them, are tending in the way of depreciation.

Now go to New York and every candid merchant will tell you the same story. I know of merchants in New York who actually changed the prices of their commodities during violent fluctuations of the currency six times in one week; and one told me himself that he had done so several times in one day, always lowering or raising the gambling risk he had put upon the price of his commodities as circumstances changed. And experience teaches us that merchants are apt to be very quick in putting up prices and very slow in putting them down.

Hence it is clear that while the farmer or planter gets for his product only the gold price, with the gold premium added at the place of sale, he must pay for all he has to buy the gold price, with the premium added, and an

additional amount covering the gambling risks of three or four dealers through whose hands the purchased articles pass before they reach him; and that additional amount covering the gambling risk will naturally grow very much higher when the currency is inflated and in process of depreciation. The conclusion is inevitable that in this point of view, the correctness of which cannot be questioned, an irredeemable fluctuating currency cannot be anything else but a curse to the agricultural interest, a curse the more oppressive as inflation goes on; and the more inflation there is the more the farmer will lose in buying in proportion to the prices at which he has to sell.

The other day I had a very interesting conversation with a Southern planter as to the effect which an inflation of the currency would have upon his interests; and I would ask those gentlemen who have the interests of the farmers so dearly at heart to give me their attention. The planter said to me: "I am in favor of inflating the currency; but as to whether the currency should be inflated just at this present moment, I am a little doubtful." I asked why. "Well," said he, "I have sold my cotton crop already and received the money therefor. There is only a very small quantity left in my hands. I sold my crop, and received the money when gold was down to 10 per cent. If we inflate the currency now, and gold runs up to 15 or 20, I shall have to lay in my supplies and buy my necessities when the currency is depreciated, and prices have risen accordingly. Thus I have sold at cheap rates and shall have to buy at high rates. This would be for me a losing business. I should prefer, therefore, that the currency be not inflated just now, but that the effect of inflation take place when I have to sell my next crop." That planter was very sensible. That the currency should be inflated after

you have sold your crops, and when you have to buy your supplies, that is not what you bargained for. If the farmer or planter could inflate the currency and run up the premium on gold when he sells his crops, and then so manipulate the currency as to raise the value of paper money and depress the premium on gold when he buys his supplies, of course that would be a winning trick. But those who buy from and who sell to him would try to play the same game; and in this tricky game the honest farmer would be sure to come to grief, as he has come to grief already.

No; if the farmer or planter wants to prosper he will, above all things, use every effort within his power to rid the country of a system of currency which obliges him to sell at low and to buy at high prices. He may for a moment think that inflation will aid him in paying off his debts, if he has any; but upon consideration he will discover that debts are paid out of surplus earnings, and that his earnings will be depressed when the price of what he buys is high in proportion to the price of what he sells; that his surplus earnings will grow larger as soon as the price of what he sells is put upon an equal footing with the price of what he buys. He will discover that the trick of depreciating the legal-tender by inflation, in order to pay what he owes in a currency less valuable, will not redound to his advantage in the end, and that in this, as in all other things, honesty is, after all, the best policy. He will discover that an honest currency, which permits him to buy and sell on the same basis of value, is for him the safest basis of prosperity, and I trust the time is not far distant when the farmers, whatever artifices of demagogism may be used at present upon them, will, as one man, stand up honestly and intelligently for the earliest possible return to specie payments.

Another scheme by which more currency is to be

introduced into the West and South, and a larger amount of circulating medium is to be made available for legitimate business, is the establishment of a greater number of national banks of issue. The complaint is that the Eastern States have an undue amount of national-bank circulation, and therefore enjoy in a measure a monopoly. I admit this to be true. I will not discuss here the system of banking in all its aspects, but I will inquire how far the establishment of more national banks of issue in the West and South will remedy the real evil complained of—which evil consists in a lack of loanable capital there. If the remedy proposed is to serve any good purpose at all, then the establishment of new national banks of issue must increase the available amount of loanable money. If it does not do that, it renders scarcely a service worth mentioning. Now, will it do that? The Senator from Indiana, who is always ready with his answers, says yes; that it will increase the amount of loanable money by the amount of bank-currency put out; for, he argues, the currency issued will be given out in loans and discounts which every thirty, sixty or ninety days will return to the banks. The currency will, therefore, stay where it is issued, and not flow East. Is this sound? I assert that it is fallacious in the highest degree. The Senator simply forgets to tell us how those new banks are to get their issues.

Let us look at the provisions of the national banking act. It provides that, in order to establish a national bank, United States bonds must be deposited in the Treasury of the United States, and that 90 per cent. of the nominal amount of those bonds may be issued by the national bank as currency.

Now, in the first place, those who want to establish a national bank will have to deposit the bonds. It is a notorious fact that in the West the amount of United

States bonds held is rather small, and in the South still smaller, and the bonds which are there are mostly held as fixed investments. The persons who want to establish national banks must therefore buy their bonds. They must buy them where bonds are sold, that is in the Eastern markets; and they must buy their bonds with money. Where do they get that money? They take that money out of their home circulation, and the money so taken out of their home circulation they carry to New York. Now see how this operates. For a \$1000 bond they have to buy they pay, as 5 per cent. bonds now stand, about \$1120 in currency. That sum of \$1120 is withdrawn from their home circulation and is added to that of New York. Then they take the \$1000 bond so purchased to Washington, and for that \$1000 bond they get \$900 in bank currency, and the \$900 they carry home. Then they lock up 15 or 25 per cent. on the \$900, as the reserve prescribed by law, in their bank vaults, as they may be country or city banks. For the \$1120 carried to New York the country bank then puts out \$865 and the city bank \$675 to accommodate their customers with loans and discounts. These loans and discounts may indeed come back to the bank every thirty or sixty or ninety days. But does not the Senator from Indiana see, is there anybody so blind as not to see, that a much greater amount had gone East before the Western or Southern bank could make any loans and discounts to its customers with its national-bank circulation? Is it not as clear as sunlight that for every \$865 issued by a country bank, or every \$675 issued by a city bank, \$1120 had gone to New York before? Is it not clear that the amount of loanable money, instead of being increased, has been diminished 30 or 40 per cent. by the operation? It is true that by the establishment of national banks here and there some greater banking facilities may be offered.

They take deposits, and they make discounts; but the value of all the facilities thus offered will not make up for the diminution which the home circulation, the amount of loanable money, has actually suffered in that locality by the process. Where, then, is the increased accommodation of the business public? Nowhere; but the result is just the reverse.

But, sir, in the establishment of a great many Western and Southern banks things have been done which show the effect upon the home circulation still more clearly. Banks have been established, not upon money taken out of their home circulation, but upon credit. New York bankers (and I have this from one of them) were applied to by parties from the West to advance the money for purchasing the bonds necessary for the establishment of a national bank in the West. The New York banker bought the bonds and charged a commission and interest. Then he deposited the bonds in the Treasury at Washington, and the national-bank currency was issued thereon. But that currency did not go West at all. The New York banker kept it as part payment for his advances and commission in purchasing the bonds for the Western parties, and the latter had to cover the balance by drawing what money they could from the West. Can anybody tell me how the amount of loanable money was increased by this operation in that Western locality where the bank was established? Not even the currency went there, but the amount covering the difference between the currency and the bonds was drawn from there, being thus a clear deduction from the home circulation. Everybody acquainted with these things knows that this has been the case in a great many instances.

But the Senator from Indiana tells us that many applications are made for permission to establish national banks in the West and South. That is probably true.

Why are they made? The persons making them know well what they are doing. The bankers themselves may do a profitable business, drawing interest on their bonds and on the circulation at the same time. But the difficulty is that their profits are their own and do not benefit the business community; for the amount of loanable money which is to accommodate business men and help along enterprise is not only not increased but is seriously curtailed by the operation, and the result is not that the West or the South gets more, but that the East gets more and the West and South less available funds after it than they had before.

The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. ANTHONY] was perfectly candid when he said, in opposing the bill now before us, that he did not do it because the transfer of twenty-five or fifty millions of national-bank currency from New England to the West would decrease the capital of New England one single farthing, for everybody can see that it would not, but he was pleading merely for the interest of the banking institutions, which do not want to have their business disturbed.

Now, sir, carry out this system on the largest scale, by a free-banking act, and what will be the result? It will be exactly the same, only much extended and intensified. And it is very probable, nay almost certain, that what may be called the banking monopoly of New York and New England will, by a free-banking act, not be weakened, but it will become stronger and more firmly established than ever before. And why? Simply because in the East, in New York and New England, they have the capital to invest in banking establishments; they have the bonds themselves, and can establish national banks without sending money away. They will, therefore, then as now have and keep a vast majority of the banks, and a preponderance of the national banking currency. They

will of course enjoy the lion's share of the business. If gentlemen complain now of the grasp the monetary power of the East has on the West and South, we shall see that grasp not weakened but very much strengthened by what is here proposed.

MR. CAMERON. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. CAMERON. I think, in the last remark he made, the Senator has forgotten that national banks cannot have more than a certain amount of circulation, so that I do not see how it is possible all the money should get into the city of New York. People have a right to establish banks with as much circulation as possible, but, no matter what the capital may be they can have only so much circulation.

MR. SCHURZ. The Senator will admit that, although they have at present more than by the spirit of the law they are entitled to, if we pass a free-banking act, they can, in New York and New England, establish a great many more banks than now; nothing is to hinder them; and inasmuch as they have the capital and the bonds, they have greater facility in establishing these banks than the West and South.

MR. CAMERON. The Senator is right in part, but not altogether. They may establish more banks, but these banks cannot have as much circulation as they had originally. Besides that, I hope if we pass a general banking law there will be such restrictions as will prevent capital in New York from controlling the system.

MR. SCHURZ. Unless those restrictions amount to this, that the people of certain States shall be prohibited from establishing new banks of issue while the people of other States shall be permitted to establish them, the restrictions will not be worth a farthing. The banks will

be established where the capital is with greater facility than where it is not.

MR. CAMERON. Once more I will say capital will go where it can be most profitably exercised; and therefore I do not think it will go to New York or the East, but to the West, where it is most wanted.

MR. SCHURZ. Have not New York banks and the moneyed men of the East every facility now to establish banks in the West as much as they please? Why do not they do it? What prevents a New York banker to-day from establishing a branch of his establishments in Chicago or St. Louis or at Saint Joseph? Nothing in the world.

MR. CAMERON. Because he can do better in New York now.

MR. SCHURZ. Precisely; because he can do better with his bank where there is the most business, and there he remains; and for the same reason more banks will be established where there is the most business. If we complain now, I say, of the grasp of the monetary power of the East over the West and South, we shall see that grasp not weakened, but rather strengthened, by what is here proposed.

I have made these remarks in order to explode that most extraordinary notion of the Senator from Indiana, that if we only permit the establishment of more national banks in the West and South, more currency will go and stay there, because the loans and discounts of the banks will return every thirty, sixty or ninety days; and to dispel that general and almost incomprehensible delusion, that by the establishment of such banks, under such laws as we have, the amount of loanable capital in the West or South will be increased and not diminished. Whatever results free banking under the national-bank act may have, it will certainly not produce those effects which the advo-

cates of free banking in the Senate pretend to be working for.

But the free-banking scheme, as proposed here, must also be looked at from another point of view. It has been argued that free banking, even without any effectual system of redemption, but carried on to any extent under our national-bank act as it now stands, will not lead to inflation, but rather operate in the direction of a return to specie payments. This view has been expressed on this floor; and it is supported by one of the staunchest and ablest advocates of specie payments in the journalistic world, a journal whose opinions on such questions are always entitled to the highest respect; I mean the *Chicago Tribune*. I shall request the Secretary to read the article I send to him, and I call upon the Senators who advocate free banking to listen to the reading, because the argument runs in their way.

The Chief Clerk read as follows:

Free banking does not necessarily involve currency inflation. If everybody who can deposit \$100,000 in bonds at Washington is allowed to issue \$90,000 in national-bank notes, this will not depreciate the currency. A paper currency is worth precisely as much as the money in which it is redeemable. The national-bank currency is redeemable in greenbacks. It is worth, then, just what greenbacks are. Now, if no more legal-tenders are set afloat, their value will remain just about what it is now. But if their value is unchanged, the national-bank notes redeemable in them will also have an unchanged value. So long, therefore, as the currency is increased by the issue of national-bank notes, and not of greenbacks, there can be no depreciation, and consequently, no inflation—for inflation, as the term is used nowadays, signifies an increase in the volume of the currency that causes depreciation, or, as its friends put it, “makes money cheaper.” Free banking would work in this way: If the banks set afloat more currency than the country co¹^d

use, its value would begin to sink below that of greenbacks. As soon as this happened, the banks would be called upon to redeem in greenbacks until the superfluous part of their issue was again in their vaults. In this way depreciation below the greenback standard would be avoided, and the volume of currency would regulate itself. This is substantially the English plan. The greenbacks correspond to the Bank of England notes, and the national-bank notes to those of the English country banks. Our readers will find in the first volume of Tooke's *History of Prices* copious extracts from the testimony of English country bankers on the working of the system there, under a suspension of specie payments. This testimony shows that the amount of currency they could keep afloat varied regularly with the season of the year. During the spring and fall trade they discounted freely, but soon after, their notes were presented for redemption, until the surplus issue was again stored away in their vaults. When the Bank of England contracted its issues, theirs increased; when it increased its issues, theirs contracted. In other words, the currency issued by banks, which could legally circulate any amount whatever, contracted and expanded in precise proportion to the needs of the country. It was thoroughly elastic. Free banking would indirectly aid the resumption of specie payments in two ways. It would make it possible to contract the greenback currency without paralyzing business, because as the greenbacks were withdrawn fresh bank-notes would be issued to take their place. And, again, it would help contradiction, because the new banks formed under it would have to keep their reserves in legal-tenders, and thus a good deal of the greenback currency would be withdrawn from circulation. The Congressmen who are opposing the bills for free banking on anti-inflation grounds are making a great mistake. The measure is not a compromise with the other side. It is a straightforward step towards specie payments.

MR. SCHURZ. When I read that article I must confess that it staggered me a little at first sight; but great as

my respect is for the source from which it comes, I am not able to accept that view of the case. It seems to me that the parallel run here between the issues of the Bank of England and of the country banks during the suspension of specie payments in England, on the one hand, and the legal-tender notes and the national-bank notes in this country, on the other, fails in one very essential point. The Bank of England notes at that period were virtually a legal-tender. I know very well that they were not made so by the express language of the law, but to all intents and purposes they were practically so, and virtually recognized as such by the courts, while the country-bank notes were not. The value as currency of the latter, the country-bank notes, depended entirely on their redeemability in Bank of England notes, and on the credit of the issuing bank. The circulation of the country-bank notes was, therefore, essentially local. But our national-bank notes are virtually to all intents and purposes a legal-tender, just as much as the Treasury note is. By section 23 of the national-bank act of June 3, 1864, they are made receivable in all parts of the United States in payment of taxes, and all other dues to the United States, except duties on imports, and also for all salaries and other debts and demands owing by the United States, except interest on the National debt, and in redemption of the National currency. Now, sir, although they are not literally made a legal-tender in the discharge of private debt, yet being received by the Government for what is due it, and being paid out by the Government for what it owes, they are practically made a legal-tender for all purposes, like the greenback. They are, moreover, founded on the secure basis of Government bonds, payable principal and interest, in gold. Their circulation is therefore not local, but national in the widest sense of the term, just like that of greenbacks. They are just

as safe, and in one sense they are even more so, for they have behind them the solid foundation of a United States bond, payable in gold, and at the same time the ability to pay of the bank that issues them. It is, indeed, provided that they shall be redeemable on demand in Government legal-tender notes, but there is really, as far as I can see, no inducement for the holder of a national-bank note to convert it into a Government legal-tender, for the bank-note does just the same business, and is just as safe as the other. The breaking of the bank that issued it does not injure its value in the least.

I know very well there was a premium on Government legal-tenders as to national-bank notes during the panic. What was the cause of that premium? It was an uncalled-for, unreasonable fear of the country banks that there would be a run on them for the conversion of national-bank notes into greenbacks. But looking at it calmly, undisturbed by the wild influences of a panic, there would not be the least inducement in the world to run to a national bank in order to convert the national-bank note into a greenback. Such things may indeed take place in panics, but panics never can furnish a general rule to control the ordinary run of business.

While in England, during the suspension of specie payments, the conversion of a country-bank note into a Bank of England note meant the conversion of inferior currency into a superior, a safer, and in so far a more valuable one, the conversion here of a national-bank note into a greenback means virtually the conversion of one piece of currency into another which is just as good and no better.

In England the relation of redeemability between country-bank notes and Bank of England notes acted, therefore, somewhat like the relation of redeemability between a bank-note and specie in specie-paying times.

But in this country the relation of redeemability does not act in the same way, because the two kinds of currency are in all essential particulars virtually the same. The only thing that makes them different is the provision of the national-bank act that the national bank is to lock up in its vaults a reserve in greenbacks amounting to 15 per cent., if a country bank, and 25 per cent., if a city bank, of its bank circulation.

Free banking, authorizing the issue of any amount of national-bank notes, only limited by the supply of United States bonds, would virtually permit an unrestricted issue of bank-notes without any system of practical redeemability, for the bank-notes would be only nominally redeemable in Government legal-tenders; while the two kinds of currency, being equally safe, performing the same office, and furnishing for that reason no inducement to prefer one to the other, are both equally irredeemable in fact, and form virtually one and the same system of paper money.

Suppose now that the enactment of such a free banking law results in a large increase of national-bank circulation, what will be the effect? The Senator from Indiana says it will only make things lovely, and not disturb values at all. Let us see.

What are the causes which produce the disturbance of values through an irredeemable currency? There are two. First, lack of popular confidence in the issuer of that currency; and, secondly, the relation the quantity of the currency bears to the actual requirements of the business of the country.

The first of these causes, the lack of confidence in the issuer, operated during the war, while the stability of our Government was still in question, and hence the fact that the fluctuations of the currency went far beyond the fluctuations that would have been caused by the relation

of the quantity of the currency to the actual requirements of the business of the country. That cause, lack of confidence in the issuer, has not operated since the Government showed that it could maintain itself, and also demonstrated its ability to work in the direction of a redemption of its liabilities. But, sir—and I wish the Senator to mark this—that cause will commence to operate again as soon as the quantity of the currency has increased to such an extent as to render doubtful in public opinion the ability or willingness of the Government, or of the banks, ultimately to redeem their promises.

The second cause, that is to say, the relation the quantity of currency bears to the actual requirements of the business of the country, will operate as soon as the quantity of currency in circulation is in excess of the actual requirements of business, and that effect will grow more extensive as the volume of currency is increased. And here, it seems to me, it matters very little whether the inflation of the currency be that of the legal-tender notes or the national-bank notes, only with this difference, that, as I admit, an inflation of the national-bank notes will be 25 or 15 per cent., respectively, less effective, owing to the amount of greenbacks to be locked up as bank reserves; but either kind of inflation, in my opinion, will run up the general prices of commodities, of gold among others; will stimulate speculation, and speculation will have the same effect that it had before. It will draw the currency away from the channels of legitimate business and concentrate it at the great centers under its own control, thus preparing the way for new collapses and disastrous crises. These breakdowns will be the more disastrous the greater the inflation of the currency has been.

Now, sir, I do not wish to be understood as being absolutely opposed to free banking under any circumstances.

I should be inclined to vote for it if it be coupled with an effectual system of redemption. Of course redemption in specie would be the most satisfactory to me. At present redemption means practically nothing. It accomplishes only the locking up of a certain percentage of the greenbacks for a purpose which is only apparent, and which might practically be accomplished by locking up the same amount of bank-notes. Redeemability, as it now is, might become of importance only in the extreme case of violent and extensive fluctuations in the market value of our bonds, such as might be caused by the very improbable contingency of a foreign war and the consequent increase of our National debt. But now, in the ordinary run of business, redemption under our present law has no restraining influence upon the workings of our currency, except locking up a certain amount of greenbacks.

A restraining influence, however, might be imparted to it even while we are under suspension of specie payments by establishing between the Government legal-tender and the national-bank note the same relation which in suspension times existed in England between the Bank of England note and the country-bank note there; that is to say, if we give the Government legal-tender note a sphere of action superior to that of the national-bank note. This might be done by repealing that part of the national-bank act which provides that the national-bank currency shall be a legal-tender in payment of taxes and other dues to the Government; and the system of redemption might be made effectually by establishing assorting-houses at the different business centers of the country. That, I think, would increase the demand for greenbacks in contradistinction to national-bank notes. It would make the conversion of national-bank notes into greenbacks an object of desire in the ordinary run of business,

and it would oblige the issue of national-bank notes, if they are to remain at par with greenbacks, to stay within the limits prescribed by the possibility of actual redemption, made effectual by the establishment of assorting-houses. I throw this out as a suggestion to be considered by Senators.

In that way I think free banking might be kept from running into inflation, and I should be inclined to vote for it. But without such a provision free banking, in my opinion, will result in inflation; and I have shown that an inflation of virtually irredeemable national-bank currency will, first, not remedy the evils which are complained of in the West and South, but rather aggravate them; will not give them a larger amount of loanable money, but seriously reduce that amount; will not destroy what has been called the banking monopoly of New England and New York, but rather confirm and strengthen that monopoly; and, secondly, if a free-banking act such as is proposed, with an effectual system of redemption, leads to the establishment of many new banks of issue as desired, it will have its effect of inflating the currency just at the centers of speculation. All the evils of inflation will inevitably follow; that is to say, violent fluctuations of values, over-speculation and gambling on a larger scale than ever, until a new crash comes, which new crash will be the more disastrous the greater the inflation has been.

Now I desire to address a word to the Senate concerning the effect such a policy will have on the rates of interest. I said in my first speech on this subject that the inflation of an irredeemable currency will not reduce but will raise the current rates of interest; and that proposition has been questioned. The Senator from Illinois [Mr. LOGAN] went into a disquisition on the laws of demand and supply, and the Senator from Indiana [Mr. MORTON]

disposed of the subject by the somewhat jocular remark that if more money were put into the market it would become cheap, just as if more horses and hogs were put into the market horses and hogs would become cheap. I suggest to the Senator from Indiana that the horse and hog argument is not quite sufficient in this case. He has only shown in this instance, as in many others, that he does not appreciate the difference between capital and currency, especially between capital and an irredeemable paper currency. I shall try to make myself clear.

Why will the inflation of an irredeemable paper currency not lower but raise the rates of interest?

In the first place, in depreciating the currency it will make a larger amount of currency necessary to perform the same transactions in business, and the aggregate amount of interest which you would have to pay for the sum you want for the same transactions would necessarily be larger. That, I think, is obvious.

In the second place, when the currency is inflated it incites speculation and gambling. This fact is so notorious that nobody questions it. Speculation and gambling dealing in large ventures and working for very large profits induce, and in most cases force, those engaged in them to pay high rates of interest in order to obtain the money with which to float their speculative enterprises from which they expect such large profits. As soon as speculation rules the money market, the rates of interest will therefore necessarily rise, and legitimate business, from which money is diverted by speculation, must conform itself to those high rates in order to obtain the money which it needs; and hence a general rise of rates.

But still another element comes in here to produce the same effect, and that is the element of risk. When an irredeemable currency is inflated, it depreciates in value. The capitalist who lends out money must take that con-

tingency into consideration. He has to run what I have already called the gambling risk. Now, suppose the Senator from Indiana had \$100,000 to lend out. If he were asked to lend it out, say on three months, he would have to consider whether at the time when the loan will be returned to him his \$100,000 will be worth as much as it was when he lent it out. The currency being inflated and depreciation being the consequence, he will ask himself whether the paper dollar, which is, say, at 10 per cent. discount to-day, will not be at 16 per cent. discount when he gets his money back. Under ordinary circumstances, with a currency of stable value, he may be willing to lend out money say at 6 per cent. a year; but when he is exposed to the chance of losing in three months 6 per cent., or in one month 2 per cent. in the value of the money invested in the loan, then he will certainly not be willing to lend out that money at one-half of 1 per cent. a month, for the simple reason that it would be a losing business to the amount of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. a month. What will he do, therefore? He will in all probability not be disposed to lend out his \$100,000 on three months' time at all. He will prefer to lend it out on call, in the first place, so as to be able to put his hand upon it as soon as the chances so turn that he may lose by leaving it out longer where he has put it; but even then he will want to cover his risk, and he will do that by demanding a higher rate of interest, sufficient to cover that risk. Hence it is that loans on call are preferred, and a higher rate of interest is demanded by lenders to cover the gambling risk, under the influence exercised by an irredeemable currency, which, by its fluctuations, renders the value of the money invested in a loan insecure.

Gentlemen complain that money cannot be had except on call. There is nothing surprising in this. There are, under such circumstances, two good reasons for the un-

willingness of lenders to put out money otherwise than on call; they are the following: a lack of confidence in the stability of business; and, secondly, the growing depreciation of our paper money increasing the gambling risk. But if we inflate the currency still more, the premium on gold will rise still higher; and the evil complained of as to loans will not only not be remedied, but will be vastly aggravated.

The fact that at the present moment loans are comparatively easy in the money market has been referred to as contradicting this view. It does not contradict it at all. The crisis has crippled enterprise generally, and especially speculative enterprise. Speculation has had no time to recover and to produce its effects. Money is plenty in proportion to the present limited requirements of business, and although we have had an addition to the currency of twenty-five or twenty-six million dollars, yet much of the money that makes up that addition, and more besides, is at the present moment lying idle. The addition has not exercised its influence yet, but it will without doubt exercise that influence and produce its effect soon. Speculation is already reviving; we observe it in the very Western markets in the grain trade. It is reviving in New York, as everybody sees. It is reviving rapidly. If we inflate the currency we shall have much more speculation than we had before; and with it, and with a further depreciation of our paper money, all the effects upon the rate of interest which I have stated will rapidly appear with all their oppressive consequences; and then those who clamor for inflation in order to give cheap money at low rates of interest to the people of the West and South will learn to their sorrow that an irredeemable currency is indeed not the people's money but the speculator's money, and that by extending and strengthening that pernicious system they have

brought a curse and not a blessing upon those whose interests they pretend to serve.

A few days ago I received from a friend in Europe a most significant letter, to which an answer was requested. The writer is a merchant who desires to retire from business. He writes me to this effect:

I can realize out of my business several hundred thousand dollars, and should like to invest my money at a good rate of interest. I have thought of investing it in the United States on mortgage security, which, as I am informed, bears from 8 to 10 per cent.; but I learn also that you are likely to inflate the currency in the United States, which, of course, will result in depreciation. I would now ask whether it would be safe for me to make such an investment in mortgage loans in the United States while there is a chance that your legal-tender money may depreciate so that I would lose more by the depreciation of capital invested than I would gain by the interest I might get.

I ask the Senator from Indiana what answer would he give, at this moment, to that gentleman who wants to send several hundred thousand dollars to the United States in order to invest them here?

MR. MORTON. I will answer it after awhile, I think to your satisfaction.

MR. SCHURZ. Will not the Senator answer it now?

MR. MORTON. No; not now.

MR. SCHURZ. He will probably give the same answer that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. LOGAN] has just given in an undertone, "Write him to send it on." Let me tell Senators that we cannot very well expect foreigners to send along their money when the chances are that they will suffer loss in consequence of our own financial policy. Senators ought not to conceal from themselves that the credit of this country has most seriously suffered by the

sale of stocks in Europe which have turned out to be worth far less than they were represented to be.

I consider it my first duty as a citizen of the United States, as an American, to deal fairly and honestly with the foreigner as well as with the countryman; and as an American who has the honor of the country at heart I cannot afford to induce a foreigner to invest money in a venture concerning which I have such good reason to fear that it will be a losing business. I shall tell that gentleman, "Send your money here and tell all your friends to send theirs as soon as we enter upon a policy that will be directed toward specie payments," for then I shall know that the value of the capital so invested will be safe; but I should not consider it honest advice, did I tell him to convert his gold into our paper money, as long as there is danger that the paper money might be depreciated by inflation.

MR. CAMERON. I trust the Senator will allow me to interrupt him for a moment.

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly, with great pleasure.

MR. CAMERON. Does he believe he would be swindling his German friends by advising them to send their money here and invest it in mortgages upon good lands, and good houses and good buildings here? Does he believe that all the people of this country are scoundrels, and that they want to get the money of Europe here upon dishonest and fraudulent representations?

MR. SCHURZ. No, sir.

MR. CAMERON. Does he not know that there is no part of the world in which money upon first mortgage upon real estate is so safe, so secure, as it is in the United States, and in every part of the United States?

MR. SCHURZ. Yes, sir; I know all that. I know that for myself I would ask for no better security than a mortgage on real estate in the United States; but I know

also, as every other Senator knows, that if I had to invest \$100,000 to-day, with the prospect of an inflation of our currency, that \$100,000 to be paid back to me in two or three years, when the premium on gold may not be 10 per cent. but 50 per cent., I would be likely to lose nearly one-half of my capital, however good the security might have been on which that capital was invested.

I would never hesitate to tell Europeans, "Send as much money as you can raise to aid us in developing our resources and to profit by it yourselves," as soon as our monetary system is such as to give them reasonable security that when the loans fall due they will get the same value back which they invested.

Now let me tell the Senator from Pennsylvania I was in Europe last year, and the people there have begun to understand this thing as well as we do. We must not indulge in the delusion that foreign capitalists will be eager to run the risks which a fluctuating currency imposes upon them; and nothing is more natural than that, while we have that currency, many investments of European money are withheld which otherwise we might expect. In this respect the character of our currency must necessarily inflict a very serious injury upon us.

MR. CAMERON. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him again?

MR. SCHURZ. Certainly.

MR. CAMERON. The Senator from Missouri stated a special case of a German friend of his who said he had two or three hundred thousand dollars which he desired to send here to invest in mortgages. Mortgages mean the security of real estate, on which he was told he could get 8 or 10 per cent. Now I want to confine the Senator to that special case. I do not believe any security in the world can be better than that, and no citizen of the United States, no subject of Great Britain, or of any other

country in the world that sends his money here and invests it upon an honest mortgage, has ever lost a cent; and if he can get 8 or 10 per cent., it is twice as much as he could get in Germany or in any other country of the old world. I want the Senator to confine himself to that case, because I do not want the credit of my country destroyed by representations coming from a Senator so distinguished as the Senator from Missouri is, and so ably and so largely connected as he is in Europe.

MR. SCHURZ. The Senator wants me to confine myself to that one case, and I should desire nothing better. Here is a man who asks me, "Can I, at the present moment, send over several hundred thousand dollars to be invested in mortgage securities in the United States, with safety as to the value of my capital, while you have a fluctuating, irredeemable paper money?" That gentleman wants to profit by the rates of interest here prevailing; but above all things he wants to have the value of his capital secured. He will not distrust the mortgage, but he wants to know whether, when the debt falls due, the same number of paper dollars returned to him will be worth in gold as much as they were when he made the loan or mortgage.

MR. CAMERON. The increase of real estate is always equal to any depreciation of the currency.

MR. SCHURZ. But, sir, the increase of real estate in value does not increase the amount of the mortgage, as the Senator knows, just as well as every child in the country knows it. [Manifestations of applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FERRY, of Michigan, in the chair). Order!

MR. SCHURZ. And, therefore, I say so long as the foreign investor cannot be sure that he will have returned to him the same amount of capital, he will not invest. It is useless for gentlemen to close their eyes to this fact.

It is one of the results springing from our irredeemable paper money. It is so, and it cannot be otherwise. If the Senator is answered, and I think he is——

MR. CAMERON. I do not think I am answered at all; but I shall not interfere for the present with the Senator.

MR. SCHURZ. If the Senator wants to put another question to me I shall be very glad to answer it.

MR. CAMERON. I am ready to say that the Senator has not answered my question at all. The special proposition was that these people expected to put their money in mortgages on real estate. I say that no one who has ever invested upon a first mortgage on property at current rates in this country has ever lost by the investment.

MR. SCHURZ. The Senator cannot have so completely misunderstood me as to think that I expressed the least doubt of the safety of mortgages in the United States. If I were worth \$10,000,000 and had it all to invest in loans, I would ask for no better security than mortgages on real estate in the United States. The question is this: Whether a man investing a certain sum in mortgages, when he retires his capital two or three years hence, will not by the depreciation of the currency lose 20 or 30 or 40 per cent. of the value of his capital; whether the dollar that he invests now will be worth just as much when that dollar will be returned to him? That is the question.

MR. CAMERON. I say yes; and I ask the Senator this question: Does he believe that any man who invested \$300,000 in St. Louis for three years could have lost by it, or has lost by it, under any circumstances?

MR. SCHURZ. The Senator from Pennsylvania is an old financier and a very successful one. He certainly knows that when an irredeemable currency is inflated, the effect will be its depreciation; that when he to-day can buy a dollar in gold for \$1.12 in currency, if we expand

the currency at the rate of \$100,000,000 or \$200,000,000 more, he will have to pay \$1.25 or \$1.30 in currency for a dollar in gold. In other words, while a dollar in currency may be worth eighty-eight cents in gold, if we inflate the currency it may be worth then seventy-five or seventy or sixty cents; and, old and successful financier as the Senator is, he is too world-wise not to understand that when I invest eighty cents and get only sixty cents back, I shall be a loser by twenty cents. [Manifestations of applause in the galleries.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is any more disorder in the galleries the Chair will order them to be cleared.

MR. CAMERON. Mr. President, I am too old and too wise to allow the Senator from Missouri to get me off the subject I started upon. I shall not contend in words with him. He can beat me there a thousand to one. But I bring him down to his assertion that he could not afford to allow his foreign friends to come here and invest money upon mortgage. I say he was wrong in that; he was depreciating the credit of the country and doing a wrong to the country which has adopted him and honored him.

MR. SCHURZ. There are other persons, I fear, who are depreciating the credit of the country. They are those who want to continue a money system which introduces into all transactions of business the element of chance and deception; a money system which by that deception injures not only the foreigner who may invest his funds here, but our own people; a system of irredeemable paper money which has time and again fallen under the contempt of civilized mankind. Those, I say, are depreciating the credit of the country who in the very midst of the nineteenth century, with all the lights of universal experience around them, still strive to maintain, to confirm and to perpetuate a disgrace like that. I tell the Senator from Pennsylvania I can think of nothing that would be better

calculated to elevate the American character and to raise the credit of the country in the eyes of the world than a speedy deliverance from that system. Why is it, I would ask him, that the National bonds of ours, than which there is no better security in the world, do not rise higher than they have done? Why is it that they do not keep pace, in proportion to the respective rates of interest, with the best of European securities? Simply because as long as we have this false system of irredeemable money, there is still lurking in the minds of men a secret suspicion that, by some trick or other, the National debt may still be paid off with depreciated greenbacks; and when I say that, I know whereof I speak, for I heard it a hundred times, to my own shame and to that of my country. I know that suspicion is wrong, absolutely groundless; but I consider it my duty, as a candid man, to tell you that such a suspicion exists.

I have now indicated how the credit of the country can be raised and how it is depreciated.

MR. CAMERON. If the Senator will allow me, he is again wrong, in my estimation. It is not because of the doubt of our credit, or our honesty, but it is because of that natural feeling in the human mind that men trust those securities that are near to them. The small money-lender in Germany will lend to a man in his own ward for less interest than he will to a man living a mile off from him in the same city. So the people of France lend their money, and so do the people of England lend it at home first. It is the surplus, which they cannot invest securely, that they send here. Besides, if he wants to make his mortgage secure, it is very easy to make the interest payable in gold.

MR. SCHURZ. Ah! there we come to it. Let us make it all payable in gold; that is what we are contending for.

MR. CAMERON. The difference between the Senator

and me is, that he distrusts the integrity of the American people. I believe that the people of the United States are just as honest as any other people in the world, and I know that they have paid their debts as honestly as any other people in the world ever paid theirs.

MR. SCHURZ. When the Senator from Pennsylvania says that I have said anything to their discredit or reflected upon the honesty of the American people, he says that which he ought to know is not correct. I have said nothing of the kind.

MR. CAMERON. I only take your words.

MR. SCHURZ. I have not used such words. I have said that an irredeemable currency is a dishonest money system. It has been stigmatized as such by the history of the world.

MR. CAMERON. But you talked about trickery in its payment.

MR. SCHURZ. I said this: that if we inflate the currency, the value of money will be depreciated. Is the Senator from Pennsylvania the man to deny it? Does he not know it just as well as I do? Is he not too well versed in addition and subtraction not to know that?

But there was one remark which fell from the Senator from Pennsylvania which really surprised me. He said that the people of Europe took hold of only such loans as were made in their immediate neighborhood. Has he forgotten that during our war hundreds of millions of our bonds went into Germany and were readily taken there while the destinies of the United States were still trembling in the scale of battle? Has he forgotten that? Does he not know that the European countries have been fairly flooded with our railroad securities? Can he count the millions of capital that came from Europe, with which so many of our enterprises were floated, that could not find ready and sufficient capital at home?

MR. CAMERON. The Senator will not represent me fairly. I said that the people of Europe sent their money here after they had invested all they could profitably at home. They send it for profit. I say that the people in the immediate neighborhood in a single city would lend their money more readily to their neighbors than they would to others at a distance; and he knows that a man living in St. Louis to-day would rather lend money at a less interest to people in St. Louis than he would to a man in Pennsylvania of whom he knew nothing. But the Senator beats me in words, and I give up.

MR. SCHURZ. I think it is indeed useless to quarrel about trifles.

MR. CAMERON. I have too much respect for you to quarrel with you.

MR. SHERMAN. I wish to recall to my friend's mind a fact that is known to me, and no doubt known to him, that on account of the uncertainty of the value of our paper money, its constant appreciation and depreciation, nine-tenths, perhaps ninety-nine one-hundredths, of all the loans now made in Europe to this country, both principal and interest, are required to be paid in gold.

MR. SCHURZ. It is a fact as notorious as sunlight; and therefore I express my surprise that so old a financier as the Senator from Pennsylvania should question it in the least.

But now, sir, to return from this digression; and I hope no Senator can have so grossly misconstrued me as to believe that I ever thought of questioning the honesty of the American character, for I have it more at heart than those who advocate the inflation of the currency. I will now say a word about the general law governing the rate of interest.

The rate of interest—and I desire to impress this especially on those of my Southern friends who the other

day asserted that if we could only furnish currency enough the rate of interest would become as low, I think it was in Georgia, as it is in London—the rate of interest at any given point is regulated by the proportion of the amount of loanable capital existing or attainable to the demand for the use of that capital. Loanable capital is that which persons possess beyond the amount used by themselves in production. Where the amount of loanable capital is large, there the rate of interest will be low; and where the amount of loanable capital is small, there the rate of interest will be high. But loanable capital is the accumulation of surplus earnings. It is therefore the growth of time. Hence in communities where production, labor and the accumulation of surplus earnings have gone on but a short time, or where such accumulation has been destroyed, as by war, the rates of interest are high, and will remain so until the necessary accumulation to lower them is effected.

The other day I received a letter from Omaha, in Nebraska, complaining very much that interest ranges there at 12 to 24 per cent., while in Boston and New York, as the letter stated, it ranged only from 6 to 8. That is undoubtedly true. In New York and Boston we can hear exactly the same complaint, that interest ranges there from 6 to 8 per cent., while in London and Amsterdam it ranges from 2 to 3; and the reason of the difference between Omaha and Boston, and between Boston and Amsterdam is exactly the same. In London and Amsterdam there are large accumulations of loanable capital; centuries have been spent in piling it up; larger accumulations of loanable capital than in New York and Boston. And in New York and Boston there are larger accumulations of loanable capital, also the growth of centuries, than in Omaha in Nebraska, or in Hannibal in Missouri. Now, if we could transport the accumulation of wealth

existing in Amsterdam and London bodily to New York and Boston, and give it the same field of action, then the rate of interest at the latter places would be no longer 6 and 8 per cent., but it would be 2 to 3 per cent., and if we could transport all the accumulated wealth of New York and Boston to Omaha and Hannibal, then, in all probability, the rate of interest there would cease to be 12 to 24 per cent., and it would range at 6 to 8.

But the same effect cannot be produced in any other way than by the gradual creation and accumulation of wealth. The accumulation of capital and consequent low rates of interest are the result of the work of generations. It cannot be created by the establishment of banks, or by the issues of paper money; and the idea that it can be done by the printing of irredeemable paper money is so absurd, that every baby can see it. Still more preposterous is the fabulous notion that we can issue paper money enough to secure to everybody who wants it a loan, or to discount every man's note at as low a rate of interest as he desires. It is indeed incredible that such propositions should be seriously advanced and advocated on the floor of the Senate of the United States. Why, we might as well in the shortest way solve the problem by saying: Let every man issue his note for all his debts, past, present and prospective; and then let us enact a law making that note legal-tender.

And now, sir, when I have demonstrated by fact and reason, so that every child might understand them, propositions like these, that capital and currency are two very different things; that the wealth of a country is not augmented by printing more paper money; that when popular confidence in the issuer of irredeemable paper money is unimpaired, the constant depreciation of that paper money demonstrates its excess in quantity over and above the real requirements of legitimate business; that such a

currency may in the aggregate be superabundant and yet an insufficiency may be felt in certain localities and certain branches of business in consequence of a vicious diffusion; that this vicious diffusion, springing in part from the natural effects of an irredeemable and redundant currency, cannot be cured but will only be aggravated by inflation; that the gambling risk inseparable from an irredeemable and fluctuating currency will drive up prices as well as the rates of interest; that the rate of interest depends on the existing amount of real capital in a loanable form and its proportion to the demand for the use of that capital, and can therefore not be lowered by an inflation of an irredeemable currency, but will be raised by the increased element of risk; that for such reasons the remedies for existing evils proposed by gentlemen who favor inflation are not only no real remedies at all, but mere quack medicines, which will only aggravate the ailment; when all this is demonstrated, gentlemen on the opposite side mount the high horse and say: "Why, all this is mere theory; you are mere abstractionists. We are practical men, which you are not; you look into books, but we look into the living, active business of the country; we trust the evidences of our senses; we open our eyes, and we see what is going on, and from what we see we draw our conclusions, and upon what we see we build our ideas as to remedies." Well, sir, the contempt of these practical statesmen for theories is of the very loftiest nature. I have heard it said on this floor that the great lights of political economy, such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Ricardo and all those who recognized the precious metals as the standard of value, and who thought they would remain so, were in fact nothing but old fogies, rather behind their times; moral cowards, who had not courage enough to confront an old popular prejudice. Away, then, with all those great thinkers upon whom the

world has so long looked with pride; away with Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill and Ricardo and Bonamy Price. Away, also, with our own Thomas Jefferson and Hamilton and Gallatin and Crawford. We have now among us a new school of political economists who know better. With the Senator from Indiana, they exclaim, "Throw theory to the dogs," as he said the other day; and it must be admitted they have thrown theory to the dogs most effectually. They rely upon nothing but the evidence of their senses, and how can that lead them astray? Well, sir, in this respect they are, however, not quite original.

Some ten or eleven years ago, during the war, I met in the South an old farmer who was called by his neighbors "Old Tatum." He was a practical philosopher of the same kind, who relied upon nothing but the evidence of his senses; and inasmuch as he could but with difficulty spell out a word or two in large print, he had a lofty contempt for book-learning. I liked to talk with the old man, and once in conversation I happened to say something about the earth moving around the sun. "Hold on," said old Tatum; "what did you say there? The earth moving around the sun! Where did you get that?" "Well," I said, "I got it from the books." "There again," cried old Tatum, and he would fairly roll over with laughter—"there again, from the books. The earth moving around the sun! And don't I see every day with these, my own eyes, the sun moving around the earth? Don't I see it rise there in the morning, and don't I see it go down yonder every evening? Ah," said he, "you book-men can't fool old Tatum."

What a shining light old Tatum would have been among the new school of political economists here! Would he not have thrown theory to the dogs like the very best of them? "Here I see a difficulty," old Tatum would say;

"there are many persons in the United States who want money; the difficulty is, of course, there is not money enough to go around. What is to be done? Inasmuch as we make money by printing it, let us print more until it will go around." But you may say: "Mr. Tatum——

MR. CAMERON. Was not Tatum a hard-money man?

MR. SCHURZ. No; unfortunately he was not. I will show the Senator what he was; and, in fact, the Senator himself has heard him quite frequently.

You might say: "Mr. Tatum, these bits of money are not proper money at all; they are promises to pay money; and the more you print of them the less they will be worth, and the less they are worth the less you can do with them in business; you cannot make the country rich in that way." Such talk would not trouble old Tatum at all. He would laugh right in your face. "Do we not call these paper notes dollars?" old Tatum would say. "Are they not dollars? Cannot I read it with my spectacles in big print upon them, 'one dollar,' 'ten dollars,' 'one hundred dollars'? and is not the country better off when it has fifteen hundred millions of these dollars than when it has only seven hundred and fifty millions of them? Ah, you can't fool old Tatum, I tell you."

Neither would the question of interest give old Tatum the least trouble in the world. He would settle it with the same ease with which the Senator from Indiana settled it the other day. He would say: "Money is capital; do you not call it so? And these paper dollars are money; do we not call them so? therefore these paper dollars are capital. Must not everybody see that?" You see old Tatum is a logician. "Now," old Tatum would continue, "when these paper dollars are plenty, then capital is cheap, and you can hire it at a low rate of interest; when these paper dollars are scarce, then of course" he would say, "capital is dear and you would have to pay much more

for it." So you cannot fool old Tatum. "Do I not know that when you put more hogs and horses in the market, horses and hogs get cheaper?" Thus you see old Tatum would be as good at the horse and hog argument as anybody. Old Tatum is eminently a practical statesman.

But I suspect after all, sir, that there is something in that theory that the earth moves around the sun, although old Tatum has never been able to see it. And I suspect there is after all something in the principles of political economy, in that science of finance, which is the accumulated wisdom and experience of many centuries, although the practical statesmen of the old Tatum school cannot see it and are ready to throw it to the dogs. Throw it to the dogs, Senators, and I fear the honor as well as the prosperity of the country will soon go the same way.

When all other resources fail, when even a contemptuous sneer at book-learning and theory will no longer answer, the advocates of inflation grow fearfully pathetic in calling the opponents of their fallacious doctrines enemies of the poor, supporters of the rich, friends of the oppressors, of the money-changer, of the wicked speculator and so on. Ah, sir, the Lord may forgive those who know not what they are doing.

Is, then, the inflation of irredeemable paper money really a help to the poor? Can it be? Can any sensible man pretend for a moment that it can be? It has been well said here that the rich man is always able to take care of his interests; and so he is. He can provide for his own welfare, whatever the vicissitudes of trade and the fluctuations of values may be, for he has the means to take advantage of every change. Is the currency inflated and does it depreciate? He speculates upon a rise of prices. Is the movement in the opposite direction? He speculates upon their fall. He stands upon that eminence where he can see the storm coming and discern in what direction

it will blow. He can bend before it and rise up when it is over. He can watch his chances, and he has the means to turn them to his advantage. He commands the situation, and can take care not to become its victim; and he covers his risks by making the poor man pay their cost; for the poor man, living from hand to mouth on his daily earnings, is the slave of his necessities. The vicissitudes of the great business world overtake him unawares, for he has not the opportunity to watch the workings of hidden forces; and even if he had that opportunity, what means would he have to avail himself of this knowledge? what means to provide for the changes of fortune? He cannot, amid the fluctuations of values, speculate on a rise or on a fall, for what he receives for his labor he has to use at once just as he receives it, for bread to feed his family, or for clothing to cover them, or if he saves anything, his savings may depreciate in his own hand while that hand holds them, small as they are; and what means has he to make up for the loss? His savings are too small for speculative operation.

The great steamer of five thousand tons may defy the storm and break her course through the angriest sea with scarcely impeded strength, but the poor fisherman's boat is helpless against the gale, and without resistance dashed upon the rocks by overpowering waves. The poor man is the helpless victim, and nothing but the victim, of that tricky game which a fluctuating paper money enables the rich to play with the poor man's fortunes.

You speak of the distress of those who this day are without work and without bread. What has caused that distress? It was caused by a crisis, a collapse of speculation, grown up under the auspices of that same paper-money system which you now strive to confirm and strengthen in all its iniquitous influences, to bring on

other crashes and collapses; and who will be the man to be ground to powder by them? The poor man, not the rich. What is it that rises last when your paper system drives up prices? The laboring man's wages. What is it that drops first when your bubbles of paper speculation burst? The poor man's earnings. You speak of reviving confidence, and, with confidence, enterprise, by new issues of paper money, and yet that very confidence has been destroyed by the very agency of that paper money; and confidence does not revive to-day for fear of new fluctuations and new uncertainties.

You talk of debtors and creditors, debtors being benefited by inflation, and creditors by the resumption of specie payments. Let me ask you, who are the debtors, and who are the creditors of this country? Let every Senator look into his own household; who are the creditors and who are the debtors there? There is but one man in that household who is able to be a debtor, and that is the Senator himself. Not his servants; for they have not credit enough to contract debts. If they are anything they are creditors, however small the amount may be. Look at the savings-banks of this country, and what do you see there? Seven hundred and sixty million dollars of deposits. Who are the depositors? Not the rich, but the poor man, who earns his bread by the sweat of his brow; the man of small means, who puts there for safe-keeping his small surplus earnings. The same class have in National and State banks, and in trust companies, as has been estimated by good authority, two hundred millions more; and another two hundred and fifty millions are owing to the same class in the shape of unpaid wages and other debts. There are twelve hundred millions, then—twelve hundred millions of debt—owing to the laboring men and the men of small means. And now, I ask you who are advocating the inflation of the currency,

what are you doing to those poor people; what are you doing with their twelve hundred millions of money? Inflate the currency, and by inflation depreciate it, and you will diminish the value of these twelve hundred millions 10, 20, 30 per cent. And now boast of being the friends of the poor while you advocate a policy that will rob the poor in the land of so large a proportion of their hard-earned property.

When looking at the scheme advocated here to relieve distress and to revive prosperity, one might almost believe that gentlemen with the most serious faces were carrying on a game of cruel mockery with those who look up to us for guidance and aid. If they ask for bread, I entreat Senators do not give them a stone! If you do not know how to aid them, at least do not deceive them; do not impose upon their credulity by offering to them as a remedy for their ills the continuance and extension of a money system which, wherever it has been tried, has always turned all social and economic movements into a game of chance and overreaching, in which always those lose most who have least to lose.

But we are told again and again that the people are demanding inflation, and the Senator from Indiana never grows tired of saying that he thinks his people think they understand this business, and they want inflation and nothing else.

But when you tell me that the American people want inflation, I boldly deny it. The American people are an enlightened and an honest people, and if for a little while they may be led astray by a taking catchword, they will soon recover their sound senses and show that they know what is honest as well as what is prudent. I have seen and heard this kind of thing before.

About seven or eight years ago some politicians thought it would be a very popular idea to repudiate our duty to

pay the National bonds in gold; they proposed to issue the necessary amount of greenbacks to pay off the National debt in a depreciated paper, in the cheapest possible money. They thought the people would jump at the chance of thus getting rid of a very onerous burden. Well, sir, what was the result? At first the proposition seemed to become quite popular in some quarters, and politicians of both parties—who are always ready to run after a popular cry, right or wrong, and always think what they think the people think—saw there a chance of a profitable game for themselves. They advocated the scheme, or at least did nothing against it. They thought they could not afford to oppose it. Well, sir, here is a piece of my personal experience. In the Presidential campaign of 1868 I was invited to make speeches in the State of Indiana. When I came into that State I was met by some politicians who told me: “Now we want you not to say anything in your speeches against that greenback scheme; the people of Indiana are almost universally in favor of it; they want to get rid of this heavy debt; they do not want to pay the bloated bondholder in gold”; and so on. I replied: “If I cannot say about the greenback scheme what I please in this canvass, I will not speak in Indiana at all.” After some hesitation those politicians consented that I should proceed; but they watched me with great trepidation. Well, I did speak my mind, and in every speech I denounced the greenback scheme as a most rascally conception, and I insisted that it was the sacred duty of the Government to pay to the National creditor every farthing according to the letter and spirit of the law. And there were the people of Indiana before me, who had been represented to me as being fairly wild on the subject of the greenback scheme. What was the result? No declaration in my speeches was more heartily applauded than just this, and

that applause came from the same people whom weak-kneed politicians had represented to me as all on fire for repudiation. And the same politicians have to thank their fate if their people have consented to forget the abandonment of honest principles they were guilty of.

Ah, sir, those miscalculate their chances who think they can safely speculate upon the rascally instincts of the American people.

The inflation cry will go the same way the repudiation cry has gone. I am convinced the inflation cry will be one of the most short-lived cries this country ever heard; and I am not much mistaken when I say that those who advocate inflation in this body must make hot haste to commit the Senate to that iniquitous doctrine, or the last semblance of popular support will drop away before the decision is reached. No, sir, it is not the people, it is the speculators and their deluded victims, who are continually dinning the cry of inflation into our ears, and so it will become manifest to every one who has eyes to see and ears to hear.

It has frequently been asserted that every native-born American citizen is apt to think of becoming at some time or other a candidate for the Presidency. Permit me to say that if any possible Presidential candidate indulges in the delusion that he can ride into the White House on the inflation cry, he will meet with the same disappointment that overtook those who seven or eight years ago thought the repudiation cry a good thing for the same purpose. If public men who advocate the inflation policy should, unfortunately for themselves and for the country, prevail in this Congress, they will live to curse the day when they achieved that fatal success. Let them not indulge in the delusion that they will secure the favor of the people by a short spell of deceptive prosperity, for I tell them the bubble may just have time to burst before the year 1876.

For their own as well as their country's good, I entreat Senators on the opposite side to stop and consider well before they irrevocably associate their names with a policy which stands already condemned by the universal experience of civilized mankind, and a new trial of which in this country would not only bring disaster and ruin upon us, but cast shame upon the American name. Yes, sir; I say it would cast shame upon the American name, for the American people will in the eyes of the world most seriously impair their credit for intelligence, to speak of nothing else, if, with open eyes, with all the warnings of history before them, they repeat a blunder which, as often as it has been made, has always resulted in private misfortune and in National disgrace.

Now, Mr. President, I am done. I said at the outset that the object of my remarks would be to show that those who advocate inflation seriously mistake the nature of the difficulties they want to provide against, and that the remedies they propose will not only not cure but will aggravate the evil. That is what I have attempted to do; nothing more. Let me hope that my remarks will not be entirely without influence upon the vote of the Senate touching the proposition before us. The other branches of this great subject—and I know there are many which I have not even alluded to—I will leave for further discussion when we shall have a matured bill before us embracing our whole financial system.

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